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This research provides a Thai case-study of social insurance benefit delivery (SIBD) 
and of the tension between the international norm of a standardized and centralised 
system and recent trends to diversified and locally responsive public service delivery. 
Thailand has been chosen as an example of decentralised and diversified SIBD since 
regional variation of its SIBD seemingly occurred after a more general 
decentralisation policy had been introduced in the country. Thus, this research 
examines the extent to which SIBD diversity exists in the way that decentralisation 
has been implemented in Thailand since the late 1990s. Built upon four theoretical 
perspectives (social insurance, collaborative public management, decentralisation, 
and inter-organisational relations) the conceptual framework uses three models of 
SIBD diversification (Weberian, customer-oriented, and strategic) to explain 
diversified patterns of SIBD in Thailand. 
The thesis is a multi-site case study research. Out of 76 Thai provinces, four 
provinces in the North were purposively selected to typify three socio-economic 
areas: commercial (Chiang Mai), industrial (Lamphun), and agricultural (Phrae, 
Nan). Employing qualitative methodology, a mixed method of data collection was 
undertaken with two major methods: interview with key actors (e.g. government 
officials, employers, employees) and documentary research (e.g. official reports, 
minutes of meetings, government plans and strategies). Further, in addition to 
analyzing content in texts (transcripts, documents), positional mappings and coding 
were carried out to illustrate the broad patterns of the phenomena studied. 
This research found that not only decentralisation but also inter-organisational 
collaboration has impacts on SIBD diversification. Political variables such as 
national and provincial elites were also investigated but they are evidently not 
predictors of the diversity. Indeed, decentralisation is a key factor of SIBD diversity 
which is evident in two of the provinces studied (Chiang Mai, Phrae). In Chiang Mai, 
being only slightly decentralised, SIBD rigidly follows national norms and routine 
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patterns. In contrast, in Phrae, being highly decentralised, SIBD is highly diversified, 
especially because of an innovative SIBD project operating in the province. 
However, this research also finds that collaboration is a key factor of SIBD diversity 
in the other two provinces (Lamphun, Nan). In Nan, although similar to Chiang Mai 
with regard to low decentralisation, SIBD has become highly diversified as original 
and innovative SIBD projects in the province evidently involve several collaborative 
activities. In Lamphun, while being moderately decentralised, SIBD is just slightly 
diversified, in congruence with the low level of collaboration in the province. This 
research concludes that even in uniform systems SIBD can be very different 
reflecting the variable impact of local initiatives which are evidently results of 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
This research began as a journey to study the diversity of social insurance benefit 
delivery (SIBD) on the basis of two disciplines: Social Policy and Public 
Administration. While the former grounds the understanding of social insurance 
policy and institutions; the latter provides an analytical framework for administrative 
decentralisation, collaboration and inter-organisational analysis. Generally, social 
insurance administration is supposed to be centralised and standardized (ILO 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, 1990). Also, consistency and 
standardization seem to be a requirement of service provision and benefit delivery in 
social security (Gent, 2001, p.190; R. L. Walker, 2005). These principles must be set 
alongside the evidence that decentralisation seemingly brings on the diversification 
of provision and delivery (Costa-Font, 2010; Costa-Font & et al, 2011, p.481; Oates, 
1993, p.242).  
In search of explanation, existing literature reasserts that decentralisation is 
significant to diversity within the welfare state. Alongside various terms such as 
‘policy divergence (e.g. Greer, 2008)’ or ‘welfare fragmentation (e.g. Pierson, 
1995)’, studies similarly emphasise the differentiation within the welfare state as a 
result of decentralisation. In the UK, for example, several studies suggest that 
devolution enables policy divergence to rise (McEwen, 2005; Parry, 2002). In Spain 
and Italy, it is suggested that devolution enhances diversity of social services (Costa-
Font, 2010). In Scandinavia, as a response to the diversity, the debate on whether to 
decentralise the welfare administration is continuing (Trydergard & Thorslund, 
2010).  
The explanation of where the diversity is actually derived from has rarely been 
elaborated. Within the limited number of diversity studies, most of them emphasise 
how decentralisation plays its part in the diversification process. This research takes 
the path of exploring the diversity in more detail. Putting decentralisation on one 
side, it embraces on the other side the possibility that another factor – namely, 
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collaboration – could be similarly influential in explaining diversity. Since it is a 
process in which actors make a joint decision-making to create interdependent 
activities, it may result in SIBD diversity. Therefore, considering that diversity is a 
less-explained issue of social insurance administration studies, four theoretical 
perspectives (social insurance, decentralisation, collaborative management, inter-
organisational relations) are specified as pillars of this research (see Chapter 2).  
Being aware of self-biases, this research selects Thailand as a case study not only 
because of the researcher’s insight as a Thai but also because Thailand’s social 
insurance administration is an interesting case. Indeed, its overall system has 
traditionally been centralised as regional offices usually followed central policies and 
had limited power of decision-making. The current structure of social insurance in 
Thailand dates from 1990. It is administered at two levels – national and provincial. 
At the national level, the Social Security Office (SSO) is a central department taking 
policies from the Ministry of Labour (MoL) and responsible for the day-to-day 
functioning of social insurance administration (SIA) in particular. It is also 
responsible for the administration of the Social Security Fund (SSF) together with 
the tripartite board (Social Security Committee: SSC). At the provincial level, the 
Social Security Regional Office (SSROs) is a delivery agency of social insurance 
benefits (SIBs) implementing the SSO’s policies and situated in each of 75 provinces 
in Thailand
1
. Similarly to other countries, seven benefits of social insurance are 
provided in Thailand including: sickness, maternity, disability, elderly, 
unemployment, child allowance, death (see Appendix 1). However, being function-
based, the system was designed to administer all benefits together under a single 
government body, the SSO. 
Although Thailand’s centralised and uniform social insurance administrative system 
is similar to other countries (e.g. UK, Japan), decentralisation in the late 1990s has 
made Thailand an interesting case for study. The decentralisation has diversified 
SIBD enabling the SSROs to experiment with initiatives and projects. This, 
consequently, leads to the further diversification of SIBD which is a major concern 
                                                             
1
 There are totally 76 provinces in Thailand but Bangkok has 12 Social Security Area Offices instead 
of a single SSRO. 
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of this research. The late 1990s decentralisation affects three SIBD-related 
administrative spheres: social insurance administration (SIA), provincial 
administration (ProA), and local administration (LoA). Changes in each 
administration include: revised central-local control in SIA, stronger governor in 
ProA, and autonomous local government in LoA. These presumably catalyse SIBD 
diversification, but there are very few existing researches addressing this hypothesis 
either in theory or specifically to Thailand. 
Studies of welfare policy in developing countries have been increasingly of interest 
among scholars. Either-or categorization is employed to understand these countries 
e.g. productive/protective (Rudra, 2007), informal-security/insecurity (Gough, 
2004b). However, none focuses particularly on welfare administration in developing 
countries. Presumably, doing research on this subject might be challenging to some 
scholars as they may ‘treat the political economies of less developed countries 
(LDCs) as more or less identical to one another or, at the other extreme, as nations 
marked by tremendous diversity’ (Rudra, 2007, p.378). Or, back to the beginning, as 
developing countries are yet-to-be welfare states, particular concern thus goes to the 
design of welfare policy rather than its implementation. Therefore, this research aims 
to contribute to the lack of welfare administration studies in developing welfare 
states.  
Similarly, existing literature on East Asian welfare state rarely focus on the 
administrative aspect of welfare delivery. Several literatures propose theoretical 
approaches addressing East Asian welfare states (Aspalter, 2006; Croissant, 2004; 
Gough, 2001; Holliday, 2000; Jones, 1990; Kurtz, 2002; Kwon, 2009; Olsson Hort & 
Kuhnle, 2000; Peng & Wong, 2010). Some focus particularly on the financial aspect 
(Asher, 1996, 2002; O'Donnell et al., 2008); some on responses to social diversity 
(Asher & Pathmarajah–Banna, 2002); one interestingly focuses on Southeast Asia 
(Ramesh & Asher, 2000). However, none of these focuses on the East Asian welfare 
administration which is a major focus of this research.  
Many research projects and studies in the Thai language focus on social insurance 
system but few of them study the administration of social insurance. According to 
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the research database of the Ministry of Labour (MoL)
2
, 89 studies on the topic of 
social insurance policy have been completed during the period of 1999-2009. Only 
10 studies contain a particular focus on implementation at the provincial level. Also, 
in the ThaiLis
3
 Database, 263 research studies have been undertaken on social 
insurance. Briefly, they can be categorised into five subjects: history, policy-making, 
law, policy evaluation, and policy implementation. Again, the policy implementation 
topic seems to be the least popular (18 out of 263). Although there are some studies 
looking at policy implementation, the analytical frameworks and research findings 
seem to evaluate the policy (e.g. Phum, 1997; Research and Consultancy Institute., 
2007) or the factors of success (e.g. Jiasakul, 2006; Rodpaimuang, 2002), rather than 
the implementation process. 
There are also several studies in the fields of Public Administration and Political 
Science focusing on the political and administrative systems in Thailand. Riggs’ 
seminal study on Thailand’s bureaucratic system (1966) presents ‘Prismatic Theory’ 
which considers the Thai bureaucracy as a ‘Sala Model’, a formal organisational 
structure with informal course of actions. This study is particularly essential to those 
aiming to study the administration in Thailand or developing countries. Heady 
(1962) classifies Thailand into the ‘bureaucratic elite’ administrative type which 
means political power is largely in the hands of the civil and military bureaucracy. 
However, although some instances in these studies remain valid, it is necessary to 
review them once again because most of the explanation cannot be applied to the 
current situation (Ockey, 2004). The scope of each of these studies is also the Thai 
bureaucratic system as a whole rather than the administrative structure of a particular 
policy. 
A qualitative research strategy was applied in this research. Three provinces – 
Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Phrae – in the North were originally selected to represent 
three different socio-economic areas – commercial, industrial, agricultural – of 
Thailand. Prior to the fieldwork, it was found that there was a distinctive project 
                                                             
2
 http://research.mol.go.th, retrieved on March 23, 2010. 
3
 Online database of Thai library network contains electronic resources such as theses and researches. 
This information is retrieved on April 1, 2010. 
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involving local organisations to deliver the SIBs in Phrae. In Lamphun, there was a 
seemingly distinctive project of SIBD in cooperation between the SSRO and the 
Lamphun governor. In Chiang Mai, no distinctive project was found but it was still 
selected because of its outstanding commercial character. Soon after the first 
fieldwork was finished, Nan was added to the set of cases because of the Nan 
SSRO’s original collaborative project
4
. While documents and interviews were major 
methods of data collection; observation was also employed as a supplement. Content 
analysis is applied to all texts and field notes; while positional mapping provides 
analytical illustrations for further discussion. Notably, selecting Thailand as a single 
case study, this research bears in mind that, as Aidukaite (2006, p.267) suggests, 
‘single nations are mostly usually viewed as hybrid cases and never considered pure 
representatives of any ideal typical model of the welfare state’. 
1.1 Research Purposes 
In this research, three purposes are set out which seek to: describe, explain, and 
explore. The first purpose of this research is to describe the administrative system of 
social insurance in three regards (see Chapter 5). It firstly elaborates components of 
social insurance – e.g. decision-makers, implementers, and structures - particularly at 
the sub-national level. Secondly, it attempts to illustrate SIBD system by elaborating 
the roles of and relations among the policy actors (actor-centred analysis). Thirdly, it 
aims to describe the decentralisation in social insurance administrative system. Then, 
the second purpose of this research is to explain the diversity within social insurance 
administration (see Chapter 6). It analyses how the diversity of SIBD has occurred. It 
examines the extent to which decentralisation and collaboration affects social 
insurance administration, particularly at provincial level, in Thailand. Lastly, the 
final and ultimate aim is to explore an analytical model of social insurance 
administration in order to enhance the knowledge about implementation of social 
insurance policy (see Chapter 7). As diversified administrative patterns are 
                                                             
4
 This project is discovered in the first fieldwork rather than online database which was the main 
source of data for the fieldwork preparation. 
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considered as a theoretical gap in social insurance administration studies, this 
research aims to propose an explanatory model of the SIBD diversification pattern.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
As mentioned earlier, this research focuses on diversity of SIBD, decentralisation 
and collaboration. It investigates the associations between, on one hand, diversity 
and decentralisation and, on the other hand, diversity and collaboration. First of all, 
two basic questions should be answered to illustrate the situation. Firstly, ‘what are 
the roles and relations of each policy actor in the delivery system at the provincial 
level?’ This basic question aims to describe social insurance administration at the 
provincial level. It seeks to define: who the actors are; their basic interest and 
responsibilities; and how they get involved in SIBD. Preliminarily, the Social 
Security Regional Office (SSRO) is considered as a central actor of SIBD and other 
actors include: the Social Security Office (SSO), provincial governor, local 
government, employee organisation, and employer organisation (discussed earlier in 
p.2). Each actor is investigated in two regards: involvement and activeness in SIBD. 
Secondly, ‘to what extent does diversity of SIBD exist in Thailand’s social insurance 
administration?’ To examine the degree of SIBD diversity in Thailand, this research 
compares the delivery pattern across the provinces studied to the uniform pattern 
which is suggested by a central agency and implemented in most provinces. It thus 
illustrates the uniform pattern, the SIBD pattern in each province and, finally, draws 
a comparison between provinces and the national norm.  
A central question of this research is set as ‘Is interprovincial diversity in SIBD 
caused by either or both a) the decentralisation policy in recent years or b) the 
relationship patterns between actors at provincial level?’ Thus, two associations are 
to be examined under two questions below:  
1. How has the policy of decentralisation having been implemented since the 
late 1990s changed the roles and relations of each provincial actor in SIBD 
and consequently led to diversity of SIBD? 
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This question seeks to clarify how decentralisation influences the delivery in 
each province, and how delivery varies across provinces. Answering this 
question could illustrate a picture of SIBD diversification in Thailand since the 
late 1990s (when regional offices were asked to become more autonomous and 
responsive to local factors). Considering the late 1990s decentralisation as 
institutional changes, this question clarifies how such changes reshape roles 
and relations of provincial actors. It draws a link between decentralisation and 
the changing roles and relations of SIBD actors. It explains how 
decentralisation has impacts on social insurance administration at the 
provincial level. It examines the association between decentralisation and 
diversity by comparing the degree of decentralisation and the degree of SIBD 
diversity in each province. This question will illustrate how the implementation 
of decentralisation policy leads to SIBD diversity. 
2. How far is the degree of SIBD diversity the result of relationship patterns, 
particularly collaboration, between actors at the provincial level? 
This question seeks to investigate the impacts of policy actors’ relations on 
SIBD at the provincial level. It intends to clarify two components: inter-
organisational relations and their impacts on SIBD. These relations will be 
analysed in terms of how an actor interact with another actor (dyadic relations); 
why they are interacting with each other; and, what type of their interaction is 
(e.g. contracting, co-ordinating, co-operating or collaborating). It further 
explains the extent to which collaboration exists in each case. It discusses how 
the degree of collaboration is related to the degree of diversity. In other words, 
it asks whether collaboration and diversity in the province are in positive or 
negative association. 
 
1.3 Thesis outline 
This thesis is structured in nine chapters including this chapter as the Introduction. 
Then, in Chapter 2, a literature review and conceptual framework are presented. Four 
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theoretical approaches – social insurance, decentralisation, collaborative public 
management, inter-organisational relations – are reviewed as part of the conceptual 
framework. While existing literature suggests significant relation between 
decentralisation and diversity of SIBD; the process of SIBD diversification is 
identified as a less-explained area which this research expects to fulfil. Assuming 
that collaboration also impacts on diversity, Agranoff and McGuire’s framework 
(2003) is employed as the main analytical framework of collaboration in this 
research. Also, the model of diversification is proposed suggesting three patterns of 
SIBD: Weberian, customer-oriented, and strategic. 
Chapter 3 (the case of Thailand) provides justification for the country selection and 
background in social insurance administration in Thailand. Despite being categorised 
as an example of an East Asian welfare state (Gough, 2004a), Thailand has its own 
unique characteristics – e.g. long-time sovereignty (Midgley, 1984), boom-and-bust 
economy (Pasuk & Baker, 1998), two-tier democracy (Laothamatas, 1996) – which 
make the country an interesting case to study. Selecting Thailand as a case study of 
decentralisation impact on SIBD diversity may be questionable as its decentralisation 
remains under-developed. However, developing from existing literature, this chapter 
argues that decentralisation has been started and had impacts on social insurance 
administration in Thailand. Four impacts supposedly occur if decentralisation is 
implemented as planned, including: a responsive delivery agency, a flexible central 
department, a stronger provincial governor, and autonomous local government. 
Chapter 4 (research methodology) focuses on the research design particularly 
sampling and selection of cases. Qualitative methodology is employed in which three 
data collection methods (document, interview, observation) are undertaken and two 
data analysis methods – content analysis, situational analysis – are applied. At the 
meso-level, the North is selected because of its outstanding political and social 
characteristics. Its four provinces are selected to represent three economic sectors: 
Chiang Mai (commercial), Lamphun (industrial), Phrae and Nan (both agricultural). 
At the macro-level, 58 respondents were selected by purposive sampling. Further, 
limitations and weaknesses of this research and how they would be minimised are 
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discussed. Also, ethical issues are discussed in accordance with the School of Social 
and Political Science Research Ethics Policy. 
Chapter 5 (provincial actors, inter-organisational relations and the diversity of SIBD) 
analyses the roles and relations of actors in SIBD and the extent to which the 
diversity exists in each province. Firstly, it applies actor-centred analysis to discuss 
roles and responsibilities of social insurance actors at the provincial level. The four 
selected SSROs are found to be autocratic, conventional, laissez-faire, and 
diplomatic in their coordination style. Despite legislated responsibilities, most 
members of the tripartite board were likely to follow the policies of the SSRO. Local 
organisations involved in SIBD seem to have insignificant roles in SIBD decision-
making.  
Secondly, it discusses inter-organisational relations. Evidence suggests that, 
considering inter-organisational resource dependence, three actors – provincial 
governor, external office, local organisation – are influential in SIBD. It is also found 
that Nan is the most collaborative case while Chiang Mai is the least. Lastly, the 
pattern of SIBD in four provinces – Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Phrae, Nan – is analysed 
to identify similarities or differences compared to the uniform pattern. Evidence 
shows that degree of diversification varies across selected provinces in relation to the 
degree of the SSRO’s responsiveness.  
Chapter 6 (decentralisation, collaboration and diversity) aims to delineate two 
associations of decentralisation-diversity and collaboration-diversity. It firstly 
discusses the politicisation of SIBD (see Section 6.1) and argues that national politics 
unlikely affects SIBD. It then re-examines the four decentralisation impacts listed in 
Chapter 3 (see Section 6.2). It concludes that the impacts actually lead to more 
autonomy and resources for the SSRO. In Section 6.3, the degree of decentralisation 
is indicated in each selected case based on the SSRO’s decentralised activities and 
contexts. Evidence suggests that decentralised authority is implemented to a certain 
extent as several actors not only acknowledge but also implement such authority. 
Phrae appears to be the most decentralised case and Chiang Mai is the least. Finally, 
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it argues that collaboration is more positively associated with SIBD diversity than 
decentralisation (see Section 6.4).  
Chapter 7 concludes that the diversity of SIBD is a result of both the late 1990s 
decentralisation and collaborative management. Chiang Mai and Phrae are congruent 
with the theory that decentralisation is positively associated with diversity. 
Differently, Lamphun and Nan are the cases in which collaboration is positively 
associated with diversity. Further, public managers of SIBD systems, namely the 
SSRO chiefs, appear to be crucial to SIBD. Consistent with Agranoff and McGuire 
(2003), variation in public service management results from the collaborative 
strategy and activity performed by public managers. Finally, the model of the 
diversification pattern is applied to the four cases (and interpreted as somewhat 
Weberian in Chiang Mai; Weberian/customer-oriented in Lamphun; somewhat 
strategic in Phrae; and somewhat strategic in Nan). Through decentralisation and 
local collaboration, the diversity mostly occurs regardless of the ongoing politics at 
the national and provincial levels. 
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Chapter 2 : Literature Review and Conceptual 
Framework 
 
This chapter defines four key concepts of this research: social insurance, diversity, 
decentralisation and collaboration (see Section 2.1). It provides a conceptual 
framework (see Section 2.3) which is constructed through the use of four theoretical 
approaches: social insurance, decentralisation, collaborative public management 
(CPM), and inter-organisational relations (IORs) (see Section 2.2). Then, models of 
SIBD diversification are proposed as an analytical framework for later chapters (see 
Section 2.4).  
2.1 Key definitions 
Four key concepts including social insurance, diversity (within the welfare state), 
decentralisation and collaboration are necessarily defined to set boundaries of the 
research. Some related concepts are also defined in this section but only four are 
considered as key concepts. 
2.1.1 Social insurance 
Defining social insurance has never been an easy task. The simplest way is to 
distinguish it from private insurance by stating that it is an insurance provided under 
the principle of ‘risk-pooling’ within the society rather than individual responsibility 
(Silburn, 1995). The more difficult issue is how to define it in relation to social 
security because the two concepts are sometimes used interchangeably. In general, 
social insurance appears to be subset of social security (e.g. Alcock, 1999; Burgess & 
Stern, 1991; Hills, Ditch, & Glennerster, 1994; International Labour Office., 1984). 
While social security is defined ‘narrowly as the provision of income maintenance 
services, or even as a particular type of income maintenance service (Midgley, 1984, 
p.81)’; social insurance is a contributory social security system involving the state, 
employers, and employees (Clasen, 2001; Dixon, 1999; Gent, 2001; Korpi & Palme, 
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1998; Midgley, 1984; Ramesh & Asher, 2000; Rogne et al., 2009; Silburn, 1995). In 
the US, however, social insurance seems to be a broader term while social security is 
restricted to functions of the Social Security Administration office (Fieldstein, 2005; 
Lipsky, 1991). This research thus refers to social insurance as a subset of social 
security which is a contributory system under the risk-pooling principle. 
To clarify further, three concepts (social insurance institution, social insurance actor, 
social insurance administration) need to be defined. Firstly, ‘institution’ is an 
ambiguous concept which scholars attempt to define as rules of the game, contexts of 
actors, or a constitutive field (Greenwood, 2008). While the first two see institution 
exogenous to actors, the latter emphasises interaction between institutions and actors. 
This research thus keeps such ambiguity and all definitions in mind to understand 
institutional settings of the selected phenomenon – SIBD. More specifically, it is 
important to distinguish between an institution and actors by their definition and 
recognizes their interaction. 
Furthermore, this research applies Korpi and Palme’s concept (1998) of ‘social 
insurance institution’ which suggests that social insurance institution can be 
understood under three criteria: base of entitlement, benefit level principle, and 
employer-employee cooperation in programme governance. Therefore, to 
operationalise the concept, this research broadly defines ‘social insurance institution’ 
as rules, contexts, and interactive field related to social insurance entitlement, 
principle, and programme governance.  Despite the blurred area of actor-institution 
interaction, this research draws a clear line between social insurance institution and 
actors only for analytical purpose. Also, social insurance institution is defined only in 
order to indicate its institutional settings i.e. decentralisation, provincial 
administration, local administration. 
Secondly, ‘actor’ is an ‘amorphous’ concept which could be ‘structures, interests, 
international regimes or policy networks’ (Pierre & Peters, 2000, p.7). More 
specifically, it is a ‘bearer[s] of rights and obligations and can perform behaviour’ 
which could be either individuals (i.e. natural persons) or organisations (i.e. 
corporate actors) (Vrooman, 2009, p.60)’. In this research, ‘social insurance actor’ is 
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referred to as an organisation, not an individual, involved in social insurance 
provision at either institutional or administrative level. Notably, this is not a stand-
alone concept separated from institutions. Rather, as Jackson (2010) suggests, ‘actors 
and institutions are seen as being mutually constitutive of one another (p.63)’ as, for 
instance, ‘institutions are produced and reproduced by the strategic behavior of 
actors, even while actors are constrained by institutions (p.67)’.  
Lastly, ‘social insurance administration’ has not been elaborately defined elsewhere. 
It has been used as a title of the governmental unit responsible for social security 
delivery in, for example, Iceland but it has rarely been used by scholars. Perhaps this 
is because, theoretically, the term ‘administration’ is outdated as it is old wine which 
has already come in a new bottle of management (Lynn, 2006). Indeed, ‘public 
management’ has been a dominant concept of public service delivery lately. It is 
‘irredeemably associated with managerialism (Lynn, 2006, p.10)’ which is a 
somewhat normative way of studying public administration. Moreover, ‘governance’ 
could be another alternative term of this research as it is ‘closely associated with the 
analytic concept of network and related ideas (Lynn, 2006, p.11)’.  
Despite its obsolescence, ‘administration’ is still employed in this research to 
emphasise its orientation on government activities rather than managerial tools and 
its focus on collaboration (see Mandell, 1999) rather than networks (see Provan & 
Kenis, 2008). Therefore, this research employs ‘administration’ to refer to ‘the 
practical management and direction of the executive department, or, of the public 
machinery or functions (Fairlie, 1935 cited in Lynn, 2006, p.6)’. In addition, it is 
related to governance which is defined as ‘patterns that emerge from governing 
activities of social, political and administrative actors (Kooiman, 1993, p.2)’ 
Therefore, ‘social insurance administration’ is broadly defined as the practical 
management of government agency responsible for and patterns that emerge from 
government activities within SIBD. 
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2.1.2 Diversity within the welfare state 
It is important to define ‘diversity’ as it is a focus of this research. Diversity can be 
considered either broadly or specifically. Broadly speaking, diversity is a basic 
concept dealing with ‘the great and growing individualization, differentiation, 
specialization and variety of the modern world (Kooiman, 1993, p.40)’. It consists of 
four aspects: social diversity, institutional diversity, micro-level governance 
diversity, and diversity of reality interpretation (Kooiman, 1993, pp.253-254). Also, 
it ‘implies qualitative and quantitative differentiation that is of similarities and 
differences in kind and degree (Kvist, 2006, p.167)’. In this research, diversity is thus 
a differentiation of social insurance benefit delivery within the welfare state that 
results from changing and diverse contexts. It should be emphasised that the term 
‘diversity’ is selected to represent differentiation only. It neither connotes success 
nor failure of the delivery nor implies a positive (e.g. local flexibility) or negative 
meaning (e.g. territorial disparities) of the differentiation. 
By positioning this research in existing literatures, it is found that diversity within the 
welfare state has been discussed from at least three different angles. Firstly, with the 
largest number of studies on this topic, diversity is seen as fragmentation of the 
welfare state (Boockmann et al, 2010; Champion & Bonoli, 2011; Costa-Font, 2010). 
As Pierson (1995) states, ‘[F]ragmented welfare state’ is a result of federalism where 
three variables – structure of party systems, nature of political economy, 
geographical distribution of minority groups – are influential. This fragmentation is 
considered as an arising problem of federal states where social injustice is of concern 
(Wilson, 2006). Secondly, in Nordic countries, the diversity is referred to as ‘local 
variation’ – a result of policy implementation by highly independent local authorities 
(Jørgensen & Lind, 1987; Trydegard & Thorslund, 2010). Although the variation 
was previously preferable (Jørgensen & Lind, 1987); it has recently raised the 
concern on regional inequality (Trydegard & Thorslund, 2010). Thirdly, in the 
unitary state, UK in particular, ‘policy divergence’ is the preferred term for diversity 
(S. Greer, 2008; McEwen, 2005; Parry, 2002). This diversity occurs after 1998 when 
‘the distinctive party politics and debates of each jurisdiction have created diverse 
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policies and trajectories (Greer, 2008, p.2)’. It is also a concern whether it will lead 
to a fragmented welfare state (Bogdanor, 2007).  
Interestingly, all three different perspectives share two things in common;  discussion 
about devolved authority to sub-national governments (decentralisation) and  concern 
over welfare fragmentation. Both are of interest in this research. Firstly, the 
discussion on decentralisation within the welfare state has mostly been studied in the 
forms of federalism (e.g. Pierson, 1995), devolution (e.g. Greer, 2008), or 
localization (e.g. Trydegard & Thorslund, 2010). These studies focus on institutional 
changes whilst this research searches for administrative changes on the ground level. 
Secondly, concern over welfare fragmentation is discussed in this research. It aims to 
reassert that difference of welfare provision within the welfare state should not 
necessarily be labelled as ‘fragmentation’. It argues rather that such difference, 
hereafter referred to as ‘diversity’, is necessary for welfare reform. In other words, 
‘universal services which are capable of meeting diverse and differentiated needs 
(Williams, 1989, p.215)’ are important. Turning the idea of fragmentation upside 
down, diversity within the welfare state is required in response to the modern world, 
and more studies should be carried out based on this perspective.   
Besides, existing literature on diversity within the welfare state mostly focuses on 
diversified benefits or coverage rather than diversity of welfare delivery (Mares, 
2000; Pierson, 1995; Trydegard & Thorslund, 2010). In other words, its focus is at 
the policy level not the practical level. Diversity is seen as a result of independent 
governments tailoring local welfare coverage and benefits in response to local needs. 
For example, in Germany, diversity occurs as ‘[I]ndividual Länder were allowed to 
raise unemployment insurance contributions if high and persistent levels of 
unemployment in a region caused a deficit in the insurance fund (Mares, 2000, 
p.237)’. To put it differently, this research focuses on the diversity of social 
insurance benefit delivery at the practical level. It aims to enhance the understanding 
of the diversity of street-level delivery in particular. In other words, it clarifies how 
welfare delivery is diversified at the implementation level. 
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Indeed, it could be argued that the diversification has been a common feature of 
public service delivery since 1980s when New Public Management (NPM) was 
introduced. As Pierre and Peters (2000, p.88), for example, indicate, ‘…many public 
services are becoming less standardized and the need for these services to be 
responsive and adapted to local needs has become more important’. Accordingly, 
diversity of welfare delivery may seem too trivial to be studied. However, welfare 
administration is a rule-bound system where discretionary welfare workers, or street-
level bureaucrats, work to cope with the rigid conditions of welfare delivery 
(Brodkin, 1997; Lipsky, 1980). Despite the influence of NPM, welfare 
administration generally remains standardized and centralised under two constraints. 
Domestically, ‘[S]tandardized services were to be delivered across a city by agencies 
that, "without fear or favor," treated everyone the same (Cooper, 2004, p.402)’. 
Internationally, welfare administration, particularly social security, is required to 
meet obligations of international organisations e.g. ILO (Strang & Chang, 1993, 
p.242). Thus, understanding welfare delivery requires a particular framework 
different from the one for general public service delivery. 
Despite the two-layer constraints, this study argues that, once decentralisation has 
been implemented, diversity of welfare delivery could happen in response to local 
needs. Indeed, several studies have already been related to this topic. Costa-Font’s 
(2010) framework, for example, analyses institutional and political determinants of 
welfare diversity in Spain and Italy. However, his work focuses on the national level 
presenting the state as one entity and overlooks the cause and result of diversity at 
the local/regional level. In contrast, this research is an attempt to clarify the diversity 
of welfare policy implementation at the sub-national level. Another example is 
Mares’ (2000) work which argues for diversity across regions by analysing ‘strategic 
alliances’ in each region of France and Germany. However, her work focuses on the 
diversified policy making rather than implementation. In contrast, this research 
focuses on the implementation of welfare policy. It aims to provide evidence to 
reaffirm that diversity is a result of decentralisation towards welfare delivery. 
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Lastly, the diversity within the welfare state in this research is defined as the 
combination of uniformity and innovation. Unlike the existing literature, this 
research does not rush to conclude that a uniform pattern exists. Rather, it discusses 
the uniform pattern of SIBD first to illustrate an entire system as a substantial part of 
diversification (see Chapter 3). Then, along with some cases, the innovation is 
exemplified and compared with the uniform pattern to analyse the degree to which 
diversity exists (see Chapter 5). 
2.1.3 Decentralisation 
Decentralisation is frequently left undefined, assigned many different meanings and 
varies across contexts and fields of research (Dubois & Fattore, 2009). Despite being 
ambiguous, decentralisation can be defined purposively. Broadly speaking, 
decentralisation is a dynamic process of authority transfer from national to sub-
national organisations or agencies (Conyers, 1983) or a static situation in which 
authority is being transferred. However, being either dynamic or static, ‘it is 
generally more useful to consider “decentralisation” continuous than dichotomous 
(Treisman, 2002, p.3)’. Therefore, this research refers decentralisation as the transfer 
process. Concurrently, its focus is the static situation of decentralised authority and 
resource. Its intent is not to specify a centralised/decentralised dichotomy but, rather, 
to seek to find the degree of decentralisation. 
There are two main categories of analysing decentralisation: political or fiscal. 
Analysing political decentralisation can be done in four aspects: devolution, 
delegation, deconcentration, and privatisation (Bremner, 2011). Recently, scholars go 
further to emphasize the impact of decentralisation as regional disparities 
(Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010), territorial differences (McEwen, 2005), or policy 
divergence (Greer, 2010). In short, they are interested in differentiation across 
territories. In fiscal decentralisation, scholars study efficiency, fiscal redistribution, 
and sometimes government spending initiative (see Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002; Oates, 
1993). Accordingly, political and fiscal decentralisation is defined in this research as 
the decentralisation of authority and resources respectively. 
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To understand decentralisation, it is important to understand both the policy and the 
practice of decentralisation. Due to the enormity and complexity of the topic, 
scholars prefer to narrow down the scope of decentralisation study as much as 
possible. As Dubois and Fattore (2009) suggest, ‘[r]esearchers who do not explicitly 
look at each dimension or haphazardly aggregate dimensions will mismeasure the 
type and degree of decentralisation (p.706)’. Despite the breadth of the topic, this 
research takes a risk to investigate political and fiscal decentralisation both on paper 
(function, budget) and in practice (power, non-financial). As the research purpose is 
to understand decentralisation at the administrative level, power and non-financial 
decentralisation is necessarily investigated. Figure 2.1 illustrates how authority and 
resource decentralisation could be investigated and what the major sources of data 
are for each investigation of function/power (authority) and budget/non-financial 
resources (resources). 




Collaboration is concisely defined as ‘a purposive relationship designed to solve a 
problem by creating or discovering a solution within a given set of constraints 
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, p.4)’. Further, it is elaborated as a process in which 
involves ‘autonomous actors (Thomson & Perry, 2006)’, ‘interdependence (Gray, 
1989)’, ‘creating (Gray, 1989; Thomson & Perry, 2006; McGuire, 2006)’ and ‘joint 
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decision-making (Gray, 1989; Thomson & Perry, 2006)’. Therefore, this research 
refers to collaboration as a process in which actors undertake joint decision-making 
whether to create, or not to create, interdependent activities under a set of constraints. 
Understanding collaboration can be done in a linear dimension or a multi-dimension. 
Regarding linear dimension, Agranoff and McGuire (2003, p.69) explain 
collaboration in vertical – information seeking (IS), adjustment seeking (AS) – or 
horizontal – policymaking and strategy-making (PM), resource exchange (RE), 
project based (PB) – direction. In contrast, Thomson and Perry (2006) suggest that 
one could think of collaborative as an ‘iterative and cyclical (p.22)’ process and 
propose five dimensions of collaboration process (p.24) including: governing, 
administering, mutuality, norms, and organisational autonomy. Taking these into 
account, this research considers collaboration process in the latter perspective and 
examines the degree of collaboration by using Agranoff and McGuire’s set of 
collaborative activities (IS, AS, PM, RE, PB; further discussed Chapter 6).  
2.2 Literature review 
Four theoretical approaches are reviewed to construct theoretical guidelines for 
analyses and discussion in this dissertation. Firstly, this research selected a 
conventional approach to study social insurance administration in Thailand (Section 
2.2.1). Then, a link between decentralisation and its impacts – responsiveness and 
initiative – is drawn to provide an analytical framework of decentralisation-diversity 
association (Section 2.2.2). Thirdly,  this research constructs an analytical framework 
of collaboration based on Agranoff and McGuire’s work (2003) (Section 2.2.3). 
Fourthly, two theories of IORs (relationship patterns, resource exchange) are 
reviewed to develop analytical framework for understanding relations between actors 
in SIBD. Additionally, Section 2.2.5 reviews Riggs’ theories on prismatic society 
and bureaucratic polity. This helps to understand SIBD in Thailand and may expect 




2.2.1 Social insurance 
To position this research in existing literature, it is found that social insurance is 
studied in at least three respects: policy analysis, economics, and administration. 
Firstly, policy analysts studying social insurance usually focus on institutional 
analysis such as: universalistic or targeting coverage (Reynaud, 2002; Van Ginneken, 
2010); means-tested, contributory or citizenship entitlement (Soderberg & 
Alexanderson, 2005); or, the negotiation between policy actors (Kim, 2007). 
Secondly, economists also focus on institutional analysis of social insurance by, for 
example, discussing its efficiency or redistribution (Arachi & D'Antoni, 2004; 
Hindriks & De Donder, 2003). Lastly, in terms of administration, scholars either 
focus on the delivery of social insurance benefits (Bolderson et al, 1997) or briefly 
discuss its administration (Dixon, 1999; R. L. Walker, 2005). These literatures can 
also be categorised into two levels of analysis: institutional and administrative. A 
large number of them particularly those undertaken by policy analysts and 
economists are concentrated at the institutional level. However, only a limited 
number of studies discuss the administration of social insurance. This research, 
therefore, aims to expand the knowledge of the administration of social insurance 
and the delivery of social insurance benefits. 
Moreover, social insurance has been studied either in general or in particular 
schemes. Until around 1990s, scholars were interested in social insurance as a 
general theme. These literatures discuss social insurance in general such as definition 
(Silburn, 1995), principle (see review in Feldstein, 2005), and institutional structure 
(Baldock, 1993; Korpi & Palme, 1998). Recently, however, studies related to social 
insurance has recently become more specific regarding its schemes i.e. 
unemployment, old-age, family, and health care. These literatures are indeed massive 
and varied. In short, while the studies of specific scheme are increasing; the studies 
of social insurance as a whole are declining. This actually might be a reflection of a 
practical world where some countries (e.g. UK, Germany) emphasise particular 
scheme for particular customers (customer-oriented scheme). However, there are still 
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some countries (e.g. Japan, Taiwan, Thailand) where all schemes are provided under 
the umbrella of social insurance (function-based provision).  
Bearing in mind contextual differences across schemes, this research admittedly 
follows the conventional way of studying social insurance perceiving it as a single 
system comprised of all scheme. In other words, it aims to enhance the understanding 
of social insurance as a whole not a particular scheme. This may raise the question of 
the theoretical contribution of this research. However, again, while the existing 
literature mostly discusses social insurance at the institutional level (social insurance 
institution), this research particularly discusses it at the administrative level (social 
insurance administration). Specifically, it aims to provide evidence of how 
decentralisation affects an entire system of social insurance benefit delivery.  
2.2.2 Decentralisation and its impacts 
The examination of decentralisation impact is complex and multidimensional as 
decentralisation ‘matters tremendously for the development of social policy, but in 
ways that are significantly mediated by other features of a particular political setting 
(Pierson, 1995, p.473)’. To measure decentralisation impact has never been an easy 
task (Dreher, 2006). As Smith (1985, p.85) suggests, ‘one obvious test of change in 
levels of decentralisation relates to the functions and powers of subordinate 
governments’ which may be measured by using data on spending and personnel. 
However, these indicators only exhibit changes at the policy level. They do not 
exhibit the impact of decentralisation at the implementation level. Therefore, this 
research includes responsiveness and initiative of each provincial actor into 
indicators of the decentralisation impact. 
It is fair to draw a causal link between decentralisation and initiative or 
responsiveness. Based on early literature, responsiveness and policy innovation are 
believed to be impacts of decentralisation. In terms of responsiveness, it is suggested 
in Tibout’s work (1961 cited in Dreher, 2006, p.2) that decentralisation ‘improves 
respect for regional differences in preferences’. It enhances organisational autonomy 
and an organisation thus becomes more flexible in response to what is actually 
22 
 
needed for the local public (Rondinelli, 1983). This complies with the ‘notion of 
responsiveness’ which ‘requires policies to be flexible with respect to heterogeneous 
or time-varying community needs (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2007, p.6)’. In terms of 
initiative, Shane (1992, p.29) suggests that initiative ‘requires decentralised authority 
because such a structure brings more information to the attention of the senior 
managers and gives employees greater incentive’. Similarly, innovation is created 
under flexible contexts and decentralised authority (Aghion & Tirole, 1997). Both 
encourage the organisation to develop and experiment their idea in response to local 
needs. 
Whether responsiveness (Faguet, 2004; Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010) and policy 
innovation (Strumpf, 2002) is impacted by decentralisation have already been re-
examined empirically. This research is therefore started based on such wisdom and 
attempts to expand the knowledge of association between decentralisation, 
responsiveness and innovation. It proposes a continuum of responsiveness by 
combining responsiveness and innovation altogether. Assuming that responsiveness 
is a result of decision-making based on local needs, innovation is a result of decision-
making in combination of responsiveness and creativity. In other words, innovation 
is referred to as a more-advanced degree of responsiveness. Although both terms are 
often referred to as positive results of decentralisation (Aghion & Tirole, 1997; 
Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2007; Dreher, 2006; Hutchcroft, 2001; Smith, 1985), this 
research does not argue for, or prove, such positivity. Being aware that ‘benefits of 
decentralisation have been substantially overestimated (Dreher, 2006, p.2)’, both 
terms are taken into consideration as a result of decentralised decision-making 
without any judgment on, for example, decentralisation success or the actor’s good 
performance. 
2.2.2.1 Responsiveness 
Responsiveness has been consistently studied in at least three fields including 
political science, business, and public administration. Studies in the first two fields 
are relatively more focused. While political scientists focus on responsiveness as 
agencies’ external control and political responsiveness; business scholars focus on 
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responsiveness to the market (Yang & Pandey, 2007, p.216). However, 
responsiveness remains an ambiguous and dynamic concept to public administration 
scholars (e.g. Saltzstein, 1992; Vigoda, 2002; Yang & Pandey, 2007). The most 
common concept of responsiveness is viewed as a result of interrelations between 
public service agencies, citizens, and policy pressures. For example, responsiveness 
is sometimes defined as ‘congruence between the goals the organisation or 
administrative system pursues and the goals desired by the people to whom the 
organisation is responsible and under whose authority it operates (Fried, 1976 cited 
in Yang & Pandey, 2007, p.217)’ or ‘willingness to strike some balance between 
professional standards and values and community priorities (Saltzstein, 1992)’.  
Further, Yang and Pandey’s (2007) study suggests three external (public/media, 
clients, elected officials) and two internal (decentralisation, results-based 
management) factors as positive variables of responsiveness. Indeed, decentralisation 
and result-based management (RBM) are crucial to decision-making of an 
organisation. However, if both are designed by the central government and imposed 
on sub-national government organisations, it is dubious to consider them as internal 
factors since they are actually pressures from an external organisation. Therefore, 
this research considers decentralisation and RBM as external factors which may 
hinder/enhance the capacity of an organisation. It applies Saltzstein’s proposition 
(1992) on responsiveness. He suggests two factors of responsiveness – interest of the 
state and public wishes. More precisely, responsiveness is the SSRO’s attempt to 
balance local needs and political pressures. Local needs refer to necessity (observed 
by officials; related to official’s professional standard) or request (submitted by 
customers) of insured persons within the province. Political pressures are either from 
the national (e.g. the SSO, the central government) or the provincial (e.g. PAUs or 
the PSSS) levels. 
Based on public administration literature, this research develops a framework to 
identify degree of responsiveness by putting the two factors on a continuum. (see 
Figure 2.3). On the left is an organisation’s responsiveness to political pressures from 
the national level, for example, the SSO’s policies. In the middle, it is responsiveness 
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to provincial actors e.g. governor or local government. Lastly, on the right, it is 
responsiveness to local service recipients e.g. insured persons in the province.  
 
Figure 2.2 Degree of responsiveness 
 
 
Indeed, the term ‘responsiveness’ reflects a government organisation’s attitude 
toward its citizens. Vigoda (2002) suggests five roles of citizens – subjects, voters, 
customers, partners, and owners – which on the other hand imply five roles of 
government organisations – rulers, trustees, managers, partners, subjects. 
Emphasising responsiveness, this research undeniably considers insured persons as 
customers and the SSROs as public managers. The view should have been shifted 
towards seeing citizens and government organisations as partners according to a 
trend in public administration studies (see Vigoda, 2002). However, the idea of 
citizens being partners in social insurance administration exists only in some 
developed welfare states e.g. Germany where the tri-partite system is established. 
That is not the case of Thailand. The aim of this research is to understand how the 
tripartite board concept works in developing countries where tripartite board is less 
influential and insured persons rarely collaborate with social insurance agency in 
policy-making. Therefore, this research applies the view of customer/manager 
interaction and bears in mind the possibility of partner/partner interaction. 
2.2.2.2 Initiative 
The question of whether decentralisation increases initiative has been of interest to 
scholars. While some argue that decentralisation induces initiatives (Aghion & 
Tirole, 1997); others contrarily find that centralisation is more suitable for initiation 
(V. A. Thompson, 1976). Acknowledging the latter set of literature, this research 
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follows the former considering decentralisation and initiatives as cause and effect. 
Also, as proposed in Figure 2.2, initiative is arguably an advanced level of being 
responsive. Therefore, initiative is referred to as the composition of responsiveness 
and innovation.  
Innovation and initiative are overlapping concepts. Innovation is recognized as part 
of diversity and frequently used in many studies (Considine & Lewis, 2007; 
Damanpour, 1991; Osborne & Brown, 2005; Thompson, 1965; Walker, 2010). For 
example, Damanpour (1991, p.556) defines ‘organisational innovation’ as ‘device, 
system, policy, programme, process, product, or service that is new [underlined to 
emphasise the key term] to the adopting organisation’. Added to this, the term 
‘initiatives’ used in this research connotes not only novelty but also proactivity. 
According to Birkinshaw (1997, p.210), ‘an initiative is viewed as a discrete, 
proactive undertaking that advances a new way for the corporation [organisation] to 
use or expand its resources’. Therefore, innovation and initiative are used 
interchangeably in this research. When initiative is used, the proactivity is meant to 
be emphasised. 
2.2.3 Collaborative Public Management 
This research refers to collaborative public management as Agranoff and McGuire 
(2003) define it as ‘a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating 
in multiorganisation arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved, or solved 
easily, by single organisations (p.4)’. With its emphasis on public managers 
(Agranoff, 2006; McGuire, 2006; Thomson & Perry, 2006) and initiative (Agranoff 
& McGuire, 2003; Gray, 1989), this approach serves as an analytical framework of 
decision-making mechanisms within the SIBD process. 
An interesting framework to understand diversification of SIBD (particularly in 
Chapter 5 and 7) is collaborative management approach proposed by Agranoff and 
McGuire (2003). Their purposes are to ‘(1) demonstrate the various ways in which 
multi-organisational, multi-actor collaboration is utilized as a public policymaking 
and management tool by cities, and (2) consider the under-recognized practical and 
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theoretical issues at the forefront of public management, and public management in 
practice (p.6)’. Their study argues that, while public management varies among cases 
depending on political-economic factors, the most influential factor is the role of a 
public manager whose collaborative activity is a result of a collaborative strategy. 
This approach thus partially becomes the platform of models of SIBD diversification 
(see Section 2.4). Moreover, they hypothesise that ‘city-level "values" of 
collaborative management vary across cities and that explanations can be found for 
how it differs, why it differs, and what determines the differences (p. 6)’. Sharing the 
same interest and hypothesis, this research seeks evidence for social insurance 
administration whereby collaboration exists and varies across provinces (see Chapter 
5).  
Applying this approach, however, this research employs different research methods. 
Agranoff and McGuire rely mostly on a survey (237 cities) and supplemented it with 
in-depth interviews in six selected cities (see Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, p.9-10). 
This definitely provides extensive data to understand collaborative management. 
However, their respondents are only the city governments which appear to be their 
central unit of analysis. This research is designed to investigate not only the central 
unit’s but also stakeholders’ views on collaboration. Specifically, as well as the 
SSRO, a central unit of analysis, other actors in provincial SIBD are interviewed. 
This consequently embraces stakeholders’ perspectives to expand the insight of how 
collaboration is formed and works. Further, this research aims to fulfil one of the 
weaknesses of Agranoff and McGuire’s study, indicated by themselves, that their 
research ‘do[es] not capture the level of power and influence that various players 
may possess (p.185)’.  
2.2.4 Inter-organisational relations 
The trend of inter-organisational relation studies has changed over time which makes 
the definition of inter-organisational relations (IORs) variable. Before 2000s, the 
literature on IOR was consistently reviewed by many scholars (Aldrich, 1971; Astley 
& Sachdeva, 1984; C. Oliver, 1990; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Hvinden, 1991; O'Toole, 
1993). Most of them discussed three major aspects of IORs, as suggested by 
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Galaskiewicz (1985): resource dependence (J. D. Thompson, 1967), policy advocacy 
(Ellison, 1998), and organisational legitimation (see Galaskiewicz, 1985, p. 296). 
Later, after 2000s, IORs have been studied by scholars under different terms such as 
collaborative management (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Skelcher et al, 2005), multi-
level governance (Peters & Pierre, 2001), or joined-up government (Perri 6, 2004). 
As Oliver and Ebers (1998, p.549) state, the study of IORs is in ‘a rather messy 
situation marked by a cacophony of heterogeneous concepts, theories, and research 
results’. Still, however the term is coined, its core remains under IORs (Cropper, 
2008, p.5). In this research, IORs refers to interrelation between actors involving 
resource exchange, policy advocacy, and organisational legitimacy. 
More specifically, acknowledging the trend, this research basically aims to examine 
IORs on the basis of resource dependency. This approach proposes that the scarcity 
of essential resources will force actors to establish relationships with others in order 
to obtain the needed resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Also, as organisations 
must engage in exchange relations to obtain necessary resources through exchange 
linkages with other organisations, ‘it is fruitful to conceive of an inter-organisational 
field as a network of exchange relations among member units or organisations’ 
(Cook, 1977, p.68). Thus, it is necessary to understand relationship pattern on the 
basis of resource exchange. Applying this approach to the research provides an 
analytical framework for understanding IORs in Thailand’s SIBD.  
2.2.4.1 Relationship patterns 
To classify IORs, Hall et al (1977) suggest three patterns of relationships – mandated 
by law, based on formal agreement, or voluntary. However, the authors appear to 
distinguish the agreement-based pattern at the different stage of relationship 
evolution from the other two patterns. For instance, they suggest that voluntary and 
law-mandated relations are derived from different preconditions at the formation 
stage. In contrast, they refer to agreement-based relations as a pattern evolved from 
voluntary agreement (Hall et al, 1977, p.459-460). It is a pattern being standardized 
after the formation stage of a voluntary relationship. Thus, there are actually two 
patterns of relationship: mandated and voluntary. Moreover, C. Oliver (1990) 
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proposed six types of relations including: trade associations, voluntary agency 
federations, joint venture, joint programmes, corporate-financial interlocks, and 
agency-sponsor linkages. However, she emphasises that the first type is mandated 
and the rest are voluntary forms. Therefore, this research will analyse IORs in two 
patterns: obligatory (mandated) and voluntary. Nonetheless, this is not to say that a 
voluntary relationship is not designated by any rules or agreements. Vrooman (2009, 
p.73) suggests that ‘to a certain degree all interaction is influenced by rules, because 
language and implicit expectations play an important role in it’.  
2.2.4.2 Resource exchange 
Resource exchange among organisations has been investigated by many authors (see 
full review in (Lazega & Pattison, 1999). Within the extensive body of IOR 
literature, scholars sometimes take it for granted that it is the public manager’s task 
to deal with resource exchange (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Hvinden, 1991; Weiss, 
1987). In attempts to clarify resource exchanges in SIBD, this research discusses the 
gaps between mandated (what is designated in policy documents), expected (what is 
perceived as necessary by an actor) and actual (what is transferred in practice) 
resources within each dyadic relationship. Indeed, it is common that needs are not 
always met. It is interesting, however, to understand the extent to which the gaps 
exist and what their impacts are on service delivery.  
Literature on this aspect is growing. It argues that, if expectations are met, inter-
organisational trust (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Zaheer et al, 1998) or, contrarily, 
conflict (Alter, 1990; Kumar & Dissel, 1996) will emerge. Apparently, if two actors 
can fulfil each other’s expectation, the relation tends to grow. As Agranoff and 
McGuire (1998, p.7) indicate, ‘[T]he greater the interdependencies between actors, 
the greater the need for coordination and collaboration’. In contrast, if needs are not 
fulfilled, conflict or tension is likely to occur. Thus, this research argues that these 
gaps of resource exchange play a role in organisational interdependency.  It is 
hypothesised that fulfilment of the expectations could strengthen the relations and, 
subsequently, lead to innovation which diversifies service delivery.  
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Developed from Hvinden’s framework (1991, pp.251-252), resources of concern in 
this research are classified into six types: information, staff, service, expertise, 
authority, and material resources. Hvinden presents four types of task resources: 
information, staff’s service and expertise, possibilities of making referrals, and 
material resources. Two major types of information are concerned: information about 
clients and their circumstances and other organisations’ regulations and priorities. 
Although Hvinden combines staff, service, and expertise together, these three are 
actually different. Staffs are human resource (hardware); while service is their action 
in response to responsibilities and clients and expertise is their knowledge and 
wisdom in providing the service (software). Hvinden’s term ‘referrals’ – one actor 
avoids being blamed by referring to other organisations – is somewhat ambiguous, 
since this could be relation rather than resource. Instead, referral can be considered as 
‘authority’ being used where the first party suggests other organisations to take part 
in the second party’s operation. Lastly, material resources simply mean either 
financial resources or office products. Sometimes financial resource will be 
specifically identified if available.  
2.2.5 Prismatic society and bureaucratic polity 
Selecting Thailand as a case of study, an approach to explain social insurance in local 
contexts is necessary. This research requires an additional concept to supplement 
European-based literature and Riggs’s concept seems to fit the purpose. In attempt to 
understand public administration in developing countries, Riggs (1961) introduced 
prismatic model which basically suggests researchers take into account the ecology 
of administration. This model provides an analytical framework of administration 
and its society in five aspects: economic, social, symbolic, communicative and 
political (see Riggs, 1964). Drawing upon a linear perspective (see Riggs, 1963), 
three types of society – fused, prismatic, and diffracted – are suggested. In brief, he 
analyses how developing countries, sometimes referred as transitional societies, are 
changed through modernization putting traditional and modern society at two ends of 
a continuum. On one end, fused society – sometimes referred as traditional society – 
is a society in which particular structure fulfils several functions. On the other end, 
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diffracted society bears characteristics of modern, or Western, society where its 
structure is highly organized with specific function of each organization in the 
society. Riggs (1961) illustrates hypothetical fused society in which a single structure 
performs all necessary functions and diffracted (refracted) society in which a single 
structure performs particular function (see Figure 2.3) as below:  
‘Let us call it a “fused model”, just as we call white light fused. In 
extreme contrast, let us imagine a situation in which every function has a 
corresponding structure that is specialized for its performance. We call 
this situation a “refracted model”, just as we say that light is refracted 
into all the separate colours of a rainbow or spectrum (p.92).’ 
Figure 2.3 Prismatic model 
 
Source: Riggs (2006, p. 38) 
In his empirical studies (Riggs, 1958, 1959, 1966), however, Riggs found that these 
two types of society cannot explain administrative system and social structure in 
developing countries. He thus proposed a ‘prismatic model’ to explain how formal 
structure imported from the Western countries was implemented under the traditional 
culture of developing countries. Like the moment when fused light being refracted in 
a prism, prismatic society reflects a society in which formally differentiated 
structures (diffracted) traditionally perform their roles regarding its cultures and 
values (fused). Formalism is one of key characteristics which one would find in 
prismatic society as Riggs (1963, p. 154) stresses such questions as ‘what is 
prescribed ideally and what actually happen’ in order to understand transitional 
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societies. Besides, Riggs discusses bureaucratic power in transitional societies – how 
bureaucracy dominates not only administration but also politics in developing 
countries (Riggs, 1964, 2006). This type of state is termed as a ‘bureaucratic polity’ 
discussed with evidence particularly from his empirical study in Thailand (Riggs, 
1966). Briefly, reflecting Riggs’ concepts, Rock (2000, p. 184) concludes that 
bureaucratic polity is ‘a political system where power and prestige were located 
within the bureaucracy, rather than in extra-bureaucratic forces or political parties 
under parliamentary rule.’ 
The prismatic model has become widely accepted and applied particularly in  studies 
in comparative and development administration. As Peng (2008, p. 528) indicates, 
‘those who study comparative public administration will inevitably find reason to 
critique Fred W. Riggs' "fused-prismatic-diffracted model", but in conducting 
research, no one is free of Riggs' influence.’ Not only appreciations but also 
criticisms arise from Riggs’ proposition of the prismatic model. For example, Riggs’ 
analysis is often questioned if it emphasizes too much on the Western, or American, 
concept of social structure and public administration as a destination of change for 
developing countries (Chapman, 1966; Kasfir, 1969; Peng, 2008; Subramaniam, 
2000). His illustration of the prismatic model is criticized as too plain (Subramaniam, 
2000). New vocabularies – e.g. bazaar-canteen, clects, sala – he introduced with his 
own definition are noted as sometimes confusing and the reader might find difficult 
to follow (Chapman, 1966; Peng, 2008; Subramaniam, 2000).  
Despite such critiques, Riggs further developed the prismatic model emphasizing the 
aim to provide a model for understanding transitional societies (see especially Riggs, 
2006). He emphasizes that ‘the ‘‘prismatic model’’ is not merely another euphemism 
chosen to avoid invidious comparisons. Rather, it is used in an effort to identify and 
analyze a particular kind of social order of wide prevalence and importance (p.44).’ 
Also, in his bi-linear version of the prismatic model, he suggests that characteristics 
of fused, prismatic, or diffracted societies may coexist in one society – either 
Western or non-Western (see especially Riggs, 2006, pp. 37-40). In other words, it 
cannot be simply said that one society is more or less fused, prismatic, or diffracted. 
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Each society rather configures several characteristics. This research agrees with his 
later view and thus applies it to the case of Thailand. 
To a certain extent, Thailand is of course one of developing countries in transition 
which can be explained by prismatic model. It is a society in which formalism 
prominently appears. Also, its system was labelled as a ‘bureaucratic polity’ when 
bureaucrats were the most powerful actors in politics (Riggs, 1966). An interesting 
question, however, is to what extent such model and concept remain applicable to the 
Thai case. This question could be considered in terms of societal and political 
development. Firstly, Thai contemporary society cannot simply be explained by the 
original yet over-simplified prismatic model (see Riggs, 1964). Rather, with large 
urban-rural gaps, it is more suitable to apply the revised prismatic model (see Riggs, 
2006) to understand the extent to which Thai society comprises fused, prismatic, or 
diffracted features of traditional, transitional, or modern societies respectively.  
Secondly, as democratization is in progress, the concept of bureaucratic polity is 
declared to be dead in Thailand by many scholars (see the full list in Ockey, 2004, 
p.143; further discussed in Chapter 3). Particularly, in 1997, the new Constitution 
was legislated with hope to provide ‘a new set of institutions to police politicians and 
bureaucrats (Unger, 2003, p. 190)’ and diffuse the power of bureaucratic elites. 
However, Ockey (2004) convincingly argues that the concept of bureaucratic polity 
‘continues to haunt scholars of Thai studies (p.143)’. One of his points is that 
bureaucratic power strongly remains as part of Thai contemporary politics. 
Otherwise, as he questions (p.143), ‘why does the Thaksin government [2001-2006] 
conceive of the bureaucracy as such a barrier to democracy? To discuss these two 
sets of questions further, evidence from four selected provinces in Thailand will be 
provided in later chapters. 
2.3 Conceptual framework 
It is originally hypothesised that diversity within the welfare state is a result of 
decentralisation. This research starts with the assumption that decentralisation 
changes inter-organisational relations, simultaneously induces public responsiveness; 
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and, subsequently, increases diversity of public service delivery. Later on, 
collaboration is taken into account as a potential factor to the diversification since it 
involves creating, interdependence and joint decision-making (see Section 2.1.4). 
Thus, this research examines the association between three variables: 
decentralisation, collaboration and the diversity of SIBD. It applies actor-centred 
institutionalism as an analytical framework to understand actors, relations and the 
diversity (see Section 2.2.1). It then applies four theoretical approaches – social 
insurance, decentralisation, CPM, IORs – to explain how the diversity happens and 
the extent to which decentralisation and collaboration diversify SIBD (see Section 
2.2.2). It is also necessary to understand local contexts of Thailand and the prismatic 
model is thus selected to explain these contexts (see Section 2.2.3). 
2.3.1 Actor-centred analysis 
Employing actor-centred analysis, this research aims to clarify social insurance 
institution, its institutional settings and policy changes. Three components of an 
institution are of concern: actor characteristics, actor constellation, and mode of 
interaction. Following definitions suggested by Boessen (2008), actor characteristics 
depend on their ‘capabilities, orientations, and concept of rationally bounded actor 
(p.16)’; ‘actor constellation represents a static picture of actors’ relations (p.19)’; 
and, mode of interaction ‘concerns the dynamics of actor interaction (p.19)’. Only 
two concepts – actor characteristic, actor constellation – are applied to the analysis in 
this research to draw a static composition of an institution. 
2.3.2 Theoretical approaches 
Four theoretical approaches – social insurance, decentralisation, CPM, IORs – are 
employed with particular focus of theory application to examine the diversification 
process (see Figure 2.4). Also, each approach has its own function in the conceptual 




Figure 2.4 Conceptual framework 
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2.3.2.1 Social insurance: identifying theoretical gaps 
A major contribution of this research is to fulfil the explanatory gaps between 
diversity within the welfare state and decentralisation. As discussed earlier, the 
diversity is explained as a result of decentralisation. However, such explanation 
briefly clarifies the situation between diversity and decentralisation. Therefore, this 
research would argue that diversity is not only a result of decentralisation at the 
institutional level but also collaboration at the implementation level. It aims to 
elaborate what goes on inside the less-explained area and how such area is 
interrelated to decentralisation and diversity. 
2.3.2.2 Decentralisation: explaining change of institutional settings 
Decentralisation has been a hot topic for several decades. On the one hand, 
decentralisation is perceived as an ideal instrument of empowering citizens (Tibout, 
1956). It conveys positive results such as responsiveness (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 
2007) and initiative (Strumpf, 2002). On the other hand, an increasing number of 
scholars argue that these benefits have been overestimated (see Dreher, 2006). 
Drawing upon this debate, this research builds up its argument on the assumption 
that decentralisation makes changes to institutional settings of SIBD diversification 
process resulting in  responsiveness (see Faguet, 2004; Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 
2010) and collaboration in SIBD (see Section 2.3). 
2.3.2.3 Collaborative public management (CPM): understanding decision-
making mechanism 
In response to institutional change (decentralisation), an actor needs to readjust its 
activities. This research employs a Collaborative Public Management (CPM) 
approach to analyse the decision-making mechanism of the readjustment. As 
Thomson and Perry (2006, p. 20) suggest, ‘[d]evolution, rapid technological change, 
scarce resources, and rising organisational interdependencies are driving increasing 
levels of collaboration’. Therefore, it is apparent that decentralisation increases levels 
of collaboration and simultaneously an actor’s responsiveness. Also, CPM 
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emphasises variation of public service delivery at the sub-national level (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2003). It provides a framework to analysing the variation which is a result 
of collaborative activity and strategy (see Section 2.4). 
2.3.2.4 Inter-organisational relations (IORs): investigating patterns and 
interdependence 
This approach is applied to investigate relationship patterns and resource 
interdependence of actors in SIBD (see Section 2.5). As a firm ground to 
understanding collaboration, roles and relations of actors need to be clarified. As 
Pierson (1995, p.463) suggests, ‘while the rules of the game are of tremendous 
significance, so are the identities, interests, and resources of the players. Policy 
outcomes depend on the interplay of these factors, rather than being dictated by 
institutions alone.’ The purpose of this theory application is therefore both analytical 
and descriptive in order to understand such factors and provide a platform for further 
discussion. 
2.3.3 Domestic contexts: prismatic society and bureaucratic polity 
To supplement European-based literature, this research applies Riggs’ prismatic 
model (1966) which provides an extensive, although obsolete, explanation of public 
administration in developing countries (discussed earlier in Section 2.2.5). His work 
provides a framework to further understand SIBD in such developing contexts as 
Thailand. Also, it is noted whether bureaucratic polity is dead considering Thai 
contemporary politics (see Section 2.2.5). Some argue that the concept cannot be 
applied to Thai case any longer. Others argue that it remains applicable. Specifically, 
looking at Thaksinization period, Thaksin’s attempts to diffuse bureaucratic power 
reinforce immortality of bureaucratic polity in Thailand. This research will discuss 
evidence from the field regarding this debate too. 
Before proceeding, it should be noted that this research could fall in between 
organisation theory and institutionalism. While the former is a somewhat developed 
concept and getting less attention, the latter has become increasingly famous in the social 
science (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Palmer, Biggart, & Dick, 2008; 
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Peters, 2005). However, the institutionalism concept is still dynamic, ambiguous and 
sometimes repetitive of the classic organisation theory. For example, Haveman and 
David (cited in Greenwood, 2008, p.5) challenge institutionalists ‘to reach agreement on 
the meaning of central constructs and wean themselves from using the vapid term 
institution, which means everything and therefore nothing’. Also, there are several 
attempts to combine the two concepts into ‘organisational institutionalism’ (Greenwood, 
2008; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). However, this novel concept is even more complex 
and ambiguous. Acknowledging these ambiguities and overlaps between the three 
concepts, this research rather employs the first two concepts to clarify the interrelation 
and distinction between organisation and institution and puts the third concept aside. 
2.4 Proposition on models of SIBD diversification 
This research proposes three models of SIBD diversification configuring three 
aspects: diversity, collaboration and decentralisation (see Table 2.1). Firstly, 
collaboration will be examined by investigating inter-organisational relations and 
resource dependence and the degree of diversification is determined by the 
differentiation of SIBD from a uniform pattern (see Chapter 5). Secondly, the 
decentralisation degree will be examined in two regards: decentralised activities and 
contexts of the SSRO (see Chapter 6).  









Weberian Low Low Low 
Customer-oriented Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Strategic High High High 
 
Three patterns of diversification – Weberian, customer-oriented, strategic – are 
particularly developed from Agranoff and McGuire’s (2003) six models of 
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collaborative management (see Table 2.1). They suggest a model of collaborative 
management as ‘the intersection of two variables or dimensions: (1) a city's 
collaborative activity level [collaborative activity] and (2) the extent to which such 
activity is strategic [collaborative strategy] (p. 43)’. Apparently, the diversification 
model is constructed upon the collaborative strategy dimension rather than the 
activity dimension. Within a single model, the degree of collaboration is left to be 
varied. This is because this research considers strategic decisions as a result of 
decentralisation which diversifies SIBD and attempts to clarify variation of 
collaborations or collaborative activity in Agranoff and McGuire’s term.  
Table 2.2 Development of diversification models* 








Top-down (TD) Moderate Low 
Weberian 
Abstinence (Ab) Low Low 
Donor-recipient (DR) High Moderate 
Customer-oriented 
Reactive (Re) Low Moderate 
Jurisdiction-based (JB) High High 
Strategic 
Contented (Co) Low High 
*Author’s construct based on Agranoff and McGuire (2003) 
The first pattern, Weberian, is simply based on a traditional bureaucratic pattern with 
three major characteristics: hierarchy, specialization, standardization (Aucoin, 1997, 
p.290). The Weberian, or ideal-type, bureaucracy is a distinct organisational setting 
which is ‘formalized, hierarchical, specialized with a clear functional division of 
labor and demarcation of jurisdiction, standardized, rule based, and impersonal 
(Olsen, 2006, p. 2)’. Despite being critiqued of, for example, its trained incapacity 
(Merton, 1940), goal displacement (Etzioni, 1964), and obsoleteness (see Olsen, 
2006), this pattern of bureaucratic system survives through paradigm shifts in public 
administration (see for example Peters & Pierre, 2003). Thus, it would be 
unsurprising to find that the Weberian pattern exist in SIBD. 
In this research, the Weberian model of SIBD diversification encompasses four 
features: routine responsiveness, low-level collaboration, low-level decentralisation 
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and low-level diversification. Under this pattern of delivery, the SSRO’s type of 
responsiveness is routine. This means that the SSRO, a delivery agency in the 
province, rigidly follows the SSO’s central policies. They usually implement routine 
projects only. They prefer a single standard and prioritise the central office’s policy. 
Concurrently, their degree of collaboration is low as collaboration is not their 
predominant strategy.  Their degree of decentralisation is also low as they tend not to 
implement devolved authorities and resources. Their delivery pattern is not, or is at 
best only slightly, diversified from the uniform pattern resulting in the low level of 
diversification. Thus, the SSRO which entails these four features will be classified 
into the Weberian pattern.   
Secondly, the customer-oriented pattern is based on the concept that customer-
oriented services involve attentiveness on at least three issues: social diversity, 
service delivery and the interaction with users, and users as active participant in 
needs-defining process (J. Clarke & Newman, 1997, p.111). In this research, 
‘customer-oriented’ entails four features: being responsive, a moderate degree of 
collaboration, a moderate degree of decentralisation and a moderate degree of 
diversification. Under this pattern, the SSRO’s responsiveness is labelled as 
‘responsive’. This occurs when the agency respond to customer’s needs concerning 
service provision or benefit delivery (Brooks & Manza, 2006; Fossett & Thompson, 
2006; Saltzstein, 1992; West, 1984).   
Notably, the distinction between routine and responsive activities should be clarified. 
It should be clear that a responsive project could possibly be imported from other 
SSRO’s initiatives without adaptation. For example, if the SSRO’s project in one 
province is a lesson learned from the SSRO in the other province, it will be 
considered as a responsive project and the case will be indicated at the moderate 
level. However, if such project is following orders from or regulations of other 
organisations – e.g. Public Administrative Units (PAUs), departments, ministries, the 
project will be considered as routine intergovernmental cooperation instead. In other 
words, if the SSRO needs to cooperate with other governmental organisations under 
orders or regulations, such activity is routine rather than responsive.  
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Thirdly, in the strategic pattern, the agency tends to have ‘decision patterns evolving 
over time as relatively autonomous managers within the organisation engage in 
resource committing activities … and take actions in response to changing market 
conditions (Juul, 2004, p.263)’. This pattern encompasses four features: initiative, a 
high level of collaboration, a high level of decentralisation, and a high level of 
diversification. The responsiveness of the SSRO falling into this strategic pattern is 
not only responding to customer’s needs but also taking initiative. Taking initiative is 
defined as the ability to operate a new-and-proactive project (Birkinshaw, 1997; 
Considine & Lewis, 2007; Damanpour, 1991; Goes & Park, 1997; R. Walker, 2010). 
More precisely, being classified into this pattern, the SSRO operates an initiative 
project which is highly diversified from the uniform pattern.  
Conclusion 
This research originally aims to clarify the association between diversification of 
SIBD and decentralisation. The basic assumption is that social insurance 
administration tends to be centralised and standardised, which results in uniformity 
of SIBD. However, it is likely to be diversified once decentralisation has been 
implemented. The more SIBD is decentralised, the more diversified it becomes. 
Drawing from existing literature, however, it questions whether the impact of 
decentralisation is overestimated and collaboration is actually major part of 
diversification (see Section 2.2). This research thus aims to deepen  understanding of 
the extent to which decentralisation has impacts on SIBD. It is expected that this 
research could provide further discussion on how decentralisation changes the 
delivery pattern at the provincial level. It examines whether decentralisation is the 
only factor of the diversity or whether collaboration has its own part to play in the 
diversity. It could be expected to fill a theoretical gap, the less-developed explanation 
of the association between diversity, decentralisation and collaboration in welfare 
state (see Figure 2.1). 
Therefore, this research provides an extensive investigation on the SIBD 
diversification process and proposes three models of diversification. These three 
models – Weberian, customer-oriented, strategic – are characterised with three 
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features: diversity degree, decentralisation degree, and collaboration degree (see 
Section 2.4). While collaborative management is employed as a major approach to 
analyse collaboration; the other three approaches – social insurance, decentralisation, 
IORs – are essential to understand SIBD diversification process and its institutional 
settings (see Section 2.3.2). Also, with Thailand as a case of study, prismatic model 
is expectedly taken into consideration to widen, or deepen, the understanding of 
SIBD in developing countries (see Section 2.3.5). Particularly, it discusses SIBD 
diversification under political instabilities and the influence of major political figures 
like Thaksin Shinawatra. 
The next chapter justifies the country selection and discusses policy developments 






Chapter 3 : The Case of Thailand 
 
To provide a brief picture of Thailand, this chapter has four sections. Section 3.1 
discusses the justification of Thailand as a case study. Section 3.2 illustrates 
Thailand’s politico-administrative structure and discusses the late 1990s 
decentralisation in Thailand. Section 3.3 explains the background and system of 
Thailand’s social insurance. Section 3.4 discusses the impacts of decentralisation on 
Thailand’s SIA. 
3.1 Why Thailand? 
Thailand is selected as an interesting case for the examination of SIBD diversity for 
four reasons. Firstly, Thai SIA is a highly-centralised system with diversity of benefit 
delivery. At the national level, with seven types of benefit, the SSO is a single 
administrative body. This is different from at least six countries including Germany, 
France, UK, Sweden, and Taiwan (see Appendix 1). At the sub-national level, the 
SSRO is also interestingly a delivery agency for all social insurance benefits (SIBs). 
In the UK, for example, particular agencies are responsible for delivering a particular 
social insurance benefit e.g. JobCentre Plus for unemployment benefit delivery. 
Differently, Thailand’s SSRO delivers and administers all types of SIBs including: 
sickness and injury, unemployment, elderly, disabled, child allowance, maternity, 
and death. Therefore, studying Thailand’s SIBD could be an interesting case to 
examine the impact of decentralisation on an entire system of SIBD. 
Secondly, Thailand’s SIA has a dual characteristic of a social insurance 
administration. It is both a developed and a non-developed system.  According to 
Walker’s criteria (2005, p. 95), two criteria - funding and programme design – could 
be employed to differentiate non-developed from developed benefit administrations. 
Non-developed provision occurs where programme design and funding are a national 
responsibility (centralised); whereas in a fully developed provision both are operated 
locally (decentralised). Despite being centralised and likely to be non-developed, it 
could also be considered as a developed system.  Although the Social Security Fund 
44 
 
in Thailand is administered by the SSO at national level, programme design could be 
modified by the SSRO at provincial level as a result of the late 1990s 
decentralisation. Therefore, as the delivery agency (the SSRO) can design its 
initiative projects, the Thai case contains both developed and non-developed 
characteristics of SIA. 
Thirdly, in spite of its distinctive pattern of development, Thailand shares sufficient 
background with international models to make it a useful case study of social 
insurance policy implementation. Siffin (1982, p.3) admits that the Thai case is 
unique and may prove nothing for wider academic knowledge. However, he argues 
that it is still worth studying because the Thai case can test and perhaps demonstrate 
the utility of concepts flourishing in the study of modern and modernising 
government and politics. From the political economists’ perspective, Thailand’s 
capitalist transition has not matched the history of Anglo-American development; 
rather, it has been rapid and has deeply transformed society which has much that is 
recognisable in other transition experiences (Pasuk & Baker, 1998; Rodan, Hewison, 
& Robison, 2006, p.75). Similarly, Thailand is perceived as ‘a fascinating 
kaleidoscope of the modern and traditional, the rural and the urban, and the affluent 
and the impoverished (McGregor et al, 2007, p.2)’. Moreover, Midgley (1984, p.105) 
emphasises that, although the colonial influence is significant to social security in 
developing countries, Thailand is an exceptional case which has never been 
colonised but is also influenced by the developed countries. 
Fourthly, studying Thailand’s SIA at the provincial level could exemplify the 
compromise between two policy actors (the SSRO and provincial governor). 
Thailand’s politico-administrative system in combination with its historical context 
results in the distinctive characteristic of Thai SIA at the provincial-level. 
Historically, the governor was traditionally considered as a nobleman who was the 
representative of the King in each administrative area. However, in the reign of 
Chulalongkorn (Rama V, 1868-1910), principalities were transformed into regional 
45 
 
governments and as such lords changed their status, or title, to become a governor
5
. 
The provincial governor is thus possibly influential to SIBD due to this traditional 
superiority. Also, more recently, the provincial governor is appointed by the Ministry 
of Interior; is authorised to make overall decisions; and could relocate bureaucrats in 
particular positions of every regional office in the province. Formally, he is rarely 
involved in the SSRO’s decision; whilst, informally and generally, if he requests the 
SSRO officials to do something, they tend to accept the request.  
3.2 Political and Administrative Background 
Historically, until the early period of Chakri Dynasty (1812-present), Thailand was 
governed by the King under a monarchy system. Enforced by the law, the position of 
the King is an object of extreme respect. This has led to a deferential tradition in Thai 
public life that also affects political and bureaucratic patterns. The greatest structural 
change of civil service emerged in the reign of Chulalongkorn (Rama V, 1868-1910) 
as a result of interactions with European expansionism. In order to negotiate with the 
European powers and preserve its own sovereignty, Thailand granted a few parts in 
the Northern and the Northeastern of the country to Britain and France and 
modernized its administrative system. Changing from feudalism to Western 
bureaucracy, Chulalongkorn decided to divide the old structure consisting of four 
ministries: Wieng (Ministry of Interior), Wang (Royal Embassy), Klung (Ministry of 
Finance), and Na (Ministry of Agriculture), into twelve ministries according to the 
Western structure, for example, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Development, 
Ministry of Economic, etc. However, although nobilities have been transformed to 
civil servants, their attitudes were the same, perceiving their social status as superior 
to their service recipients (Bowornwathana, 1983; (Morell & Samudavanija, 1981). 
Later on, in the early decades of the twentieth century, many Thais studied overseas, 
and a small group of Western-educated elite with less traditional ideas emerged. In 
1932 a bloodless coup d'etat by military officers and civil servants ended the absolute 
monarchy and inaugurated Thailand's constitutional era. Their professed goal was the 
                                                             
5
 Occasionally, a governor is called Pau Muang (the father of the city) reflecting the strong perception 
of Thais towards the governor in a superior position. 
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introduction of parliamentary democracy, and they set up a National Assembly of 
appointed and elected members. However, Thailand’s transformation towards a 
democratic political system has been inconsistent. Politics has been dominated by 
rival military-bureaucratic cliques headed by powerful generals (Therawekin, 1990). 
These cliques have initiated repeated coups d'etat and have imposed prolonged 
periods of martial law. For 60 years after 1932, the military dominated Thai 
government (Bunbongkarn, 2004) and it retains an important role in Thai politics. 
Also, businessmen have become emerging elites in either national or provincial 
politics (Laothamatas, 1988; McVey, 2000; Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004). The case 
of Thaksin is a prominent example of how they became influential figures in Thai 
contemporary politics (see McCargo & Ukrist, 2005). This section thus clarifies two 
major issues related to the research topic. One is politico-administrative structure and 
contemporary issues in Thai politics (see Section 3.2.1). Another is Thailand’s 
administrative reform including its international contexts, history and the highlighted 
timeframe (see Section 3.2.2). 
3.2.1 Thai politics and administration: structure and contemporary 
issues 
Having been a unitary administrative system since the promulgation of constitutional 
monarchy in 1932, Thailand’s structure of the government is highly centralised with 
a single hierarchy (Bowornwathana, 2006, p.28). The politics of Thailand are 
currently conducted within the framework of a constitutional monarchy, whereby the 
Prime Minister (PM) is the head of Government and the King is the head of State. 
The judiciary is independent of the executive and the legislative branches. The 
National Assembly of Thailand (NAT) as the legislative branch consists of two 
chambers: the upper house (the Senate of Thailand) and the lower house (the House 
of Representatives of Thailand). The establishment of a cabinet, as an executive 
branch, is authorised to the PM and a number of positions as ministers, the minister 
of each ministry, vary depending on his discretion. The election system in Thailand 
includes three levels: national level (MPs, Senators), provincial level (Public 
Administrative Organisations: PAOs), and city (municipalities, special administrative 
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area) or sub-district (Subdistrict Administrative Organisations: SAOs) level. 
Accordingly, Thai political system is structured in three levels: central or national-
level government; provincial governments; and local governments constituted.  
In relation to the political system, Thailand’s administrative system is also divided 
into three levels: central administration, provincial administration, and local 
administration (see State Administration Act 1991). The central administration 
consists of ministries and departments. Provincial administration comprises branches 
of the central government (Provincial Administrative Units: PAUs). Some 
departments might have a branch in every province; some might have a branch 
covering several provinces. Local administration includes: PAOs, municipalities, 
SAOs, and special administrative area (e.g. Bangkok, Pattaya). Considering three 
systems (electoral, political, and administrative systems) together, sometimes the 
boundary of provincial administration is confusing. Thus, it should be noted that 
‘provincial administration’ in this research refers to the administration in, 
geographically speaking, a province. 
Further, although Krannich’s diagram (1979, p.514) depicting the politico-
administrative structure is somewhat obsolete, it adequately portrays the system. 
Figure 3.1 is amended from his work, showing the recent (around 1990s-2000s) 
politico-administrative structure in Thailand. The three following subsections 
elaborate Thailand’s politico-administrative contexts in three levels – national, 
provincial, local – based on Krannich’s framework. 
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Figure 3.1 Thailand's politico-administrative structure 
 




3.2.1.1 National level  
In principle, the relationship between the political structure (parliament and cabinet) 
and the administrative structure (central administrative units) is through the 
interaction of policy makers and policy implementers respectively (see Figure 3.1). 
Regardless of this tidy modern structure, however, Riggs (1966) points out that 
Thailand is a bureaucratic polity in which politics and administration are intertwined 
as he suggests (p.242): 
‘the great majority of those who reach the political pinnacle of cabinet 
rank emerge from careers within the bureaucracy, military and civil.’ 
From 1932 to 1970s, bureaucratic elites had dominated the government. Elections 
were at many times a process to legitimize those in power while many voters in 
provinces knew very little about election system (De Young, 1955). Instead of 
responding to their constituents, Riggs (1966, p.243) observes that ‘the Thai 
politician [whose career mostly starts in bureaucracy] is carried forward primarily by 
the dynamism of his personal quest for power’. 
This theory remained applicable to the case of Thailand until recently. By the 1980s, 
‘Thailand had transformed itself into the paladin of Southeast Asia’s capitalist take-
off’ (McVey, 2000, p.3). Hewison (1997, p.3) indicates that Riggs’s theory of 
bureaucratic polity had previously been a significant consensus in the study of Thai 
political system. However, he notices that this modernization approach has been 
challenged since the early 1980s drawing on two approaches: political economy 
approach and neo-pluralist and institutionalist approach. While the former 
emphasises on societal or class influences on the state; the latter focuses on the 
identification of various interest groups e.g. business, bankers, provincial elites 
(Hewison, 1997, pp.6-10). These two approaches however discuss one thing in 
common: the emergence of business in Thai political arena. For example, 
Laothamatas (Laothamatas, 1988, p. 452) interestingly draws a conclusion that ‘two 
new forms of political influence by business have increased remarkably: (1) direct 
participation in Parliament and the cabinet, both through elections and the support of 
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the parties, and (2) group-based lobbying or membership in the Joint Public- Private 
Consultative Committees (JPPCCs)’.  
Recent interventions of business into politics have indeed dramatically changed 
Thailand's political landscape. A prominent example of these interventions is the 
Thaksinization period in which Thaksin Shinawatra, a business-become-politician 
tycoon, dominates politics, bureaucracy, and business (see McCargo & Pathmanand, 
2005; Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004). Being one of the most popular prime ministers 
in Thai political history (see McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005; Pathmanand, 1998; 
Phongpaichit & Baker, 2008), he has personal relations with a number of senior 
bureaucrats and politicians through his telecommunication business network (Shin 
Corporations) and old-school ties (Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School). 
This partially enabled him to also be one of the most powerful prime ministers who 
undeniably brought on dramatic changes to Thai politics at all levels. He is perceived 
as not only ‘a new phenomenon in Thai politics (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2004, 
2008)’ and who is ‘going beyond the Thai state (Glassman (2004)’ but also ‘an 
opportunistic politician, for whom ideas are simply a means to an end (McCargo and 
Pathmanand, 2005). In any case, provincial and local politics has consequently 
become more connected to national politics than the past. At the national level, 
power between political elites has been restructured. 
Despite such arguments that the Thai bureaucratic polity has been changed 
(Hewison, 1997; McVey, 2000; Rock, 2000; Unger, 1998), some argue that it still 
exists in Thailand (Arghiros, 2001; Haque, 2010; Ockey, 2004). As mentioned 
earlier, Ockey (2004) insists that the bureaucratic polity still haunts Thai politics as 
the bureaucracy is still of Thaksin’s major concern. Haque (2010) emphasises that 
either civil or military bureaucrats still play substantial roles in Thai politics. The 
former plays their part in policy-making. The latter remains powerful as the 2006 
coup has shown. Also, Arghiros (2001, pp.20-21) suggests that ‘[I]t is evident that 
the rise of provincial businessmen-politicians has been at the expense of the power 
and control of the bureaucracy. … [However,] relations between the rural majority 
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and the state are largely unaltered’. Thus, it is arguable that the characteristics of 
bureaucratic polity persist in Thai politics to a certain extent. 
Not only the power structure of elites has been changed but the social structure on 
the ground has also been affected. By 1990s, the aurban-rural divide in Thai politics 
has been convincingly argued to be a central variable by Laothamatas (1996, 2000) 
and become a conventional set of belief in Thai politics. In his seminal work, 
Laothamatas (2000) categorises Thais into two groups: city (Muang) and rural 
(chonnabot). Each of them has their own ‘democracy’: urban democracy versus rural 
democracy. Middle class in the city values political ideology and votes for the party 
regarding its policies. Differently, rural people remain in nepotism system and votes 
for those who are in their cycles of friends and families. Until now, Laothamatas’s 
‘two democracies’ theory remains an essential ground to understand Thai politics.  
However, this urban-rural divide has been widely questioned (e.g. Kaewmano, 2011; 
Satitniramai, 2013b). Particularly, along with recent political changes e.g. 
Thaksinization (2001-2006), the 2006 military coup, and political unrests in the late 
2000s, the debate on Thai political landscape has been moved forward to a colour 
war – confrontation between those who wore yellow (originally anti-Thaksin) and 
red (originally pro-Thaksin) shirts. Conflicts between yellow and red shirts need 
attention from those who are interested in Thai contemporary politics. The divide, 
and each group, is sophisticated and rooted in various causes.  
At the beginning, red shirts were believed to be those who support Thaksin and 
yellow shirts were those who believe Thaksin corrupted and took absolute power 
(BBC News, 2012). Another belief which comes afterwards is that yellows are richer 
and better-off than reds. Besides, each group is labelled differently. For example, 
reds are labeled as ‘new leftist (BBC News, 2012)’ while yellows are ‘ultra-
nationalist (The Economist, 2011)’ or ‘royalists (Isra News, 2012)’. Still, as two 
groups have been developed (see Ewsriwong, 2010b, 2010c; Techapira, 2010a, 
2010b), it becomes more and more difficult to generalize, for example, the red shirts 
as Thaksin’s supporters since they could be ‘red Thaksin,’ ‘red UDD (United Front 
for Democracy Against Dictatorship),’ or ‘independent red’ (Prachathai, 2013).  
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Several researches attempt to identify who red and yellow shirts are. Thailand 
Development Research Institute (TDRI) finds that reds comprise not only the poor 
and rural but also the rich and urban (see BangkokBizNews, 2011). It also finds that 
it is very likely that yellows are those who live in Bangkok at any income level and 
those who live out of Bangkok with high income. In his survey research, Satitniramai 
finds that red shirts tend to be farmers, labourers, and informal labour while yellow 
shirts tend to be government officials, public enterprise officers, and merchants (see 
Prachathai, 2010; Satitniramai, 2013a). Also, the yellows tend to be higher educated 
and earn more than the reds but, considering poverty line of Thailand’s National 
Statistics Office, neither of them is poor. Concluding from the survey, however, he 
finds that neither yellows nor reds are better-off in any of the criteria. Both yellows 
and reds actually comprise groups of various socio-economic statuses.  
Conflicts between yellows and reds have been investigated. As mentioned earlier, the 
divide starts from pro or against Thaksin. In their speech during the 2010 political 
unrest, some leaders of the UDD declared the ‘class war’. They called themselves 
and the reds ‘phrai (peasants, serfs)’ and the yellows ‘ammat (the noble, the lords)’. 
Seemingly, the leaders emphasized such war between rich (yellow) and poor (red) in 
attempt to gain support from large number of Thai population who are in poverty. 
Still, this appears to be a discourse constructed for political purposes. This discourse 
is argued by Teerawit (2010) emphasizing that the UDD’s class war is different from 
the one in Marxist approaches. Based on a socio-economic perspective, TDRI 
research concludes that yellow-red conflicts are not ‘class war’ as both groups 
comprise the rich and poor (see BangkokBizNews, 2011). Similarly, in her 
fieldwork, Lueng-aramsri finds that ‘being red’ is not related to socio-economic class 
either (see Khaosod, 2011).  
In fact, yellow-red conflicts are socio-political class struggles. As Winichakul (2010) 
further interprets the UDD’s discourse that:  
The UDD discourse of their struggles as the “phrai” against the “
ammat”reveals as much as belies the configuration of class and 
hierarchy in Thai context. … Phrai and its opposite, “ammat” (the 
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noble, the lords) in the UDD discourse targets the oppression and 
injustice due to social class and hierarchy such as the one in Thai 
political culture. The struggle of the Reds is a class war in this sense of 
the revolt of the downtrodden rural folks against the privileged social and 
political class, the “ammat.” 
Also, these conflicts could be the clash between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ middle class in 
Thailand. In his research, Mukdawijit suggests that those in rural areas have recently 
become the new middle class with more political awareness (see Prachathai, 2010). 
Concurrently, he suggests that yellows are the old middle class – urbanized, 
educated, economically well-off, and politically active. In contrast to a conventional 
belief that rural people are ignorant and poor, Mukdawijit evidently argues that these 
people earn more than the past and they are well-informed and educated. Some of 
them join the red shirts not because they are poor and simply bought off Thaksin’s 
populist policies. Rather, they are searching for their rights under democracy. His 
argument interestingly considers social, economic, and political aspects of class 
which could explain further who the red shirts are.  
Precisely, yellows and reds cannot easily be put in an either-or categorization such as 
rich/poor, urban/rural, and pro/against Thaksin. Each group in fact comprises people 
from various socio-economic statuses sharing a particular set of political believes. 
Their conflicts are on the basis of socio-political rather than socio-economic class 
struggles. Interestingly, the two colours have rarely been attached to any particular 
province. When colouring the Thai map with red colour on the provinces in which 
Thaksin’s parties won the seats, the North and the Northeast become mostly red (see 
The Nation, 2011). Indeed, some got to believe that rural residents in the poor north 
and northeast regions supported Thaksin and the anti-Thaksin group tended to 
represent middle class Thais, the military, bureaucrats, intellectuals, and people in 
the south (Prasertsuk, 2010, p.203). Still, should there be an attempt to claim that the 
region or the province is red or yellow by one side, the other side in the region would 
appear to counter such claim (Mydans, 2008). In other words, the movement of 
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yellow and red simultaneously occurred, and sometimes clashed, in many provinces. 
Thus, it cannot be simply judged that a province is yellow or red. 
As the Thaksinization went on, however, regional variation in Thai political 
landscape could not be ignored and this is related to the selection of the North in this 
research. Regarding recent election results, regional variation of Thai politics is 
prominent with two consistently pro-Thaksin regions (North, Northeast), the 
somewhat pro-Thaksin Central, the pro-Thaksin-turned-opposite Bangkok, and the 
consistently Thaksin-unwelcomed South. Three political parties (Thai Rak Thai, 
People’s Power Party, Pheu Thai Party) considered as Thaksin’s parties won most 
seats in the North in four recent general elections (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 Election results of Thaksin’s parties in 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2011 
Year Party's title Bangkok Central North Northeast South 
2001 Thai Rak Thai (TRT) 28 (37) 51 (87) 34 (40) 73 (138) 1 (54) 
2005 TRT 32 (37) 73 (89) 40 (40) 126 (136) 1 (54) 
2007 People’s Power Party (PPP) 6 (36) 38 (87) 36 (41) 75 (135) 1 (56) 
2011 Pheu Thai Party (PTP) 9 (33) 47 (82) 35 (36) 104 (126) 0 (53) 
x(y) = seats gained by Thaksin’s parties in the region (total number of seats available in the region) 
Source: Office of the Election Commission of Thailand, website 
 
 
Some scholars refer to the north as crucial strategic point of Thaksin’s political 
power (Pongsudhirak, 2008; A. Walker, 2007) perhaps because in recent elections 
Thaksin’s political parties simply gained most votes in the North (McCargo & Ukrit, 
2005). To stand on the firm ground of their political power, Thaksin’s parties 
particularly need to maintain their strong bond with the North since the region is 
Thaksin’s ‘electoral heartland (A. Walker, 2007)’. One of the attempts is to 
strengthen the sense of localism associated between Thaksin and the region. As 
Walker (2008, p. 96) states, one of the popular Thaksin’s party’s slogans ‘reflected 
this sentiment: The people of Chiangmai are proud. The Prime Minister is from 
Chiangmai. Thai Rak Thai is the only party.’’   
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Thaksin’s high popularity not only exists in the North but also the Northeast (A. 
Walker, 2007). After Thaksin took power in 2001, his popularity extended from the 
North to other regions particularly the Northeast. This is believed to be driven by the 
success of his populist policies e.g. ‘30-baht Universal Health Care Scheme’, ‘One 
Million, One Village’ and his decisive and immediate actions on, for example, drug-
dealing issue (Bangkok Post, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d). In the 2005 election, the TRT 
was hugely supported by both the North (Bangkok Post, 2005e; The Nation, 2004a) 
and the Northeast (The Nation, 2004b). Even after the 2006 coup, Thaksin’s 
popularity remained strong in both regions (The Nation, 2007a).  
Although not as much as in the North and the Northeast, the Central is also in favour 
of Thaksin’s parties as they won more than half seats in the region in 2001, 2005, 
and 2011. Despite less than half seats in 2007, it is possible that some parts of the 
Central consistently support Thaksin’s parties. In Bangkok, the TRT won most votes 
in 2001 and 2005. However, while Thaksin’s popularity was increasing at the time, 
more and more people in Bangkok were questioning his real intention on populist 
policies and were suspicious of his corrupt behavior. Instead of resisting the 2006 
coup claimed to eradicate the Thaksin regime, many Bangkokians welcomed the 
military intervention with flowers given to soldiers deployed on the streets.  In 2007 
and 2011, Thaksin’s parties rarely gained their seats in Bangkok possibly because 
Bangkokians’ fears of the return of Thaksin regime.  
The South has rarely been part of Thaksin’s popularity – his parties gained only one 
of 54, 54, 56 seats in 2001, 2005, 2007 respectively and none in 2011 – for several 
reasons. One reason, for example, could be his measures on the South insurgency 
and his decision on Tak Bai causing deaths of local people in Krue Se mosque 
(Bangkok Post, 2005a; the Nation, 2005b). Another reason could be that the South 
has always been in favour of the Democrat Party (The Nation, 2005a). Interestingly, 
this discussion of regional divide based on four election results (2001, 2005, 2007, 
2011) shows that the North is distinctive as a strategic region in Thai politics. This 
leads to the region selection which will be further clarified in Chapter 4. 
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In conclusion, to understand Thai contemporary politics, there are two major issues 
and one political figure of concern at the national level. The first issue is that Thai 
political elites are not limited to bureaucrats any longer. Interest groups have become 
nuanced and that it is difficult to distinguish, for example, bureaucrats, politicians 
and business from one another. The second is that one must always bear in mind that 
Thai politics has been explained in two-tiered democracies – city and rural. This 
explanation remains applicable to the nation but the colour war, which instigated by 
Thaksin political presence, must also be taken into account. Current nationwide 
confrontation has been shifted from rural and poor versus rich and urban to reds 
versus yellows. These coloured groups are far too complicated to put into any 
particular socio-economic categories. To simplify, they are pressure groups sharing a 
set of political believes e.g. leftists for reds, nationalists for yellows.  
Thaksin is definitely an unforgettable figure in Thai politics. To this date, he remains 
a debate topic in the country. Although academia suggests the debate go beyond the 
haunt of ‘Thaksin ghost (Ewsriwong, 2010)’, the possibilities remain questionable as 
he still plays a role in current politics. With all of these in mind, this research 
acknowledges that national politics could affect SIBD somehow. Perhaps either reds 
or yellows, whichever dominate the province’s politics, could drive the design of 
SIBD in the province. It is also possible that Thaksin or his governments would 
attempt to manipulate SIBD design.  
However, there is no evidence particularly from the media that Thaksinization has 
affected SIBD. Thaksin’s governments did provide a universal healthcare scheme 
and gained more popularity from this policy. However, SIBD or even social 
insurance policy has rarely been touched by his governments. Being businessman by 
nature, perhaps nine million insured persons are a less interesting number than the 
number of other groups in the country e.g. farmers, hourly-paid workers. Once he 
attempted to intervene in social insurance policy: he thought of spending the money 
in the SSF but that is far from intervention in SIBD decision making. More likely, 
members of Thaksin’s parties could patronize SIBD through their political 
connections in the province. Discussions in following chapters will provide further 
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understanding and empirical findings on these assumptions. Particularly, Chapter 6 
will assess evidence from the interviews related to these discussions. 
3.2.1.2 Provincial level 
As much of SIBD is organised at provincial level, the political and administrative 
traditions of this level need to be discussed. The current structure of Thailand’s 
provincial administration was started from 1932 when the absolute monarchy was 
changed into a constitutional monarchy (see earlier discussion in Section 3.2). The 
most powerful political group (Khana Ratsadon or the People’s Party) whose ideas 
became a blueprint of revolution were mostly educated in France. They brought 
political and administrative concepts from Europe, particularly France, to Thailand. 
For example, the group leader, Pridi Bhanomyong who after 1932 became a senior 
bureaucrat in the Ministry of Justice, took part in the drafting of several bills which 
were enacted afterwards. One of these bills was Administrative Structure Act 1933 
which outlined Thailand’s provincial administration.  
Indeed, one may argue that the origin of contemporary Thai provincial 
administration should be dated back to the Rama V reign (1868-1910). During his 
reign, Rama V modernized the country under pressure from the governments of 
Britain and France. Ministries and departments were arranged in a central 
administration; while regional (monton) and provincial (chung-wat) territories were 
set and governed by noblemen appointed by the king. However, the 1932 reform is 
the ground for the current structure of Thai provincial administration. It terminated 
the traditional system established by Rama V. The layers of government were 
decreased to three-tiers central, provincial and local. Civil servants were appointed 
by the central government to be provincial governors to replace noblemen.  
At the provincial level, although the Provincial Administrative Organisations (PAOs) 
are situated in each province, they rarely cooperate with the Provincial 
Administrative Units (PAUs). The PAOs, as local governments at the provincial 
level, are somewhat autonomous and have their own personnel and budget; whilst the 
PAUs as branches of central departments rigorously follow the decision and 
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regulations of the central offices. For example, the Chiang Mai SSRO as a provincial 
office of the SSO is mainly responsible for benefit delivery. It is not authorised to 
amend any rules or regulations. Contrarily, the Chiang Mai PAO could design their 
provincial policy and collect industrial tax imposition. This structure of Thai 
provincial administration is explained further by Arghiros (2001, p. 21): 
‘Compared to many states,…the Thai state is extremely strong and has 
effective reach into all provinces and districts, no matter how far they are 
from Bangkok. Despite never having been colonized, Thailand's provincial 
administration is reminiscent of the colonial apparatus of administrations 
established by the British in India and the French in Indochina. It was 
designed to ensure effective central control of rural areas… This heritage 
goes some way to explaining why...Thailand's experience with democratic 
decentralisation shares so much in common with former colonies 
elsewhere.’ 
The governor is similar to the Prefect in France in terms of being ‘the local command 
over all administrative activity over a given area (Panter-Brick, 1951, p. 245)’ which 
in Thailand is the province. However, the French influence only remained significant 
to Thai provincial administration until 2001. When Thaksin became the Prime 
Minister in that year, he declared the policy of regional empowerment which 
transformed the governors into the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). After this 
policy was implemented in 2003, technically the governors became directly under 
the control of the Prime Minister since Thaksin could relocate them at his discretion. 
Provincial politics of course involves more than professional bureaucracy (e.g. 
provincial governor and those who work in the PAUs). Being appointed from 
Bangkok, provincial bureaucrats need local connections to facilitate their work. 
These connections are links with politicians and business elites in the province. Co-
operation between them and bureaucrats are not new but what is new is the 
dominance of these provincial elites in the relationships (Ockey, 2000, p. 89). As 
mentioned earlier, they potentially emerge as new powerful elites in Thai 
contemporary politics, either at national or local level. Generally, provincial elites 
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comprise politicians and wealthy businessmen. Firstly, politicians in a province are 
not only ‘national’ but also ‘provincial’ and ‘local’ politicians. National politicians 
are those elected in general elections. To survive in any case, they have to channel 
the taxpayers’ money back to their home constituencies (Siamwalla, 2002, p. 127). 
For example, Banharn who became the prime minister in 1994 channelled ‘massive 
road construction projects’ to Suphanburi, his home constituency, transformed the 
province from remote area to a ‘modern’ province and apparently he gained huge 
local-level support (Nishizaki, 2008).  
Provincial politicians are those elected for PAO councils. Local politicians are those 
elected at sub-provincial level to administer either municipalities or TAOs. Many 
times provincial and local politicians are altogether perceived as local politicians 
(nak-gaan-Muang thong-thin). However, the clear line between them can be drawn 
regarding their constituencies: provincial politicians from provincial elections, local 
politicians from local (city or sub-district) elections. Interestingly, candidates at both 
levels are more likely to succeed if they are from affluent or elitist family or have 
some sort of connections with national politicians. As Haque (2010, p. 684) states 
that cronyism is evident in ‘the results of 2003–2004 local election in which the MPs 
and their relatives constituted 18.67 percent of the elected PAO Chairmen, while the 
remaining 81.33 percent of these Chairmen were represented by the entrenched 
politicians who served under the old system and were closed to local MPs’. In this 
sense, it is interesting that sub-national politics seemingly becomes a nursery for yet-
to-be national politicians. 
Secondly, business elites in the province, or Chao Pho (the Godfathers), are those 
with money and power (see particularly McVey, 2000). As Thailand grew into 
capitalist state, McVey (2000, p.16) observes that cash ‘has become the basis of 
provincial leaders’ followings, as money become more important in people’s lives’. 
Phongpaichit and Baker (2000) defines Chao Pho as ‘provincial business and local 
influence’ who may rise from two forms of business – public works contracting and 
illegal enterprise e.g. gambling, smuggling. Slightly different, Ockey (2000, p.81) 
explains the term Chao Pho as: those involved in crime (the closest meaning to the 
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English-language godfather), those whose fortune activity is legal but their methods 
are corrupt; and, those with decisive, charismatic and generous style of leadership. 
Chantornvong (2000) also discusses local godfathers (chao pho) as those who have a 
character of nak leng and phu mi itthiphon. A nak leng, as Chantornvong (p.54) 
suggests, is knowledgeable about or highly preoccupied with something and has to 
be daring, courageous, honest, and manly. However, a nak leng’s influence is only 
limited to his immediate community. Another type of chao pho is phu mi itthiphon 
(man of influence) who can denote power and exert pressure over government.  
The term chao pho seems varied in its meaning but its core concept refers to those 
affluent and influential people who can put pressures on government, at whichever 
level, to a certain extent. Some of them may become politicians and some may 
remain in business with regular interventions in the government’s policy-making. 
Still, it should be noted that chao pho is not something newly emerged from 
Thailand’s recent economic development. As McVey (2000, p.14) stresses, the chao 
pho’s presence ‘draws attention to certain persistent facts of Thai life: that 
patraonage is important; that justice and protection are to be found more in personal 
relationships than in the law. They remind us that officials have high status but may 
in fact be irrelevant to power, or may wield power but by no means in the interest of 
the state’. Thus, this reinforces what Arghiros (2001) suggests that while Thai 
politics at the national level has been changed its provincial politics remains largely 
unchanged. 
3.2.1.3 Local level  
At the local level, four types of local governments – municipality, Subdistrict 
Administrative Organisation (SAO), Bangkok, Pattaya – share the same politico-
administrative structure (see Figure 3.1). The type of local government varies by 
population and tax imposition capacity. Bangkok and Pattaya are special areas due to 
their high density of population and high capacity for tax imposition. In comparison 
to SAOs, municipalities are higher in both terms. Although local governments are 
supposed to be autonomous, there are some employees assigned by central 
government in order to support the performance of local governments. Previously, 
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employees in all sections were assigned from the MoI but, recently, local 
governments recruit all staff themselves, with the exceptions of the Chief 
Administrator and the Deputy Chief positions.  
In the past, local governments in Thailand were expected to play as role of a local 
administrator (Krannich, 1979). The elected local politicians were expected to 
perform housekeeping functions (the role of pau baan – father of the house) rather 
than playing politics (see Krannich, 1979, p.512). This situation has recently 
changed. Local politicians increasingly not only look after their residents but also 
relatively more involved in political negotiations among interest groups. In an 
attempt to enhance authority and autonomy of local government, the Plan and 
Processes of Decentralisation Act, 1999, was enacted. However, although personnel 
and financial autonomy has been legislated, it has been implemented slowly for 
many reasons e.g. political instabilities, the 1997 economic crisis, and central 
government’s attempt to maintain control (see Puang-Ngam, 2000). 
3.2.2 Administrative reforms: contexts, history and recent policies 
To illustrate Thai administrative reforms, this section is presented in three analytical 
frameworks: international contexts, historical background and the late 1990s 
decentralisation. While the first two topics outline contexts and background, the last 
topic draws the focus of administrative reform in this research. Both the timeframe 
and the reform policies of interest are specified. 
3.2.2.1 International contexts 
Recent administrative reform efforts in various countries are predominantly based on 
managerial approach or the New Public Management (Polidano & Hulme, 1999). 
England stands out as ‘the model case in terms of the reception and implementation 
of the neo-managerial types of reform of the late twentieth century’ with New 
Zealand equally accepted as another model (Peters & Pierre, 2003, p. 467). Thailand 
applies some of the lessons learned from the models and other Western nations 
(Haque, 2007). Four sets of factors of administrative reform in developing countries 
– political, economic, strategic, and international – are unsurprisingly applicable to 
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the Thai case (Schneider & Heredia, 2003, p. 2). Political factors are resulted from ‘a 
process of re-writing the contract between elected politicians and bureaucratic 
officials (Haggard, 1995, cited in Schneider and Heredia, 2003, p.2)’. Economic 
factors include fiscal crises and constraints pressuring government to reform. 
Strategic factors refer to strategic choices of state reformers, such as policy design 
and coalition building. International factors are particularly international financial 
institutions which can have influence in domestic reform initiatives through aid 
conditionalities. 
Although never been under direct colonial rule, Thailand have been through the three 
stages of administrative evolution – traditional bureaucratic model, developmental 
model, and NPM model – similar to many developing countries (Haque, 2007, p. 
1300). Thai administration evolved in line with the traditional bureaucratic model 
when Western countries imposed colonial rules on their neighbouring countries. The 
developmental model was adopted along with the aid from Western countries in 
1950s. Similar to most developing countries, it began to pursue state-led 
socioeconomic development, and restructured their bureaucracy in favour of 
development-oriented public administration. The NPM model was introduced in 
recent years.  
In the past, administrative reform efforts in Thailand had been mostly unsuccessful 
with similar reasons to some South Asian countries (see Khan, 2002) and Arab states 
(see Jreisat, 1988). The reform lacked of political leadership, strong pressure groups 
favouring reform, and a democratic governance system (Khan, 2002, p. 73). It 
experienced ‘conventional limitations of bureaucracy, the copying of Western 
administrative rationality in form if not in substance, and insufficient attention paid 
to traditional, cultural, religious, and political contexts of administration’ (Jreisat, 
1988, p. 85). Recently, with political and international factors, the efforts in Thailand 
became relatively successful in terms of structural and procedural changes. As a 
result of the 1997 economic crisis, Thailand received aid from the IMF and World 
Bank and reformed its financial and administrative system. In 2000s, Thaksin’s 
political leadership managed to restructure Thai administration based on the NPM 
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model. However, similar to some Southeast Asian countries, it has not been easy to 
apply NPM and see drastic change of market-oriented administration in the state-
centric structure (Haque, 2007, p. 1313). While political and international factors 
reinforce the reform, bureaucratic politics still plays substantial roles in the reform 
design. 
To understand administrative reform further, one needs to understand the nature of 
politics and administration in the country. The Thai administration could be 
summarized as below, 
‘Since the late nineteenth century, Thai administration had been highly 
centralized. Policies flowed from Bangkok to field offices, where 
officials collided with the local agents of other ministries. Policy 
coordination either at the center or at local levels was weak. ... Within 
ministries, departments retained autonomy and often failed to work with 
other departments.’ (Unger, 2003, p. 188) 
Also, Thai bureaucracy encompasses six cultural traits: hierarchy; personalism; 
arrogance and disdain for outsiders; paternalism; security; and the pursuit of sanuk 
[having fun] (Chai-anan, 1987, cited in Painter, 2006, p. 29)’. Although it has been 
reformed under the NPM umbrella in an attempt to lessen these traits, they still seem 
to be embedded in Thai bureaucracy. Similarly, Unger (2003, p. 190) suggests that 
‘many of the problems that beset the Thai bureaucracy reflect its Weberian features: 
red tape, excessive rigidity, and a lack of accountability.’ Concurrently, instable Thai 
politics is characterized by patron-client relationship (J. C. Scott, 1972), money 
politics (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1995), urban-rural democracy gaps (Laothamatas, 
1996) and business politics (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004). It is not uncommon that 
politics and bureaucracy attempt to dominate each other in administrative reform 
strategy (Aucoin, 1990). Thailand is one example of such situations 
(Bowornwathana, 1994). Particularly, Schneider and Heredia (2003, p. 3) suggest 
that the prospects for administrative reform in Thailand are dim as the bureaucratic 
and political elites are fused. 
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Moreover, administrative reforms are implemented in Thailand in various forms and 
approaches. Similarly to many developing countries, recent administrative reform in 
Thailand not only relates to New Public Management approach (NPM) but also 
embraces other strands of reform which are not related to the NPM. These non-NPM 
reforms include capacity-building, controlling corruption, political decentralisation 
and local empowerment (Polidano & Hulme, 1999, p. 124). However, it is not the 
purpose of this research to look at all strands elaborately. Only two types of reform 
are of interest in this research. One is the NPM reform which directly affects social 
insurance administration. Another is political decentralisation which provides 
understanding in changes of political power of stakeholders in provincial SIBD.  
3.2.2.2 Historical background 
The history of Thai administrative reform has been consistently and extensively 
reviewed (e.g. Bowornwathana, 2008; Connors, 1999; Hewison, 1993; McCargo & 
Pathmanand, 2005; Ockey, 2004; Painter, 2006). To summarise, Thailand’s 
administrative reform can be explained with reference to three key moments of 
political change: the 1932 regime shift, the 1997 people’s constitution, and the 2001 
political arrival of Thaksin as the prime minister. The 1932 overthrow of the absolute 
monarchy could be identified as the beginning of Thai democratization (as discussed 
earlier in Section 3.2). However, it ‘had not been a popular uprising, but an uprising 
of the bureaucracy, for the bureaucracy (Ockey, 2004, p. 143)’. According to 
Bowornwathana (1994), the Thai polity had been more bureaucratic than democratic 
as politicians had failed to institutionalise the control over the bureaucracy (p.159). It 
was ‘traditionally dominated by bureaucrats but with cycles of military rule and 
representative government (p.157)’. Therefore, after the abolition of absolute 
monarchy, Thailand was labelled as a ‘bureaucratic polity’ where bureaucrats were 
the most powerful actors in politics (Riggs, 1966). Although this concept is declared 
to be dead by many scholars (see the full list in Ockey, 2004, p.143), it ‘continues to 
haunt scholars of Thai studies (Ockey, 2004, p. 143)’ and thus, it remains part of 
administrative characteristics of Thailand. 
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In 1997, the people’s Constitution was inaugurated causing dramatic political and 
administrative changes in Thailand (Bowornwathana, 2006; Connors, 1999; 
Montesano, 2002; Ockey, 2004). It was amended in 2007 by the civilian government 
being appointed after the 2006 military coup. It aims to reduce the power of ‘strong 
prime minister’ which was implicitly empowered in the 1997 Constitution. 
Particularly, it is believed to prevent Thailand from sustaining a strong prime 
minister like Thaksin. Also, as usually happened after successful coups, the existing 
constitution would be terminated and the new one would be drafted to exempt all 
charges relating to prosecution of the coup. However, most contents in the 2007 
Constitution remain the same as its original version. Despite being replaced by the 
2007 Constitution, the 1997 Constitution has been considered as ‘a central feature of 
Thai political life (Montesano, 2002, p. 171)’ and culminated in ‘the belief that 
effective constitutional engineering can overcome all the problems in Thai politics 
(Ockey, 2004, p. 153)’. Also, as Bowornwathana (2006, p. 30) states, ‘Thailand’s 
long tradition of a centralised system of government has been shaken, at least on 
paper, by … the 1997 Constitution. … [Accordingly,] the state shall give autonomy 
to localities in accordance with the principle of self-government and the will of the 
people’. However, this goal is yet to be reached due to Thaksin’s administrative 
reform. 
Thaksin’s government tenure is sometimes termed by scholars (e.g. Bowornwathana, 
2004; McCargo & Ukrit, 2005; Mutebi, 2004b; Painter, 2006; Pasuk & Baker, 2004) 
as ‘Thaksinization’. His administration (2001-2006) ‘has reversed the process of 
state autonomisation by introducing administrative reform that further consolidates 
political power and government authority in the hands of a single person: Prime 
Minister Thaksin himself (Bowornwathana, 2005, p. 38)’. He applied business 
concepts into Thai administration using the approach called ‘A Country is My 
Company’ approach (see Bowornwathana, 2004). He rewarded and relocated 
politicians and bureaucrats as if he was the super CEO of Thailand company. 
Consequently, under Thaksinization, the Thai polity has been less influenced by 
bureaucrats than in other periods.  
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Acknowledging that most powers remained in the hands of bureaucrats and 
ministers, Thaksin attempted to establish a more centralised and politically-managed 
system of ‘spoils distribution’ and to ‘break down existing forms of bureaucratic 
power, rather than merely to manage them for his own ends’ (Painter, 2006, p. 34). 
In 2002, Thaksin inaugurated the Bureaucratic Restructuring and the National 
Administration Acts considered as ‘Thailand’s biggest bureaucratic shakeup in more 
than a century (Mutebi, 2003, p. 107). Thus, bureaucratic power has been dispersed 
along with the intervention of Thaksin and his cliques – either business partners or 
politicians – in politics. However, according to Ockey (2004), while capitalists have 
been more involved in Thai politics; ‘bureaucrats retain considerable leverage in 
their relationship with politicians (p.147)’ as ‘the power of the bureaucracy was 
strengthened as some of its members [e.g. technocrats, autonomous organisations] 
were given additional power over members of the regime (p.153)’ under the 1997 
Constitution. However, Thaksin was ousted in 2006 by the military coup whose 
claim was to abolish corruption under Thaksin’s regime. 
There might be the question whether the 2006 coup should be included as key 
political changes to Thailand’s administrative reform. It is apparent, however, that 
this incident froze Thailand’s political development. Instead of moving forward, 
political struggles after 2006 have been just pulling-and-hauling among interest 
groups. Although Thaksin’s government was officially ousted by the military coup in 
2006, the Thaksinization is still influential in Thai politics and administration. Some 
political struggles and turmoil after the 2006 coup (e.g. the clashes between the 
United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) and the People’s Allies for 
Democracy (PAD) in 2008) are examples of how Thaksin remains powerful in the 
country. Also, after four civilian governments during the period of 2006-20116, the 
government elected in 2011 was run by Yingluck Shinnawatra, Thaksin’s sister, who 
is believed to be under his supervision. Thus, it is fair to say that, until now, 
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administrative reform in Thailand has remained largely the same since 
Thaksinization. 
3.2.2.3 The late 1990s decentralisation 
This research focuses on the decentralisation after the promulgation of the 1997 
Constitution which from now will be termed as ‘the late 1990s decentralisation’. 
Indeed, Thaksinization has caused enormous political changes in Thailand and it 
could be a critical point of change for decentralisation in Thailand. However, he has 
actually drawn the system back in a centralising direction. This is a case of ‘old wine 
in new bottles’ as, for example, Thaksin recentralised the power in the guise of  a 
managerialist approach (Mutebi, 2004a). It somehow made the country go backward 
to a strong patron-client society. In contrast, the basic dynamic for imposing attempts 
to decentralisation and diversity, which draw on international norms, appears to 
continue to be the 1997 Constitution. This Constitution fundamentally changed both 
the political and bureaucratic systems of the country. It emphasised, at least on paper, 
citizen’s political participation, decentralisation, and customer-oriented public 
services. Therefore, this research considers the 1997 Constitution, instead of 
Thaksinization, as the scaffolding of Thailand’s decentralisation. In other words, it 
remains the reference point to which Thaksin has reacted. 
Decentralisation in this research is defined as ‘any transfer of the authority [and 
resource] to plan, make decisions and manage public functions (Conyers, 1983, p. 
101)’. It refers to the administrative reform comprising of: decentralisation from 
central department (the SSO) to its field offices (the SSROs), decentralisation from 
central government to a prefect in provincial administration (provincial governor), 
and decentralisation from central government to sub-provincial governments (local 
governments). Firstly, in relation to decentralisation in SIA, the SSO is obliged to 
give more power and money to the SSRO as a result of post-1997 administrative 
reform which is influenced by New Public Management (NPM) and Good 




Secondly, in decentralised provincial administration, the central government is 
required to provide more money for the provincial governor (see Decree of Good 
Governance, 2003). Central departments and ministries are required to give 
particular authorities to the governor. This policy of Integrative Provincial 
Administration (IPA), is based on a business, or managerialist, approach (the 
governor is the CEO of the province). It is designed and implemented by  Thaksin to 
recentralise control over the provinces. Thirdly, in decentralised local administration, 
central government is required to give both money and power to local governments. 
This, hereafter labelled ‘localisation’, is a longer process than the first two and can 
be traced back to before the 1997 Constitution. For example, the Tambon 
Administrative Organisation Act was enacted in 1993 to empower the SAOs in terms 
of authority and resource (see Krongkaew, 1995). However, the 1997 Constitution 
has more impacts on localisation. It is expected to secure that ‘[I]n the long run, 
autonomisation of local governments will have a significant impact on the unitary 
administrative system of the Thai Government (Bowornwatthana, 2006)’. 
It should be noted that these three areas of decentralisation are still developing. As 
Bowornwatthana (2000, p. 395) suggests,  
‘…one has to keep in mind that Thailand has a long way to go. 
Governance reform for a civil polity has just started. Whether the change 
process will be gradual or volatile depends on Thailand's ability to blend 
traditional elite preferences with the new governance values.’  
Therefore, the late 1990s decentralisation is considered as an impetus to diversified 
SIBD. On the one hand, it brings in a complexity of SIA in particular along with 
political and administrative changes in general. Being more complex, central-local 
relation in SIA has been relatively tense. On the other hand, it gives more resources 
and authority to the SSRO. Provincial governors and local governments have become 
alternative resource providers. Also, the bureaucratic reform grants more authorities 
to regional offices of any central department which in this case are the SSROs.  
Last but not least, two issues should be reinstated. Firstly, this research focuses on 
administrative reform in decentralization form which is broader than the NPM-based 
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reform practices. NPM is undeniably the outstanding approach of the reform in 
Thailand. It particularly affects the procedure of service delivery at the provincial 
level. However, the aim of this research is to study the diversity of SIBD which 
appears to be a result of not only the NPM but also political decentralisation. 
Decentralisation is thus referred to the reform in SIA, ProA and LoA. Secondly, this 
research immediately searches for the association between decentralisation and 
diversity of service delivery. It did not start from the extent to which the reform 
exists (already argued in Krongkaew, 1995; Rohitarachoon & Hossain, 2012) or 
whether public responsiveness of government agency is actually a result of 
decentralization (already argued in Haque, 2010).  
Perhaps some question the result of Thailand’s administrative reform. As Jreisat 
(2002, p. 163) states, ‘[A]dministrative reform in developing countries is often 
described in pessimistic terms, not only because the results are sparse but also 
because the options for reform policies are increasingly narrowing.’ However, as 
Kickert suggests, this research would argue that: 
‘It is ... too ‘pessimistic’ to judge these small, incremental and gradual 
changes as ‘almost nothing’. It is unnecessarily ‘pessimistic’ to have the 
dichotomous view that either institutional patterns remain unchanged, or 
there is an abrupt radical change. ... this all-or-nothing dichotomy is not a 
fruitful view of the complex empirical reality of reforms (Kickert, 2011, 
p. 803).’ 
3.3 Social insurance in Thailand 
Social insurance policy in Thailand could be broadly understood using two time 
periods: policy introduction (1930s-1989) and policy implementation (1990-present). 
In addition, the introduction could be sub-divided into three time periods: 
introducing social insurance (1930s-1958), the first launch (1954-1957), and the 
negotiations (1958-1989). Originally, the concept of social security was firstly 
introduced into Thailand in the 1930s (Department of Public Affairs, 1960), after the 
political change from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy, but it was not 
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adopted as a policy because of the political instability. In 1940, the then Prime 
Minister decided to establish social security policies which he prioritised as part of 
the implementation of poverty alleviation measures. In order to achieve this, the 
Department of Public Affairs (DPA) was established under the Ministry of Interior 
(MoI). Two years later, Thailand’s first Social Security Act (SSA) was drafted and 
enacted in 1954. Although its name is ‘social security’, its details refer to ‘social 




The concept of social insurance was ineffectively portrayed to Thais and failed to be 
adopted as a policy before 1954 (Department of Public Affairs, 1960, p.8). However, 
despite being negatively criticized by stakeholders - e.g. workers, employers, private 
insurance companies, medical staffs (Department of Public Affairs, 1960, p.8), the 
first draft of Thailand’s SSA was adopted in 1954. The first SSA was enacted and a 
new organisation – Division of Social Security – was established as a particular 
government unit operationalising social security. However, by 1957, the parliament 
was forced to stall its implementation because of increasing resistance. This period of 
1954-1957 is therefore named here ‘the first launch’.   
Between 1958 and 1989, negotiations between actors occurred in order to re-
legitimise the social security approach. Particularly between 1981 and 1988, several 
social security bills were drafted, but no decisive steps were taken. With the rapidly 
changing political, economic and social conditions in the 1980s, pressure built for the 
government to pass a social security law and in 1988, five social insurance bills were 
submitted to the parliament for consideration. A parliamentary committee merged the 
five drafts into a single draft and despite the opposition from the senate, the 
parliament unanimously passed the Act on 11 July 1990. The political decision was a 
historical event in the country’s long struggle for a social security law (Schramm, 
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 In Thai, the two terms are also differently written. While ‘social security’ is literally ‘kwam munkong 
tang sungkom’; ‘social insurance’ is ‘prakan sungkom’. However, the ambiguity remains as the 
government often translate the term ‘prakan sungkom’ into ‘social security’. Thus, it should be 
noted that ‘social insurance’ will be referred to ‘prakan sungkom’ throughout this dissertation except 
for the organisation title e.g. Social Security Office, Social Security Regional Office. 
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2001, p. 3). The SSA was revised, pushed forward by a group of MPs, and finally 
implemented in 1990, three decades after the first draft.  
Subsequently, the implementation period occurred from 1990 until the present and 
serves as the main focus for this research. After the prolonged struggle of policy 
introduction, Thailand’s social insurance policy was eventually implemented in 
1990. A new organisation, the Social Security Department, was founded in the 
Ministry of Interior with the basic missions were to change people’s perception 
towards social insurance, and to establish the working process of three benefit 
deliveries: injury and sickness, invalidity, and maternity (Chittichanont, 1996).  
Responsibility for the Thai social insurance system has remained with the 
Department ever since. However, during an administrative reform in 1993, it was 
reorganised into a unit under the control of the Ministry of Labour (MoL), namely 
the Social Security Office (SSO). In addition, the SSO’s regional offices (SSROs) 
were established to deliver the SIBs in a uniform manner nationwide. In other words, 
to deliver the SIBs, each SSRO inevitably operates in compliance with three systems: 
budget, planning, and administrative.  
Although social insurance has been implemented in Thailand for two decades (1990-
present), its effectiveness has been questionable. The SSO indicates that the obstacles 
include; inertia of bureaucracy, lack of specialists and competent personnel, and a 
rigid budget system (Srichatrapimook, 2004). However, Sri-Dhamruk (1993) argues 
that, in fact, after the SSA was implemented, the problems of social insurance 
provision are more a matter of complexity of: service procedure, low quality of 
service in the incorporated hospitals, and employers’ avoidance of paying 
contributions and work welfare provisions. Additionally, since the SSO is in charge 
of managing the SSF budget which totaled 364,973 million Baht (£7,299,460,000) at 
the end of 2005, sometimes politicians show policy intent to spend the money on 
purposes different from social insurance objectives (BangkokBizNews, 2009). Not 
only do policymakers try to redirect the money, but bureaucrats in the SSO may 
inefficiently spend some of the SSO’s budget, for instance on business trips to 
foreign countries (KomChadLuek, 2007).  
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There have been several attempts to identify causes of such inefficiency. Some 
analysts indicate that the bureaucratic structure of the SSO is a root cause of 
management problems and suggest that the SSO be reformed into an autonomous 
organisation (Prachachat Thurakit, 2007). The SSO also presented the idea of 
employing business professionals to manage the fund (Reecharoen, 1997). 
Nonetheless, the idea of decentralising service delivery and authority to the 
established local governments has never been discussed directly. Rather, although it 
is not an intent to reform the SIB delivery system, the SSRO has indirectly gained 
more freedom due to the amendment of the Constitution in 1997 and the enactment 
of the Decree of Good Governance in 2003. The Constitution 1997 emphasised 
decentralisation and appeared to support accountability, transparency, open 
government and emphasising a less important central government (Bowornwattana 
2008). The Decree of Good Governance, 2003, specified that delivery agencies must 
have enough jurisdiction in performing their duties and should, whenever 
appropriate, cooperate with other agencies in providing the services. Thus, 
interestingly, the way the SSROs implement the decentralisation policy is a key part 
of analysis in this research. 
3.3.1 International principles and contexts 
Social insurance in Thailand is based on the general international principles: the 
system is contributory and compulsory; a contribution fund has been established, 
namely the Social Security Fund (SSF), and the excess amount after paying benefits 
will be invested in the financial market; benefit rates are income-related and depend 
on contributory records; and, industrial injury benefit is paid by employers only 
(TDRI, 2006). Although the social insurance systems of several countries were 
reviewed before the system was established (Department of Public Welfare 1960; 
Department of Public Welfare, 1960; Division of Social Security, 1962), Thailand’s 
social security administration seems to be most influenced by the structure of 
German system (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992). A special unit (SSO) 
with the tri-partite board (consisting of employers, employees and the government) is 
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responsible for the system, and its branches (SSROs) are responsible for benefit 
delivery.  
In comparison to East Asian welfare state (see Peng & Wong, 2010), Thai social 
insurance is inclusive and individualistic. Firstly, social insurance in Thailand has 
become more inclusive than the past. It has gradually been expanded to include 
workers in other employment sectors and self-employed workers by providing 
voluntary social insurance. However, while its pattern of development is similar to 
Peng and Wong’s ‘inclusive’ category (Japan, Korea and Taiwan) the reasons for 
social insurance enhancement in Thailand are not democracy and national 
homogeneity as suggested by Peng & Wong (2010, p. 660). While the bottom-up 
democratic political pressure compelled the government to enlarge social insurance 
in the three sample countries, inclusive social insurance in Thailand is mainly driven 
by the government. Secondly, Thai society seems to be more individualistic due to 
the strong belief in Buddhism
8
 (Piker, 1968) which might imply that Thailand should 
follow the pattern of individualistic social protection. However, Thailand’s social 
insurance differs greatly from this pattern as the sense of ‘we-ness’ in Thailand is 
weaker (see Piker, 1968) than the three countries (Hong Kong, Singapore, China) in 
Peng and Wong’s individualistic category. 
Statistically, Thailand seems to be more typical of Asian developing countries in 
terms of: low social insurance coverage and low public spending on social security 
(see Table 3.1). Although the coverage of Thailand’s social insurance is expanding, it 
is still very low compared to other countries. In Southeast Asia, Singapore’s social 
security covers 58.1% of the labour force which is the highest number of the region; 
the smallest number, around 10%, is in Indonesia; Thailand’s figure is 19.5% which 
is the second smallest (Asher, 2002). However, in 2008, the number of insured 
persons in Thailand increased to 9.3 million equating to 25% of the total number of 
workforce (37.15 million) (Academic Division of Department of Employment, 2009) 
and reflecting the expansion of social insurance coverage.  Finally, although public 
                                                             
8
 Piker (1968) suggests that Buddhist society is individualistic based on the teaching in Dhamapada 
(cited in Piker, 1968, p.781), "By oneself is evil done; By oneself one suffers; By oneself evil is left 
undone; By oneself one is purified". 
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spending on social security in Thailand is increasing, it is still comparatively low, 
3.7% of GDP was spent on social security in Thailand (Croissant, 2004, p. 508). 
 





(% of total labour force) 
Public spending on social security**  
(% of total central government expenditure) 
2000 1972-9 1980-9 1990-2000 
Singapore 58.1 1.56 1.47 2.84 
Malaysia 54.7 3.11 3.99 4.50 
Philippines 20-25 2.36 1.46 2.79 
Thailand 19.5 3.79 3.06 3.74 
Indonesia 10 n/a n/a n/a 
* Asher (2000, p.74) 
** Croissant (2004, p.508) 
 
 
3.3.2 Political-economic background 
As discussed earlier, there are three levels of administration – central, provincial, 
local – in Thailand. However, in this section, the background will be further 
explained at only two levels - national and provincial – because local administration 
is hardly related to SIA. Local governments are authorised to deliver social 
assistance, not social insurance benefits. They are involved in SIA only if the SSRO 
requests it. 
3.3.2.1 National-level 
At the national level, the Thai social insurance system has been shaped regarding the 
ILO principle. It is thus similar to the typical social security administrative structure 
suggested by Dixon (1999, p. 5). Also, Thailand’s national SIA could be considered 
as a hybrid of the German and British systems. According to the pre-1990 documents 
which framed social insurance in Thailand, social insurance in Germany was 
identified as the very first model of social insurance (Department of Public Affairs, 
1960, 1970) and Britain considered as one of the best social security system in the 
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world (Department of Public Affairs, 1960, 1970; Division of Social Security, 1973). 
Undeniably, the Thai system evolved learning from many more lessons from other 
countries around the world (e.g. Division of Social Security, 1962) but these two 
countries’ concepts appear at its core. Consequently, in 1990, a tripartite board 
(Social Security Committee: SSC) has been set as the policy maker of social 
insurance with fifteen members (five government representatives, five employer 
representatives, and five employee representatives). Also, the SSO has been 
established as a policy implementer. 
In principle, each sector – government, employer, employee – in the tripartite board 
is expected to be active. Ideally, according to the German principle, SIA should be 
self-administered and depoliticized (Clasen, 1994). Employers and employees should 
be the main actors responsible for the administration and the state should facilitate 
SIA with the least possible intervention. However, the Thai system does not function 
in this way for many reasons which will be clarified in the following order: 
government, employer, and employee. 
Firstly, the government appears to dominate the tripartite board. Similar to other 
Southeast Asian countries, SIA in Thailand was the result of a combination of 
politics and the market but the Thai government had relatively ‘not left all their fates 
to the market [i.e. employers, employees] (Crone, 1993, p. 64)’. The government 
hardly implements or listens to suggestions from the SSC members (Buddhadilok, 
2003, p. 59). Further, the government perceived social insurance as another financial 
resource (ASTV, 2006) and sometimes suggested policies which misused social 
insurance contributions e.g. buying rice for insured persons (BangkokBizNews, 
2009), supporting social assistance (Daily News, 2011) or clearing public teachers’ 
debts (ASTV, 2008). Instead of facilitating SIA, thus, the government overlooks the 
SSC’s authorities and even takes over decision making on the SSF spending.  
Like the British system, SIA is designated to a single government department. The 
Social Security Office (SSO), under the control of the Ministry of Labour (MoL), is a 
government organisation which is responsible for the day-to-day functioning of SIA. 
Their public image is believed to be stable (mun-khong) and reliable (na-chue-thue) 
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(Singkiphorn et al, 2007) but they, as an administrator of the system, have 
occasionally been questioned on their transparency (see Matichon, 2011; Muennoo, 
2010; Thairath, 2011). Some of their spending plan was criticized as overspending, 
such as 100 million baht (£2m) for SSO public relations (Matichon, 2008), 16 
million baht (£320,000) for value-added ID card project (Charoenwongsak, 2010), 
100 million baht (£2m) for the SSC election (Matichon, 2008), or 2,800 million baht 
(£56m) for MIS installation (PostToday, 2007). These government interventions in 
social insurance seem complied with what Hewison (2005) suggests, Thailand 
encompasses the characteristics of ‘crony capitalism’ which is referred to ‘a range of 
meanings – weak corporate and state governance, inadequate institutions, moral 
hazard, corruption/rent-seeking/patronage and resource misallocation (p.311)’. 
Secondly, it is necessary to understand the role of employers in Thailand in general 
before discussing their roles in social insurance in particular. This could be explained 
in two separated time; before and after 1997 (see Figure 3.2), the year in which East 
Asian economic crisis
9
 occurred. This crisis not only impacted economic and social 
development of the country but also challenged business sector to rethink about their 
roles in politics (Hewison, 2005). Before 1997, employers or business sector played a 
role as merchants following the government’s policy and financially supporting 
political parties (see Baker & Phongpaichit, 2009). After 1997, their role has changed 
into businessmen who are sometimes directly involved in national politics and 
policymaking. These businessmen accumulated wealth either legally or illegally and 
had influence on provincial politics. The articles in McVey’s (2000) discuss their 
roles in at least two respects. One considers them as Chao Pho (godfather) whose 
sources of power varied. Another considers them as emerging provincial elites whose 
influence may not be limited in a particular province. Then, it went further in 2001 
when Thaksin Shinnawatra, a telecommunication tycoon, got his landslide victory in 
the general election. The new Thai political era – the ‘business of politics’ (Pasuk & 
Baker, 2004) – had been ignited and the business sector has not been easily separated 
                                                             
9
 This economic crisis is sometimes referred to as ‘Tom Yum Kung crisis’ since it started from the 
collapse of financial market in Thailand. 
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from politics since then. In other words, ‘capitalists were buying influence and taking 
over political parties (Connors, 1999, p. 204)’. 
 
Figure 3.2 Employers in Thailand 
 
 
Employers are involved in SIA in two ways: direct and indirect. Directly, five 
employer representatives are nominated and elected by members of employer 
organisations. It is unclear how these representatives perform their roles in the Social 
Security Committee (SSC) but it is likely that the employer representatives are not 
influential to the SSC’s decision making because of two reasons (Buddhadilok, 2003, 
p. 60). One is that they may focus too much on their personal interests so that the 
government discerns their opinions. Another is that they may not have enough 
related knowledge or experience to get their voices heard by other SSC members. 
Indirectly, employers can choose to either pressure the government’s policymaking 
through their interest groups or become a policymaker – or politician – themselves. 
As mentioned earlier, employers who become national politicians could be 
influential on SIA through the government. Although it is difficult to conclude 
whether this actually happens, it is worth noting that employers could employ their 
political power over SIA.  
Thirdly, employee organisations, i.e. trade unions, in Thailand are not as strong as in 
Germany due to historical and cultural development. Culturally, a sense of gratitude 
(ka-tan-yu) has been strongly emphasised in Thai society (Arghiros, 2001). 
Employees are expected to be grateful to the employers who are their job and welfare 
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providers. Before the revolution in 1932, workers in noble families were considered 
as dependents. Although liberty and freedom were emphasised after the abolition of 
absolute monarchy in 1932, this perception was still embedded in the society. The 
situation was slightly changed in 1973 when student movements arose. Such 
movements included cooperation between the two interest groups – students and 
labours – which aimed for basic social welfare and the victory of this demonstration 
temporarily strengthened labour movements. However, as Ramesh (2000, p. 544) 
suggests, ‘trade unions have played only a peripheral role in the social policy process 
in Thailand because of government – and employer – sponsored intimidation and low 
union density (3% of industrial workforce in 1991) and their own internal 
fragmentation’. Also, the thankful perception of gratitude remains strong particularly 
in rural area of the country. 
Further, the return of the 1973 exiled Prime Minister to Thailand, Thanom 
Kittikajon, in 1976 started another period of political turmoil. This hampered the 
democratization and particularly weakened political power of the employees. The 
situation went on until the government of Chatchai (1988-1991) which emphasised 
the importance of economy and labour. His policy of ‘changing battlefields to 
commercial fields’ enabled the implementation of any policies which would result in 
economic development and productivity (Schramm, 2001). These policies included 
the idea that more work welfare should be provided for all workers and, 
consequently, the SSA was enacted in 1990 and the voices of labour unions were 
allowed to increase.  
Although most governments, before and after 1990, willingly adopted social 
insurance principles from the ILO and other countries which urged the participation 
of employees, it has barely happened in reality. Although five employee 
representatives are included as members of the tripartite board (Social Security 
Committee: SSC), originally, these representatives were selected by the SSO and 
needed to ‘follow order (tum-taam-sung), not to be picky (mai-rueng-maak) and take 
the same side [as the SSO] (pen-phuak-diew-gun)’ if they wanted to be reappointed 
(Chanduoywit in Thairath, 2011). The election of SSC members was firstly 
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introduced in 2008 as a result of the amendment of Constitution in 2007. It was an 
attempt to empower the employees in all tripartite boards under responsibilities of 
the MoL (Labour Relations Bureau, website; Thailuan, 2010).  
However, it is still noted that their roles are deficient (e.g. Buddhadilok, 2003; 
Thailuan, 2010). For example, as Atiwanichyapong (2007, p. 11) states, ‘labour 
[employee] representatives did not perform their roles fully. Labours [employees] 
considered this as the problem resulted from electoral process which did not 
accommodate the right person getting into the position. Some discussed how to 
change the electoral system. Perhaps representatives could be elected by all insured 
persons’. Therefore, it is likely that employees are not influential or even 
representative enough in the tripartite board. 
3.3.2.2 Provincial-level 
Similar to national level, the three sectors – government, employer, employee – are 
used as a framework to explain provincial SIA. At the provincial level, SIA is 
defined on the basis of the SSRO’s responsibilities. This briefly includes: 
contribution collection, benefit eligibility determination and benefit payment. The 
focus of this research is not on the first aspect but on the benefit-related function of 
the SSRO which is termed as ‘social insurance benefit delivery (SIBD)’ throughout 
this dissertation. To understand the context of SIBD, one needs to understand Thai 
provincial administration which is a prefectoral system where the governor is the 
chief of the province (see Section 3.1.2). In brief, it would rather be more accurate to 
say that British influence is mainly on national SIA. Meanwhile, SIA at the 
provincial level is undeniably involved provincial administration which influenced 
by Napoleonic norms. 
A tripartite board of social insurance at the provincial level, the Provincial Social 
Security Subcommittee (PSSS), enables the direct participation of employers and 
employees in provincial SIA. While this will be discussed further in four provincial 
contexts in Chapter 5, this section illustrates the general picture of the PSSS. The 
composition of the PSSS is not proportionate among the three sectors; out of 11-15 
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members, 2-6 of each employer and employee representatives depending on the size 
of the province will be appointed. This leads to the domination of the state in this 
subcommittee and, therefore, neither employers nor employees could fruitfully get 
their voices heard. Also, although these representatives are supposed to be elected 
(see Regulation of MoL on Tripartite Board Election 2008), how each representative 
actually gets into the position remains unclear.  
For employers, the situation of representativeness and participation in the PSSS 
could be better or worse than the SSC at the national level. On the positive side, as 
the election of the representatives at the provincial level should be less complicated 
than at the national level, it is possible that representatives are elected by as many 
employers or employees as possible. However, as provincial politics has become 
more and more powerful, the PSSS appointment may be totally manipulated by 
employers who become politicians. As Connors (1999, p. 204) indicates, ‘[W]ith the 
rise of the provincial capitalists, a new dynamic had emerged in the political 
process.’ Otherwise, the situation of employers at the provincial level is possibly not 
different from the national level. Notably, it is still unclear whether the 
representatives are actually elected or appointed. Also, it is unclear how the 
representatives perform their roles at the provincial level. It is likely that the 
performance of either employer or employee representatives in each province is 
similar to the tripartite board at the national level. These will be discussed further in 
the following chapters. 
The situation for employees is similar to that of employers in terms of their 
representativeness and participation in the PSSS. The appointment process is unclear 
and the appointee might not represent employees in the province. However, in terms 
of political negotiation in the province, they are not as powerful as employers. The 
negotiation between employers and employees mostly occur in 34 out of 76 
provinces where labour unions exist (see Figure 3.3).  In the provinces with labour 
unions, employees tend to collaboratively negotiate with their employers on the 
issues of, for example, wages, work welfares or job security. For example, the 
Electronics Labour Union (Hoya Union) in Lamphun (Prachathai, 2012) and the 
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Triumph Labour Union in Samutprakan (Prachathai, 2008b) fought against the 
employers over the unjust redundancy. However, in the provinces without labour 
unions, no attempts of negotiation with either the government or employers were so 
far found. It should be noted that, in both cases, employees seldom work together in 
order to negotiate over or participate in provincial SIA. In other words, if employees 
experience difficulties in SIB-related issues, they mostly negotiate with the SSRO 
individually rather than collectively. Labour unions appear not to be the first resort of 
help when it comes to social insurance issues. 
 
Figure 3.3 Number of labour unions by province 
 
Source: Labour Relations Bureau, website, accessed on 24 September 2012 
 
3.3.2.3 Politics of Thai social insurance administration 
In general, the Thai social security system is described as a ‘paternalistic welfare 
state’ in which the ‘structure and features of the public spending programmes result, 
to a substantial degree, from the activities of the Thai bureaucracy’ (Schramm, 2001, 
p. 15). Thailand’s social insurance tripartite board not only reflects such character of 
welfare state. It also reflects characteristics of Hewison’s crony capitalism (2005) 
particularly weak governance, inadequate institutions, and patronage (see 
Buddhadilok, 2003; Thailuan, 2010; Chanduoywit in Thairath, 2011). At the national 
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level, the state, including both the government and the SSO, dominates SIA and 
sometimes misuses the SSF (see Section 3.2.2.2). Instead of facilitating SIA, the 
national government and the SSO have been consistently criticized on their 
intervention in the administration. At the provincial level, the SSRO is a central 
agency of SIBD and the governor who plays a similar role to the Prefect in France is 
not only responsible for provincial administration but also being part of the PSSS.  
Employers generally have an ambiguous role. They are sometimes businessmen and 
at other time politicians. Before 1997, employer’s roles were behind the stage but 
since 1997 employers have been more involved in politics. This involvement 
increased when the Thaksin government started in 2001. At the national level, they 
have two choices of participation in SIA. One is through the tripartite board; another 
is through their political connections. The former seems to be less influential than the 
latter. While the government still plays an important role in the SSC appointment, the 
representatives need to follow the government’s decisions if they wish to be 
appointed again. Differently, with their direct (becoming MPs) or indirect (e.g. 
financially supporting the government) roles in Thai politics, some employees could 
exert power on social insurance somehow.  
Employees are insufficiently strong to negotiate either in general or in the PSSS. 
Generally, employees in Thailand have been weak in labour relations and political 
negotiation (Hewison & Brown, 1994). Culturally, they were expected to be grateful 
to employers meaning that they should not confront their employers. In the 1970s, 
labour movements were growing as the country became industrialized but they still 
struggle in negotiations with either employers or the government. These negotiations 
are mostly focused on wage, work welfare and job security; while no attempts of 
collaborative action on the issue of SIA have been found. Politically, as Schramm 
(2001, p.15) suggests, ‘the combination of power and welfare interests, and the 
traditional paternalistic attitude towards welfare recipients, led to the establishment 
of supply-oriented bureaucracies with little participation of social security financiers 
(employers and employees) and recipients’.  
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National and provincial politicians are less likely (or tend not to be?) involved in 
SIBD (see Section 3.2.1). Apparently, national politicians intervene in SIA now and 
then particularly when it comes to the SSO’s revenue (e.g. BangkokBizNews, 2008) 
and expenditure (BangkokBizNews, 2005). However, with no news in the media and 
a limited amount of research, it is unclear if they play any part in SIBD. For 
provincial politicians, nothing related to their roles in SIA and SIBD appears in the 
media and the research database either. On the contrary, local politicians tend to be 
involved in SIBD regarding the Phrae and Nan SSROs’ local cooperation projects. 
These assumptions are to be discussed further in this research. Roles and influence of 
politicians, at whatever level, will be clarified. Also, the extent to which Thaksin and 
his parties influence SIBD will be discussed in particular. 
3.3.3 National-level administration 
Thai SIA can be explained at two levels: national and provincial. This section 
elaborates upon the national-level administration in three respects: policymakers, 
planning process, and budget process.  
3.3.3.1 Policy-makers: Social Security Office (SSO) and tripartite board 
Policy makers of Thai SIA include two actors: a tripartite board and a central 
department. Firstly, out of the three national social security committees
10
, the Social 
Security Committee (SSC) is an advisory tri-partite board mainly responsible for 
policy and decision making regarding social insurance. Secondly, the Social Security 
Office is a central department under the control of the Ministry of Labour with three 
major roles. Its first role has been to be responsible for SIA since the beginning of 
the policy in 1990. In fact, not only from 1990 but also prior to that year, its 
predecessor was a department under control of the Ministry of Interior since 1957. 
The second role is also to be responsible for the Social Security Fund management 
                                                             
10
 At the national level, three committees are in charge of the SSF administration including 
(Thanachaisethawut, 1999): Social Security Committee (SSC), Medical Committee (MC), and Appeal 
Committee (AC). The SSC is a tripartite advisory board. The MC comprises experts from various 
types of medical sciences being responsible for health-care related matters e.g. medical service 
provision, sickness benefit entitlement, or medical advice. The AC is a tripartite committee 
concerning legal issues i.e. the case in which either employees, employers, or other stakeholders are 
not satisfied with the prior results. 
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and, thus, there are different types of experts in the organisation e.g. actuarial 
specialists, financial experts. Lastly, the SSO’s third role is a secretary of the SSC 
responsible for administrative tasks related to the SSC’s decision making. 
3.3.3.2 Planning Process 
There are four types of plan in Thailand’s SIA: five-year plan, annual plan, action 
plan, and project. Specifically, the SSO addresses the Social Security Five-year 
Strategy as a guideline of its administration in the five-year period (Social Security 
Office, 2009c, pp. 1-1). Seven technical terms are central concepts in the five-year 
strategy (Sawasdi-atikom & et al, 2010) including: vision, mission, value, strategic 
issue, strategy, output, and project. ‘Vision’ is an ultimate aim of the SSO defining 
what the SSO would like to become in the future. It is constituted by the Director-
General. ‘Mission’ is an operation the SSO will carry out in order to achieve the 
designated vision. ‘Value’ is a guiding principle or an expected behaviour of 
organisation or individual. It guides the decision making of all individuals and will 
assist the organisation to achieve the vision and mission. ‘Strategic issue’ is an 
important issue the organisation must bear in mind. It needs to be operated to achieve 
the vision. To identify a strategic issue, the vision, external policies or factors, and 
expectations of stakeholders need to be reviewed. ‘Strategy’ is a means to achieve 
the vision under the SSO's limitation and capacity. ‘Output’ is the completed 
activities of service delivery. ‘Project’ is a performance process or a course of action 
which is systematically undertaken under particular objectives; the timeframe, 
budget, and a person in charge of the project must be specified at the beginning. 
Until 2010, five five-year strategies, three Social Security Plans and two Social 
Security Strategic Plans, were declared in Thailand. The first Social Security Plan 
(1992-1996) was mainly to prepare for the system launch. The second Social 
Security Plan (1997-2001) was drafted in accordance with problems and obstructions 
that arose from the implementation of the first plan. The main points of this plan 
were to improve service efficiency and expand the coverage. The third plan (2002-
2006) was still aimed to improve service efficiency and coverage but it additionally 
applied Result-Based Management in the administration.  The fourth plan is the first 
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to be named a ‘Social Security Strategic Plan’ (2005-2009) which reflects the 
application of strategic management in the system. Similarly, the fourth and the fifth 
plan (Social Security Strategic Plan 2010-2014) are both concerned with efficiency, 
coverage expansion, and organisational contexts. 
Briefly, the planning process of SIA in Thailand has recently concerned the 
participatory principle. To draft the strategy, at least four policies are considered 
including: the 1990 SSA, the National Economic and Social Development Plan, the 
government's policy, and the Labour and Social Welfare Development Plan. Also, 
the problems and comments that occurred during the implementation of the previous 
social security strategy gathered from stakeholders are also considered. Out of five 
five-year plans, the first three plans were drafted by the government only. However, 
since the late 1990s when the NPM has been of major concern, strategic management 
has been applied in Thai administration and the SSO was inevitably obliged to follow 
such a pattern. Consequently, the recent two five-year social security strategies have 
involved all stakeholders in order to draft the so-called participatory strategy. 
3.3.3.3 Budget Allocation and Spending   
The accounting system of Social Security Fund (SSF) is supposed to be decentralised 
(Division of Finance and Accounting, 1997, p. 1). In principle, the SSO and SSROs 
separately run their own audit and accounting system (see Appendix 2). Each unit 
must present its revenue, expenditure, and the allotted budget to the public. The SSO 
is particularly responsible for gathering all SSROs’ accounts and submitting these to 
the Office of the Auditor General. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the 
‘decentralised’ budget system is restricted to the audit and accounting only, it does 
not mean decentralised decision-making of budget allocation. Two sources of the 
Social Security Office’s budget are of interest in this research: the annual budget and 
the extra-annual budget. These two types are the budget for social security 
administration both at the national and regional level (Hanbenjapong, 1999). An 
annual budget must conform to the Bureau of Budget legislation. An extra-annual 
budget (10% of annual contribution being collected), or the so-called administrative 
budget, could be spent on operational administrative costs e.g. temporary 
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employment, over-time per diem for officials and employees, business trip costs, 
etc., as approved by the Board. This budget makes SIA more flexible as, for 
example, the SSO could allot this budget to the SSRO for their initiative project.  
3.3.4 Provincial-level administration 
SIA at the provincial level can be explained in three respects: social insurance benefit 
delivery (SIBD) pattern, the collaborative committee (PSSS), and a provincial 
delivery agency. 
3.3.4.1 Pattern of social insurance benefit delivery 
Generally, the pattern of provincial SIBD is designed by the SSO. This pattern is an 
official process which is usually operated nationwide. Figure 3.4 shows a simplified 
diagram of SIBD at the provincial level. Starting from the claim made by 
beneficiaries, documents such as proof of identity, house registration, medical fee 
receipt, and so on are required together with the claim. Different benefits require a 
slightly different set of documents but the claiming processes are the same. Then, the 
SSRO considers whether the claimant is entitled to with the benefit and whether the 
supplied documents are valid and sufficient. If not, the claim will be returned to the 
claimant. Otherwise, the claimant will receive the benefit through the delivery 
channel of their choice which is either in-person, bank transfer, or by post. Notably, 
this pattern is considered as the uniform pattern of SIBD which will be referred to 
throughout this dissertation. 
 




3.3.4.2 Collaborative committee: Provincial Social Security Subcommittee 
(PSSS) 
At the provincial level (excluding Bangkok), similar to the national board, the 
Provincial Social Security Subcommittee (PSSS) is appointed to advise the service 
and benefit delivery in the province or, precisely, to be an advisory tripartite board at 
the provincial level. Their responsibilities are to: consider problems and suggest 
solutions of service and benefit delivery, give advice on the development of the 
employer’s contribution payment system, make suggestion the SSRO regarding the 
prosecution of the employer who break the laws, consider each special case of 
disability which does not comply with the general regulation, and other operation 
according to the assignments from the SSO (see SSC’s Order No.02/2550). 
The PSSS is considered to be a fundamental group of social insurance actors in each 
province. Basically, 11-17 actors are involved in SIBD at the provincial level (see 
Table 3.2). In the provinces where up to 200,000 insured persons are registered, 11 
members of the PSSS will be appointed. In the provinces where 200,001-500,000 
insured persons are registered, there will be 14 members. Lastly, if more than 
500,000 insured persons are registered, 17 members of the PSSS will be appointed.  
 
Table 3.2 Variation of the number of the PSSS across provinces 
Number of insured persons ≤200k  >200k – 500k >500k 
Internal offices 4 4 4 
Health care providers 2 2 2 
Additional external office(s) 1 2 3 
Employer representative 1 2 3 
Employee representative 1 2 3 
Total (including the governor and 
the SSRO) 
11 14 17 





Figure 3.5 Structure of the PSSS 
 
Source: SSC’s Order No.02/2550 Concerning the Appointment of Provincial Social 
Security Subcommittee 
There are two types of PSSS members: incumbent and non-incumbent (see Figure 
3.5). The first group of members being appointed regarding their posts (incumbent 
members) includes: the Governor as chairman, the Chief of the SSRO as secretary, 
four chiefs of regional offices under control of the Ministry of Labour (internal 
offices), and two Health Care Providers (HCPs: Public Health Office, Provincial 
Hospital). The second group being appointed regarding the nomination (non-
incumbent members) includes: additional external office(s), employee representative, 
and employer representative. Notably, in Figure 3.5, the HCPs and additional 
external office(s) are considered together as external offices (provincial offices not 
under control of the MoL). However, in later chapters, the term ‘external office’ will 
only refer to the (appointed) additional external office. 
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The non-incumbent PSSS members are nominated by: the SSRO, the national 
employee organisation, the national employer organisation, a national politician, and 
a senior bureaucrat. This can be analysed in two groups of non-incumbent members: 
additional external offices and representatives of employers and employees. Firstly, 
the selection of additional external offices lies mostly at the SSRO’s discretion. 
Secondly, the selection criterion of employer and employee representatives varies 
across provinces. Employer and employee representatives must be selected from the 
legalized employer and employee organisations in the province. However, 
presumably, the employers are actually selected due to their political or economical 
power in the province. Also, the employees are possibly selected politically. Some 
employees are nominated either by the national employee organisation or through 
their personal connection in the province. These selections of employer and 
employee will be discussed further with fieldwork data in Chapter 5. 
3.3.4.3 Delivery agency: Social Security Regional Office (SSRO) 
The SSRO was first established not long after the SSO’s establishment. It was 
specified in the SSA that the SSRO must be set up and the subsequent laws and 
regulations designated the SSRO’s responsibilities and authorities. For example, 
according to the Regulation of the Ministry of Labour, the SSRO is responsible for 
practice and cooperation with other organisations in compliance with the SSO’s 
policies, plans, and projects. In brief, the SSRO is a central agency of SIBD with 
seven major functions: registration, contribution collection, information update, 
social insurance benefit payment, Workmen’s Compensation benefit payment, public 
relations, and suggestion service (Chaiwong et al, 2006, p. 148). 
The SSRO’s organisation slightly varies across provinces. Originally, its 
organisational structure could be classified into five divisions regarding its functions: 
(1) registry, (2) benefit claim and verification, (3) contribution collection, (4) finance 
and accounting, and (5) general administration. Then, in the fourth social security 
plan, its organisational structure was supposed to be separated into two parts: front 
office and back office. The divisions (1)-(3) were considered as the front office 
literally interacting with the clients; whereas (4)-(5) were the back office mainly 
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responsible for supporting the activities of the front office. However, recently, it has 
been structured slightly different across provinces. For example, while the Phrae 
SSROs set up their organisational into front office and back office; the Chiang Mai 
SSRO structured their office into three parts: front office, back office, and legal 
office.  
3.4 The impact of decentralised administration since the late 
1990s 
In the late 1990s, two policies in relation to decentralisation (constitutional change, 
good governance) were enacted resulting in the change of SI administrative system 
(see Section 3.2.2.3). Firstly, the Constitution of 1997 emphasised decentralisation 
and New Public Management (NPM) approaches. It appeared to support 
accountability, transparency, open government and emphasising a less important 
central government (Bowornwathana, 2008). Secondly, the Decree of Good 
Governance was enacted in 2003 specifying that executive agencies must have 
enough jurisdictions in performing their duties and should cooperate with other 
agencies in providing the service whenever appropriate (Dhamrongrachanupap 
Institute, 2009). Additionally, after the enactment of the 1997 constitution, a number 
of studies were also carried out to provide data for the government’s further plans on 
regionalization and decentralisation (e.g. Dhamrongrachanupap Institute, 1999, 2000; 
Provincial Administration Development and Promotion Bureau, 2004). Thus, 
subsequent policies and regulations were indeed constituted changing the 
administration at regional and local level. However, the 1997 constitutional change 
and the 2003 decree are considered to be the most influential policies affecting the 
change in SIA.  
These two policies had four main impacts on SIA at the provincial level. For 
instance, the SSRO has become more responsive; the SSO more facilitative; local 
governments more independent; and, the Governor more powerful. As a result of the 
Decree in 2003, the new direction of bureaucratic reform promoted and influenced 
regionalization (OPDC, 2003b). The first two impacts of decentralisation – more 
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responsive SSRO, more facilitative SSO – on the SI administrative system are thus 
results of the regionalization. Although Thailand’s bureaucratic system has been 
reformed over time (see Suwanmongkol, 1994), the reform policy being operated 
after the 1990s has based on the concept of ‘smaller central; more responsive 
regional and more decentralised local [governments] (OPDC, 2004)’. At the regional 
level, a strategic planning approach has been introduced to regional administration 
(see the Regulation of Prime Minister’s Office on Integrative Provincial 
Administration 2003). The organisational context (SWOT) analysis has become a 
crucial first step of the planning process. The SSRO, therefore, needs to be more 
concerned with its local contexts (more responsive) while the SSO needs to steer 
rather than row (more facilitative).  
The third impact was also resulted from the Decree of Good Governance 2003 which 
gave more power to the Governor (Wirachnipawan, 2004). It was specified that there 
must be a head of the province looking after all provincial offices. Applying the 
business concept of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in the regional public 
administration, the Governor was authorised as a CEO, the highest position, of the 
province and therefore became more powerful than before. Theoretically, regarding 
the IPA policy, s/he could be involved in SIA in two respects: personnel and budget. 
Subject to his/her discretion, the Governor not only could relocate the SSRO officials 
but also could provide an extra budget for project operation of any regional offices in 
the province. 
Yet, as the IPA policy being implemented, it was argued that it had no impact on the 
provincial administration. According to Damrongrachanupap Institute (2003), the 
IPA policy is insignificant to provincial administration because of its implementation 
failure citing insufficient devolved authority and funds as the reasons of failure. I 
would argue, however, that the IPA strengthened the hierarchical relations between 
the governor and other provincial offices. It enabled the governor to intervene in 
provincial administration of social insurance. Also, Thepthong’s study (2004) finds 
that the CEO governor plays a role in provincial policy making and implementation 
and that his/her enthusiasm help to obtain good cooperation from government 
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agencies, resulting in better service delivery to the recipients. Therefore, apparently, 
the governor was empowered by this policy. 
Lastly, the Decentralisation Process and Plan 1999 was inaugurated as a practical 
guideline for decentralising authorities to local governments. It set a framework for 
the central government to follow in order to enable local governments’ autonomy. 
Notably, as local governments become more independent, their involvement in SIA 
depends upon their leader’s decisions. Further, since local governments are basically 
obliged to social assistance benefit delivery, they play no role in SIA unless the 
SSRO requests their involvement. 
Conclusion 
Reviewing both the international and national contexts of social insurance in 
Thailand not only portrays the system but also depicts policy actors in SIBD. In line 
with international norms, the actors involved in social insurance can be categorised 
into: the state, employee, and employer. All of them are indeed the basic actors in 
Thailand’s social insurance system. Further, there are six actors involved in 
Thailand’s SIBD: the SSRO, the (national) SSO, the provincial administrative unit 
(PAU), local governments, employees, and employers. However, the Thai politico-
administrative context brings two more actors into SIBD system: the provincial 
governor and local government. As a result, the state is divided into three levels of 
governments where each level plays different roles in SIA. First, the central 
department, namely the SSO, is a direct controller of the SSRO. Second, the 
provincial governor is an indirect controller who is authorised to take overall control 
of the province. Third, local governments are a potential actor which voluntarily 
involved in SIBD. In brief, the SSRO is the central agency of SIBD at the provincial 
level in Thailand surrounded by its central department (the SSO), provincial 
governor, local governments, employers, and employees. 
In addition to the principles of ILO, there are three countries – Germany, UK, France 
– influencing Thailand’s SIA on the ground. Thailand under modernization has 
shaped its social insurance system using lessons learned from Germany and UK. 
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However, lessons from France cannot be overlooked as France shaped Thai regional 
administration, which in turn affected SIA at the provincial level. However, it should 
be noted that generalizing social insurance benefit delivery across countries is ‘the 
least possible task and sometimes could be misleading (Bochel, 2005, p. 52)’. 
Bearing this in mind, the following explanation may be oversimplified but at least 
provides some understanding of the Thai system. 
Being centralised, social insurance in Thailand has been administered at two levels: 
national and regional. At the national level, the SSC, a tri-partite board, makes 
overall decisions on how to manage the SSF. The SSO receives policies from the 
board and sets out policy frameworks for its regional offices. The SSRO is a central 
agent of SIBD at the provincial level in Thailand and a delivery agency of the SSO in 
benefit delivery. Its main responsibilities are to operate the contribution collection 
and to provide social insurance benefits and services for the insured persons in each 
province. Since the beginning, the SSRO have been implementing the policy 
uniformly in order to standardised the service and benefit delivery.  
During the early 1990s, the SSRO, when delivering SIB, strictly followed the 
relevant national regulations and laws. The regulations could only be changed by the 
SSC and, although employers and employees had positions in the SSC, the 
government representatives usually dominated the decision-making at the national-
level. By the same token, since the SSC took over all decision-making, the SSRO 
had no authority to adapt any regulations to respond to socio-economic factors in its 
area. However, after the late 1990s, the SSROs have initiated projects in response to 
local contexts e.g. local people’s opinions or local policy actor’s requests. 
Two policies (the 1997 Constitution and the 2003 Decree of Good Governance) 
generated four impacts on three administrative spheres – SIA, provincial 
administration (ProA), local administration (LoA) – related to SIBD. Firstly, in SIA, 
the SSROs have become more responsive and the SSO become more facilitative. 
Secondly, in ProA, provincial governors have become more powerful. Thirdly, in 






Chapter 4 : Research Design and Practices 
 
This research is case-study research aiming to investigate a single phenomenon, 
namely, ‘diversification of social insurance benefit delivery (SIBD) in Thailand’. It is 
an intensive study of diversified service patterns of social insurance at the provincial 
level ‘for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units (Gerring, 
2004, p. 342)’ and ‘concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case 
in question (Bryman, 2008, p. 52)’. Selecting four provinces (Chiang Mai, Lamphun, 
Phrae, Nan), this research is a multi-site case study in which ‘the aim is to draw 
comparisons between cases (Bryman & Burgess, 1994, p. 223)’. As ‘similar units’ 
are restricted to Thai provinces only, this research admittedly falls on one of case-
study common concerns on limited generalizability (Platt, 2007; Rihoux & Grimm, 
2006; Yin, 1994). However, as Yin (1994, p.10) suggest, ‘case studies, like 
experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or 
universes. ... [It] does not represent a "sample," and the investigator's goal is to 
expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate 
frequencies (statistical generalization)’. 
This chapter is outlined into three sections: sampling and selection, data collection, 
and data analysis. Section 4.1 discusses sampling techniques and the case selection 
of this research; how and why each province and respondent is selected. Section 4.2 
discusses three data collection methods (documents, interview, observation), 
fieldwork plan and practice, ethical issues and limitations. Then, Section 4.3 
discusses data analysis methods: content analysis and situational analysis. 
4.1 Sampling and Selection 
This section discusses the sampling method and selection criteria. Sources of data for 
this research are ‘natural social setting’ and ‘social artefacts’ which can be analysed 
at three levels: micro-social, meso-social and macro-social (Blaikie, 2009, p. 163). A 
single-stage non-probability sampling method, specifically purposive sampling, was 
employed to select samples for data collection at each level. At the macro-level, the 
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government offices, universities, and research institutions were specified for 
collecting tertiary data in order to get a whole picture of the system. At the meso-
level, regions and provinces in Thailand are the unit of consideration. Firstly, out of 
five regions (Bangkok and metropolitan areas (BMAs), Central, South, North, 
Northeast), the North is selected regarding its distinctive socio-economic 
characteristics and outstanding political contexts (see Section 3.2.1 and further 
discussion in Section 4.1.1). Regional variation is elaborated to highlight distinctive 
characteristics of the North, the region in which four selected provinces located. 
Secondly, out of 75 provinces, Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Phrae, and Nan are selected 
on the basis of three criteria: economic differences, practicality and political contexts 
(see Section 4.1.2). Then, at the micro-level, 58 prospective interviewees were listed 
in accordance with the analytical framework and the data collected from the first 
phase of fieldwork (see Section 4.1.3). 
4.1.1 Regional political variation and the North of Thailand 
As discussed earlier, in terms of politics, regional variation in Thailand can be 
explained in five regions (see Section 3.2.1). Particularly in the context of Thai 
contemporary politics, the North is an interesting region. Among five major regions, 
the North is crucially important in Thailand’s political game as well as the Northeast. 
What makes the North politically more interesting than the Northeast, however, is 
the fact that it is the region with a strong and direct connection with Thaksin whose 
sister was in power until the latest military coup in 2014. Despite consistently high 
popularity in the North and the Northeast, other three regions i.e. the Central, 
Bangkok and the South have not always been in favour of Thaksin’s parties. It is thus 
fair to conclude that the North is the strategic region of Thai politics and Thaksin’s 
electoral heartland. 
Selecting the North, this research could exhibit how political contexts affect SIBD in 
the region. Perhaps members of Thaksin’s parties would play a role as mediator 
between the SSRO and insured persons. They may see an opportunity that the 
accessibility of SIBs is too low and offer their offices as another channel of SIBD. 
Or, they might connect with the SSRO chief to provide a ‘special’ service channel 
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particularly and exclusively in their constituencies. It is also possible however that 
they are barely influential in provincial SIBD since,  as discussed in Chapter 3, 
provincial politics in Thailand is a complex entity of money and power game in 
which social security is perceived as negligible.  
Further, it is argued that politics in the North is not simply a patronage system. Neher 
and Bunjaipet (1989) study sociopolitical behavior in three villages of Northern 
Thailand and conclude that ‘[c]lientelism is one way villagers attempt to maximize 
their interests. However, patron-client relations are no longer (if they ever were) the 
explanatory variable for understanding Thai society (p.66).’ With long years in the 
field, Bowie’s works discusses the North in various aspects such as its subsistence 
economy (1992), social class and Buddhism (1998), and vote-buying in a village 
(2008). In brief, she finds that the North has complex patterns of economic exchange 
and Buddhist merit-making which could reflect socio-economic classes in the region. 
Also, ‘far from being politically immature or uneducated, villagers [in the North] are 
involved and informed participants in electoral politics (Bowie, 2008, p. 504)’. In 
other words, with pressures from the top (central government) or the oppressing 
(political leaders at all levels), the bottom (the Northern villagers) is not necessarily 
oppressed to cohere with power and orders. Possibly, this will reflect in the field of 
SIBD where, in principle, the oppressed could resist their patrons. 
In other aspects, Van Roy (1971) studies organizational patterns and developmental 
processes of economic systems in the North of Thailand and states that the North is 
an important region of Thailand. To understand this, similar to political aspect, 
regional variation is firstly explained in five regions: one metropolitan area (Bangkok 
and vicinity) and four major regions (Central, Northeast, North and South). Bangkok 
and vicinity are usually considered together due to socio-economic characteristics – 
high economic productivity, relatively urbanized society – they have in common. 
The other four regions are geographically clustered while Bangkok is the centre of 
the country. Generally, Thailand has a huge socio-economic gap between its centre 
and regions (Central, Northeast, North, South) regarding four indicators: GRP, GRP 
per capita, monthly income, and population density (see Table 4.1). Firstly, Bangkok 
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and vicinity has the highest Gross Regional Products (GRP) in Thailand which is 
much higher than the Northeast (4.6 times higher), the South (5.1 times), the North 
(5.7 times) and the Central (7.1 times) respectively. This exhibits how the Thai 
economic development is concentrated in Bangkok and vicinity.  
 





Vicinity Central Northeast North South 
GDP (million baht)1 9,590,722 - - - - - 
GRP (million baht)1 - 4,337,991.60 607,167.26 939,012.70 756,710.17 865,008.33 
GDP per capita 
(baht)1 
143,352.64 - - - - - 






























123.7 1,318.9 179.5 127.0 69.4 124.7 
 
1 
National Economic and Social Development Bureau website, accessed on 24 October 2013 
2 
National Statistics Office website, accessed on 24 October 2013 
3 
Department of Provincial Administration website, accessed on 24 October 2013 
 
Secondly, considering the GRP per capita, Bangkok and vicinity still has the highest 
number, the Central comes as the second (53.10% of Bangkok and vicinity) 
following by the South (24.76%), the North (16.53%) and the Northeast (10.94%). 
This suggests the large economic gap between the central part of Thailand (Bangkok, 
vicinity and the Central) and the three regions (Northeast, North and South). Thirdly, 
Bangkok and vicinity area is the most populous area in the country. Regarding 
average income, each household in Bangkok and vicinity approximately earns 
37,732 baht (£755) per month. The South comes in the second place and the Central 
the third. The two poorest regions in Thailand are the North and the Northeast. 
Fourthly, being the most populous area in the country, population density in 
Bangkok and vicinity is much higher than the other regions. On the opposite end, the 




Considering socio-economic indicators above, the North is an interesting region with 
the lowest population density and being one of two poorest regions in Thailand (the 
other is the Northeast). It is thus interesting to know how social insurance benefits 
are delivered in such circumstances. Possibly, service users are living sparsely across 
the region and some may find the journey to service points e.g. the SSRO’s office 
difficult. Things may be worse if the journey costs almost half of their daily wages 
and a whole day of their work. Under the current NPM-based Thai social insurance 
administration, the SSRO is expected to respond to this situation and provide 
customer-oriented services. Hence, this research is expected to exhibit how the 
service has been customized in response to local contexts. 
In relation to social insurance, the North was also interesting regarding four indices 
(see Table 4.2). Firstly, the North is the region with the smallest number of insured 
persons (606,364) but the number of utilizations in this region (2,786,493) is larger 
than those of the Northeast (2,635,805) and the South (1,933,732). Secondly, in 
relation to the first, the North has the largest number of utilizations per insured 
person (4.60 service receipts per insured persons) in Thailand. This is higher than the 
average of the country (3.55). Compared to other regions, it comes on the top 
following by the Northeast (3.79), the Central (3.64), Bangkok and vicinity (3.39), 
and the South (3.17) respectively. Thus, the question is how SIBD works in this 
region where insured persons could access the service more often than other regions. 
While insured persons in the North seemingly dispersed around the region and many 
may find service access inconvenient, the figures contrarily show that benefits are 
claimed more than several regions. Is this because the SSRO designs SIBD to be 












Vicinity Central Northeast North South 
Number of insured 
persons1 
8,680,359 4,787,053 1,980,908 695,397 606,364 610,637 
Utilization of SIBs2 30,786,756 16,213,277 7,216,449 2,635,805 2,786,493 1,933,732 
Utilization per 
person3 
3.55 3.39 3.64 3.79 4.60 3.17 
Percentage of insured persons in each size of enterprises4 
%S 32.10 30.83 23.12 42.23 48.40 43.39 
%M 21.62 21.10 21.59 21.80 21.10 26.10 
%L 27.17 27.35 31.65 22.51 20.98 22.77 
%XL 19.11 20.72 23.64 13.46 9.52 7.74 
 
1 
Insured persons under Article 33 of Social Security Act, Social Security Office’s annual statistic 
report (2009) 
2 
Utilization by insured persons under Article 33, from Social Security Office’s annual statistic 
report (2009) 
3 
Utilization per person is estimated by the number of utilization divided by the number of insured 
persons 
4 
Percentage of enterprises in the region (by size) is calculated from the number of enterprises into 
percentage by the author 
 
Thirdly, considering the percentage of insured persons in S-sized enterprises in each 
region, the North has the largest number (48.40%) in the country following by the 
South (43.39%), the Northeast (42.23%), Bangkok and vicinity (30.83%) and the 
Central (23.12%). Two questions could be addressed regarding this figure. Firstly, 
small-sized enterprises include shops and family industries which sometimes located 
in remote area. It is thus interesting to see how the SSRO manages to deliver SIBs to 
those who work in small-sized enterprises which scattered around the province. 
Secondly, it is generally assumed that the bigger the enterprise is the better work 
welfare is possibly provided by employers. Is the reason why the SIB utilization in 
the North is the highest in the country because social insurance is the best choice for 
many employees in small-sized enterprises? 
In conclusion, three dimensions – social, economic, political – of regional variation 
are considered in this section. This research selected the North as a region of study 
not only because it is the least populous and the second poorest region in the country. 
It also entails interesting political character. It bears the label ‘Thaksin’s electoral 
heartland’ resulting in political constraints in which politicians try to retain their 
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votes. Moreover, in terms of social insurance, the North is the region with the 
smallest number of insured persons, the largest number of SIB utilization per insured 
person and most enterprises are small-sized. Thus, it is an interesting case of study 
which could provide the understanding of how SIBs are successfully – compared to 
other regions – delivered in the contexts of poor and less-populous society with high 
political pressures. 
4.1.2 Selection of Provinces 
The total population of province selection is 75 provinces. Although there are 76 
provinces in Thailand, Bangkok was excluded because it had a particular social 
insurance administrative system different from the other provinces. As a capital city, 
Bangkok has 12 branches to serve three millions insured persons in the province. In 
contrast, each province normally has only the SSRO or the SSRO with its branch 
depending on the number of insured persons. Basically, four out of 75 provinces 
(Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Phrae, Nan; see Figure 4.1) were purposively selected 
regarding three criteria: economic differences, data accessibility and political nature 
of the province. Since social insurance inevitably involves different types of 
employers and employees within the labour market, the first criterion is provincial 
employment structure. In Thailand, the economic structure comprises three major 
sectors: industrial, service (or commercial), and agricultural. Thus, with its 
employment structure, the selected cases should represent a different major economic 
sector in order to control for socio-economic variation on social insurance 




Figure 4.1 Number of large-sized manufacturers in each province, 2007 
 




Second, the data should be accessible in the limited time and resources available. Re-
emphasizing the North distinctiveness, this region has a province with a high number 
of large-sized manufacturers (Lamphun) surrounded by several provinces with lower 
numbers of large manufacturers (see Figure 4.1). Thus, out of four main regions in 
Thailand, it was selected because it was an area where three possible samples were 
located nearby one another. This results in saving time and the cost of transportation. 
By the same token, since the researcher had been living and working in this area for a 
period of time, it was expected that the researcher could either gain access to data 
and the contact of key informants or travel around the area with ease. Third, as 
discussed earlier, the North is an interesting region since it is one of the poorest 
regions with substantial political interventions of the government. Regardless of 
different political nature, all provinces share one thing in common. Based on 
Thailand’s recent general election results, most of locals support Thaksin. 
The sites of study were originally restricted to three provinces in the North - Chiang 
Mai (commercial), Lamphun (industrial), and Phrae (agricultural) – as they are three 
different areas located nearby one another. However, after the first fieldwork phase, 
Nan, an agricultural province next to Phrae, was added due to its participation in a 
distinctive co-operation project. Nan was not selected at the beginning due to the 
limited accessibility of data. As the researcher prepared for the fieldwork in the UK, 
most data for province selection was accessed through an online database. However, 
in the first fieldwork phase, the Nan SSRO’s distinctive project (Thinking Partners 
and Friends of Insured Persons: P&F) was mentioned by the Phrae SSRO so the 
researcher further investigated and found that Nan was one of the outstanding cases 





4.1.2.1 Province profile 
The four selected provinces are different from one another in many respects. Four 
relevant indices – per capita income, geographical congestion of insured persons, 
number of service accesses, satisfaction of service users – are exhibited to highlight 
the differences (see Table 4.4). In this section, the profiles of Chiang Mai, Lamphun, 
Phrae and Nan are presented respectively. 
 
Table 4.3 Characteristics of selected provinces 
  Chiang Mai Lamphun Phrae Nan 
Size (sq.m.)1 20,107.06 4,505.88 11,472.07 6538.60 












Number of insured persons
3
 174,380 77,196 16,092 10,715 
Concentration of insured 
persons in city centre (%)
4
 
59.52% 91.99% 67.11% 54.61% 




2 2 31 100 




70.73 67.80 71.13 78.86 
Sources: 
1
Department of Provincial Administration (2010) 
 
2
National Economic and Social Development Bureau (2010) 
 
3
Social Security Office (2009b) 
 
4
Social Security Office (2010) 
 
5
Chiang Mai has one central office and one branch office; Lamphun has one central 
office and additional access (GCS) in the shopping mall; Phrae has one office and 30 
additional accesses in cooperating SAOs; Nan has one office and 99 additional accesses 
in cooperating SAOs 
 
6
Thammasat University Research and Consultancy Institute (2007, p. 122) 
 
Chiang Mai, the largest province in the North, is a commercial area with 174,380 
insured persons in 25 districts (see Figure 4.2). Interestingly, almost 60% of insured 
persons are concentrated in the city centre or Muang District (see Table 4.4). Also, 
being the second lowest satisfied province, SIBD service in Chiang Mai is mostly 
provided at the SSRO’s office in the city centre with additional service in the remote 
district of Fang (see Table 4.3). In this research, this province represents as expected 
a case of a rigid form of SIBD. Possibly, this rigidity is a result of political tensions 
in Chiang Mai. This province is politically significant to the current government (see 
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Section 3.2.1). Having close ties with Thaksin’s, many elite and wealthy families in 
the province tend to have political power and influence over provincial policy-
making. 
Table 4.4 Number of insured persons in District No.1-12 in Chiang Mai 
Source: SSO (2011) 
Figure 4.2 Number of insured persons in Chiang Mai, by district 
 
Source:  - Map from National Statistics Office, website, accessed on 21 February 2012 




 No. District 
Number of 
Insured persons 
1 Muang 106004  7 Maewang 415 
2 Saraphee 9918  8 Samerng 364 
3 Sankhumpang 9260  9 Mae-rim 7939 
4 Hang Dong 7427  10 Sansai 13576 
5 Sanpatong 3731  11 Doisaket 3821 
6 Doi-loh 686  12 Mae-on 621 
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Lamphun is an industrial area and the smallest province among four selected 
provinces. Due to its location and economic contexts, it is sometimes considered as 
another district of Chiang Mai (Sarnpruek, 2010, p. 85). Many big businesses in 
Lamphun, except those in the industrial park, have links with Chiang Mai.  With 
77,196 insured persons in the province (see Figure 4.3), more than 90% of them 
work in Muang District where an industrial park is located; while the rest are 
dispersed in seven other districts. Per capita income in Lamphun is the highest 
among four provinces since a number of multi-national companies providing a high 
salary are situated in the industrial park. This also makes Lamphun an interesting 
province where not only local businessmen but also international businesses must be 
of major concern to the government.  In addition to its central office, the Lamphun 
SSRO operated the Government Counter Service (GCS) project to provide an extra 
service in the shopping mall nearby the industrial park. Hypothetically, this is for the 
purpose of serving local needs (workers who work until late in the evening). Still, it 
should be noted that, compared to other selected provinces, Lamphun gained the 
least satisfaction from its service users (see Table 4.3). 
Figure 4.3 Number of insured persons in Lamphun, by district 
 
Source:  - Map from National Statistics Office, website, accessed on 21 February 2012 
 - Number of insured persons from SSO (2011) 
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Compared to the four selected, Phrae is the second largest province with the second 
least per capita income (see Table 4.3). It is an agricultural area with 16,092 insured 
persons scattered around the province (see Figure 4.4). Mostly, provincial elites in 
Phrae are those with noble or wealthy background (Bumbud, 2012). Many of them 
directly joined in provincial and national politics; some became MPs and some 
became members of the Phrae PAOs council. Before 2010, the social insurance 
service had been provided only in the SSRO office located in the city centre (Muang 
District). Then, in 2010, the SSRO cooperated with 30 local organisations in 
providing additional service access for insured persons. As a result, thirty service 
accesses were added across the province under the Cooperation with Local 
Organisations (CLO) project. According to the project proposal, the SSRO designed 
the CLO project in an attempt to provide easy-to-access service in response to local 
needs in Phrae. Since service recipients found the travel to the SSRO office 
troublesome and time-consuming, the SSRO officials noticed such difficulties and 
decided to initiate the CLO project. In general, the Phrae SSRO’s service users were 
highly satisfied with their services. 
Figure 4.4 Number of insured persons in Phrae, by district 
 
Source:  - Map from National Statistics Office, website, accessed on 21 February 2012 
 - Number of insured persons from SSO (2011) 
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Nan is the poorest and second smallest province of the four. Instead of being 
economically outstanding, the province is known of their strong community-level 
political participation (Khampeng, 2009). It is an agricultural area with 10,715 
insured persons (see Figure 4.5). Compared to the other three selected provinces, 
Nan’s city centre is the least congested with 54.61% of insured persons. The Nan 
SSRO’s service was the most satisfied by its users (see Table 4.3). Undertaking the 
P&F project, the Nan SSRO decided to expand their service accesses within remote 
areas rather than stay at rest in their central office. 
Figure 4.5 Number of insured persons in Nan, by district 
 
Source:  - Map from National Statistics Office, website, accessed on 21 February 2012 
 - Number of insured persons from SSO (2011) 
 
In conclusion, Chiang Mai, the second largest city in Thailand and the largest and 
most affluent province in the North, was selected to represent the situation in a 
commercial province
11
. Lamphun represents the situation in an industrial area since it 
is a province in which an industrial park is located. Phrae is an agricultural province 
                                                             
11
 Its area is 20,107 sqare metres which seconds Nakonratchasima with 20,493 sq.m. Its Gross 
Provincial Product (GPP) in 2009 is 126,486 millions baht (£2529.72 millions). 
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representing the situation in areas of low income and low population density
12
. In 
general, Nan is similar to Phrae in terms of agricultural characteristic but the number 
of enterprises and insured persons in Nan is less than in Phrae. Before proceeding, 
however, it should be emphasised that service recipients’ satisfaction in Table 4.3 
partially reflect the recipients’ perception of the SSRO’s responsiveness. The 
satisfaction survey shows that Nan is the most satisfied case (78.86%) while 
Lamphun is the least satisfied (67.80%) (Thammasat University Research and 
Consultancy Institute, 2007, p.122).  
Considering its methodology, this Thammasat University’s survey is interestingly 
based on five appraisal criteria (process, staff, place, benefits, ethics) embracing 
several important attributes of service delivery. It is also the most-elaborated study of 
provincial social insurance service provision found in two research databases – 
ThaiLIS and the MoL’s database. Although there are other interesting studies with 
focuses on the satisfaction of the SSO’s service provision and success factors (e.g. 
Jiasakul, 2006; Research and Development Division (SSO), 2006), their findings 
only illustrate the national, not provincial, picture. In other words, they do not 
compare the differences between provinces. Also, many studies on the satisfaction 
and administration of provincial social insurance are carried out but neither of their 
methodology nor findings are convincing. This research thus draws upon Thammasat 
University study to gain service users’ perspective.  
4.1.2.2 Provincial employment structure 
As the provinces were selected based on their economic contexts, it is necessary to 
clarify how employment structure in each province is different from the nation and 
the other selected provinces. This is also to emphasise each province’s distinctive 
characteristics. Figure 4.6 compares each case with the overall picture of Thailand. 
Generally speaking, despite little difference from the agricultural industry, the 
service industry is the biggest employer in the economic sector; whereas, the 
                                                             
12
 Density of population in Phrae is 72 persons/m
2 
which is much lower than the density of a whole 
country with 123 persons/m
2
 Annual personal income of Phrae is 48,937 baht of is also much lower 
compared to the country with 150,118 baht.  (Thailand’s National Statistics Office, website). 
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manufacturing sector is the smallest industry in Thailand. Three provinces – Phrae, 
Lamphun, Chiang Mai – seemingly fit into this pattern. Considering each case 
individually, Phrae is the most similar to the national picture while Chiang Mai, 
Lamphun, and Nan are special cases. The percentage of service sector employment 
in Chiang Mai is much higher than average. Also, the percentage of manufacturing 
employment in Lamphun is much higher than the overall. Outstandingly, Nan is 
similar to neither the overall nor the first three provinces. Its economic structure 
predominantly depends upon the agricultural sector. 
Figure 4.6 Percentage of employed person by industry, 2007 
 
Source: National Statistics Office, Thailand 
These patterns produce three differences among the four provinces: the proportion of 
S/M/L-sized enterprises, the proportion of employees by enterprise size, and the 
number of labour union in the province. The first difference is the proportion of 
S/M/L-sized enterprises (see Table 4.2). Figure 4.7 compares percentages of small-
sized enterprises in each area and nationwide. More than 90 percent of enterprises 
are small-sized everywhere but it is worth noting that Nan and Phrae are provinces of 
which percentages of small enterprises are exceptionally high (98.3% and 97.7% 
respectively). Also, Figure 4.8 shows that all selected provinces share the same 
pattern of the proportion of medium (M), large (L), extra-large (XL) sized enterprise 
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as the national pattern. Medium-sized is the most, large-sized is the second, and 
extra-large is the last. Noticeably, extra-large sized enterprises do not exist in Phrae 
and Nan. This is different from the existence of extra-large enterprises in overall 
(0.2%), Chiang Mai (0.05%), and Lamphun (0.6%). Lamphun’s figure is relatively 
much higher than the national one which fits with its degree of industrial area.  
 










Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Nationwide 382,170 355,631 93.1 19,640 5.1 6130 1.6 769 0.2 
Chiang Mai 12,171 11,648 95.7 421 3.45 96 0.8 6 0.05 
Lamphun 1,935 1,788 92.4 85 4.4 50 2.6 12 0.6 
Phrae 1,738 1,698 97.7 35 2 5 0.3 - - 
Nan 1,530 1,504 98.3 23 1.5 3 0.2 - - 
Source: Annual Report 2008 (Social Security Office, 2009b) 
Figure 4.7 Percentage of small-sized enterprises in selected provinces 
 
Source: Annual Report 2008 (Social Security Office, 2009b) 
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Figure 4.8 Percentage of medium, large, and extra-large sized enterprises in selected 
provinces 
 
Source: Annual Report 2008 (Social Security Office, 2009b) 
 
Consequently, it is assumed that a large enterprise tends to become involved in SIBD 
more than a small enterprise. Lamphun, as an industrial province, has 12 enterprises 
with more than 1000 employees each. The Lamphun SSRO provided an extra service 
channel at the provincial Government Counter Service (GCS) in Lamphun’s biggest 
shopping mall located next to the industrial park. This service was open until 8pm 
which served workers after works. Chiang Mai as a commercial province has six XL-
sized enterprises but the Chiang Mai SSRO, curiously, has never undertaken similar 
projects. In Phrae and Nan, no large enterprise exists. The provinces are agricultural 
areas in which a large number of small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) exist. 
The Phrae and Nan SSRO did not provide an addtional service similar to Lamphun. 
Therefore, it is likely that large enterprises influence the Lamphun SSRO’s decision. 
Secondly, the proportion of enterprises apparently affects the proportion of 
employees by enterprise size. This proportion of insured persons is significant to the 
SSRO in providing the channel of SIBD. In other words, it influences the SSRO’s 
decision-making resulting in the variation in SIBD channel. Figure 4.9 exhibits the 
composition of various sizes of enterprises in each province and the nation. 
Nationally, the percentage of employees in small-sized enterprises is the highest; 
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second is in large-sized; third medium-sized; and, fourth extra-large sized. None of 
the selected provinces shares this pattern. The only similarity is that the highest 
percentage of insured persons in the provinces, except Lamphun, is in small-sized 
enterprises. Distinctively, Lamphun bear a unique characteristic in which 72.1% of 
insured persons are employed in large and extra-large sized enterprises. 
Figure 4.9 Percentage of insured persons by size of enterprises 
 
Source: Annual Report 2008 (Social Security Office, 2009b) 
Considering this data facilitates as expected the analysis of SIBD diversity and 
affirms that a link between the SSRO’s initiatives and employees’ needs exists. In 
comparison among the four provinces, the highest number of insured persons is in 
Chiang Mai (see Table 4.3). The Chiang Mai SSRO emphasises the internet and bank 
channel in delivering the benefits. Lamphun has around one-third of Chiang Mai but 
the concentration of insured persons, almost half, is in extra-large sized enterprises 
situated in the city. The Lamphun SSRO cooperates with the Lamphun Governor’s 
Office and creates a special channel of delivery in the shopping centre close to the 
industrial park. In Phrae and Nan, the employees in SMEs are the majority of insured 
persons. The Phrae and Nan SSRO similarly initiated the project of cooperation with 
local governments in SIBD in order to enhance the accessibility of services to the 
insured persons in remote areas.   
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Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Nationwide 8,779,131 2,715,936 31 1,873,721 21.3 2,448,295 27.9 1,741,179 19.8 
Chiang Mai 174,380 86,010 49.3 39,884 22.9 38,803 22.2 9,683 5.6 
Lamphun 77,196 13,279 17.2 8,218 10.7 22,579 29.2 33,123 42.9 
Nan 10,715 8,111 75.7 1,887 17.6 717 6.7 - - 
Phrae 16,092 10,347 64.3 3,350 20.8 2,395 14.9 - - 
Source: Annual Report 2008 (Social Security Office, 2009b) 
 
Thirdly, the number of labour unions in each province also varies, resulting in a 
variety of employee organisation’s roles (see Figure 4.10). In Lamphun, two labour 
unions exist; one of them is active in terms of seeking for labour rights and welfare 
in the workplace (Prachathai, 2008a). There is no information for another one so far. 
Therefore, the preliminary assumption is that the active one might get involved in 
SIBD and influence the SSRO’s decision-making. In Chiang Mai, one labour union 
is registered but has never appeared in any media until now. Its role is still unclear. 
Lastly, labour unions do not exist in Phrae and Nan. 
 
Figure 4.10 Number of Labour Unions in Four Selected Provinces 
 
Note:  While one labour union exists in Chiang Mai and Lamphun; none exists in the other 
two selected provinces (Nan and Phrae) 




In conclusion, three differences – the proportion of S/M/L enterprises, the dispersion 
of insured persons in various enterprise sizes, the number of labour unions – among 
the four provinces not only distinguish them from the national pattern but also 
illustrate the unique characteristics of each province. 
4.1.3 Selection of respondents 
Prospective respondents were mainly selected regarding an analytical framework in 
Chapter 3 and a list of Provincial Social Security Subcommittee (PSSS). Firstly, 
Chapter 3 outlines three types of organisations involved in social insurance 
administration: governments, employers, and employees. Although three types of 
governments get involved, this is considered in the two levels of policy-making and 
policy-implementation. Secondly, in the initial fieldwork, a list of PSSS members 
was secured. This list comprises: the SSRO as a secretary, the governor as a chair, 
four internal offices (Employment Office, Labour Office, Work Welfare and 
Protection Office, Labour Development Centre), the Public Health Office, the 
provincial hospital, additional office(s) appointed by the SSRO, representative(s) of 
employee organisations, and representative(s) of employer organisations (see Section 
3.2.4). Since cooperation with local organisations exists in Nan and Phrae, local 
governments are included in the selection of respondents. Consequently, two types of 
respondents (PSSS members and project participants) are listed and the number of 
provincial actors varies across provinces depending on the size of the province and 
the SSRO’s cooperation with local governments (see Table 4.5).  
 
 Table 4.7 The number of potential SIBD actors in selected provinces 
Actors Chiang Mai Lamphun Phrae Nan 
(1) PSSS members 14 11 11 11 




Total number:  
(1) + (2) 





To summarise, Nan is the province with the highest number of actors in SIBD (110 
actors). Eleven PSSS members were appointed as there are 12,365 insured persons 
registered. 99 cooperating local organisations are involved in SIBD in the project of 
‘Thinking Partners and Friends of Insured Persons (P&F)’. Secondly, Phrae is the 
province in which 11 members of the PSSS were appointed as 16,479 insured 
persons are registered in the province. Also, since the Phrae SSRO underwent the 
CLO project which cooperated with 30 local organisations, 41 actors were involved 
in the Phrae SIBD. Thirdly, Chiang Mai with 178,108 insured persons had 14 
members of the PSSS appointed without any cooperating organisations as additional 
actors. Lastly, Lamphun with 78,338 insured persons is similar to Chiang Mai in 
terms of no additional local actors.  
Ideally, at least one respondent from each actor should be interviewed. In total, 
therefore, there are 58 selected respondents including: 1 in Bangkok, 16 in Chiang 
Mai, 13 in Lamphun, and 14 each in Phrae and Nan (see Table 4.6). Judgmental and 
purposive sampling techniques were employed to select prospective respondents. At 
the policy-level, the Director General of the SSO is selected to delineate the 
influence of the SSO towards SIBD at the provincial level. At the implementation-
level, the Chief of the SSRO in each province was selected to represent public 
managers. This is to clarify the relations of the SSRO with either governmental or 
non-governmental organisations in the province and to understand the decision-
making process within the organisation. Also, since two heads of back office and 
front office of the SSRO play the role of coordinator between operatives and the 
Chief, they were interviewed to gain additional understanding on the decision-


















√√     
Policy 
implementer 
Chief of the SSRO  √ √ √ √ 
Head of front office 
(SSRO) 
 X X √ √ 
Head of back office 
(SSRO) 
 X √ √ X 
Cooperating 
actor at the 
provincial 
level 
Provincial Governor  √ √ √ √ 
Chief of EO  √ √ √ √ 
Chief of LO  √ X √ √ 
Chief of LWPO  √ √ √ √ 
Director of LSDC  √ √ √ √ 
Chief of PHO  X √ √ √ 
Director of PH  √ √ X √ 
Chief of offices 
appointed as PSSS 
 √√ √ √ √ 
Employer 
representative 
 X√ X X X 
Employee 
representative 
 √√ √ √ X 
Local government 
officers 
   √√ √ 
Total* 58(48) 1(2) 16(12) 13(10) 14(13) 14(11) 
*x(y) = number of prospect interviewees (number of completed interviews) 
 
Three points should be noted here. Firstly, none of the clerical officers in the SSRO 
were selected, for two reasons. One reason is that the focus of this research is on the 
perceptions of higher-level actors about the degree of diversity and decentralisation 
in the delivery system. This is obviously not a matter related to front-line staffs. 
Another reason is that since each SSRO has at least 20 officials, interviews with all 
operatives were practically impossible due to limited time. Instead of interviewing 
street-level bureaucrats, two heads of front and back offices were interviewed. As the 
heads work with the operatives more often than the chief, it was expected that 
interviewing them could clarify work process at the closer level to service recipients 
in addition to their perceptions about diversity and decentralisation. Secondly, for 
local organisations, data for fieldwork preparation was insufficient to purposively 
118 
 
select one out of 30 (Phrae) or 99 (Nan) so the prospect respondent of each local 
organisation was designated to be only one before the fieldwork started. 
Thirdly, none of service users i.e. insured persons were selected. The major aim of 
this research is to understand decision-making mechanism of SIBD which is 
somewhat state-centric. Rarely do service users technically participate in the SIBD 
decision-making. Although there are employee representatives in the PSSS (see 
Section 3.3.4), their representativeness and participation in the decision-making 
remains questionable according to how they are selected. In other words, even the 
representative is unlikely active in the PSSS (see Section 3.3.2). It is more likely that 
service users have impacts on the decision-making through another mechanism such 
as the SSO’s or the SSRO’s feedback evaluations (see for example Thammasat 
University, 2007). Hence, although this research does not interview any of insured 
persons, it does not mean that the insured are opted out as an actor in SIBD. Rather, 
this research is aware that service users are important feedback providers with 
unlikely participation in SIBD decision-making. 
4.2 Data collection 
This section aims to answer the following questions. What are data types, sources, 
and format of interest? What are methods of data collection? Why were the methods 
selected? How did the researcher access the data? How was data collection plan 
being operated during the fieldwork? When the data collection did not go to plan, 
how did the researcher manage it? What was the limitation in collecting data for this 
research? And, what are ethical issues of concern? 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, sources of data for this research are ‘natural social 
setting’ and ‘social artefacts’ being analysed at three levels: micro-social, meso-
social and macro-social. The individual perspectives of policy actors involved in 
provincial SIA are concerned at the micro-level in order to understand results and the 
process of negotiation between actors. At the meso-level, Social Security Regional 
Offices (SSROs) are of major concern in order to understand their structures and 
functions in the social insurance system and their cooperating organisations are 
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considered as policy actors involved in the SSROs’ service delivery. At the macro-
level, the social insurance system, particularly its regional administration, is a unit of 
analysis.  
Two data types of concern are primary data (collected by interviews) and tertiary 
data (collected from documents e.g. minutes of meeting, research reports, and official 
statistics). Numerical data such as the amount of benefit or public spending on 
Thailand’s social insurance are considered as research background; however, 
qualitative data is the main form utilised. The data collection was planned to be 
predominantly conducted through qualitative methods: documents and interviews. 
Secondly, since interviews ‘can get close to the social actors’ meanings and 
interpretations, to their accounts of the social interaction in which they have been 
involved (Blaikie, 2009, p. 207)’, they were utilised to achieve the data on the roles 
of policy actors in practice and to reflect the relations between one another in the 
system.  
Research fieldwork was planned in two phases lasting for six months in total. The 
first phase was three months (December 2010 – February 2011); the second was 
three months (October – December 2011). Indeed, collecting data within a single 
period benefits in several ways such as continuity of data, a constant relationship 
with gatekeepers, and lower cost especially for travel expenses. However, dividing 
data collection into two periods also has its own advantages. It provides room for the 
researcher to review the data collected in the first fieldwork phase. As a result, in the 
second fieldwork phase, the researcher could consider the data in hands, identify the 
gaps, and eventually fulfil those gaps in the first phase. In other words, the first 
fieldwork was to pave the way and established the ground for data collection. The 
second phase was to ensure the completion of listed interviews.  
In the first phase, three main outcomes were expected: an evaluation of data access, 
connection establishment, and gathering the in-house documents. An ultimate aim of 
the first phase was to evaluate the accessibility of required data. Since most of the 
data reviewed to make a plan of data collection were accessed either online or 
through libraries in the UK, it was possible that the plan would not reflect the 
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accessibility of data in practice. Another aim was to establish the connection with all 
organisations of interest including the SSO, the Phrae SSRO, the Lamphun SSRO, 
and the Chiang Mai SSRO. This could lead to the access of either documents or 
interviews specified in the original plan (see Table 4.6). Lastly, it was expected that, 
in addition to the tentative data specified in the original plan, more interviewees and 
documents could be identified. The second phase of data collection basically aimed 
to fulfil the gaps of the first phase. The process of accessing the data was the same 
but the contact persons were changed in some cases. In this phase, references from 
insiders in social insurance system were available so that some data which was not 
available in the first phase became more accessible.  
In both fieldworks, two research methods – documents and interviews – were 
employed with supplementary data from observational methods. Documents were 
accessed through three channels including library, online database, and government 
offices. Libraries were in Thailand; online databases were searched in Thai and 
English languages; and selected government offices included the SSO and the 
SSROs in selected provinces (see Section 4.2.2). Interviews were conducted in five 
provinces (Bangkok, Phrae, Nan, Lamphun, Chiang Mai) with 58 selected 
respondents. In-person interviews were more preferable to telephone interviews 
because doing interview is not only about conversation with (verbal data) but also 
observation of (non-verbal data) the interviewees. Still, when necessary, telephone 
interviews were undertaken and data was recorded in the form of field notes. 
Observation is undertaken in an unobtrusive – non-structured, non-participant, 
uncontrolled – way in all sites of the study. Notably, for an additional province 
(Nan), all plans of data collection designed for the three originally-selected cases 
were applied. 
4.2.1 Searching for access 
Data access could be classified into two groups: governmental organisations (i.e. 
SSO, SSRO, provincial governor, provincial offices, local governments) and non-
governmental organisations (i.e. employer representative, employee representative, 
private hospital). The former is access for both documents and interviews; the latter 
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is access for interviews only. Firstly, to access documents or obtain interview 
permission in public organisations, a single process was undergone at the same time 
with the same contact persons. The researcher needed to make a telephone call in 
prior to official letter submission, wait for the response, and then access the data. 
Similarly, to get interview permission with non-governmental organisations, the 
researcher required to these same three steps. However, apparently, this process was 
less formal and bureaucratic. Sometimes no official letters were required.  
4.2.1.1 Government organisations  
There are three ways to explain how the researcher accessed data in government 
offices including: by process, by method, and by province. In general, the process of 
accessing official documents in Thailand can be summarised into four steps: making 
a phone call, submitting a letter of data access request, waiting for the response, and 
accessing the data permitted. The first step was substantial because the researcher 
needed to explain the research topic and inquire regarding the possible date and time 
of interview. Sometimes, when it was not convincing enough, the researcher needed 
to go to the office and explain it in person. Then, letters provided for each 
organisation were delivered either by fax or in person. During the waiting time, the 
researcher needed to call the contact persons several times to confirm the result.  
Accessing data in government organisations can also be presented as three different 
methods: official letter, telephone, and recommended contact person. Formal letters 
of data access permission were required by all offices. Although government offices 
abide by the Official Information Act (certain types of data must be provided for 
public), all contacted offices asked for official letters. In all instances, a similar 
reason was given; ‘it is necessary that this data request be approved by the 
Chief/Director’. 
Telephone calls were made to request the data in many ways. This could be clarified 
over four different periods: before the first fieldwork, during the first fieldwork, the 
period in between two fieldworks, and during the second fieldwork. Before the first 
fieldwork, two offices, Phrae and Lamphun SSRO, were contacted on the phone 
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asking if they could send the data via email. Both of them agreed to send emails; 
however, only one email from Phrae was received. During the first fieldwork, some 
organisations were contacted on the phone and official letters were submitted to the 
office by fax instead of in person. This is because some organisations, particularly 
local governments, were situated in remote areas. Travel to some places may take at 
least two hours one way. During the preliminary analysis in between the two data 
collection phases, or the preparation for the second fieldwork, the researcher made a 
phone call from the UK to the selected offices to ask for the permission and submit 
the letters by email. Then, in the second fieldwork phase, the process was the same 
as in the first phase. 
Gatekeepers recommended by either the researcher’s acquaintances or the previous 
interviewees were contacted only after the first fieldwork. This channel was used 
only in accessing data in some organisations in Chiang Mai and Lamphun. Since 
these organisations seemed to require not only official letters and brief introduction 
of the research, the researcher needed to provide references from ‘insiders’. 
4.2.1.2 Non-governmental organisations  
Similar to the process of accessing data in government organisations, searching for 
permission to interview with either an employer or employee representative required 
to commence from making a phone call. To specify the preliminary date and time of 
interview, phone calls were made to all potential interviewees. Contact numbers were 
accessed either online or through the SSRO. For example, in the case of a 
representative of employer organisations in Lamphun, the contact was suggested by 
the SSRO. Conversely, in the case of the employer representative in Phrae, the 
contact number was found on the respondent’s company website. 
However, the second step varied depending on each respondent’s personality. Some 
respondents needed no official letters; some requested it for more information. For 
example, a Lamphun employee representative agreed to be interviewed on the first 
day of contact. The appointment was set and the interview was undertaken at the 
same time he read the letter. In a different manner, an employer representative in 
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Phrae requested the letter and passed it to his secretary to arrange the interview with 
the researcher. 
4.2.2 Documents 
‘Documentary research’ was employed as a data collection method of this research 
because the required data are contained in documents and texts both official and 
unofficial in format. According to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1992), social 
and political research must rely almost exclusively on data which is mostly available 
in documents and artefacts. This research focuses on diversification of Thailand’s 
social insurance administration at regional level. It is necessary to understand the 
background and history of the administrative system which can be found in research, 
studies, textbooks, and government documents. Also, documentary research was 
employed because ‘a document does not only represent a reflection of a 
correspondence between its description and the events to which it refers but also 
represents the practical requirements for which they were constructed (May, 2001, 
p.176)’.  
Documents, containing tertiary data, were collected in order to: understand 
background of the Thai social insurance administration, set the interview guideline, 
and triangulate the data gathered from the interviews. It was expected that 
investigating documents could highlight area of concern in this research such as 
implementation processes and activities. According to Scott (cited in May, 2001, 
p.178), a ‘document’ is ‘physically embodied texts, where the containment of the text 
is the primary purpose of the physical medium’. It is ‘evidence[s] containing 
messages either in text or picture format (May, 2001: 180)’. Also, since a document 
has the potential to inform and structure the decisions which people make on a daily 
and longer term basis, employing this method is supposed to delineate the decision-
making process of Thailand’s social insurance administration e.g. the rationale 
behind actions in the policy arena and negotiations between policy actors. 
Additionally, the means for doing so are to utilize the idea of a constant that may be 




Two types of documents, official documents and academic works, considered in this 
research were in public sources. All official documents specified in Table 4.7 were 
usually kept in the offices where they were produced. The number of researches and 
theses on social insurance in libraries is enormous; keywords such as ‘social 
insurance administration’, ‘regional empowerment’, and ‘administrative 
decentralisation’ were used to generate the most relevant data. 
Two types of access were considered: libraries and government offices. Firstly, five 
government offices of interest were in Thailand including: the SSO, Phrae SSRO, 
Lamphun SSRO, Chiang Mai SSRO, and Nan SSRO. Most of the documents were 
only in Thai; some provided an English version such as annual reports of the SSO. 
After search results were generated, selecting the most relevant documents was based 
on four criteria: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (see the 
following sub-section). Secondly, the SSO’s Library was a source of government 
documents and archives on Thailand’s social insurance. As the SSO is a major 
organisation responsible for social insurance administration, it was expected that 
most of the documents and archives on the general background of social insurance 
would be found in this library. 
Notably, it is necessary to differentiate between documents and literature. Table 4.7 
aims to provide an overall picture of prospective texts. However, it is a mixture of 
documents and literature. To be clear, ‘document’ considered as data of this research 
is the texts – e.g. minutes of meeting, reports, plans, strategies – produced by the 
selected government offices (see Section 4.1.2). On the other hand, literatures are 
summarised and presented earlier in Chapter 2. Yet, ‘documentary research is not a 
clear cut and well-recognized category. It can hardly be regarded as constituting a 
method’ (Platt in May, 2001: 176). Being aware of this, another research method, 
interviewing, is employed to strengthen, sometimes supplement, findings of the 
research. This will be clarified later in the next section. 
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Table 4.9 List of documents and sources 
Document 
type 
Source Type of source Expected data 
Objective 







- Five-year strategy 
- Annual plan and projects 
- Budget by province 
- Annual reports 
- Government-funded 
researches 
- Laws and regulations 
- To define the policy intent 
and the SSO’s role in 
SIBD 
- To identify the significance 
of the SSO’s policy towards 












- Annual reports 
- Action plan 
- Projects 
- Annual budget 
- Minute of Meeting 
- To understand the SSRO’s 
external and internal 
environments 
- To identify particular 
projects differing from the 
ones decided by the SSO 
- To analyse the actors 




Ministry of Labour Online 
database  
- Research reports - To survey relevant policy 
actors in the perspectives 
of other scholars and 
students 
- To develop the analytical 
framework from the existing 
knowledge  
- To find the gap of existing 
knowledge of social 

















4.2.2.1 Keywords for Generating Data 
There are four major key terms for generating data; ‘regional empowerment’, 
‘administrative decentralisation’, ‘social insurance administration’, and ‘initiative 
project’. While ‘regional empowerment’ focuses on the matter of how the central 
unit empowers its provincial offices politically; ‘administrative decentralisation’ 
emphasises how administrative system is being decentralised. ‘Social insurance 
administration’ is defined as ‘processes and systems of delivering social insurance 
benefit (SIB) delivery’. Notably, SIBD means the services provided by the SSRO in 
order to deliver all seven benefits of social insurance in Thailand. This research 
focuses on how delivery agencies serve their insured persons (services) not how the 
amount of each benefit is decided (rules). The last keyword ‘initiative project’ means 
the project which is originated by the SSRO in response to local needs. 
4.2.2.2 Logic of Selecting Documents 
There are four criteria for assessing the data available from documentary sources; 
meaning, authenticity, credibility, and representativeness (Scott in May, 2001: 189-
190). ‘Meaning’ refers to the clarity and comprehensibility of a document to the 
analyst. To find documents with the relevant meaning, the researcher considers tge 
search results twice. First, the search results were scanned roughly through the titles 
of each search result. If the title appeared to be relevant, it was shortlisted. Second, 
the abstract or summary or contents of each item in the short list was read thoroughly 
in order to confirm that the selected documents were relevant to the researcher topic. 
 ‘Authenticity’, whether the document is genuine and original, is evaluated by 
following a few questions provided by Forster (in May, 2001: 189); ‘Are the data 
genuine? Are they from a primary or secondary source? Are they actually what they 
appear to be? Are they authentic copies of originals?’ It is imperative that 
documents in this research need to be genuine. For example, the book ‘Social 
Security in Thailand’ was written by the Thai Social Security Division in 1973. It is 
the first and only one edition usually found in the government publication zone of 
university libraries. Its content has never been altered as it is a published book and 
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secured in the library. The book cover also shows the official number of the 
document, ‘Document No.69 Book No.1/1973’, therefore, apparently, this copy was 
published in the year of 1973 by the government organisation.  
To assure ‘credibility’, another set of questions were employed. Are the people who 
record the information reliable in their translations of the information that they 
receive? How accurate were their observations and records? From the previous 
example, since the author is the government, it is doubtful that the information is 
from only one perspective and it is perhaps written in the way the government wants 
the readers to believe. Therefore, it is necessary to find other documents to argue or 
support the data within in order to avoid bias. Apparently, different authors construct 
different data. In order to gain unbiased and accurate data, the authors are categorised 
into three groups; governments, academics, and individuals, and the search 
documents was based on these categories. Although some documents may still lack 
credibility, it can be increased by triangulation. 
Since political research cannot easily find a typical document because most 
documents were subjectively written by each political side (May, 2001), 
‘representativeness’, referred to as ‘typically’, in this research is only found in the 
SSO’s documents. A series of the SSO’s strategies (1990-2015) are considered to be 
typical documents representing the SSO’s opinion. Contrarily, other documents 
cannot be identified as representative because each of them presents perspectives of 
policy actors variably. 
4.2.2.3 Collection Summary 
The following presents results of access in two phases of data collection. Firstly, 
during December 2010 – March 2011, four offices – the SSO (in Bangkok), Phrae 
SSRO, Lamphun SSRO and Chiang Mai SSRO – were approached. Letters  to 
request permission were submitted to all offices; the responses, however, varied. 
Although they are all under the same laws (i.e. SSA and Official information Act) 
and the SSO’s policies (open access of official data), each of them provided different 
reasons in granting data access to the researcher. Firstly, the SSO’s library and 
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Information Center (situated in the same building as the SSO) provided all 
information required to be revealed under the Official Information Act. Also, in 
implementing their open access policy, they provided an accessible and convenient 
space for anybody who would like to read the data.  
Besides, two divisions of the SSO – Division of Research and Development and 
Division of Administrative System Development – were contacted in person. Firstly, 
it was expected that Division of Research and Development could provide a research 
report on the topic of the SSO’s regional administration. According to online 
information, the Division offered funding for researchers to carry out research under 
such a topic. However, the official said that the funding was cancelled in response to 
the Director-General’s suggestion. Although the expected document did not exist, the 
official suggested another documents relevant to this research topic instead (see 
Chaiwong et al, 2006).  
In contrast, the Division of Administrative System Development
13
 refused to give 
access to the data. The officials contacted were curious about this research project’s 
focus on diversity of social insurance administration at the provincial level. They 
believed that all projects of the SSRO should uniformly comply with the SSO’s 
policies. They wondered whether the issue of this research was worth studying. 
Interestingly, although they were working for the Division which was supposed to be 
relatively non-bureaucratic
14
, their attitudes appeared to be somewhat bureaucratic. 
They mentioned that no matter what happened the SSRO should follow the SSO’s 
policies
15
 but paradoxically they also admitted that the SSRO should respond to local 
needs.  
Three SSROs were requested for data access: Phrae, Lamphun, and Chiang Mai. In 
comparison among the three SSROs, the Phrae SSRO enthusiastically welcomed and 
granted data access to the researcher. Since the first time of contact in person, they 
allowed the data access without hesitation. The head of the back office not only tried 
                                                             
13
 This division is in charge of structural and administrative development of the SSO. 
14
 Another informal label of them is the ‘little Office of Public Sector Development Reform 
Commission (OPDC)’ which implies that they should be working under the New Public Management 
Approach. The OPDC is a facilitator and regulator of Thailand’s bureaucratic system reform. 
15
 ‘This is a bureaucratic system; we could not do much about it’ the official stated. 
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to give most of the obtainable data, regarding the Act and the SSO’s policies, but 
also willingly explained the structure of the SSRO to the researcher. Although some 
documents specified in the letter of data access request were not available at the time, 
the head told the researcher that the SSRO would inform the researcher later whether 
the data was accessible. Surprisingly, the SSRO took only a week to consider the 
letter and allowed the researcher to access the data. 
In the case of the Lamphun SSRO, the consideration of the data access request was 
relatively slow and not all data requested was accessible. Three of four documents 
requested in the submitted letter were given. Requested documents included: 
structure and authority of the SSRO, vision and policies of the SSRO, annual plans 
and projects of the SSRO, and statistics of benefit claims in Lamphun. The document 
which was not given was plans and projects of the SSRO. The reason they stated was 
that some information was confidential. However, in fact, this data was supposed to 
be disclosed to the public under  the Official Information Act.  
The Chiang Mai SSRO was the slowest one in responding to the data access request; 
two out of four requested data were given including the statistics and the SSRO’s 
structure. They stated that the SSRO’s vision, policies, annual plans and projects 
were the same as the SSO’s; thus the researcher could access them through the SSO. 
Therefore, the researcher requested the additional data, the name list of the PSSSC, 
instead of insisting on getting those data. However, eventually, they informed the 
researcher that, at the moment, they were too busy to provide the requested data for 
the researcher due to the newly launched SSO’s policy on coverage expansion. 
At the end of the first fieldwork phase, to substitute for the inaccessible data of the 
SSRO, the researcher decided to gather as much data as possible from the SSO 
instead. For instance, although the information on annual plans and projects of 
Chiang Mai and Lamphun SSRO were inaccessible, the data in the SSO’s annual 
plans could be substituted. These annual plans not only presented an overall plan and 




Secondly, in October – December 2011, four offices were contacted including the 
SSROs in Chiang Mai, Lamphun, and Nan and the SSO. There was no need to 
request more documents from the Phrae SSRO since they were sufficiently supplied 
in the first fieldwork phase. The Nan SSRO was added as the fourth provinces of 
case selection due to its distinctive project. Briefly, responses from all offices were 
better than in the first phase. This could possibly be because the researcher had 
learned how to establish the connection with each office from the first fieldwork. All 
documents requested from each office was given but the quantity of data varied. For 
instance, while the Nan SSRO gave several minutes of the PSSS meetings from 
2006-2010; the Chiang Mai SSRO gave only one minute of one PSSS meeting. 
4.2.3 Interviews 
Since this research aims to understand the practice of SIA, the interview was selected 
as a method because ‘the emphasis [of interview] must be on how the interviewees 
frames and understands issues and events – that is, what the interviewee views as 
important in explaining and understanding events, patterns, and forms of behaviour 
(Bryman, 2008)’. The research highlights a period of policy-implementation process 
in order to answer the core questions; who was involved in the process, how they 
inter with one another, and what results of the relations or cooperation were. Since 
public policy implementation needs to follow policies designated by the policy-
makers which are written down in texts, documents are expected to give a picture of 
the written formal process. However, as implementation is ‘a conversion of policy 
into practice’, although some practices were written down, the data on how the 
implementation being undertaken in practice is still significant to the research. This 
data is obviously unavailable through the documents; rather, it is technical 
knowledge kept by the implementers. Also, although some data can be found in 
documents, it is necessary to triangulate the data in order to compare between what 
was written and what was practiced. 
Both semi-structured and unstructured interviews were conducted during the 
fieldwork. Mainly, semi-structured interviews were employed to gather primary data; 
‘the researcher has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be covered… but the 
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interviewees have a great deal of leeway to reply (Bryman, 2008, p. 438)’. This 
research employs semi-structured interviews for two main reasons. Due to limited 
time and opportunity to get an interview, one reason is to ensure that all required data 
or answers are collected during the interview. Since the research field site is in 
Thailand, the researcher cannot go back and forth to redo the interview if some data 
is left behind or some questions are not asked. Also, as all interviewees were in 
employment and the interview took place during their working hours, the researcher 
needed to make the most use of the granted period by asking concise and well-
organised questions. Another reason is that, reviewing the literature before the 
fieldwork, a number of questions arise. Some of these can be answered by 
documentary research; some cannot. To ensure that the interview could cover all 
those questions, the topic guide was designed.  
Unstructured interviews were used with some interviewees including local 
government officers, regional officials, representatives of employee organisations, 
and representatives of employer organisations. At the beginning, the researcher 
introduced the topic of interview and then conducted the interview in conversational 
style. The main reason was that, although relevant data were reviewed before the 
interviews started, the data were insufficient to develop the topic guide. The 
researcher only knew that the interviewees were involved in the SSRO’s 
administration but the details of how they were involved were not mentioned in any 
documents. Therefore, the researcher prepared for the interviews by studying their 
organisations or general roles before undertaking the interviews. Then, during the 
interviews, the researcher took note and developed the questions simultaneously. 
The tentative interviewees (listed in Table 4.6) were selected in accordance with the 
analytical framework developed from literature reviewed before the first fieldwork. 
Also, the topic guides of the interviews were preliminarily designed before the 
fieldwork. After reviewing more documents during the first month of fieldwork, a 
list of interviewees was confirmed and the topic guides were revised. 
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4.2.3.1 Topic guide of interview 
This section presents discussion in two respects: a list of questions for semi-
structured interviews and topics for unstructured interviews. In semi-structured 
interviews, three sets of topic guides were prepared as follow: for chiefs of the 
SSRO, the Director-General of the SSO, and the provincial governor. These sets 
were initially designed before and amended after the fieldwork started. 
Firstly, the topic guide for the SSRO Chief was better clarified after the fieldwork 
started (see Figure 4.12). Four questions were originally designated; five topics were 
eventually submitted to the interviewees. The first and fifth topics aim to find the 
chief’s opinions toward the SSRO’s position in social insurance administration. The 
second topic investigated how the SSRO implemented the SSO’s policies and how 
the chief and his subordinates worked together to initiate projects. The third topic 
was to evaluate the influence of the provincial governor on activities of the SSRO. 
The fourth topic inquired why and how the SSRO cooperated with other 
organisations in the province. 
Figure 4.11 Topic guide of interview for the SSRO chief 
 
Secondly, for the SSO’s Director-General, two original questions were clarified into 
three topics (see Figure 4.13). The first topic aimed to investigate the interviewee’s 
attitude towards a centralised administrative system which could be linked to 
monitoring and controlling the system of the SSO on the SSRO’s administration. The 
second topic was to inquire about the thoughts of the interviewee on empowering the 
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SSRO. Lastly, the topic aimed to evaluate the tensions between the SSO and the 
SSRO. 
Figure 4.12 Topic guide of interview for the SSO Director-General 
 
Thirdly, two questions for interview with the provincial governor were elaborated 
into three topics (see Figure 4.14). Since the governor plays two major roles in 
regional social insurance administration (chair of PSSS and the provincial CEO), the 
first and second topics were to inquire about the two roles in practice in order to 
compare with the data gathered from the documents. The third topic sought for the 
data was on how the governor and the SSRO worked together. In other words, it 
attempted to identify the negotiation between the two actors. 
 
Figure 4.13 Topic guide of interview for the provincial governor 
 
Interviews with four groups (cooperating provincial offices, employee organisations, 
employer organisations, local governments) were conducted in unstructured form. 
Each group was informed of the topic of interview either during the introduction of 
interview or prior to the meeting. Generally, the topic concerns their role and 
cooperation with the SSRO. Then, the researcher continued with questions which 
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originated from the previous answers given by the interviewee. Otherwise, if the 
researcher gained relevant information from previous interviewees, this information 
would be used to form a question. These questions also varied among the groups 
regarding their affiliation and relations to the SSRO. In brief, broad topics were 
designed before the fieldwork and detailed topics were developed either during the 
conversation or from existing information the researcher had so far. 
4.2.3.2 Collection Summary 
Initially, during the first fieldwork phase, letters of data access request were 
officially submitted to interviewees in Phrae, Lamphun, Chiang Mai, and Bangkok. 
As Nan was added later on, all letters for interviewees in Nan were submitted in the 
second fieldwork period. In five provinces, 48 interviews were completed while 12 
respondents were unavailable (see Table 4.6). There were different reasons why 
some interviews remained undone. Firstly, in Phrae, an employer representative 
agreed to be interviewed at the beginning but asked to postpone it afterwards. 
Although the researcher re-contacted the interviewee, the date could not be fixed 
since the interviewee’s secretary referred to a busy schedule.  
Secondly, in Nan, both employer and employee representatives were unavailable. 
The employer, who is the Phrae employer’s brother, also claimed that his schedule 
was unavailable at the proposed time. The employee appointed as the PSSS member 
was unapproachable. She quit her job and her employer knew nothing about her new 
contact details. Her mobile number was changed and other contacts (i.e. postal 
address, home phone) were unavailable. The new employee representative, appointed 
in late 2011, has never attended the sub-committee meeting. Apparently, she could 
not provide relevant information.  
Thirdly, in Lamphun, the Chief of Labour Office rejected giving an interview. She 
assigned her assistant for the interview and passed relevant documents to the 
researcher. Although the conversation happened with the assistant, she reaffirmed 
her chief’s statement that the office had not participated in any of the SSRO’s 
decision making although they were a member of the PSSS. In addition, the head of 
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the Lamphun SSRO’s front office was not interviewed because the head of the back 
office was simultaneously responsible for back and front offices. Also, similar to the 
Phrae employer, the Lamphun employer agreed to be interviewed but the 
confirmation was prolonged until after the fieldwork ended. 
Fourthly, four prospect respondents remain to be interviewed in Chiang Mai 
including: the chief of Public Health Office, two heads of the SSRO, and one of the 
employer representatives. In the case of the Public Health Office, the answer given 
was that the office was barely involved in provincial social insurance administration. 
Accordingly, they were unsure that they could provide any relevant information. The 
two heads of the SSRO’s front and back offices were unwilling to be interviewed due 
to their busy schedule and continued postponing the date until the fieldwork was 
finished. For the remaining employer, although contacted several times, he answered 
the phone call only once and never got back to the researcher afterwards. 
Additionally, the number of interviews with the representative of local organisations 
in Phrae and Nan are different. In Phrae, since there are 30 organisations (22 local 
governments, 5 local hospitals, and 3 local organisations) cooperating with the Phrae 
SSRO, all local governments were contacted on the phone using the contact numbers 
accessed on the Phrae Local Administration Office’s website. Some local 
governments situated in accessible distance were asked if the researcher could visit 
and interview in person; the further ones were interviewed on the telephone. 
However, the data from only two local governments are really relevant to and used in 
the data analysis.  
Differently, although the Nan SSRO also operated a cooperation project similar to 
Phrae, only one out of 99 cooperating local organisations in Nan was selected for two 
reasons. Firstly, regarding the acquired information from the SSRO, the selected 
municipality is an organisation with the strongest bond with the SSRO. They 
provided a temporary office for the SSRO for weekly service provision in their 
office. Secondly, although a few more local governments were questioned on the 
phone, their participation was not as much as the selected one. Information they gave 
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was similar to what was written on the SSRO’s documents. Therefore, the researcher 
decided to focus on a single case with more depth of information rather than all 
cooperating organisations. 
4.2.4 Observation 
Observation was undertaken in supplement to the two major methods (documents 
and interview) of this research. Doing observation, ‘the information is sought by way 
of investigator's own direct observation without asking from the respondent’ 
(Kothari, 2005, p. 96). It differs from documents and interview in that ‘data are 
collected directly rather than through the reports of a respondent; the observer or 
measurement device, in essence, becomes the respondent (Lyberg & Kasprzyk, 2004, 
p. 246)’. Particularly, the researcher is aware of the limitation of interview method as 
Webb et al. (1966, p.1) suggest that interview ‘intrude as a foreign element into the 
social setting’, is limited to those who are accessible and cooperate, and data 
obtained are produced ‘by dimensions of individual differences irrelevant to the topic 
at hand.’  
In other words, data generated from interview are questioned of their ‘authentic 
accounts of subjective experience (Miller & Glassner, 2004, p. 125)’. In interview, 
perhaps the data desired may be ‘unreliable because of either recall difficulties or 
practical difficulties in obtaining the cooperation of a respondent (Lyberg & 
Kasprzyk, 2004, p. 247)’. Also, ‘[E]ven studies based on direct interviews employ 
observational techniques to note body language and other gestural cues that lend 
meaning to the words of the persons being interviewed’ (Angrosino & Perez, 2003, 
p. 107). Thus, doing research requires more than ‘simply asking’ as Lee (2000, p. 1) 
summarises: 
 
‘A problem with this assumption [of ‘simply asking’] is that what we 
gain 'simply by asking' is often shaped by the dynamics surrounding the 
interaction between researcher and researched. ... One consequence of 
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this might be a need to accomplish the 'interrogation of experience, 
attitude and belief' in other, less direct, ways.’ 
 
In this research, observation is employed as complementary to interviews and 
documents. It is expected, as Lee (2000, p. 7) suggests, that ‘configuring different 
methods, each of which is fallible in a different way, gives greater purchase on the 
problem to hand than on over-reliance on a single method.’ Additionally, this 
research employs an unobtrusive way of observation not only because it is 
complementary to other methods but also because of its adaptability (see Lee, 2000). 
With early research experiences, the researcher is thus aware that accesses of 
documents or interviews could possibly be unavailable and observation may serve 
the purpose of collecting substitute and sometimes substantial data. 
Observational data in this research were generated from unstructured, non-participant 
and uncontrolled observation. Being unstructured, the observation took place without 
‘careful definition of the units to be observed, the style of recording the observed 
information, standardised conditions of observation and the selection of pertinent 
data of observation (Kothari, 2005, p. 96)’ to be thought of in advance. It agrees with 
Babbie’s suggestion (2013, p. 295) that:  
‘As a field researcher, you'll seldom approach your task with precisely 
defined hypotheses to be tested. More typically, you'll attempt to make 
sense out of an ongoing process that cannot be predicted in advance...’  
 
The researcher thus went to the field with the knowledge based on the literature 
review and many times used topic guides of interview (see Section 4.2.3) as 
observational guidelines. For example, after the interview with one of the Nan TAOs, 
the researcher went to observe the Nan SSRO’s temporary office situated in the 
TAO. In contrary to the SSRO’s and the TAO’s claim that the temporary office was 
doing well, what the researcher saw is a room with several desks and a signpost 
‘SSRO’s office’ lying on one of the desks instead of being stuck on the wall. It is 
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thus noted that the temporary office may not be doing well as they claimed. This 
observation was not structured before the interviews with either the SSRO or TAO. It 
was developed after interview data was gathered in the field. 
Being non-participant, the observation occurred in the way ‘the observer observes as 
a detached emissary without any attempt on his part to experience through 
participation what others feel (Kothari, 2005, p. 97)’. Gold (1958) suggests four 
modes of researcher’s roles regarding the degree of involvement: the complete 
participant, the participant-as-observer, the observer-as-participant, and the complete 
observer. In this research, the researcher positions herself as a complete observer. 
Participant observation may enable the researcher more appreciated of selected social 
process. However, there are dangers that the researched may shift their attention to 
the research project rather than their natural process and the researcher may ‘go naive 
and lose much of [his/her] scientific detachment’ (Babbie, 2013, p. 300).  
Hence, in attempt to maintain the scientific detachment and nature of the social 
process, the researcher did not take part in any processes or activities of SIBD 
decision-making in any way. Observations took place mainly during interviews and 
visits to all sites of study. In attempt to minimise the researcher’s influence to the 
researched, gestures of interviewees and physical traces in each office were observed 
and recorded in field notes without prior notice. Indeed, this type of observation may 
be sketchy, transitory and less appreciated of social process (Babbie, 2013). Being a 
complete observer, however, serves the purpose of objectivity. As Adler and Adler 
(1998, p. 48) suggest, this role ‘most closely approximates the traditional ideal of the 
“objective” observer,’ although not perfectly.  
Similarly, being uncontrolled, the observation took place in natural setting in attempt 
‘to get a spontaneous picture of life and persons (Kothari, 2005, p. 97)’. At two 
opposite ends, controlled observations mostly occur as experiments in laboratories 
and uncontrolled observations takes place in natural social settings. The former is 
believed to aid accuracy and standardisation, while the latter likely supply 
naturalness and completeness of social settings (Kothari, 2005). This research, as 
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discussed earlier, attempts to minimise intervention in and influence on social 
settings and process. It aims to understand SIBD from the stakeholders’ perspective 
as much as possible. Thus, uncontrolled observation was undertaken while 
acknowledging the limitations of this unobtrusive way of observation. 
In brief, observational methods are mainly critiqued over its effect of the observer on 
the observed (Angrosino & Perez, 2003; Barker, 1980; Sechrest & Phillips, 1979), 
subjective interpretation (Angrosino & Perez, 2003; Kothari, 2005), and questionable 
validity and reliability (Adler & Adler, 1998). Unobtrusive observation is still 
undertaken in this research for three reasons. Firstly, this method embodies ‘the least 
potential for generating observer effects’ as Adler and Adler (1998, p. 89) argue that 
‘[T]he naturalness of the observer role, coupled with its nondirection, makes it the 
least noticeably intrusive of all research techniques.’ 
Secondly, despite its subjectivity, observation when combined with other methods – 
interviews and documents in this research – could enhance the rigour of data. As 
Adler and Adler (1998, pp. 89-90) convincingly argues that ‘[A]lthough direct 
observation may be marred by researcher biases, at least they are consistent and 
known. Direct observation, when added onto other research yielding depth and/or 
breadth, enhance consistency and validity.’ The last reason of undertaking 
observation lies in its emergence. Compared with more structured methods, 
unobtrusive observation has flexibility to ‘yield insight into new realities or new 
ways of looking at old realities (Adler & Adler, 1998, p. 89)’. It allows the researcher 
to ‘observe subtle communications and other events that might not be anticipated 
(Babbie, 2013, p. 298)’.  
Either interview transcripts or field notes are produced after the interview is finished. 
All recorded interviews are transcribed in order to provide elaborate data for the 
analysis. However, in the case that the interviews could not be recorded, field notes 
are written either during or after the interview. Recording proved unavailable in two 
cases. Basically, if the interview takes place in person, the researcher always asks to 
record it. However, some interviewees deny the request; some ask to stop the 
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recorder in the middle of the interview; some start talking more comfortably after the 
recorder is switched off. Another case is during telephone interviewing when the 
researcher could not record it due to the lack of an appropriate device. 
Nonetheless, informal conversations happen during the time the researcher visit 
various offices to introduce the research and search for gatekeepers or interviewees 
which were taken into consideration as data. Although, according to the research 
ethics, the information the researcher acquired through these conversations should 
not be written in the dissertation, some opinions are very interesting and possibly 
reflect perspectives, for example, of central offices towards regional offices. 
Therefore, field notes are employed as a supplement method of data collection. 
4.2.5 Limitations 
There are three main concerns relating to data collection: the accessibility of data, 
ethical issues, and limited resources. First, even though most of the tertiary data are 
in the public domain, some of the official documents might be preserved for secrecy. 
If this arises, other documents or transcriptions with similar information are 
consulted instead. On the other hand, if interview permission is rejected, documents 
are used as a supplement. Second, since the primary data was collected by 
interviews, informed consent should be considered in terms of ethical issues (more 
detail in Section 4.3.2). If the tentative interviewees refuse to provide the required 
information for any reasons, the sample needs to be re-selected or supplemented with 
documents as mentioned earlier. Finally, since this is PhD research without any 
funding, the time, personnel, and financial resources are limited. This particularly 
results in the limitation of data collection both financially and non-financially. 
This research design contains both strengths and weaknesses which fall under four 
issues: a case study research design, a qualitative strategy, the data sources, and the 
data collection method. Firstly, case study is not a perfect research design; 
undertaking it has to deal with ‘misconception (Yin, 1994)’. On one hand, taking a 
case-study approach, this research engenders weaknesses such as a potential lack of 
generalizability. On the other hand, it has strengths – such as descriptive inferences, 
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in-depth explanation, internal comparability, insight into causal mechanisms, 
invariant causal proposition, and exploration within a single unit. 
Secondly, this research design lacks a quantitative methodology. For example, it 
excludes analysis of the magnitudes of resource exchanges and concentrates on 
perceptions of stakeholders. This may result in classic weaknesses of qualitative 
research regarding the suggestion that it is too subjective, difficult to replicate, incurs 
problems of generalisation, and has a lack of transparency (Bryman, 2008, pp. 385-
390). Still, this research rests upon five preoccupations of qualitative strategy 
strengths including: seeing through the eyes of the people being studied, description 
and the emphasis on context, emphasis on process, flexibility and limited structure, 
and concepts and theory grounded in data (Bryman, 2008). Further, being aware of 
such weaknesses, the research is designed as qualitative and case study research due 
to the research purposes and limitations. Through the combination of using a 
qualitative strategy and a case study, as Bennett and Elman (2006, p.473) suggests: 
‘qualitative methodologists have identified case study methods as: 
having comparative advantages in developing internally valid and 
context-sensitive measures of concepts; heuristically identifying new 
variables through within-case analysis of deviant or other cases; 
providing a potential check on spuriousness and endogeneity through 
within-case analysis; and testing and elaborating theories of path 
dependency and other types of complexity.’ 
Thirdly, in selecting data sources, this research employs non-probability sampling 
including purposive sampling and snowball sampling. Although using purposive 
sampling may raise the question of the representativeness of each sample, the 
technique has strengths of getting a particular appropriate case and a variety of types 
of cases for in-depth investigation (Blaikie, 2009, p. 178). . Snowball sampling 
involves the personal recommendation of a contact. An advantage is that it reveals a 
network of contacts which can itself be studied; whereas a potential problem is that it 
only includes those within a connected network of individuals. It also vouches for the 
legitimacy of the researcher, which is both a strength and potential weakness of the 
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method (Arber, 1993, p. 74). Thus, this technique is employed with hope to carefully 
supplement those selected from purposive sampling. Lastly, although doing 
interview lets the researcher grasp the point of view of the actors, which is strength, 
the problem is that the interviewees do not give stable or consistent meanings to 
things, people, and events (Becker, 1996). Consequently, this will intensify the 
subjectiveness of the research because the data will be interpreted by the researcher. 
Being aware of this weakness, documentary research and observation are employed 
to minimise the subjectiveness and triangulate the data.  
Doing research requires an awareness of internal and external validity. Documents, 
interviews and observation are designed to provide the internal validity, or causality 
(Bryman, 2008, p.32), in this research. Employing documentary research, in terms of 
authenticity, most of the shortlisted documents are likely genuine. Their content has 
never been altered as they were published and secured in the library or the 
government offices. However, some documents were written by the government. In 
terms of credibility, it is doubtful that the information is from only one perspective 
and it is perhaps written in the way the government wants the readers to find 
credible. Therefore, it is necessary to find other documents to argue or support the 
data within such documents in order to avoid bias.  
Interviews and observations were conducted to triangulate the data collected from 
documents. A set of interview questions was designed in accordance with the data 
from a literature review and the documentary research. Observation was merely 
unobtrusive and unstructured in order not to generate observer effects. Likewise, 
later on, data from the interviews and observations was reviewed together with the 
data from the documents. Also, different groups of stakeholders were interviewed in 
order to avoid the bias of each particular group. In an attempt to provide external 
validity, ‘whether the results of a study can be generalised beyond the specific 
research context (Bryman, 2008, p.33)’, the three different cases were selected: 
commercial (Chiang Mai), industrial (Lamphun), and agricultural (Phrae and Nan) 
areas. Since the production in an economy can be divided into these three main 
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sectors, it was intended that each case was selected to represent one sector in order to 
enhance the generalisability of the research results.  
Also, the combination of two or more methods in one research, or, in other words, 
‘triangulation’ (Blaikie, 2001; Jick, 1979), or ‘mixed-methods’ (Bryman, 2006), can 
improve the research results. According to Denzin’s four triangulation classifications 
(in Macdonald & Tipton, 1993), only ‘data triangulation’ was employed in this 
research. The ‘investigator triangulation’ was not used because there was the only 
investigator. The ‘theory triangulation’ was not used because the researcher intended 
to test the model of diversification proposed in Chapter 2. Lastly, although many 
academics agree that the ‘between-methods’ triangulation could lead to more valid 
results (Blaikie, 2001; Bryman, 2006; Clasen, 2004; Jick, 1979; Sartori, 1970), this 
research did not employ the ‘methodology triangulation’ due to the limited time and 
resources. In brief, although there are problems and limitations which should be of 
concern, this research attempts to maximise the internal and external validity. It 
employs the data triangulation in order to minimise the subjectivity and bias of 
collected data and, in attempt to generalise the research finding, it studies three 
distinctly different areas. 
4.2.6 Ethical Issues 
The discussion of ethical issues is divided into two issues regarding two data 
collection methods. Firstly, the most crucial ethical issue to be concerned in doing 
documentary research is whether the documents are closed or restricted. Since all 
documents I used are in the public domain, it is not necessary to be overly concerned 
with ethical issues. Secondly, ethical issues, and in particular informed consent, are 
particularly important when carrying out interviews. I asked for the interviewees’ 
permission and provided the consent form to be signed before starting the interview 
with each interviewee. Notably, I respected the rights of the interviewees to refuse to 
take part in interviews or to answer any specific questions for any reason, in strict 
compliance with the university ethical guidelines. 
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In addition, regarding the School of Social and Political Science Research Ethics 
Framework, this research is considered to fall at level-1 ethical review for five 
reasons. Firstly, confidentiality of the data was ensured to the interviewees all 
information would be kept confidential and used for the academic purpose in this 
research only. Secondly, every respondent was briefly informed about my research 
project at the time I contacted them asking for their interview permission and again 
before the interview started. Thus, each of them had enough information to decide 
whether to give an interview. Also, the collection of personal data was strictly 
adhered to the consent of the respondents and the respondents’ name was 
anonymised in order to ensure them that the data they gave would not affect their 
career or life.  
Thirdly, since this research is not financially supported by any organisation and I am 
not receiving any benefits from any organisations for doing this research, there is no 
issue of conflict of interest to be considered. Also, as a researcher, I bore in mind that 
the interviewees have the rights to set the time for giving interviews or refuse to give 
any information. There are no attempts to either explicitly or implicitly pressure the 
respondents to give more time or information. Fourthly, since the issue of interest 
and the data collection are not related to any sensitive or harmful incidence, there is 
no potential physical or psychological discomfort or distress to the researcher or the 
respondents. Lastly, there is no chance that the proposed research might bring any 
disrepute to the university.  
4.3 Data analysis 
First of all, to analyse data, one should be clear on their position regarding 
ontological and epistemological perspectives. Each of them concerns a different 
basic question as below (Moses & Knutsen, 2007, p.5): 
‘The fundamental question in the field of ontology is: ‘What is the world 
really made of?’ Epistemology is a more straightforward term; it denotes 
the philosophical study of knowledge. ‘What is knowledge?’ is the basic 
question of epistemology.’   
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To clarify the first question further, ontology ‘involves asking what you see as the 
very nature and essence of things in the social world (Mason, 1996, p.11)’. In 
response to this, this research conceptualizes social reality as made up of several 
components such as actors, relations, actions, narratives, and codes
16
 involved in 
SIBD.  
Epistemologically, each component should be asked whether and how it can be 
known and how knowledge could be generated (Mason, 1996, p. 13). Two ‘ways of 
knowing’ (naturalism and constructionism, Moses & Knutsen, 2007) seem able to 
portray answers for this question. With a naturalist’s view, to a certain extent, this 
research believes that: ‘there exist regularities or patterns in nature that can be 
observed and described’; ‘statements based on these regularities can be tested 
empirically’; and, ‘it is possible to distinguish between value-laden and factual 
statements’ (Moses & Knutsen, 2007, p.9). However, with constructivist’s view, it is 
also aware that  
‘... we do not just experience the world objectively or directly: our 
experiences are channelled through the human mind ... It is in this short 
channel between the eye and the brain – between sense perception and 
the experience of the mind – that we find many challenges to naturalism 
(Moses & Knutsen, 2007, p.10-11)’. 
Thus, although this research uses mediums e.g. texts, narratives, and codes to 
generate its conclusion and theory, it is always aware that these mediums are all, or 
partially, constructed. Their power to capture social reality is limited and research 
findings should never be over claimed as ‘the reality’. 
Further, this research combined two approaches of data analysis to convey its 
findings: content analysis and situational analysis. Instead of selecting a particular 
approach, the two approaches are employed regarding Mello’s (2002, p.235) 
suggestion that ‘... if we use multiple forms for data analysis it is more likely that the 
findings and narratives of research ... will be grounded and, as a result, more likely to 
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 These are selected from a list provided by Mason (1996, p.11). 
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be valid’. Indeed, the danger of this multi-method application perhaps lies in the 
confusing and vague analysis. However, it is suggested that ‘data be analysed using 
more than one operation simultaneously ... [which] allows for a more complex look 
at the way narrative functions in our informants’ lives and encourages us to create 
and express more complex and interwoven research texts at the summative stages of 
the work (Mello, 2002, p.236)’. Thus, each approach is employed for a particular 
purpose which will be clarified in: Section 4.3.1 (content analysis) and Section 4.3.2 
(situational analysis). Briefly, the former emphasises the understanding of texts and 
discourses; the latter provides an additional framework of data analysis and 
presentation. 
4.3.1 Content Analysis: narrative, coding, and counting 
This research employs content analysis as it ‘emphasises the fluidity of the text and 
content in the interpretive understanding of culture (May, 2001, p. 191)’. Also, 
according to Sedlack and Stanley (1992), it is ‘a fertile procedure for investigating 
any problem or issue for which the content of communication can serve as a basis of 
inference (p.275)’. Within three types of texts (documents, transcriptions, field 
notes), contents are considered together with the contexts behind texts and the 
purpose of the authors or interviewees in order to understand concepts, structures, 
ideologies, practices and so on, in the system.  
Content analysis in this research is undertaken within three steps: describing, 
classifying, and connecting (see Dey, 1993). Firstly, it is necessary to produce 
thorough descriptions of the phenomenon being studied including the context of the 
actions the intentions of social actors, and the processes through which social actions 
and interactions occur. Secondly, the collected data will be reduced by ‘open 
coding’. It ‘involves breaking the data down into categories and subcategories 
(Blaikie, 2009, p. 211)’. Three categories of data in this research include: roles, 
relations, and impacts. The first category is divided into three subcategories: policy 
maker, defined as an actor participating in the decision-making at the policy-level, 
policy implementer as an actor responsible to practicing and operationalising the 
policy, and influential actor as an actor who is not implicated in the delivery 
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provision but shares the same set of beliefs or interests as the implementer. The 
second category is divided into two subcategories: relationship pattern and resource 
dependence. The last category is considered in two subcategories: responsiveness 
and initiative. Lastly, the connections between each category are made to discover 
regularities, variations and singularities in the data. Notably, since this research also 
focuses on the variation of SIBD across provinces, not only the data between 
categories is connected but also the data between the four chosen cases. Then, the 
theoretical model of SIBD diversification proposed in Chapter 2 is examined. 
Applying a conventional view, both quantitative and qualitative approaches of 
content analysis are applied in this research. Firstly, qualitative content analysis is 
employed because the data delivered to the audiences always contain two important 
meanings; ‘detached’  (from context) and ‘engaged’ (with contexts and researchers) 
(May, 2001, p.182). Therefore, the researcher must carefully generate data from the 
documents in both meanings. Secondly, quantitative content analysis is ‘a research 
technique for the systematic, objective, and quantitative description of the manifest 
content of communication (Rourke & Anderson, 2004, p. 5)’. Despite its descriptive 
characteristic, this analytical method is employed to briefly test and measure policy 
intent or conceptualization of selected activities.  
To explain the data analysis of this research further, however, this section discusses 
the practicality of data analysis not in regard of the quantitative/qualitative divide 
which has recently been under question. As Moses and Knutsen (2007, p.293) argue,  
‘[T]he quantitative/qualitative divide, if it ever existed, is a relic of the 
past. Worse, it is a remarkably offensive relic: after all, this divide 
implies that quantitative work lacks quality. By continually harping on a 
division between quantitative and qualitative methods, we end up doing 
more harm than good: we reproduce this detestable division, keep a 
useless debate artificially alive, and undermine attempts to build bridges 
across what has become a divide (even if it is an imagined one). This 
quantitative/qualitative schism has been the incubus of social science for 
almost 100 years. We can live with it no more.’ 
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Therefore, this section is divided into three subsections – narrative data analysis, 
coding and interpreting data, counting the countable – instead, each of which is 
actually a technique being used in the analysis. They are inseparable, overlapping, 
and iterative but clarified separately to ground the understanding of how the findings 
in this dissertation are derived. 
4.3.1.1 Narrative data analysis 
Narrative analysis could be either an analytical approach itself (Elliott, 2005)  or part 
of content analysis (e.g. Mello, 2002). This research takes the latter aspect as it sees 
content analysis as a broader approach in which narrative analysis seems to be the 
first step of a whole process. According to Wertz (2011, p.224), narrative analysis 
‘takes as a premise that people live and/or understand their lives in storied forms, 
connecting events in the manner of a plot that has beginning, middle, and end points’. 
In other words, it regards ‘narratives’ as ‘unique individual worldviews, perceptions 
that are negotiated through the act of storytelling itself. ... their meaning is dependent 
on context, time, place of telling, and audience response, as well as the teller’s 
viewpoint, coupled with the researcher’s findings (Mello, 2002, p. 234)’. Further, 
Wertz (2011, p.225) interestingly summarises that narrative analysis ‘aims to explore 
and conceptualize human experience as it is represented in textual form, ... 
epistemologically respects the relativity and multiplicity of truth
17
, ... and [focuses 
on] how events are understood and organised.’ 
This research embraces three approaches in Mishler’s (1995) framework of narrative 
analysis which includes: content (actual events and experiences being recounted in 
narratives), structure (the way in which the story is put together), and performance 
(interactional and institutional contexts in which narratives are produced, recounted, 
and consumed) (summarised in Elliot, 2005, p.38). The application of narrative 
analysis is apparent in Chapter 5 and 6 of this dissertation as both chapters aim to tell 
a story.  
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4.3.1.2 Coding and interpreting data 
This research brings in coding to the analysis for two reasons: ‘(i) narratives are too 
long and complex to use in their entirety; and (ii) data can best be understood and 
controlled when divided up into smaller units of discourse (Mello, 2002, p.235)’. 
Also, Basit (2003, p. 144) agrees with this view stating that ‘[R]aw data can be very 
interesting to look at, yet they do not help the reader to understand the social world 
under scrutiny ... unless such data have been systematically analysed to illuminate an 
existent situation’. Coding is employed as a key process in this research  since it 
‘serves to organise the copious notes, transcripts or documents that have been 
collected and it also represents the first step in the conceptualization of the data 
(p.218)’ and ‘provides the link between data and the conceptualization (p.5)’ 
(Bryman & Burgess, 1994).  
Despite several classifications of coding being proposed (e.g. Miles & Huberman, 
1984; Mason, 1994), this research employs Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) three 
procedural coding categories: open, axiel, and selective. It develops its theory 
following these three phases of coding. Firstly, ‘open coding’, as ‘the first basic 
analytical step’, is defined as ‘the process of breaking down, examining, comparing, 
conceptualizing, and categorizing data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.61)’. Appendix 6 
is an example of how this research conducted the open coding. Secondly, ‘axiel 
coding’ is defined as ‘a set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new 
ways after open coding, by making connections between categories (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990, p.96). Lastly, selective coding is defined as ‘the process of selecting 
the core category, systematically relating it to other categories, validating those 
relationships, and filling in categories that need further refinement and development 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.116)’. Results of these last two phases of coding can be 
seen in several analyses in Chapter 5 and 6. 
Indeed, coding has a crucial role in data analysis as it ‘allow[s] the researcher to 
communicate and connect with the data to facilitate the comprehension of the 
emerging phenomena and to generate theory grounded in the data (Basit, 2003, p. 
152)’. Still, there are at least three things one should bear in mind when theory 
150 
 
generation entails coding. Firstly, coding ‘involves how you differentiate and 
combine the data you have retrieved and the reflections you make about this 
information (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 56)’. Secondly, as a result, research 
findings are ‘parts of the researcher’s intuitive/cognitive perception and emanate 
from serious attempts to manipulate, explore, and organise sets of data (Mello, 2002, 
p.235)’. Thirdly, coding may lead to the ‘danger of diminishing or misinterpreting 
the nature of the narrative as a whole (Mello, 2002, p.235)’. Consistent with this, 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p.56-57) suggest that the researcher should be aware 
that ‘code’ is a choice being made and ‘[T]hat choice excludes other choices that 
could have been made to "stand for" that word or phrase, and that choice is 
embedded in a particular logic or a conceptual lens.’ Thus, this research bears these 
cautions in mind while analysing the data. 
4.3.1.3 Counting the countable 
In this research, data analysis is sometimes simply counting. As Silverman (1993, 
p.163) suggests,  
‘…simple counting techniques can offer a means to survey the whole 
corpus of data ordinarily lost in intensive, qualitative research. Instead of 
taking the researcher's word for it, the reader has a chance to gain a 
sense of the flavour of the data as a whole. In turn, researchers are able 
to test and to revise their generalisations, removing nagging doubts 
about the accuracy of their impressions about the data.’ 
Also, as suggested by Lee (1999, p.7), ‘counting the countable’ should undoubtedly 
be used if the researchers ‘endeavour to describe organisational phenomena.’ 
According to Miles & Huberman (1994, p.252), there are three good reasons to do 
so: ‘to see rapidly what you have in a large batch of data; to verify a hunch or 
hypothesis; and to keep yourself analytically honest, protecting against bias.’ For 
example, in Chapter 7, to illustrate a brief picture of how authorities are increasingly 
devolved from the SSO to the SSRO, the researcher counted the number of 
authorities recently devolved. Another example is when the researcher counts the 
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number of relations falling on a particular category (e.g. ritualistic/non-ritualistic) to 
determine the extent to which an actor is characterized (low, moderate, high).  
It should be noted, however, that counting is employed not because the researcher ‘is 
tempted to quantify qualitative data to elucidate events and views (Basit, 2003, 
p.151)’. Nor does the researcher deny that ‘counting can be as arbitrary as qualitative 
interpretation of a few fragments of data (Silverman, 1993, p. 165)’. Ultimately, the 
researcher aims to analyse qualitative data under two strategies: ‘to report results in 
terms of a relatively simple category scheme’ and ‘to put before the reader by 
extensive, though necessarily selective, quotation the data themselves, hoping thus 
that the essential flavour comes through’ (Basit, 2003, p.146).  
4.3.2 Positional mappings and situational analysis 
There are two purposes of employing situational analysis in this research. One is to 
build up a ground of understanding selected social phenomena. In addition to content 
analysis, situational analysis enables the researcher to ‘draw together studies of 
discourse and agency, action and structure, image, text and context, history and the 
present moment – to analyse complex situations of inquiry broadly conceived. Thus 
it can support researchers from heterogeneous backgrounds pursuing a wide array of 
projects (Clarke, 2005, p. xxii)’. 
Another purpose is to present a simplified picture of selected social phenomena using 
a positional mapping method. Three methods of situational analysis (situational 
maps, social world/arena maps, and positional maps) are built upon Strauss’s work 
(Clarke, 2005). The method being presented several times in this dissertation is 
positional mapping as it provides a framework to explain a complex system and 
communicate with readers of the research.  According to Clarke (2005, p.126), 
positional maps are: analytical tools applied to the discursive materials; represent the 
heterogeneity of actor’s positions; and capture and represent various social settings 
through the mapping process. 
Nonetheless, it should be emphasised that despite the presentation of simplistic 
diagrams in this dissertation the researcher is aware that the selected phenomenon is 
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not as simple as it is illustrated. Complexity exists and the researcher explains it in 
texts corresponding to each diagram. The purpose of diagrams is merely for basic 
understanding of the research not representation of all findings. As Clarke (2005, 
p.83) emphasises, 
‘…the maps produced using any or all of the strategies laid out here are not 
necessarily intended as forming final analytic products. ... the major use for 
them is “opening up” the data and interrogating it in fresh ways within a 
grounded theory framework. … Their most important outcome is 
provoking the researcher to analyse more deeply.’ 
4.3.2.1 Using diagrams in addition to positional mappings 
Not only positional maps but also other types of diagrams – e.g. pictures, charts – are 
presented in this dissertation. With careful effort, these visuals are constructed ‘to 
ensure that diagrams emerge from the data to avoid what Glaser [1998] has called 
forcing (Buckley & Waring, 2013, p.152)’.  Briefly, this dissertation contains a 
number of diagrams and mappings for two major purposes: analytical purpose and 
communicative purpose. Precisely, diagrams and positional mappings are of use to 
visualize thoughts and ideas of this thesis which, afterwards, expectedly facilitate 
communication with its readers. As Buckley and Waring (2013, pp. 148-149) 
suggest, diagrams ‘not only serve as visual representations of what is being 
discovered through analysis but also as generative/analytical techniques and 
communicative tools (pp.148-49)’. 
Conclusion 
This research is a multi-site case study. Being aware of a case-study and qualitative 
research weaknesses, it minimises such weaknesses by using mixed-method 
triangulation. Data was collected through three methods: documents, interviews and 
observations. 48 semi-structured interviews in four provinces were conducted and 
documents were accessed both at the SSO and the SSROs. Unobtrusive observational 
methods are employed in all interviews and visits in all sites. Two analytical methods 
– content analysis and situational analysis – were employed. With such research 
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design, although this research ‘does not permit definitive hypothesis testing, it can 
point to the limits of existing knowledge while generating propositions that can help 
guide subsequent research’ (Fossett & Thompson, 2006, p. 375).  
In site and case selection, this research employed a purposive sampling technique to 
select meso-level (region, province) and micro-level (respondent) source of data. The 
North is selected not only because of research practicality but also because of its 
distinctive socio-political context. It is one of the poorest and the least populous 
region in which Thaksin’s electoral heartland lies. Under three criteria (socio-
economic characteristics, political nature of the province and data accessibility), four 
provinces in the North were selected to represent three different socio-economic 
areas: commercial (Chiang Mai), industrial (Lamphun) and agricultural (Phrae, Nan). 
Political nature of each province varies but they share a common characteristic – pro-
Thaksin. With work experiences in the North, the researcher used her contacts and 








Chapter 5 : Patterns of Provincial Actors, Relations 
and Diversity 
 
This chapter presents findings concerning actors and relations in provincial SIBD. It 
answers two basic questions. Firstly, ‘what are the roles and relations of each policy 
actor in the delivery system at the provincial level?’ Applying actor-centred analysis, 
it clarifies actors’ characteristics and relations in social insurance institution at the 
provincial level (see Section 5.1). Then, resource exchange between provincial actors 
and the SSROs is analysed to clarify each actor’s influence on SIBD decision-
making (see Section 5.2). Secondly, ‘to what extent does diversity exist in SIBD?’  
To answer this question, the four systems in the four provinces are thus characterised 
and the overall differences between them are discussed (see Section 5.3).  
5.1 Institutional analysis of SIBD in Thailand 
Regarding the framework presented in Chapter 3, actors in provincial SIBD are 
classified into six types of actors including: the SSRO (delivery agency), the SSO 
(policy maker), Public Administrative Unit (PAU), employer, employee, and local 
government (see Figure 3.11). All of these actors perform their roles in at least one of 
three administrative spheres; while the SSRO stands as a central agency of SIBD in 
all three spheres (see Figure 5.1). These three administrative spheres are actor 
constellations (a static picture of actors’ relations) of social insurance institution at 
the provincial level (see Section 2.3.1) which include: the PSSS administrative 
sphere (orange zone) as the first actor constellation (AC1); the project management 
(yellow zone) as the second constellation (AC2); and, the provincial administration 
(purple zone) as the third constellation (AC3). Essentially, there are three roles of the 
SSRO in each constellation: a convenor of the PSSS (AC1), a contractor for services 
(AC2) and an intermediary between various actors (AC3).  
AC1 and AC2 are a major focus in this section. Regarding the institutional analysis 
discussed in Chapter 2, this section analyses social insurance institution particularly 
AC1 and AC2 in two respects: actor characteristics and actor constellations (see 
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definitions in Chapter 2). The AC3 is another channel of communication between 
some actors in SIBD and considering it provides background of provincial SIBD (see 
Chapter 3). However, this sphere has relatively few impacts on SIBD. Its focus is on 
provincial policies in general. Decisions directly related to SIBD are rarely made in 
this sphere. In other words, AC3 is not significant part of SIBD but it is important to 
our understanding of administration at the provincial level.  
 





5.1.1 Provincial actors and their characteristics 
To investigate actor characteristics in AC1 and AC2, actors are grouped into three – 
the SSRO (central agency in AC1 and AC2), the tripartite board (in AC1), and 
project participants (in AC2). Firstly, the SSRO’s role as a coordinator of provincial 
SIBD is discussed. Over the past few decades (1990s-2010s), regulated roles of the 
SSRO have been changed periodically (see summary of regulations in Appendix 5). 
However, changes being made were trivial as, for example, the amended version of 
the regulations remained similar to its preceding versions. Three roles can be 
summarised from the regulations – SSO’s delivery agency, Labour Office (LO)’s 
supervisee, provincial SIBD coordinator
18
. However, only the first and third roles are 
of concern in this research. The second role is singled out because it is just the 
SSRO’s obligation to formally report to the LO rather than the role of which affects 
the decision-making in SIBD. It is a one-way communication where the SSRO 
reports and the LO acknowledges with few, or no, suggestions.  
Further, this section discusses the roles of actors in the tripartite board (AC1) and 
project management (AC2) in order to clarify actor characteristics (see definition in 
Section 2.3.1).  Firstly, the boundary of the PSSS’s administrative sphere (AC1) is 
derived from functions, responsibilities, and authority of the PSSS in particular (see 
Chapter 3). This AC1 is important because it is an actor constellation particularly 
constructed for SIBD decision-making in the province. All PSSS members are 
appointed by post (by regulation) or selected (politically or apolitically) based on 
their potential on SIBD. The PSSS is anticipated to be an actor constellation in which 
actors are willing to contribute to SIBD. 
Secondly, the project management (AC2) is also an important administrative sphere 
because it essentially shows how the diversity of SIBD appears across provinces. 
Studying it provides the understanding of how actors outside the administrative 
sphere of social insurance at the provincial level (the PSSS) are involved in SIBD 
                                                             
18
 As a coordinator, the SSRO is to ‘coordinate under policies, programmemes, and projects 
concerning duties and responsibilities of the SSO in the province’ (MROSSO, 2009); as a LO’s 
supervisee, to ‘report the monitoring and evaluation under policies, programmes, and projects to the 
Labour Office’ (MROSSO, 2011); and, as a delivery agency, to ‘operate services under social security 
law, workmen’s compensation law, and other relevant laws’ (MROSSO, 2011). 
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and work with the SSRO. The yellow zone of the project management sphere in 
Figure 5.1 is encircled by dashed line to note that not all provinces have an initiative 
project. In other words, not all SSROs provide a service diversified from national 
norms. Also, this sphere needs not to strictly involve only three actors – SSRO, SSO, 
local. It is flexible depending on the SSRO’s policy; who they would want to work 
with in their initiative project.  
Two issues should be noted before proceeding. Firstly, while all lines represent 
existing and consistent relationship between the SSRO and other actors, a dashed line 
linked between the SSRO and local organisations implies that this relation only 
happens in some provinces. For instance, in Phrae and Nan, the line of SSRO-local 
relation could be drawn because the project of local cooperation was operated in the 
provinces. This type of relation is briefly discussed in this secion and will be further 
clarified in Section 5.2. Secondly, at the national level, the SSO is not the only actor 
involved in Thailand’s SIA. For example, the Ministry of Labour (MoL) and the 
Social Security Committee (SSC; a tri-partite advisory board) are also influential to 
the SSO’s decision making and policy planning. However, as Figure 5.1 exhibits 
actors and relations in provincial SIBD, neither of them are added to the diagram 
since they barely have direct interactions with the SSRO. In contrast, the SSO is the 
national organisation of concern in this research as a direct superordinate of the 
SSRO. It designs national policies and strategies of SIBD.  
5.1.1.1 The SSRO as an organiser of provincial social security  
This section clarifies the SSRO’s role as a coordinator in the PSSS administrative 
sphere (AC1). The SSRO is obliged to be a secretary of the PSSS or, in other words, 
a coordinator of provincial SIBD. They should organise regular meetings, report their 
work and progress to the PSSS and gather comments and suggestions from PSSS 
members. To understand actor characteristics (capabilities, orientations, 
rationalities), this section applies an analytical framework from organisational 
behaviour approach to clarify the SSRO’s role as a coordinator of provincial SIBD.  
In line with Lewin’s leadership styles (see Miner, 2005), four types of coordinator 
are proposed: conventional, laissez faire, autocratic, and participative. The 
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classification of coordinator is proposed (see Figure 5.2) based on two criteria: 
degree of activeness and degree of openness
19
.  
 Figure 5.2 Classification of SSRO as a coordinator 
 
In the first criteria, the degree of activeness is identified based on the frequency of 
the PSSS meeting and the distinctive project operation in the province. If the SSRO 
organises the meeting regularly, it is considered as active coordinator. Also, if a 
distinctive project is operated, the SSRO’s degree of activeness is increased. 
Secondly, the SSRO’s level of openness is indicated regarding three issues: the PSSS 
meeting agendas, the SSRO’s response to comments, and the SSRO chief’s working-
style. They are analysed to specify whether the SSRO is agreeable or argumentative.  
The chief’s working style is considered in this analysis because it is suggested that an 
organisation (the SSRO) is a reflection of its chief. According to the Nan SSRO 
chief: 
‘[This is] bureaucracy. How the chief’s face looks like is how the office’s 
face looks like. How the governor’s face looks like is how the province’s 
                                                             
19
 The openness criteria combines two levels of organisational analysis – individual (SSRO chief), 
organisational (SSRO performance) – together to summarise the performance of the SSRO. 
Differently, the activeness criterion only reflects organisational-level activeness. 
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face looks like. How the Director-General’s face looks like is how the 
department’s face looks like.’ 
Added to this is the statement from the Phrae SSRO chief: 
The reflections of bad administration [on the organisation] can be 
observed in the same way as human body. If it is fresh (sod-chuen) inside, 
outside will be glowing (pleng-plung). If the internal core is instable 
(ruan-ruan), the outer will look gloomy (tuem-tow). ... One important 
thing is how the executive reach the goal [of administration]. Some 
executives arrive and build the team but some may not. They [the latter] 
may just pay a visit [to insured persons]. This is...depends on...what is it? 
Dissimilarity of administrative taste.’ 
As Boyne and Walker (2010, p. 185) suggest, the managers can ‘actually influence 
and shift in more positive directions’ in seeking higher performance. Therefore, to 
examine the SSRO’s degree of openness (open or closed), data from the observations 
on the chief’s characters is analyses in addition to the data from the PSSS minutes 
and interviews. 
All four provinces are hypothetically classified into four different types based on 
preliminary data analysis. The Phrae SSRO is participative because they seemingly 
organised the PSSS meeting regularly and was willing to listen to what the PSSS 
members thought (open). The Nan SSRO, although regularly organised the meeting, 
tended to stand firmly on their ideas so that they are classified as autocratic type. The 
Lamphun SSRO is similar to the Nan SSRO in terms of being closed. They appeared 
not to listen to other actors’ comments or suggestions. Unlike the Nan SSRO, they 
seldom organised the PSSS meeting. Thus, they are labelled as a conventional 
coordinator. The Chiang Mai SSRO seldom organised the meeting but they appeared 
to be open and agreeable. They, therefore, are classified into laissez faire type. 
Nonetheless, the following sections discuss whether these assumptions are verified. 
It is found that the hypothesis is verified in three provinces – Phrae, Nan, Lamphun 
(see Figure 5.4). The Phrae SSRO organised the PSSS meeting regularly (6 times in 
2010, see Table 5.1) and was opened to the PSSS members’ suggestions. Therefore, 
they are labelled as participative coordinator. The Nan SSRO, although regularly 
organising the meeting, had a firm standing point so they are classified into the 
autocratic type. The Lamphun SSRO appeared not to be open to suggestion and 
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seldom organised the PSSS meeting (once in 2010 and none in 2009). Thus, they are 
labelled as conventional PSSS secretary. However, the case of Chiang Mai is 
different from the hypothesis. Although the Chiang Mai SSRO’s level of activeness 
can be classified into inactive type, their degree of openness falls neither on 
agreeable nor argumentative. Rather, they seemingly bear another characteristic 
which is ‘diplomatic’. 
 
Figure 5.3 Classification of SSROs as coordinators in selected provinces 
 
Specifically, in terms of openness, the Phrae SSRO appears to be open while the 
Lamphun and Nan SSROs are closed and the case of Chiang Mai is ambiguous. In 
terms of activeness, according to minutes of meetings in 2010 the year in which data 
of four provinces is acquired, the Phrae SSRO is the most active secretary as they 
organised six meetings in a year (see Table 5.1). The second is the Nan SSRO who 
organised the meetings twice. In Chiang Mai and Nan, the SSROs similarly 
organised the meeting only once. Notably, the Nan SSRO appears to be very active 




Table 5.1 Frequency of the PSSS meeting and the number of comments in the 
meeting 
Year 
Nan Phrae Chiang Mai Lamphun 
Meeting Comments Meeting Comments Meeting Comments Meeting Comments 
2006 5 4       
2007 4 5       
2008 1 0       
2009 3 6   1** n/a** 0*** 0*** 
2010 2 0 6* 0* 1** n/a** 1 4 
2011 2 2   2 0   
Source: Nan SSRO (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011), Phrae SSRO (2010), Chiang Mai SSRO 
(2011), Lamphun SSRO (2010) 
           The grey cell means neither minutes of meeting nor meeting agendas were accessible. 
*The number of meetings and comments is based on the accessible Minutes of Meeting on 23 
December 2010. 
** The number of comments is not available because the Minutes of Meeting were not accessible. 
*** Suggested by the director of Hariphunchai Memorial Hospital, Lamphun 
 
It should be noted that there are two roles of the SSRO as a coordinator in SIBD: 
PSSS coordinator and project manager. The above discussion on the coordinator role 
is limited to the SSRO’s function as a PSSS secretary only. The SSRO’s role of 
project manager will be elaborated later in Section 5.3 because it is related to how 
the SSRO’s project is started and, if any, diversified SIBD pattern. 
5.1.1.2 Tripartite board (AC1): how does it work? 
A provincial tripartite board, namely the PSSS, is supposed to be the most important 
actor constellation in Thailand’s social insurance institution at the provincial level. 
Its role is legislated by several regulations e.g. the SSA, the regulations of Ministry 
of Labour. As explained in Chapter 3, the SSC is an advisory tripartite board 
responsible for the national-level policy-making. Expectedly, the PSSS performs a 
similar role at the provincial level.  
The role of each actor appointed in the PSSS is investigated in two respects: 
involvement (orientation) and activeness (rationally-bounded action). Firstly, an 
actor could be involved as either incumbent or non-incumbent member of the PSSS 
(see Section 3.2.4). While being incumbent simply means get involved by posit and 
163 
 
is restricted to government organisations (i.e. PAUs, governor, HCPs); being non-
incumbent is far more complicated. This kind of involvement usually occurs to 
employer and employee representatives and external organisations. Non-incumbent 
members could be government organisations (Attorney Office in Phrae, Local 
Administrative Office in Nan) or private hospitals (Hariphunchai Mememorial 
Hospital in Lamphun, McCormick Hospital in Chiang Mai). It is unclear, however, 
who exactly nominated and selected the prospects.  
Secondly, activeness regards to the actor’s participation in and out of the PSSS 
meetings. In the meeting, each actor’s comment(s) recorded in the minutes is 
counted. The more comments they give; the more active they are. Out of the meeting, 
interview data is analysed regarding the answer of whether they have ever given 
comments or suggestions to the SSRO in some other occasions. Ideally, all 46 
interviewed provincial actors should be discussed one by one. However, this section 
will not go to that extensive detail but rather provides a summary of the data.  
To consider activeness further, the PSSS members are categorised into three groups: 
government organisations, representative of employer and employee, and external 
office. Firstly, government organisation includes provincial offices, health care 
providers (HCPs), the governor, and external PAUs. Provincial offices, or Public 
Administrative Units (PAUs), include either four internal offices (offices under 
control of the MoL: LO, EO, LWPO, LSDC) and the HCPs. The HCPs including the 
Public Health Office (PHO) and the provincial hospital (PH) are discussed separately 
because, although both are also PAUs, their major role as health care provider makes 
them different from other actors in SIBD. Distinctively, the governor plays two 
important roles in the provincial SIBD: a province head and the PSSS chair (see 
Section 3.3.2). Theoretically, as a provincial leader, the governor’s responsibilities 
are to direct and coordinate all PAUs in the province.  
Regarding the MoL’s suggestion on PSSS Appointment (see Appendix 8), there are 
two major responsibilities of the PSSS. One is to consider cases of disabled benefit 
claimants; another is to be an advisory board for the SSRO. Apparently in the 
minutes of meeting, it is found that the PSSS had been working very well regarding 
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the first responsibility. However, in the second role, most of interviewees agreed 
with the assertion that ‘the PSSS is just a rubber stamp’. In overall, most PAUs, both 
internal and external offices, thought ‘the SSRO is authorised to SIBD’ (see Table 
5.2) so that they should not intervene in the SSRO’s decisions.  There are a few 
PAUs responded differently such as the Nan LAO, the Chiang Mai governor, and the 
Lamphun governor. They contended that being a PSSS member one could express 
their opinions and contribute to SIBD. The LAO Chief denied the assertion stating 
that the PSSS is an open stage for the subcommittee to discuss. It is not a rubber 
stamp unless someone would behave like that. Both governors insisted that this 
subcommittee was like other committees in the province and all participants were 
encouraged to share their thoughts so obviously it is not a rubber stamp. 
 
Table 5.2 Opinion of PAUs towards the SSRO's legitimacy in SIBD 
Actors Phrae Nan Chiang Mai Lamphun 
Governor O O X X 
Labour Office O O O n/a 
Employment Office O O O O 
Labour Welfare and Protection Office O O O O 
Labour Skill Development Centre O O O O 
Public Health Office O O n/a O 
Provincial Hospital n/a O O O 
Attorney Office O    
Local Administration Office  X   
O = The SSRO is authorised to SIBD so that we do not need to intervene. 
X = We do have the rights to suggest the SSRO although SIBD is the SSRO’s jobs. 
n/a = Interview permission is not given. 
 The actor does not involve in the province. 
 
According to the interviews, the mentor role was evidently not performed well by 
most of the PSSS members. Considering government organisations, most internal 
offices stated that they did not object any of the SSRO’s ideas because they believed 
that the SSRO was doing their jobs and following all regulations. Therefore, they 
rarely gave comments or suggestion in the PSSS meeting. Slightly differently, 
external offices in three provinces – Chiang Mai, Phrae, Nan – appointed in the PSSS 
reasoned their specialization as their quality for being chosen. Interestingly, they 
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were rarely active in the PSSS meeting. The low activeness of government 
organisations could be quantified based on the minutes of meeting available from the 
fieldwork. Using quantitative content analysis, every comment, suggestion, or 
question from the PSSS members remarked in minutes of meetings is counted as 
participative action. The result is, according to the accessible minutes of 21 PSSS 
meetings in the four provinces, only 16 comments were recorded (see Table 5.3). 
Particularly, public organisations in Phrae and Chiang Mai gave no comments at all. 
In Nan, 14 comments were noted down in 12 minutes of meetings but most of them 
were not directly related to SIBD. 
 
Table 5.3 Number of government organisations' comments in the PSSS meetings 
Province Actors Number of comments 
Phrae - - 
Nan 1. PHO chief 2 comments 
 2. LO Chief  3 clarifications, 2 comments 
 3. EO chief  1 comment 
 4. PH director  3 comments 
 5. Governor  3 suggestion 
Chiang Mai - - 
Lamphun 1. External office 2 suggestions 
Source: Nan SSRO (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011), Phrae SSRO (2010), Chiang Mai SSRO 
(2011), Lamphun SSRO (2010) 
 
Secondly, representatives of both employer and employee organisations are selected 
from the nomination which varies across provinces. Their roles could be analysed in 
two regards: the PSSS’s official responsibilities (see Chapter 3) and their theoretical 
motives to participate in the tripartite board. For instance, are they representing 
employers and employees? Or, are they just involved for political reason and become 
inactive actors? As Knudsen (1995, p. 16) suggests, employees and employers 
involved in industrial relations expect influence and higher efficiency. Accordingly, 
it is hypothesised that employer and employee representative will participate in 
attempt to influence the decision-making in SIBD. While employees anticipate ‘gains 
from influence e.g. work satisfaction, better working conditions’; employers seek 
‘absence of conflict, employee motivation and commitment to company goals’ 
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(Knudsen, 1995, p.16). Although ‘participation [of employers and employees in 
social insurance administration] must be a battlefield rather than a field of 
cooperation (Knudsen, 1995, p. 16)’; such battle could positively be perceived as a 
pursuit of better SIBD.  
Activeness of employers and employees as PSSS members is rare. Only four 
comments were recorded in 21 PSSS meetings of four selected provinces. Also, all 
interviewed employees noted that they attempted to be participative in the meeting. 
However, only two comments of the Lamphun employee representative were 
recorded. He suggested to the SSRO communication channel with employees and 
registration of insured persons (Minutes, 22 November 2010, Lamphun SSRO). 
Similarly, employers are rarely active. Only two comments of the Nan employer 
representative were recorded during the discussion on the government’s populist 
policy in 2009. Added to this, interviews with two employers, one in Lamphun and 
one in Chiang Mai, suggest that both employers likely disregard their roles in SIBD. 
In conclusion, employees wanted to participate more but they did not, or could not, 
know how or what they could do. Employer seemingly got involved in the PSSS just 
because their friends (phak puak) advised them that the post would benefit them 
somehow. 
Lastly, by regulation, external offices are selected by the SSRO in the light of the 
office’s duty in relation to SIBD (see Section 3.2.4). In Phrae and Nan, PAUs are 
appointed into the PSSS. They basically shared the same opinion as other PAUs in 
the PSSS. In Lamphun and Chiang Mai, private hospitals are selected for the reason 
that they are HCPs. Lamphun Hariphunchai Hospital was recommended by a 
national politician; Chiang Mai McCormick Hospital was selected by the Chiang Mai 
SSRO. Being HCPs, they provide healthcare similar to public hospitals but, being 
profit-oriented, they may have different perspective or practice. In their interviews, 
both of them claimed that they were willing to participate in SIBD more but they did 
not have the chance or the SSRO had just not listened to them.  
The Hariphunchai Hospital Director said there were few occasions for all PSSS 
members to participate in SIBD more. The McCormick Hospital Director felt 
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reluctant to suggest the SSRO something since the SSRO seemingly assumed their 
suggestion would have been profit-oriented. However, he stated that the hospital 
work for patients not profits as it was funded by a non-profit organisation, the 
McCormick Foundation. To conclude, the activeness of external offices greatly 
varies. The external PAUs are rarely active similar to other government 
organisations. In a slightly different way, the external private organisations attempted 
to be more involved. However, similar to the representatives, it is quite difficult to 
find their way to get their voice heard by the SSRO. 
In overall, the performance of PSSS reflects how bureaucratized SIBD is. In all four 
provinces, it is found that the PSSS is likely a rubber stamp (tra yaang). This implies 
that the subcommittee’s work is basically to approve the SSRO’s decisions. In 
Chiang Mai and Lamphun, meetings of subcommittee were less regular than in Phrae 
and Nan. Although rare, the meetings were only about approving benefits for 
disabled and not much about discussion on service provision. In Phrae, despite 
regular meetings, the PSSS activeness is found to be few. Exceptionally, Nan is the 
case where the PSSS appears to be relatively active. 
5.1.1.3 Project Management (AC2) and the SSRO as a contractor of service 
delivery 
Project management (AC2) is an actor constellation characterized by rules mutually 
agreed between the SSRO and project participants and only exists in some provinces. 
Project participants are local governments, sub-provincial hospitals, and local 
mitigation centre. In this section, the term ‘local organisations’ includes sub-
provincial organisations which politically responsible for particular sub-district area 
(local governments or local mitigation centres) or working closely to service 
recipients (district-level or community hospital). The roles of these organisations in 
SIBD are not officially designated nationwide. Although the SSO’s policy guidelines 
stated that local network should be built, searching through the SSO’s documents or 
royal decrees no evidence of obligation for the SSRO to involve local organisations 
in SIBD is found. Their roles are suggested by the SSROs who are the manager of 
local cooperation projects.  Employing the same framework in Section 5.3, project 
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participants are discussed in two respects: involvement and activeness. Firstly, their 
involvement is voluntary as they can choose whether to join the project. Therefore, 
the analysis focuses more on who made the decision to join. Secondly, their degree 
of activeness is analysed based on the question of what they had done as a project 
participant and how often they cooperated with the SSRO in the interviews.  
Local organisations did not have a chance to participate in the PSSS meeting since 
they are not qualified to be appointed as the PSSS. To investigate their activeness in 
SIBD, the evidence is based on interviews with them and documents related to 
cooperation projects. Evidence suggests that local organisations performed a role as 
the SSRO’s subordinate organisations rather than networking service providers. They 
waited for the SSRO’s order rather than proactively engaged in SIBD. In Phare, two 
selected interviewees similarly stated that they only participated in seminars and 
training organised by the SSRO. In Nan, the interviewee stated that she, as a local 
coordinator, would provide the information or forms only when insured persons 
came to her. This occasion, however, rarely occurred. Particularly, since the Nan 
SSRO came to her office to provide the service themselves, service recipients tended 
to come on Tuesdays. Also, if they came the other day, she would suggest them to 
come on Tuesday instead. Thus, it is evident to conclude that local organisations 
were not active and participative in SIBD. 
There seem to be only one reason why local organisations did not participate more. 
They thought the responsibilities given by the SSRO were some sort of burden. As 
decentralisation was being implemented, more and more authorities and 
responsibilities were transferred from central to local governments. As one of them 
said, ‘sometimes we were just busy so that we sent anybody, whoever available at 
the time, to the SSRO’s training’. However, the Nan LAO disagreed with this. He 
stated that as long as it was a matter of serving public local governments should be 
ready to engage. Also, as the Baan Lao SAO in Phrae stated, the cooperation with the 
SSRO helped their local insured persons. Therefore, this reason cannot be 
generalized for all local governments. 
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5.1.2 Social insurance institution in action 
Social insurance institutions (see definition in Section 2.1.1) at the provincial level 
comprise three actor constellations including: provincial SIA (AC1), project 
management (AC2), and ProA (AC3). Only two constellations (AC1, AC2) are 
significant to the institution and discussed in Section 5.1.1. This section illustrates 
the pattern of SIBD in each province and show the variation of SIBD across the four 
provinces (see Figure 5.4). Comparatively, Nan seems to be the province in which 
local governments and the external office were actively engaged in SIBD. This leads 
to the most diversified pattern of SIBD compared to other three provinces. The 
second most diversified is Phrae where local cooperation also happened. However, 
differently from Nan, it was limited to only two actors in the province (the SSRO and 
local organisations). Thirdly, the Lamphun SSRO participated in the GCS project 
which slightly diversified the SIBD pattern. In Chiang Mai, the SSRO basically did 
routine work and no evidence of local cooperation exists. 
 Regarding the regulations, the PSSS (AC1) is the most important sphere for 
decision-making of SIBD where the governor is a facilitator of each meeting while 
the real leader is the SSRO. Actors involved in this tripartite board either voluntarily 
or obligatorily are required to play a mentor role for the SSRO. However, in reality, 
the meetings are an information sharing and bureaucratic approval process rather 
than a stage of negotiations or discussions. Although some members such as the 
employee representative or the hospital representative attempted to suggest to the 
SSRO the improvement of their services, this would be noted down in minutes of 
meetings but rarely operationalised. In brief, this sphere seems not to be working as 
expected. While a few PSSS members are active; none of them are, or can be, 







Figure 5.4 Comparison of SIBD pattern across selected provinces 
 
 
In project management (AC2), actors are involved by the SSRO’s selection and 
perform their roles regarding the project agreement such as the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) signed between the SSRO and the actors. This exemplifies 
how the provincial delivery pattern is diversified from the uniform pattern of SIBD. 
For example, the CLO project appears in Phrae where local organisations were 
directly cooperated – signed the MoU – with the SSRO. Also, the P&F in Nan 
cooperated with not only local governments but also the LAO, an external office. In 
this arena, the SSO is involved in the project approval, while local organisations play 
a role as service providers. 
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In contrast to SIBD diversity, similarity of SIBD patterns across provinces exists in 
the PSSS members’ low level of activeness. Several reasons were given i.e. respect 
to the SSRO, no interest in SIBD, lack of chances, and the SSRO’s misperception of 
their organisational goal. The activeness of local organisations in SIBD is also low. 
In principle, they are supposed to work as partners of the SSRO in SIBD network. In 
practice, no evidence shows that they are equal in the hierarchy of provincial SIBD. 
Rather, they technically put themselves as the SSRO’s operatives following orders 
only. Due to the limited chance and interest, as they claimed, local organisations took 
part only if the activities were of their interest. For example, they were cooperating 
with the SSRO for the sake of their employees (in Phrae) and the order of higher-
level organisation (the LAO in Nan). Contrarily, the reason of being inactive is that 
they needed to pay more attention to their core function rather than SIBD. 
This section concludes that social insurance institutions at the provincial level play a 
trivial role in SIBD. Table 5.4 summarises the discussions in Section 5.1.1 
emphasising two key issues (involvement, activeness) of provincial actors’ roles in 
SIBD. In terms of provincial actor’s involvement, there are two possibilities that 
actors are directly involved in SIBD: being a PSSS member or participating in the 
SSRO’s local cooperation project. Firstly, regarding PSSS appointment, the SSRO is 
responsible for selecting a specific number of actors regarding the number of insured 
persons. While some PSSS members are incumbents (PAUs, HCPs, governor), the 
others are non-incumbent (representatives, external offices). Secondly, the SSRO’s 
local cooperation projects enabled local organisations to be part of SIBD as 
happened in Nan and Phrae. They were involved either voluntarily (decisions made 




Table 5.4 Provincial actors' roles in SIBD 
  Tripartite board (PSSS) 
Project participants 
(Local governments) 
  Government organisation Representative External office 
  PAU** Governor Employer Employee PAU Private hospital 
Administrative 
arena* 
PSSS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Provincial Admin Yes Yes No No Yes/No No No 
Local Cooperation 
Project 
No Yes/No No No Yes/No No Yes 
Involvement 
Involving reason Obligation Obligation Social status - Social status 








- Being asked 
by the SSRO/ 
politician 
- The sake of 
organisation’s 
employees (Phrae) 
- Order from the LAO 
(Nan) 
Nominated by - - Group of 
friends (Phak 
Phuak) 
- Phak Phuak 
- The national 
employee 
organisation 





- The SSRO (Phrae) 
- The LAO (Nan) 
Activeness 
Activeness Low Low Low Low Low/Moderate Low Low 















- The SSRO’s 
misperception 
on the hospital 
(CM) 




Influence*** Low Low Low Low Low/Moderate Low Moderate 
* Does the actor exist in any administrative arena? (‘yes/no’ means the case varies across provinces) 
** PAUs here include internal offices and the HCPs 
*** Assumption being set for further discussion in Chapter 6 
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Regardless of their involvement, provincial actors are rarely active in SIBD. As an 
advisory board, the PSSS are supposed to advice the SSRO. However, in reality, they 
rarely made suggestions to the SSRO on their activities or decisions. Being either 
incumbent or non-incumbent, they shared the same reason of being inactive in SIBD. 
Internal offices, the HCPs, and the governor (incumbent members) are obliged to be 
part of the PSSS; while external offices (non-incumbent members) are selected by 
the SSRO. However, what they said in their interviews similarly connoted ‘SIBD is 
the SSRO’s business, not my business’. Besides, as project participants, local 
organisations play insignificant roles in SIBD. Some perceived SIBD as a burden; 
while some did not. However, no evidence shows that local organisations are active 
in SIBD. 
Purposively, this section focuses on provincial actors’ roles and their performance in 
SIBD and left the inter-organisational relations untouched. However, the activeness 
of provincial actors suggests the hypothesis of their influence over SIBD (see the last 
row in Table 5.4). Simply speaking, it is hypothesised that being active could result 
in being influential. This will be examined in the next section. 
5.1.3 Resource dependence within SIBD 
It is necessary to understand which actor is influential on SIBD or precisely the 
SSRO’s decision-making. This could be viewed through resource-based analysis. As 
Provan (1984, p. 499) states, ‘...[resource] dependence results in influence...because 
dependence is a measure of potential power and influence over decisions refers to 
enacted power’. Also, as Purdy (2012) suggests, ‘[R]esource-based power recognizes 
the dependencies among organisations involved in collaboration and their ability to 
deploy resources (p.410)’. To do so, Aldrich (1971, p. 285) proposes an analytical 
framework of power-control in inter-organisational relations under two criteria: 
control over entry and member control over participation. However, although this 
framework clarifies each organisation’s conditions of participation in resource 
exchange fields, it only emphasises an organisation’s power over the other in entry or 
participation not the decision-making.  
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This research this develops a framework to analyse resource exchange on the bases 
of mutuality and expectation. This analytical framework of resource exchanges 
within dyadic inter-organisational relations is applied to data collected from four 
selected provinces. Each organisation (namely Organisation B) is classified into six 
actor types: internal office, province head, HCP, external office, representative, and 
local organisation. These are developed from four types of actor (government 
organisation, representative, external office, project participant) in Chapter 5 (see 
Table 5.4). Specifically, government organisations are further classified into three 
types of actor including internal office, province head (governor), and the HCP. 
Also, project participants are referred to as local organisations in this chapter.  
Six types of resources (discussed in Section 2.5.2) are specified in column (a) and (b) 
of Figure 6.3. Column (a) presents the resources being transferred from an 
organisation B to the SSRO (B -> SSRO). Similarly, column (b) presents the 
resources being transferred from the SSRO to the organisation (SSRO -> B). Both 
columns are divided into three sub-columns including: ‘Mandated’, ‘Expected’, and 
‘Actual’. This approach allows resources of different kinds to be related in a 
qualitative research design and it is not an attempt to put figures on actual money 
transferred. ‘Mandated’ means resources which are specified in regulations, policies, 
or agreements as required resources to be transferred. ‘Expected’ means resources of 
which one actor expected from the other. ‘Actual’ means resources being transferred 
through the relationship in reality. All dyadic relations are analysed regarding this 
framework (see Appendix 6). To be clear, this analysis employs coding method and 
‘counting the countable’ approach. As shown in the example, three sets of data 
(interviews, minutes of meeting, official documents) are analysed and categorised 




Figure 5.5 Analytical framework for resource exchange 
 
 
For example, the analysis of resource exchange between the Nan SSRO and the LAO 
is shown in Figure 5.6. From the LAO to the SSRO, three resources (information, 
expertise, authority) are mandated by the SSO’s Guideline of PSSS and the P&F 
MoU. According to the Guideline (SSO’s Order No.79/2552), the LAO as a member 
of the Nan PSSS is required ‘...to provide suggestions to the SSRO's strategy and 
operation and advises on problem solutions’. Also, according to the P&F MoU (Nan 
SSRO, 2008), ‘[B]oth parties [the SSRO and the LAO] agree to support and promote 
information service of social insurance which will promote quality of life in each 
administrative territory [of local government]’. These two regulations suggest that 
the LAO contribute their information, expertise, and authority to SIBD. 
Figure 5.6 Example of Resource exchange analysis 
 
 
Contrarily, the SSRO only expected to receive the LAO’s authority. As the Nan 
SSRO chief (interview, 17 October 2011) suggests that:   
‘The LAO is a regional office coordinating between central and local 
governments. This is semi-commanding (Kueng bangkub buncha). The 
LAO cannot command [local governments] but they can coordinate [with 
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them] for us. They can discuss and have authority. If they [local 
governments] want to get their plan approved, it seems they [local 
governments and the LAO] rely on each other.’ 
Working with the LAO in the P&F, the SSRO actually received the LAO’s authority 
only. From the SSRO to the LAO, it is mandated in the SSO’s Guideline of PSSS 
that the SSRO should provide information to all members of the PSSS including the 
LAO. Technically, the LAO received information from the SSRO (see the Nan PSSS 
Minutes of Meeting). The LAO in fact expected nothing from the SSRO as the LAO 
chief states that (interview, 1 December 2011): 
‘We just help [the SSRO]. This [P&F] project is good for service 
recipients. There is no reason not to do it.’  
There are three assumptions in considering each resource type within the actor’s 
influence. One is that information is considered as ‘basic commodities in inter-
organisational transactions (Shrum, 1990, p. 497)’ and thus information exchange is 
less influential than exchanges of other resource types. Secondly, financial resource 
is essential in inter-organisational relations and thus the financial resource owner is 
influential in resource exchange. According to Purdy (2012), ‘while information and 
knowledge resources are needed to comprehend and analyse the issues. Financial 
resources can allow organisations to gain expert advice or representation in 
collaborative processes, increasing their influence (p.411)’. Lastly, it is difficult to 
give values to the other resources (staff, service, material, authority, expertise). An 
assumption is thus set as: ‘the more varied types of resource are exchanged in the 
relation, the more influential the relation is to SIBD’. 
Provincial actors are mostly influential on SIBD at low level. Specifically, three 
relationships - SSRO-internal, SSRO-HCP, SSRO-representative - are slightly 
influential on SIBD. Firstly, resources being exchanged in the SSRO-internal and the 
SSRO-representatives relations are information only. These relations are highly 
ritualistic and moderately entail trust. Secondly, the SSRO-HCP exchange may look 
different from the other two relations at the first glance as it is slightly ritualistic and 
entails moderate level of trust. Indeed, the HCPs as direct service providers could 
possibly provide the SSRO medical services for insured persons and medical 
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knowledge in addition to information. However, it turns out that the SSRO-HCP 
exchange is just an information-sharing. This thus makes the SSRO-HCP relation 
slightly influential on SIBD, similar to SSRO-internal and SSRO-representative 
exchanges. 
Three relations – SSRO-governor, SSRO-external, SSRO-local – are more influential 
on SIBD. Firstly, the SSRO-governor relationship is moderately influential on SIBD. 
Resources exchanged between both parties – finance, service – are substantial to 
their operations. If one would want to process particular activities, the other’s 
cooperation is crucial. Secondly, the SSRO-local relationship is highly influential to 
SIBD. Consistent with the conclusion in Section 5.1.2, this relation is highly 
ritualistic since local organisations expected nothing from the SSRO and put few 
efforts in the project in cooperation with the SSRO. However, their resources 
(service, staff, material) are crucial for initiatives. If local organisations do not 
cooperate, the project could not be settled and SIBD will not be diversified. Lastly, 
the SSRO-external relationship is the most difficult to conclude because the SSRO’s 
interaction with the external office varies across provinces. For instance, Chiang 
Mai, Lamphun, and Phrae are where the SSRO-external plays a trivial role in SIBD. 
However, in Nan, the LAO as a selected external office played an important role as a 
coordinator between the SSRO and local organisations.  
To conclude, it is interesting to revisit the assumptions set in Section 5.1.2 and re-
examine the influence of provincial actors towards SIBD. Concordantly, three actors 
(internal offices, HCPs, representatives) are proved to be slightly influential to SIBD; 
the governor is moderately influential; external office is variably influential. 
However, local organisation’s level of influence is slightly different from Section 
5.1.2 assumptions. While it is assumed that the actor would have been moderately 
influential, evidence in this chapter proves that local organisation is highly influential 
to SIBD.  
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5.2 Inter-organisational relations and collaboration 
It is not easy to measure the degree of collaboration as well as to find a particular 
framework for such measurement. Mostly, existing literature deals with the 
conceptualization of collaboration (e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson, Nabatchi, & 
Balogh, 2012; Huxham, 2003) but none deals directly with its measurement. As 
McGuire (2006, p. 40) suggests, studies of collaboration have been focused on three 
aspects including: collaborative management/governance, necessary skill sets in 
collaboration and effect of collaboration on programme outcomes. Developed from 
relevant literature, therefore, this section draws the measurement of collaboration 
degree upon two components of collaboration: relationship patterns, collaborative 
activities. Firstly, ‘relationship pattern’ refers to the form of relationship formation 
i.e. the two organisations are obligatorily or voluntarily involved in the relation (see 
Section 2.5). Secondly, ‘collaborative activity’ refers to an activity in which two 
actors purposively involved with each other (see Section 2.4). 
5.2.1 Relationship patterns: contracting, cooperating, coordinating or 
collaborating? 
In Section 2.5, two dimensions of inter-organisational relations (obligatory, 
voluntary) are proposed as an analytical framework. As this research focuses on 
dyadic relations, it is thus important to consider possibilities of interrelations 
between the two actors. Two relationship patterns are stressed in Agranoff and 
McGuire (2003) as they indicate that one should not confuse collaboration with 
cooperation. However, the interrelation of organisation exists in more forms as 
Axelsson and Axelsson (2006) suggest four categories of inter-organisational relation 
i.e. co-ordination, co-operation, contracting, and collaboration. They consider the 
relations under two dimensions (vertical, horizontal) implicitly suggesting linear 
views of the relations.  
However, it is questionable whether this would confuse an analysis of relationship 
pattern with the power between two actors as, for example, vertical relation 
inevitably means the relation between two organisations from different levels. In 
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other words, one organisation is superior over the other. Therefore, acknowledging 
such vertical/horizontal dichotomy, this section uses the terms suggested by 
Axelsson and Axelsson (2006) but looking at inter-organisational relations from a 
different angle. As collaboration involves not only two or more organisations but 
also mutual agreement (see Mandell, 1999), this research takes such mutuality as a 
platform to analyse relationship patterns within collaboration. 
Developed from these frameworks, Figure 5.12 presents four possible relationship 
patterns (I – IV) for two organisations interacting in a particular field. Each 
dimension in the figure depicts two choices of an organisation. An ‘obligatory’ 
pattern occurs when an organisation has no control over participation in the field as it 
is under rules or functions. A ‘voluntary’ pattern occurs when an organisation can 
choose to participate in the exchange field. It should be noted that this framework is 
drawn under two assumptions. Firstly, in a particular exchange field, an organisation 
(A) is a focal organisation while the other (B) is participating in response to A’s 
request. Secondly, in order to do their job, A is in need of resources from B. Also, 
throughout this dissertation, organisation A always refers to the SSRO while 
organisation B is a provincial actor in SIBD listed in Chapter 5. 
Figure 5.7 Possibilities of dyadic relationship patterns 
 
Source: adapted from Axelsson and Axelsson (2006) 
 
Each pattern is labelled using the terms borrowing from Axelsson and Axelsson’s 
(2006) work mentioned earlier. However, each term is defined slightly different in 
this research. Contracting (Pattern I) occurs when both parties are obliged to 
cooperate in the field. Co-ordination (Pattern II) occurs when A would like to do 
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something out of their functions or routine jobs and put a request on B whose major 
function is related to the job and cannot deny taking part. Co-operation (Pattern III) 
occurs when A is obliged to operate their function; B has needed resources but does 
not need not to join unless they want to. Lastly, Collaboration (Pattern IV) occurs 
when both parties are not obliged to cooperate but as A wants to do the job they 
request B to join. B has the resources and they could voluntarily join the operation.  
Also, Axelsson and Axelsson (2006) suggest that contracting (low vertical and 
horizontal integration) is the least collaborative pattern of relationship while 
collaboration (high horizontal and low vertical) is the most collaborative. Similarly, 
although this research looks at the relations from mutual-agreement perspective, 
contracting is considered to be the least collaborative relation while collaboration is 
the opposite. Further, the determination of the degree of collaboration in this section 
is not for each relation but for the case selected. Therefore, the hypothesis is set to be 
as below: 
‘The more contracting pattern exists in the province, the less degree of 
collaboration. Contrarily, the more collaboration pattern exists in the 
province, the higher degree of collaboration.’ 
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Table 5.5 Interprovincial comparison of actor's involvement and relationship patterns 
Actor Organisation 


















EO O/O Contracting O/O Contracting O/O Contracting O/O Contracting 
LO O/O Contracting O/O Contracting O/O Contracting O/O Contracting 
LWPO O/O Contracting O/O Contracting O/O Contracting O/O Contracting 
LSDC O/O Contracting O/O Contracting O/O Contracting O/O Contracting 
Province head GO 




O/O Contracting O/O Contracting 
HCP 
PHO O/O Contracting O/O Contracting O/O Contracting O/O Contracting 













    
Representative 
EmE1 O/V Cooperation O/V Cooperation O/V Cooperation O/V Cooperation 
EmE2 O/V Cooperation       
EmR1 O/V Cooperation O/V Cooperation O/V Cooperation O/V Cooperation 





    
V/V Collaboration V/IO ?? 
O = Obligatory; V = Voluntary; IO = Indirect Obligatory
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In Section 5.1, it is suggested that there are two ways of involvement in the 
provincial SIBD. One is obligation which mostly occurs when the SSRO cooperates 
with government organisations. Another is voluntary which mostly occurs between 
the SSRO and three actors: external offices, the representatives, and local 
organisations. In this section, the involvement is further analysed to portray the 
degree of collaboration in each selected province based on the framework suggested 
earlier. Consequently, it is found that most of inter-organisational relations, 
specifically governmental relations, are through contracting with two collaborative 
relations in Phrae and Nan each (see Table 5.13). 
This could be briefly explained by province. In Chiang Mai, only two patterns of 
relationship – contracting, cooperation – coexist. For all actors involved with the 
SSRO obligatorily, their relations fall into the contracting pattern. As most 
government organisations are in obligatory relationships with the SSRO, their 
relationships with the SSRO are thus contracting. In contrast, for all voluntary 
involvement, these relations fall on cooperation pattern. These includes relationships 
between the SSRO and two types of actor (external office, representative) For the 
external, they could have denied taking part in the PSSS as it was not their duty but 
they accepted the SSRO’s request since, as they claimed, it was inter-governmental 
cooperation or kwaam-ruam-mue (interview, Maharaj Hospital, 7 December 2011) or 
social contribution (interview, McCormick Hospital, 6 December 2011). In contrast, 
the representatives of employers and employees voluntarily participated in SIBD 
because, as they claimed, it was an honour to be part of the PSSS.  
In Lamphun, two relationship patterns – contracting, cooperation – similarly coexist 
with the line clearly drawn between government organisations and non-government 
organisations. All government organisations are in the contracting pattern as they are 
obligatorily involved with the SSRO. Differently, the external office (Hariphunchai 
Memorial Hospital) and the representatives of employers and employees are in the  
cooperation pattern as they are voluntarily involved with the SSRO. Still, considering 
the GCS project in which the Lamphun SSRO cooperated with the governor, the 
SSRO-governor pattern could be coordination. Although, regarding the assumptions 
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that organisation A (the SSRO) is a focal organisation who starts the interrelation 
with organisation B (governor in this case), this SSRO-governor interrelation could 
be contracting instead of coordination as the GCS is in fact the governor’s field of 
service delivery which is not the same field as SIBD (the field of concern). However, 
following the assumption that B is obliged to interact with A, this relation could be 
coordination. Thus, three patterns – contracting, cooperation, coordination – coexist 
in Lamphun. 
In Phrae, three patterns – contracting, cooperation, collaboration – coexist. Firstly, 
similarly to Chiang Mai, most government organisations (except an external office) 
are in a contracting relationship with the Phrae SSRO. Secondly, two relations – 
SSRO-representative, SSRO-external – are in cooperation pattern as the SSRO is 
obliged to cooperate while representatives and external office voluntarily cooperate 
with the SSRO. Lastly, the SSRO-local relation is distinctive as it is in collaboration 
pattern. In this relation, the SSRO and local organisations voluntarily work together 
in the CLO project.  
Lastly, in Nan, three patterns – contracting, cooperation, collaboration – coexist with 
one unexplained relationship. Firstly, similar to other provinces, most government 
organisations are in a contracting pattern with the SSRO. Secondly, actors 
voluntarily work with the SSRO i.e. LAO, and representatives are in a cooperation 
pattern. However, the SSRO-LAO relation is relatively complicated as they do not 
only work together in the PSSS but also voluntarily work together in the P&F. This 
SSRO-LAO relation consequently is not only cooperation but also collaboration, 
which is the third relationship pattern, exists in this province. For the unexplained 
relationship, the SSRO-local relation finds nowhere to fit in the framework. 
Interestingly, the SSRO managed to sign the MOU with the LAO, which makes local 
governments obliged to participate in SIBD or precisely the P&F. Therefore, an 
indirect obligatory relation occurs between the SSRO and local organisations in Nan. 
Although under the late 1990s decentralisation, local governments are relatively 
autonomous, they cannot deny taking part in this project as it is the LAO’s, their 
mentor’s, policy to collaborate with the SSRO.  
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In conclusion, Chiang Mai is where relations equally appear in contracting and 
cooperation forms. Lamphun is similar to Chiang Mai, but coordination exists 
between the SSRO and the governor. Phrae and Nan are where contracting, 
cooperation, and collaboration similarly coexist. However, differently, collaboration 
in Phrae occurs in the SSRO-local relation while, in Nan, it is the SSRO-external 
relation. Therefore, it is concluded that Nan and Phrae are equally collaborative (one 
collaborative relation exists) while Lamphun (one coordination) and Chiang Mai is 
less collaborative respectively (neither coordination nor collaboration exist).   
5.2.2 Labelling collaborative activities 
This research employs Agranoff and McGuire’s work (2003), one of widely-accepted 
collaborative management frameworks (see overview in Rethemeyer, 2005), to 
develop one aspect of the collaboration measurement. This framework proposes a 
descriptive analytical method quantifying collaborative activities of a central unit of 
analysis. As mentioned in Chapter 2, they categorise such activities into five major 
activities: information seeking (IS), adjustment seeking (AS), policymaking and 
strategy-making (PM), resource exchange (RE), and project based (PB). Each of 
these labels can be detailed as below (see Figure 5.13). 
Agranoff and McGuire (2003) use descriptive statistics to understand these activities. 
Data collected by the survey method is quantified and classified into five activity 
types. They suggest that variation of collaborative activity is a result of exploiting 
‘complex governing environment strategically (p.89)’ which eventually determines 
how active/inactive their cases are in proceeding collaboration. Therefore, in this 
section, it is hypothesised that:  
‘The more variety of collaborative activities in the province, the higher 




Figure 5.8 Agranoff and McGuire's collaborative activities 
 
According to the primary data analysis (see Appendix 6), it is found that Nan is the 
case where collaborative activities are the most varied (see Table 6.2). Phrae, 
Lamphun, and Chiang Mai are the cases where the variety is less. Firstly, in Nan, 
four types of collaborative activities – IS, PM, PB, RE – exists. The SSRO-external 
(namely the LAO) relation is not only information-sharing relation (IS) but both of 
them work together to ‘gain policymaking assistance (PM)’ and ‘establish 
partnership for a project (PB)’. As the Nan LAO chief suggests (interview, 1 
December 2011), 
‘We just help [the SSRO]. This [P&F] project is good for service 
recipients. There is no reason not to do it.’  
Similarly, the SSRO-local relation involves IS and PB activities. Particularly, local 
governments provide resources for the SSRO (RE) under the supervision of the 
LAO. As the Nan SSRO chief states (interview, 17 October 2011):   
‘The LAO is a regional office coordinating between central and local 
governments. This is semi-commanding (Kueng bangkub buncha). The 
LAO cannot command [local governments] but they can coordinate [with 
them] for us. They can discuss and have authority. If they [local 
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governments] want to get their plan approved, it seems they [local 
governments and the LAO] rely on each other.’ 
Table 5.6 Interprovincial comparison of collaborative activities 
 
 
Secondly, in Phrae, three different activities – IS, PB, RE – exist in the SSRO-local 
relation. For instance, the SSRO not only exchanges information (IS) and other 
resources (RE) but also establishes network in the CLO project (PB). Being asked 
about the CLO project, the Phrae SSRO chief enthusiastically credited his front-
office head as follow (interview, 4 February 2011): 
‘This [CLO] project was started by her [pointed to the front-office head]. 
When I arrived, the project had already been approved. I was also 
fascinated. How could this [project] be drafted? It is such a surprise since 
it is, first, the point where inter-organisational cooperation can be built. 
Second, bringing all sources [of both organisations] to be merged. Third, 
success or failure of this kind of project depends on public relations. 
Merging the sources can be another way to publicize [the SSRO’s 
work].’ 
Thirdly, in Lamphun, two activities – IS, PB – exist between the SSRO and the 
governor. For example, the Lamphun Deputy Governor explained the reason why 
organisations, including the SSRO, should be participating in the GCS as (interview, 
11 March 2011) 
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‘It is important that all provincial offices that share and use government 
online database participate in the GCS project…’ 
This participation let both the Lamphun SSRO and the Lamphun governor work 
together in terms of information sharing (IS) and partnership establishment (PB). 
Lastly, in Chiang Mai, only one type of activity – IS – exists. In fact, the Chiang Mai 
SSRO chief explains that the SSRO was applying the SSO’s network building 
principle which could be possible in the future but, at the moment, local-cooperation 
initiative was not present in Chiang Mai (interview, 3 October 2011). However, 
according to interviews with most Chiang Mai PSSS members and the documents 
such as the SSO annual report, there is no other types of collaborative activities in 
SIBD in Chiang Mai. 
5.2.3 Examining the degree of collaboration 
Taking relationship patterns and collaborative activities into consideration, Nan is the 
case with highest degree of collaboration; while Phrae (moderately high), Lamphun 
(moderately low), and Chiang Mai (Low) are at a lower degree respectively (see 
Table 6.3). This determination is based on two hypotheses. One is ‘the more 
collaboration, the higher collaborative degree (see Section 6.1.1)’; another is ‘the 
more variety of collaborative activities, the higher collaborative degree (see Section 
6.1.2)’. Firstly, Chiang Mai is undoubtedly a case of a low degree of collaboration as 
no evidence of collaboration and only one activity type (IS) are found. Secondly, 
although two activity types (IS, PB) and coordination exists in the province, 
Lamphun is determined as a moderately-low case because no collaboration is found. 
Thirdly, Phrae is the case of moderately high collaboration where one relation is 
found to be collaboration and three activity types (IS, PM, RE) exist. Its degree of 
collaboration is not determined as high as Nan because, although only one 
collaborative relation is similarly found, Nan has four different collaborative 
activities (IS, PM, PB, RE). 
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Table 5.7 Collaboration degree of each case 
 
Drawing from inter-organisational relations and influential actors, this section 
illustrates the pattern of SIBD in each province. The illustration is developed from 
the one presented earlier in Chapter 5. It further discusses on how the relations 
impact the diversification of SIBD in each province by comparing the case to 
national norm (see Chapter 3) and other selected provinces. In brief, the degree of 
collaboration is positively associated with the diversity degree. For instance, Nan as 
the most distinctive case has the highest degree of collaboration. Similarly, this is 
followed by Phrae, Lamphun and Chiang Mai respectively. 
 
5.2.4 Collaboration and SIBD patterns 
Section 5.2.3 indicates the degree of collaboration in order to understand a causal 
link between the diversity and collaboration Chiang Mai is the case where no 
distinctive project is found and degree of collaboration is low. Inter-organisational 
relations in the province are either contracting (SSRO’s obligatory and actor’s 
obligatory) or cooperation (SSRO’s obligatory and actor’s voluntary) (see Figure 
5.10). This, consequently, suggests that SIBD pattern is rarely diversified from the 
national standard. For instance, the SSROs rigidly follow the SSO’s policies. Also, 
none of the actors are influential to SIBD in particular as resource being shared in 
social insurance administration in the province is only information. 
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Figure 5.9 Actors and relations in provincial SIBD in selected provinces 
Chiang Mai    Lamphun 
 
 
Phrae      Nan 
In Lamphun, most relations are either contracting or cooperation, similar to Chiang 
Mai. However, the degree of collaboration is shifted to moderately low regarding the 
fact that the coordination and project-based activity between the SSRO and the 
governor exist in the form of GCS project. The governor could have influence over 
SIBD as he could provide extra financial resource for the SSRO. This, consequently, 
makes SIBD pattern in Lamphun slightly different from the SSO’s standardized 
pattern (see Figure 5.10). With moderately high degree of collaboration, pattern of 
SIBD in Phrae is diversified from national pattern and the one in Chiang Mai (see 
Figure 5.10). Although most relations are contracting and cooperation similar to 
Chiang Mai and Lamphun, the CLO project created collaboration between the SSRO 
and local organisations. This is arguably a major factor of the diversification. Also, 
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local organisation is an important partner whose collaboration is needed to complete 
the diversified service of SIBD.  
Similar to Phrae, the pattern of SIBD in Nan is diversified from national norm but 
with the highest degree of collaboration among cases. Most relations between the 
SSRO and provincial actors in Nan are unsurprisingly contracting and cooperation 
while two relations (SSRO-LAO, SSRO-local) are not (see Figure 5.10). This is 
because the P&F is operated creating a triangle relation in which the SSRO is a host, 
the LAO is a facilitator, and local governments are operative units. Within this 
project, collaboration between the SSRO and the LAO is crucial as they agreed to 
start an initiative project together. However, the relation between the SSRO and local 
governments is somewhat ambiguous as local governments are bound to cooperate 
with the SSRO regarding the contract signed between the SSRO and the LAO. Thus, 
two actors with significant influence to SIBD include an external office, namely the 
LAO, as a cooperating policy-maker and local governments as cooperating service 
providers. 
A question left unanswered from the above discussion is ‘what are other factors of 
these inter-organisational relations?’ Inter-organisational trust is suggested as 
relational factors (Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008) and earlier discussion 
portrays how it was developed within SIBD as resource exchanges were undertaken. 
Earlier sections already discussed the trust built in-between resource exchange. 
However, external factors – e.g. socio-political factors – are suggested as relational 
factors too (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). This section thus clarifies socio-political 
factors at the provincial level (e.g. size of the province, inter-organisational 
communication).  
Presumably, province size is a factor affecting tight or loose ties between 
organisations. Firstly, ‘size’ contains two implications – geographical, workload – in 
this research. Geographically, Chiang Mai is the biggest whereas Nan, Lamphun, and 
Phrae are smaller respectively. In terms of workloads, the province with more 
workloads per SSRO officials is ‘bigger’. This could possibly consider from the 
number of population in each province. Therefore, Chiang Mai with the population 
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of 1,640,479 is the biggest while Nan (476,363), Phrae (460,756) and Lamphun 
(404,560) are smaller respectively (2010 statistics, DOPA website). 
Does the province’s size really matter to inter-organisational relations in the 
province? Several interviewees agree with the size significance towards their 
relationships with other organisations. For example, the Chiang Mai EO chief stated 
that Chiang Mai was a big province ‘so usually the PAUs needed to keep focus on 
our tasks’ (interview, 4 October 2011). However, some argue that size is not the 
matter since they would know how to manage the relations. For example, the Chiang 
Mai deputy governor stated that Chiang Mai administration was not different from 
other province; rather it was easier since the provincial culture was relatively 
compromise and agreeable. Also, the Nan EO chief stated that she would employ the 
same management style wherever she worked.  
Considering all interviews’ data, however, it appears that the province’s size does 
matter to inter-organisational relations as it also relates to inter-organisational 
communication. As in Nan, a small province in both terms, inter-organisational 
relations seemed to be closer compared to Chiang Mai a big province in both terms 
too. In Nan, besides the PSSS meeting, the governor organised daily informal 
meeting (sapa-gafae) in weekday morning. This informal communication, therefore, 
was perceived as more productive way to build up cooperation. For example, the LO 
chief mentioned that he and the SSRO chief went cycling together sometimes before 
or after the sapa-gafae and they had a chat on either general topic or work-related 
topic (interview, 12 October 2011). However, it is observed that no one in Chiang 
Mai mentioned anything similar to sapa-gafae activities. Evidently, informal 
communication is more significant to tightening the relations than formal 
communication.  
5.3 A bi-dimensional framework: diversity and the SSRO’s 
responsiveness 
The previous discussion only examines resource dependence relations and identifies 
which of these relations are influential to SIBD. It clarifies relationship patterns, the 
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degree of collaboration and the resource exchanges in four provinces and discusses 
the diversity of SIBD in the dimension of IORs. Therefore, this section further 
discusses each selected province under two dimensions: diversity and 
responsiveness. It investigates the extent to which the diversity of SIBD exists in 
relation to the SSRO’s responsiveness. Its main question is ‘to what extent does the 
experience of the four provinces studied suggest diversity and responsiveness in 
SIBD?’  
Moving the discussion from collaboration between elite actors, this section clarifies 
diversification and responsiveness to the needs of service users in the case of three of 
the provinces through case-studies of innovative projects. In brief, it is found that 
Chiang Mai appears to be the case where SIBD remained standardized. It does not 
only illustrate the rigidity of policy implementation but also emphasises a uniform 
pattern of SIBD. Lamphun is similar to Chiang Mai as the SSRO routinely operated 
their service. However, the Lamphun SSRO’s GCS project exemplifies a slightly 
different pattern of SIBD. Phrae and Nan are provinces where the SSROs delivered 
distinctive projects, CLO and P&F respectively. These are derived from, as they 
claimed, the officials’ sympathy towards insured persons.  
In Chapter 2, three patterns of SIBD diversification – Weberian, Customer-oriented, 
Strategic – are proposed. This section considers the four cases in the characteristics 
of diversity degree and responsiveness (see Figure 5.5). Firstly, each provincial 
SIBD pattern is categorised into three different degrees of diversity – low, medium, 
high. To do so, projects and activities of the SSRO are investigated and compared 
with the uniform pattern presented in Section 3.2.4. The more they are different from 
the national norm; the higher degree of the diversity they have. Secondly, three levels 
of responsiveness are specified as routine (low), responsive (moderate), and initiative 
(high). Three sets of project are of concern as service delivery activities including: 
projects specified in the SSO’s strategies (routine projects), projects operated in 
response to local political pressures which could similarly be found elsewhere in the 
country (responsive projects), and projects newly created by the SSRO and never 
been operated elsewhere (initiative projects).  
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Being aware of quantifying qualitative data, it is admitted that this degree of 
diversity is based on the researcher’s analysis only. No statistical methods are 
involved in this distinction between low, moderate, and high. It is basically an 
estimation based on qualitative data. As a qualitative research, this continuum is 
considered as an attempt to illustrate a simplified picture of the phenomena. 
According to Greenwood (2002, p. 140), it is not ‘a monopoly of truth’ but ‘assists in 
providing helpful insights’. 
 
Figure 5.10  Analytical framework of SIBD diversification 
 
 
5.3.1 Chiang Mai: standardized delivery pattern? 
The pattern of SIBD in Chiang Mai is the most standardized one compared to other 
selected provinces. It reflects the uniform pattern of SIBD. This is because of the 
Chiang Mai SSRO’s routine and rule-bound characteristics and circumstances. For 
instance, the Chiang Mai SSRO followed the service guidelines of the SSO rigidly. 
Being requested to provide their annual strategy, the Chiang Mai SSRO gave the 
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researcher the SSO’s strategy and, as the contact person
20
 suggested, the SSRO 
employed the same strategy as the SSO. Searching through all accessible documents 
e.g. plans, projects, activities of the Chiang Mai SSRO, the researcher found nothing 
diversified from the SSO guidelines. Moreover, Table 6.1 shows special projects of 
several SSROs listed in the SSO’s 2009 annual plan21. These projects are written in 
the SSO’s plan regarding distinctiveness that has been accepted by the SSO. In fact, 
some are not that unique but the SSO still accepted them as ‘special’ for some 
reasons. However, the discussion on this will be provided in another section. As 
shown, the Chiang Mai SSRO’s projects have never existed in this list. 
Table 5.8 Initiative projects in the SSO's 2009 Annual Plan 
Province Project Title 
Nan Thinking Partner & Friends 
Nan Network relations for social insurance development 
Ratchaburi Training for new employers and employees who lacks 
understanding of their legal duties and responsibilities 
Chumpon Building up knowledge and understanding of sickness and injury 
benefit 
Prajuabkirikan Educating community on social insurance laws 
 
Although the Chiang Mai SSRO has two offices - one in the city centre (Muang 
District) and another in Fang District, this is not considered as a responsive action of 
the SSRO to local needs in this research. The branch was officially established to 
provide service for insured persons in remote areas. However, its responsibilities are 
repetitive to the SSRO (see Labour Ministry Regulation on Organisational Structure, 
2011). This branch, hence, represents the Chiang Mai SSRO and is operated as if 
they are a division of the SSRO not an independent delivery agency. Although the 
pattern of dual service accesses
22
 in Chiang Mai is slightly different from the national 
norm (a single access at the SSRO office), their service delivery pattern rigidly 
follows the standardized pattern.  
                                                             
20
 The contact person is the head of the Chiang Mai SSRO’s administrative division.  
21
 This 2009 annual plan is the first plan provincial initiative projects are officially listed. 
22
 Dual-access pattern (main office and its branch) exists in 24 out of 75 provinces (SSO website, 
accessed on 9 June 2012). 
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The Chiang Mai SSRO in fact tried proposing a particular project titled ‘Promotion 
of Work Security and Insurance for Labourers in Chiang Mai’ to the Governor’s 
Office in order to get into the provincial strategy budget (see Chiang Mai Operational 
Plan (Budget Proposition) 2010, Chiang Mai Governor’s Office, 2010). However, 
this project has never been approved or operated. According to the Governor’s Office 
official, this project had been terminated before the Chiang Mai Operational Plan 
was completed. In response to the termination, the Chiang Mai SSRO chief 
presumed that the Chiang Mai SSRO might have found that this project had been 
compliant with the SSO’s policy and changed their mind afterwards. As he 
explained, to request the Governor’s budget or not, the basic principle is that the 
proposed project must not be repetitive to the projects proposed to the SSO. To 
reaffirm his statement, the researcher searches through the Chiang Mai SSRO’s 
operational plan and finds a similar project existed i.e. the ‘disseminating social 
insurance knowledge’ project.  
No local cooperation project similar to the Nan and Phrae SSROs’ initiative projects 
exists. Being asked about local cooperation, the Chiang Mai SSRO Chief indicated 
that the SSRO was applying the network building principle suggested by the SSO 
and it could be possible in the future. At the moment, such initiative was not present 
in Chiang Mai. Nonetheless, it could be argued that cooperation with local 
organisations does exist in Chiang Mai. Still, the cooperation in which local 
governments provide pamphlets and local organisations occasionally participate in 
the SSRO’s seminars are not considered as initiative activities in this research. These 
activities are practices rigidly following the SSO’s guidelines. Also, the Chiang Mai 
SSRO’s budget rigidly conformed to the SSO’s budget plan (see Social Security 
Office, 2008b). In other words, no funding was requested or approved for the Chiang 
Mai SSRO’s initiative project. This is different from the Nan SSRO’s budget plan 
which contained a particular budget for the P&F. Also, no initiative projects were 
found in the documents given or produced by the Chiang Mai SSRO (e.g. Chiang 
Mai SSRO annual budget 2010, minutes of meetings, meeting agendas) or in the 
SSO’s strategies (Social Security Office, 2008a, 2009a). 
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More interestingly, the Chiang Mai SSRO could work without a Chief for almost a 
year in 2011. For instance, in the first fieldwork of this research which started in 
December 2010, the gatekeeper asked if the interview with the Chief could be 
substituted by someone else since the position was unoccupied. The researcher 
agreed to interview with any acting chief at the time but the confirmation process 
lasted until the first fieldwork finished. Then, in the second fieldwork started in 
October 2011, the researcher approached the SSRO again and found that the Chief 
had recently been appointed in the early September of 2011. This should have been 
troublesome to SIBD to some extent but it was not. All of the SSRO’s tasks were 
operated under rules and regulations of the government and the SSO as, for example, 
the Deputy Director of LSDC suggested (interview, 5 October 2011),  
‘the SSRO can work although they don’t have the chief. They still have 
acting chief and everything. [They] just follow the rules’.  
Indeed, bureaucracy is supposed to work without attachment to a person but a year 
without the chief reinforces how routinely the Chiang Mai SSRO’s has functioned. 
Moreover, local politics in Chiang Mai seems to put high pressure on the SSRO 
resulting in their routine delivery pattern. According to the Lamphun SSRO Chief 
who was the former Chief of the Chiang Mai SSRO, administering SIBD in Chiang 
Mai was stressful so that it affected his health. In off-record conversation, he pointed 
out that the politics in Chiang Mai was substantial. Seemingly, lots of powerful 
entrepreneurs and politicians somehow pressured the SSRO. Although this issue 
remained unclear since the Chief did not want to clarify, it was somewhat evident 
when looking at the problem of contribution evasion in the province. For instance, as 
the employer had somehow avoided paying contribution for a period of time, the 
SSRO still did not manage to impose it. Therefore, dealing with this high pressure 




5.3.2 Lamphun and the GCS project: Slightly or fairly diversified 
pattern? 
In Lamphun, SIBD was presumably diversified from the uniform pattern as it was 
believed that the GCS project was operated because the SSRO wished to expand 
service access to insured persons in an industrial park. However, it is evident that the 
SSRO in fact participated in the GCS in response to the provincial governor rather 
than their initiation. The project is in fact one of the Ministry of Interior’s (MoI) 
policies being implemented in all provinces. Its rationale is to establish a one-stop 
shop of public services in communal areas such as shopping malls or train stations. It 
is optional for all regional offices, including the SSRO, to participate in the project.  
The Lamphun SSRO participated in the project due to support from the governor. At 
the beginning of the project, the Governor’s Office provided a space and staffs for 
the GCS centre. For instance, the Office paid for the space rental in the shopping 
mall and hired temporary employees to work at the counter. According to the Chief, 
if the Governor did not provide financial support back at the beginning, the SSRO 
would not have been provided their services at the counter service in the shopping 
mall. As he stated (interview, 22 February 2011), 
‘The GCS project is not the SSRO’s direct responsibility; it is the 
Administrator’s
23
 [the responsibility of the Governor’s Office]. Simply 
speaking, it is not easy to work while “eating a salt crystal [Gud Gon 
Klua Gin]24”. Therefore, we need to be clear [about financial support of 
the project] before taking part in any project.’ 
However, as the project came to the end of its first year, such supports were 
minimised and a few provincial offices remained serving at the counter service in the 
shopping mall. The SSRO was refraining from the GCS participation. After the first 
year ended and the new Governor appointed, no funding was provided so that the 
                                                             
23
 ‘Administrator’ is literally translated from ‘pok-krong’. The full form of this term is ‘pok-krong 
chung-wat’ which literally means ‘provincial administrator’. This term is usually used by 
provincial bureaucrats to refer to the Governor’s Office. Sometimes it is shortened as either ‘pok-
krong’ or ‘chung-wat (province)’. 
24
 This idiom means ‘living a tough and poor life’. 
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SSRO stopped delivering their service in the shopping mall. According to the SSRO 
Chief, 
‘…we have no financial support. [Previously,] We used to pay for 
overtime wages ourselves. However, we can’t bear the cost any longer. 
The province
25
 [the Governor’s Office] should realize how the activity 
could be operated. There’s a cost of everything e.g. electricity, paper, and 
so on. At the beginning, the former governor had spared the provincial 
budget for this [GCS project]. Frankly, if he did not provide financial 
support, the project would have been hardly operated.’ 
The Chief also reasoned that if insured persons came to the SSRO office it would be 
more convenient for them. They could submit the claim, wait for the result, and if 
succeed get the cash benefits within a few hours. If they go to the counter service, 
what they could do was only to submit the claim. They still needed to come to the 
SSRO office to proceed to the claiming.  
Sharing the same opinion, the SSRO official stated that the project did not work 
since insured persons might find coming to the SSRO office quicker and more 
comprehensive. According to the interview (Lamphun SSRO head, 9 November 
2011): 
Respondent:  ‘…mostly, originally, we were based there [at the GCS 
counter] to collect data [related to the claim] for benefit 
consideration. However, people [or service users] [would 
rather] come to the [SSRO] office because the distance 
between the industrial park and the office is short. They 
come here [and get] quicker and more comprehensive 
services. Over there [at the GCS counter], we don’t pay 
benefits; just receive claim forms and forward them here’ 
Researcher:  ‘Was the reason of the SSRO’s GCS participation to 
provide extra-time service?’ 
Respondent:  ‘…since the Ministry [of Labour] emphasised integrated 
services of the Ministry… they planned to cooperate with 
the province [Governor’s Office]. However, it seemed not 
work because the GCS service users mostly use particular 
services such as utility bill payment, transportation fee 
payment, ID card issue. Ours [the SSRO’s] is just 
collecting documents and forwarding them here so the 
                                                             
25
 This is literally translated from ‘chung-wat’ (see earlier footnote). 
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users would better come to the office. Otherwise, if they 
want to pay [contributions], they can go to banks. 
Researcher:  ‘Originally, it was assumed that the SSRO could decide 
whether to participate in the GCS.’ 
Respondent:  ‘It is semi-obligation (kueng-bungkab).’ 
 
The SSRO had had their staffs at the GCS counter (10.00-17.00, Mon-Fri) since the 
beginning of the project. However, the only service provided by the SSRO at the 
counter was only document submission. From mid 2011, they had stopped doing 
that. 
Also, the GCS was a result of the negotiations between the governor and the SSRO. 
Since the GCS was not included in the SSO’s policy, it was unnecessary for the 
SSRO to be involved in the project. However, the Lamphun Deputy Governor 
explained the selection criteria of organisations participating in the GCS as 
(interview, 11 March 2011) 
‘It is important that all provincial offices sharing and using government 
online database participate in the GCS project…’  
Accordingly, the voluntary principle seems not to be applied in the selection of 
participants in the GCS in Lamphun. Unsurprisingly, in response to the governor’s 
request, the Lamphun SSRO took part in the project. 
Seemingly, the Lamphun SSRO could be categorised as ‘responsive’ since they 
responded to political pressure (the governor’s request) in the province. However, 
Lamphun remains to be a routine case with a slight shift towards ‘being responsive’ 
for three reasons. Firstly, as discussed in the previous section, the SSRO responded 
to the SSO’s or the Governor’s policies rather than local needs. Secondly, the 
Lampphun SSRO did not draft their provincial strategy. Being asked about their 
strategy, the Chief explained that it was the same as the SSO’s strategy (Chief of 
Lamphun SSRO, interview, 22 February 2011). Hence, no documents on the 
Lamphun SSRO’s strategy were given. Also, the researcher went further to the 
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SSRO’s website and found nothing related to the SSRO’s strategy. Therefore, it is 
apparent that the SSRO intended to follow the SSO’s policies only. 
The last reason refers to the SSRO chief’s response to the question of service 
diversification and innovation. He stated that social insurance system should be 
standardized so that no diversification existed in social insurance system. Also, the 
Chief believed that the Lamphun SSRO was trying to originate initiative projects as 
he said: 
Respondent: ‘We are trying to think about it [initiative project] … we 
[analyse] what we have got and what we have lost. We tried 
to fulfill the gaps by coordinating with local governments. 
We even went further to train local officer on regulations 
and practical guidelines. The second step is to build up the 
network of which we could spread the news of changes to 
public. These are what we have been thinking.’ 
Researcher:  And how has the network been developed? 
Respondent: Admittedly, it is under development. Each staff [in all 
provincial offices]. Each organisation [in the province]. All 
are trying to set up the network. …It [network building] is a 
mainstream now. We are in the stream too. …However, our 
specific point is in the enterprises. But we do not just stop 
there only. We also expand it to auntie, grannies, [to] 
however small [enterprises]. 
However, the projects or activities he mentioned could be found in any accessible 
documents. With regards to the three reasons, it is thus concluded that the Lamphun 
SSRO is in fact an obedient delivery agency not a responsive agency.  
5.3.3 Phrae and the CLO project: Highly diversified pattern? 
Phrae is the province where the SSRO operated the Co-operation with Local 
Organisations (CLO) project. Based on the SSO’s policy guidelines, it is an initiative 
formulating extra service accesses in remote areas. The SSRO’s cooperation with 
local-level organisations was suggested in the SSO’s policy documents. This 
suggestion has existed in Thailand’s social insurance administration for more than a 
decade. In the five-year strategic plans of the SSO after the late 1990s, the SSO 
attempted to improve the service and benefit delivery through cooperation with other 
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organisations (Social Security Office, 1996, 2002, 2009c, 2010). Specifically, it 
encouraged the SSRO to cooperate with employers and schools in an attempt to 
establish ‘better understanding’ on social insurance for existing and future insured 
persons. This concept of cooperation has recently been referred to as ‘network 
building’ in the two most recent strategies, 2005-2009 and 2010-2014. 
In order to pursue the SSO’s approval, the Phrae SSRO designed the Cooperation 
with Local Organisations (CLO) project reflecting the concept of network building 
(Phrae SSRO, 2010b). Although the Phrae SSRO chose ‘cooperation’ to name their 
project, they need to refer to ‘network building’ as the ultimate aim of the project. 
Since the latter term has been emphasised in the SSO’s recent strategies, the SSRO 
mentioned it in their project in order to ensure that the approval would be granted. 
According to the CLO project proposal, the main objective of this project was to 
create a network which could provide closer and more convenient service access for 
insured persons (Phrae SSRO, 2010a). Eventually in 2010, the project was finally 
approved with additional support from senior bureaucrats (Phrae SSRO official, 
interview, 4 February 2011). 
The Phrae’s CLO project development could be analysed in three stages: the 
initiation stage, the establishing stage, and the continuation stage. The initiation stage 
means the period in which the concepts and ideas of the project were built up; 
whereas, the establishing stage is when the SSRO attempted to set the project 
framework and resources. The continuation stage is when the SSRO attempt to pave 
the way for the sequel of the project. Firstly, in the initial stage, the CLO project 
initiation is a result of the administrative autonomy rather than the negotiation 
between policy actors. The Phrae SSRO aimed to respond to local factors and 
implement the SSO’s policy of cooperation, they thus intiated the CLO project. The 
head of Phrae SSRO’s front office who was a key person in this stage indicated the 
local needs were influential to the project design as follow (interview, 4 February 
2011); 
‘…We saw insured persons travel to the [Phrae SSRO] office from 
different districts and areas. Some of them who travel from the 
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district have to come here very early in the morning because there is 
only one bus from the district at around four or five o’clock in the 
morning. Some people who travel from other areas are the persons 
who previously worked in other provinces or countries and then 
migrated back home. These people also experience the difficulties of 
travelling to the [Phrae SSRO] office.’ 
All of the project details were designed and drafted by the Phrae SSRO. None of the 
policy actors got involved at this initiation stage. After the project draft was finished, 
the SSRO proposed the CLO project to the PSSS and got the primary approval 
without objections. The project, therefore, was completely an idea of the SSRO 
because the policy actors offered neither suggestions nor objections. 
Secondly, at the establishing stage, the CLO is not only a result of the SSRO’s 
autonomy but also of the negotiations with policy actors. Defining the framework 
and seek for resources was the responsibility of the Phrae SSRO. As they were the 
only one who drafted the project, they decided how the project framework would 
look like and what kind of resources they would be required. As the project focus 
was on the cooperation with local organisations, the negotiations with them became 
an important part at this establishing stage. Local organisations had become potential 
partners and resource providers. Each of them was contacted by the Phrae SSRO and 
could voluntarily take part in the project. It was necessary that the SSRO could 
convince each organisation to participate in the project and, within this step, a 
negotiation between the SSRO and the organisation occurred. To get the cooperation 
from local organisations, the SSRO clarified what they would do and what the 
cooperating organisation would get in return. Consequently, 23 local governments 
took part in the project whereas other 61 did not. 
The continuation stage started when the Phrae SSRO was satisfied with the CLO 
operation in the first year and said it would like to continue the project. In the 
meeting on 19 October 2010, the SSRO summarised the progress of the CLO project 
stating that the project was ‘well-cooperated’ and participating organisations 
provided useful information and documents. Three examples were given in the 
meeting (see Phrae SSRO, 2010b). Firstly, with the connection established in the 
CLO, one of the cooperating organisations (namely the Baan Lao SAO) informed an 
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emergency case of fire in a local wood carving factory to the SSRO and the SSRO 
could help the affected insured persons immediately. Secondly, during the flood in 
2010, employers and employees in affected areas could contact the SSRO or claim 
benefits via cooperating organisations. Thirdly, as the Phrae Hospital participated in 
the project, the SSRO received more information through this channel improving 
their database on, for example, employment and update of individual entitlement. 
The CLO project is distinctive in four respects: type of cooperating organisations, 
long-term cooperation, cooperation activities, and response to local needs. Firstly, 
the cooperation in this project was to construct the networks with local organisations 
such as municipalities, the SAOs (sub-district administrative organisations), local 
hospitals. While two compulsory projects of the SSO are to cooperate with 
employers and schools as mentioned earlier, cooperation with local organisations is 
optional. Secondly, the project attempts to build long-term cooperation with 
participants through the training of service agents and the establishment of service 
accesses in each cooperating local organisations.  
Thirdly, in relation to the second reason, the cooperation activities in the CLO 
project include local staff’s training. Local cooperation in SIBD occurred not only in 
Phrae but, in the other provinces, local organisations were mostly information 
centres, pamphlet distributors, or occasional exhibition centres. However, in the 
Phrae’s project, service agents, nominated from the cooperating organisations, were 
trained by the SSRO One representative from each cooperating organisation is 
regularly invited to seminars and trainings to become a service agent.  Also, service 
accesses, including document shelves and service desks, were set up in local 
organisations’ offices.  
Fourthly, the CLO project appears to respond to local needs rather than the SSO’s 
policy. According to the Phrae SSRO officials (interview, 4 February 2010), the 
CLO project was originated in an attempt to assist insured persons who lived in 
remote areas and found the journey to the SSRO office troublesome. It took some 
recipients up to a day or more to claim the benefits. Particularly, if required 
documents were not provided, they had to go back and forth between the SSRO and 
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their residences. The official stated that this situation was inconvenient and tiresome 
particularly for the low-income recipients and, thus, the project was a response to this 
local need. Statistically, 66.53% of insured persons in Phrae are concentrated in 
Muang District (city centre); while the rest are dispersed in seven other districts 
(Social Security Office, 2008). In terms of efficiency, providing a single service 
access in the city centre is sensible but, regarding needs of recipients, the CLO 
project is necessary.   
The performance report of the CLO project was presented in the PSSS meeting on 19 
October 2010. Each participating organisation kept records of their service and 
submitted these to the SSRO (see Figure 6.2). As is being shown, only four 
organisations frequently served the recipients. It should be noted that these four 
organisations comprise three hospitals and a single local government. As the 
hospitals are medical service providers who directly contact with insured persons and 
sickness benefits are claimed the most in social insurance, it might be a convenient 
access for insured persons to claim their benefits when they are taking medical care.  
 
Figure 5.11 Service frequency of cooperating organisations in the CLO project 
 




Differently from most local governments participating in the CLO, the Baan Lao 
SAO reportedly granted services more than 20 times. At local government offices, 
although service access was established in each participating organisation, few 
employees and employers acknowledged, or used, the service. As shown in Figure 
6.2, most participating organisations served insured persons only once or twice 
within ten months (January-October 2010). However, the case of Baan Lao is 
different. According to the SSRO chief (interview, 4 February 2011) and Baan Lao 
SAO official (interview, 3 March 2011), this was caused by the incident of fire in 
local wood carving factory in the Baan Lao sub-district. Since the SSRO was the first 
government organisation arrived at the place of incident, the SAO and affected 
people recognized the reliability of the SSRO and the existence of the CLO project. 
Hence, the Phare SSRO is labelled as an initiative delivery agency because of their 
CLO project which reflects responsiveness to its local contexts. Also, three more 
factors (provincial strategy, activeness, participative character) are essential to the 
Phrae SSRO’s responsiveness. Firstly, the Phrae SSRO drafted their provincial 
strategy instead of using the SSO’s national strategy. For example, the Phrae SSRO’s 
2010 vision was ‘ascending to leading organisation, building up social insurance 
under principles of good governance and participation’ (Phrae SSRO, 2010c). Also, 
it was specified in its strategy that the Phrae SSRO would have network built for 
service provision. Undeniably, the Phrae strategy complies with the SSO’s strategy 
but the Phrae SSRO made it more specific and responsive to local factors. 
Secondly, the working environment in the Phrae SSRO appeared to be active. For 
example, in the first time the researcher was at the office to submit a data request 
letter and get to know a gatekeeper, the official gave as many documents as possible 
and promised to provide more documents on the day of interview with the chief. 
Thirdly, the working environment seemed to be participative as, for example, the 
SSRO chief appeared to respect his subordinates ideas and works. Therefore, the 
case is proved to be in the High zone of the diversification continuum as 
hypothesised. Also, the Phrae SSRO is labelled as an initiative delivery agency based 
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on this initiative project and two more factors (provincial strategy, local-driven 
staffs). 
5.3.4 Nan and the P&F project: Highly diversified pattern? 
Nan is the province where the SSRO operated a distinctive initiative, the ‘Thinking 
Partners and Friends of Insured Persons’ project (P&F). The P&F, started in 2008, is 
in fact a series of activities comprising M-service (IT system development) and the 
Mobile Branches (establishing unofficial branches in remote areas). In accordance 
with their organisational vision, the Nan SSRO had designed the P&F with the 
rationale of long-term relationship with local organisations. It addressed how local 
networks could help improving the SSRO’s services. As stated in the P&F proposal 
(Nan SSRO, 2008): 
‘Being reciprocal organisations’ is a goal of which the Nan SSRO aimed 
to reach by undertaking the project of ‘network of social insurance 
coordinators’. This network embraced all 99 local governments in Nan. 
On the 4 of April 2008, the Nan SSRO organised a training seminar for 
all coordinators from each local government to pursue a better service for 
local residents.’  
 
The term ‘reciprocal organisations’ had become a major concept of the P&F ever 
since. It appeared not only in the project proposal but also in the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) which was drafted for the endorsement by the SSRO and the 
LAO. ‘Being Reciprocal Organisations’ was defined as following (MoU, Nan SSRO, 
2008): 
‘Both party [the SSRO and the LAO] agree to support and promote 
information service of social insurance which will promote quality of life 
of local people in each administrative territory. This will escalate quality 
of life of citizens and improve quality of proactive public service which 
leads to the service in the format of reciprocal organisations.’ 
 
Further, there was a clear statement on functions of the SSRO and local governments 
in this MoU. The LAO chief signed the MoU on behalf of all local governments. 
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These governments were responsible for ‘providing basic mentor, suggestion, and 
document check-up for insured persons’. Meanwhile, the Nan SSRO would provide 
materials and training for local coordinators so that they could deliver such services.  
Similar to the CLO project, the P&F development could be divided into three stages: 
the initiation stage, the establishing stage, and the continuation stage. Firstly, in the 
initiation stage, the concept of the P&F was started by the SSRO. The introduction of 
this local cooperation concept was before the current chief’s tenure. It was developed 
from the ‘Social Insurance Coordinator Network’ project (see P&F project proposal, 
Nan SSRO, 2008) which the year of its beginning could not be identified. According 
to the head of Nan SSRO’s front office: 
‘…in fact local cooperation had existed before the current head came. We 
[the Nan SSRO] had done it [cooperating with local governments] for 
many years. It was originated long before in order to serve insured 
persons across the province. The SSRO chief just came and made it more 
official. For instance, he signed the MoU with the LAO which formalized 
the intergovernmental cooperation.’  
 
However, the P&F became more concrete at the arrival of the current chief. In 2008, 
soon after he was assigned to the post, he made the existing collaborative activities 
with local organisations more official by asking the LAO to be part of his plan 
(interview, 11 October 2011). The formalization of the project by the current Chief 
was the starting point of the establishing stage. Then, all paper works – e.g. project 
proposal, MoU – were completed and the project operation had begun.  
Secondly, the project establishment was started when the SSRO reported the P&F 
progress to the PSSS. In the PSSS meeting on 26 November 2008, it was the first 
time the P&F was mentioned and presented to the PSSS as recorded below (Minutes, 
Nan SSRO, 2008): 
‘The Nan SSRO has been operating the project of ‘social insurance 
coordinators’ network’ consistently. …Objectives of the [P&F] project 
operation are to: comprehend and disseminate information of social 
insurance [at local government’s office]; facilitate the service for insured 
persons and employers in remote area which would consequently reduce 
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the cost [of travelling] for people who came to the SSRO office; and build 
up intergovernmental relationship to ‘reciprocal organisations’ as for 
ultimate benefits of local residents’ 
Then, the project became part of the Nan SSRO’s annual strategy and more 
established as local network expanded. In 2009, the SSRO presented the project 
progress again in the PSSS meeting on 17 November 2009. They referred the P&F as 
part of their new organisational vision which is stated as ‘impressive service at the 
office, accessible service in remote areas’. As mentioned in the Minutes of the 
Meeting: 
‘According to the strategy [or vision], the P&F was operated as a result 
[of the strategy]. In 2009, the SSRO will review the [project] operation in 
the past year which [the cooperation with local governments] is expanded 
from 22 to 99 local governments…’ 
 
Thirdly, at the continuation stage, the Nan SSRO had a different way in negotiating 
with the SSO from the Phrae SSRO. While the Phrae might ask for support from the 
governor in the second year of the CLO project, the Nan SSRO still relied on a 
budget from the SSO. The Nan SSRO Chief explained that in its first year the Chief 
went to the SSO to present the project himself. Accordingly, he convinced the SSO 
by stressing that the project was to provide a quality service of which shared the 
similar aim with the SSO and the project was approved. As he acknowledged the 
project might not be approved for the second year, however, he made a request of the 
fund for the P&F under a different name. When it came into practice, he spent the 
money on the P&F activities. This, as he claimed, was not illegitimate because he 
was still using the money on the purpose of SIBD. 
The P&F went further after its second year of operation ended in 2009. The project 
was transformed into two activities: M-service and mobile branches. In the minutes 
of meeting on 28 June 2010, the M-service was firstly mentioned. The SSRO Chief 
admitted the obstruction of the P&F and suggested the M-service as stated (Minutes, 
28 June 2010, Nan SSRO): 
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‘… the Nan SSRO has been operating the P&F of which presented in the 
PSSS meeting earlier. This project responded to the area [difference] but 
it did not respond to the service [at the SSRO’s office]. Therefore, the 
Nan SSRO proposed the project to the central [the SSO] and asked for the 
solution. Consequently, we [the SSRO] and the SSO produced the M-
Service software (e-mobile Smart Service). This [M-Service] project is a 
sequel of the P&F project which aims to reduce the number of insured 
persons using the service at the SSRO office and settle the service access 
close to insured persons’ residences. … In the future, we [the SSRO] 
hope insured persons would come to the SSRO office the least while the 
SSRO will go to serve the persons as close as possible to their home.’ 
 
The SSRO kept developing the service on the basis of providing the closest access 
for the insured persons. They even moved forward to establish two unofficial 
branches in the province. As stated (Minutes, 21 December 2010, Nan SSRO): 
 ‘…the project of “Branch Office Establishment in Pua and Wieng Sa”… 
The Nan SSRO had started providing services in branch offices from 5 
September 2010. On Tuesdays, the service will be provided in Pua 
District at the Pua Municipality ...On Thursdays, the service will be 
provided in Wieng Sa District at the Klang Wieng SAO…’ 
 
Diversified from the uniform pattern, unique characteristic of the P&F project is a 
service access at local organisation added to the delivery process (see the grey zone 
in Figure 6.3). Instead of going to the SSRO’s office directly, the claimant had a 
choice to go to the local government closest to their residence first. There they could 
submit the claim with all required documents to the local coordinator (authorised by 
the SSRO) for the preliminary check-up. If all documents were valid and sufficient, 
the coordinator would affix a seal of approval on the claim. The claimant then had 
three choices: submitting the claim at the SSRO’s office, sending the claim to the 
SSRO by post, or asking the coordinator to proceed. Meanwhile, if the coordinator 
had any questions, they can consult the SSRO instantly. Hence, the uniqueness is a 
closer and optional service access. Local governments, the closest public service 
providers, became a choice of service access for insured persons. In other words, 
convenient and accessible service is a key characteristic of the P&F.  
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Figure 5.12 Process of SIBD in Nan 
 
Source: Adapted from Service guideline for Reciprocal Networking Organisations, Nan SSRO, 2008 
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Still, not many people know about this service as few insured persons were served by 
local coordinators (interview, Pua Municipality official, 30 November 2011). Despite 
its uniqueness, the project was arguably not successful. So, is this project still worth 
being studied? Certainly. The focus of this research falls on the conversion of policy 
into practice. Diversity of ‘implementation’ not ‘performance’ is a key concern of the 
research. The P&F project portrays the extent to which diversity of social insurance 
policy implementation exists in Northern Thailand as the SSRO managed to operate 
a unique project. Its success may not be substantial but its diversified pattern of 
delivery is outstanding. Failure or success of the practice is investigated as an 
indicator of how well the SSRO and local governments worked together. However, 
this is not to determine whether the project could be an evidence of diversity of 
policy implementation. 
The Nan’s P&F project is also unique when being compared to the Phrae’s CLO 
project; it shares five similarities but differs in six aspects. Similar to the Phrae 
SSRO’s CLO project, the Nan SSRO’s P&F project is operated in response to local 
needs. As shown in Table 6.2, the CLO and P&F projects have many things in 
common such as concepts, objectives, procedures, budget, and expected outcomes.  
Firstly, although ‘network organisations’ and ‘reciprocal organisations’ are two 
different terms, the basic concept is similarly to set up inter-organisational 
cooperation in the province. Secondly, objectives are differently stated but, again, 
their core concept is to improve service accessibility. Thirdly, the process of both 
projects is composed of: participant selection, MoU endorsement, facilities 
settlement, training, and evaluation. The sequence looks different but, in fact, the 
content is similar. Fourthly, both projects were subsidized by the SSO’s annual 
administrative budget equivalent to 10% of the SSF. Lastly, expected outcomes were 
mainly satisfaction of the service recipients and the established social insurance 
network. Consequently, their attempts at doing such projects made their pattern of 





Table 5.9 Summary of cooperation projects in Phrae and Nan 
  Phrae Nan 
Rationale network organisations as basic service 
and knowledge providers 
reciprocal organisations 
Objectives a document submission service points; 
an information centre; and a 
coordination centre  
information centre 
  convenient access for insured persons in 
remote area 
convenient access for insured persons in 
remote area 
   cost-saving for service recipients cost-saving for service recipients 
  intergovernmental coordination for 
local citizens 
intergovernmental coordination for 
local citizens 
Target groups 1. local governments 
2. community hospitals 
99 local governments  
 
Procedures 1.call for application  1. The SSRO designs activities.  
  2. have the MoU signed  2. Set up service corner in the office of 
participating local governments.  
  3. organise training for appointed 
officials  
3. Prepare and have the MoU signed  
  4. set up the cooperation centre  
4.1  publicize knowledge and 
suggestions on social 
insurance 
4.2  arrange shelves for documents  
4.3  appoint officials [of local 
organisations] 
4.4  visit participating local 
organisations and evaluate the 
project monthly 
4. evaluation 
4.1 appraisal (diamond network 
project) 
4.2 relationship development (social 
insurance network building 
project) 
Timeframe January – December 2010 June 2008 - December 2008 
KPI Citizens/employers/employees/insured 
persons receive convenient (sa-duag) 
and accessible (krob-klum) services  
citizens/employers/employees/insured 
persons receive accurate (thook thong) 
and fast (ruad raiw)services 
Budget Administrative budget from the SSF 
(10%) 




1. cooperation and information centres 
are set up  
1. satisfied service recipients 
  2. satisfied service recipients 2. reciprocal network is built up 
  3. service recipients save the cost of 
travelling 
  
  4. network of reciprocal organisations is 
set up  
  
Source: (extracted from Nan SSRO, 2008; Phrae SSRO, 2010a) 
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The Nan SSRO’s cooperation project is different from the Phrae SSRO’s in six 
respects: project establishment, middleman, official appointment, official stamp, 
facilities installed in local offices, and sequel projects (see Table 6.3). Firstly, the 
Nan SSRO’s P&F is more established than the Phrae SSRO’s CLO project. The 
length of cooperation period can be considered as a crucial factor. Although the P&F 
was started in 2008, local cooperation between the Nan SSRO and local cooperation 
had possibly existed before 2006. Therefore, this made the establishment of P&F at 
ease since local governments had been accustomed to participate in such project. 
Differently, in Phrae, local cooperation had never been mentioned in any documents 
before the CLO project started in 2010. Indeed, following the SSO’s policy, the 
Phrae SSRO might ask local governments to distribute pamphlets long before 2010. 
However, such action is not ‘local cooperation’ in this research.  
Secondly, while the P&F has a middleman to deal with local organisations; the CLO 
does not. In Nan, the LAO played a role as a coordinator between the SSRO and 
local governments. This facilitated the process of the P&F operation since the SSRO 
needed not to contact 99 local governments themselves. The LAO would issue a 
letter to them on behalf of the SSRO. This request of the LAO was usually followed 
by local governments since they likely perceived the LAO as their director. In 
contrast, the Phrae SSRO contacted with each local organisation directly. 
Table 5.10 Comparison of cooperation projects in Phrae and Nan 
Province Phrae* Nan** 
Year started 2010 2008 
MoU Yes Yes 
Training for local 
coordinators 
Yes Yes 
Middleman No Yes 
(The LAO) 
Official appointment of 
local coordinators 
No Yes 




(provided by the SSRO) 
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Province Phrae* Nan** 
Facilities set up in office of 
participating organisation 






4. the SSRO’s office space (under 
Mobile branch project) 
Sequel projects No 1. M-service 
2. Mobile branches 
* Phrae SSRO’s CLO project proposal (2010) 
** Nan SSRO’s P&F project proposal (2008) 
 
Thirdly, the Nan SSRO had officially appointed local governments according to the 
Announcement of Nan Governor’s Office on Social Insurance Coordinators (Nan 
Governor’s Office, 13 September 2010). This document included the name list of 
local coordinators. No evidence of such appointment was found within the Phrae 
SSRO. Fourthly, the Nan SSRO gave local governments an official stamp used as an 
approved signature when authorised coordinators check documents of insured 
persons. Again, the Phrae SSRO did not provide such thing for their local 
coordinators. Fifthly, the facilities installed in local organisations in Nan are more 
than in Phra. The Nan SSRO set their mobile branch there, while the Phrae SSRO did 
not. Lastly, in Nan, two projects – M-service, mobile branches – were operated as a 
sequel of the P&F. Then, the mobile branches project leads to difference of provided 
facilities between the Phrae and Nan SSRO. In selected offices, local governments 
provided office spaces for the Nan SSSRO to operate the mobile branches. 
Evidently, nothing similar happened in Phrae. In fact, these differences also imply 
the extent to which the P&F is more established than the CLO. 
Besides, the appointment of local government officers as social insurance 
coordinators implies two interesting issues: their perception towards social insurance 
and the significance of the P&F towards local governments. 104 local officials being 
appointed as social insurance coordinators under the P&F (see Announcement of the 
Nan Governor’s Office, 13 September 2010) are analysed into two respects: their 
affiliations (divisions) and their positions. Firstly, affiliation of each appointed local 
officer implies local government’s perception towards the P&F specifically or social 
insurance in general. Regarding general organisational structure of local 
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governments, this can be analysed into four groups of officials: the financial division, 
administrative division, the educational and welfare division, and the urban planning 
division. Interestingly, 51 and 40 coordinators are from financial and administrative 
divisions respectively,  while 13 are from welfare division and none of them are from 
urban planning division (see Figure 6.4). This indicates that the cooperation with the 
SSRO is perceived as a financial or administrative task rather than welfare provision 
for their residents. 
Figure 5.13 Number of local coordinators by division 
 
Source: Announcement of the Nan Governor’s Office, dated13 September 2010 
Secondly, the hierarchical position of local coordinators may imply how local 
governments value participation in the P&F. Three levels of employees are shown in 
Figure 5.14 including: head, officer, and assistant. ‘Head’ means an employee who 
works at management level such as head of financial division or chief administrative 
officer. ‘Officer’ means either a civil servant or a permanent employee of local 
governments. Lastly, ‘assistant’ means a temporary employee whom hired for a 
specific period i.e. three or six months, one year. Most of appointed local 
coordinators are officers of local governments; while the least are from management 
level of the organisations. It is interesting that some local governments appointed 
division heads as social insurance coordinators. As the SSRO expected that the 
coordinators should be able to provide services for insured persons, assigning the 
heads as coordinators raised the question of how regularly they could serve the 
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recipients on one hand and whether they may assign other officials to do the job on 
behalf of them on the other. 
Figure 5.14 Number of local coordinators by position 
 
Source: Announcement of the Nan Governor’s Office, dated 13 September 2010 
To conclude, the Nan SSRO is an initiative delivery agency. They provided services 
not only at the main office but also at local governments’ offices and its unofficial 
branches. Since 2009, the Nan SSRO delineated their organisational vision as 
‘impressive services at the office, networking services in remote area’ under the 
following rationale (Minutes, 17 November 2009, Nan SSRO): 
‘As the Nan SSRO is responsible for an entire province where the 
distance between the SSRO office and districts is significant, [the SSRO 
questioned] how to insured persons could gain the most of benefits and 
services. Therefore, the SSRO decided to set such organisational vision.’ 
To provide ‘impressive services’, the Nan SSRO improved the facilities at their 
office. For example, in 2011, the Nan SSRO underwent the project of office 
refurbishment (Minutes, 4 April 2011, Nan SSRO). Layout of service zone was 
reorganised, new furniture was inserted, and new queuing IT system was installed. 
As stated in the Minutes: 
‘Since a large number of service recipients – employers, employees, 
governmental and non-governmental organisations – came to the SSRO 
daily, quick and efficient services are necessary. Service systems, 
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particularly queuing system, are required to be improved for more 
efficiency so that no intensity occurs at the service point.’ 
Besides, to provide ‘networking services’, they operated the project of network 
building including the P&F, M-service project, and mobile branches (see Section 
3.2). These projects had been driven by the Chief since his arrival in the Nan SSRO’s 
office in 2008. All projects were distinctive and not easily approved by the SSO. 
However, the chief presented the P&F to the SSO himself. Then, the project was 
eventually approved.  
5.3.5 Comparison of Delivery Patterns 
In principle, all SSROs should provide the same pattern of SIBD. Evidently, 
however, Phrae and Nan SSROs have diversified the pattern. While Chiang Mai and 
Lamphun SSROs similarly deliver the SIBs in the same way as the SSO suggested, 
Phrae and Nan SSROs initiated the distinctive projects in response to local factors. 
Figure 6.6 compares SIBD pattern in each province with the uniform pattern in 
simplified version. Chiang Mai and Lamphun correspond to the uniform pattern, 
Phrae and Nan share a similar different pattern. 
5.3.5.1 Diversity of SIBD in provinces 
Nan is the most diversified case and Phrae, Lamphun, and Chiang Mai are less 
diversified respectively in three aspects. Firstly, despite sharing the same pattern, the 
pattern of Nan SIBD is more diversified than the one in Phrae. The Nan SSRO 
operated three initiative projects which made the diversified pattern of Nan SIBD 
more established. Therefore, the diversification degree in Nan is at the higher point 
than in Phrae. Secondly, SIBD in Lamphun is not as diversified as assumed. The 
actual degree of diversification in Lamphun is in the Low zone rather than the 
Medium because the GCS project turned out not to be a responsive project. Thirdly, 
Chiang Mai is the least diversified as no evidence of diversified service is found. 
218 
 
Figure 5.15 Comparison of SIBD process 
 
Three indicators – number of service accesses, number of insured persons per access, 
degree of local cooperation – could be listed to determine the degree of SIBD 
diversity. The most prominent indicator, firstly, is the number of service accesses in 
each province (see Table 6.4). Chiang Mai is the least diversified province with two 
forms of access – the SSRO office and its official branch. However, the branch is 
established regarding the SSO’s regulation so the Chiang Mai SIBD pattern is not 
different from the uniform one. Lamphun with two accesses is slightly more 
diversified than Chiang Mai because of their interaction with the provincial 
governor. This interaction once originated an additional access to SIBD in Lamphun 
although it was terminated later on. Phrae with 31 accesses – 30 local organisations 
and the SSRO – is highly diversified because the CLO project appeared to be an 
initiative of SIBD. Indeed, the project was derived from the Nan SSRO’s P&F but 
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the Phrae SSRO adapted it in response to local circumstances. Nan with 100 accesses 
– 99 local governments and the SSRO – is the most diversified province due to the 
P&F. Subsequently, there were another two projects developed from the P&F idea. 
Table 5.11 Number of insured persons per access 






National 9702833 96* 101071.18 
Chiang Mai 178108 2 89054.00 
Lamphun 78338 2 39169.00 
Phrae 16479 31 531.58 
Nan 12365 100 123.65 
Source: Annual Statistics 2010, SSO website 
*Number of the SSO’s official field offices in 75 provinces, accessed on 9 
June 2012 
 
Interestingly, considering the number of insured persons per access in each province 
reasserts the diversification degree in each province. First of all, it should be noted 
that the SSO has rarely considered the total number of service accesses nationwide. 
Although service expansion – e.g. the Mini Office scheme (Social Security Office, 
2002) or the service expansion to banks or convenient stores (Social Security Office, 
2009c)– was introduced to SIBD, the total number of accesses cannot be found in 
any acquired documents. Therefore, to estimate the national norms, simple 
calculation is applied. As a result, in Table 6.4, Nan is the case different from 
national norms the most, while Chiang Mai is the least. 
The degree of diversification entails a different degree of local cooperation in each 
province. The number of service accesses reflects the extent to which local 
cooperation exists in the four provinces. In Nan, the highest diversified case, local 
cooperation involved all local governments in the province. Phrae is at the second 
highest degree of diversification and local cooperation. Although the CLO project 
covered all over the province (eight districts), only 30 out of 75 local governments 
participated. Also, although Lamphun is slightly more diversified than Chiang Mai in 
terms of SIBD, both of them are similar in terms of degree of local cooperation. 
Helps such as document distribution were requested of local governments indeed but 
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these are not considered as local cooperation in this research. Therefore, no local 
cooperation exists in either Chiang Mai or Lamphun. 
5.3.5.2 The SSRO’s responsiveness 
Further, while Section 5.1 classifies the SSRO regarding its coordinator role, this 
section classifies the SSRO as a decision maker of SIBD whose responsiveness is 
varied across provinces. Four selected SSROs are put into two categorizations: an 
initiative delivery agency (Phrae and Nan) and a routine delivery agency (Chiang 
Mai and Lamphun). In Phrae and Nan, the SSROs are classified as initiative delivery 
agencies since they exercised local cooperation projects which bore characteristics of 
responsiveness and creativity. The Nan’s P&F makes the case more diversified from 
the standardized pattern of SIBD than Phrae. Compared to the Phrae SSRO’s CLO 
project, the P&F is more established in terms of sustainability (sequel projects, 
length of time) and facilities provided for cooperating organisations (devolved 
authorities, specific advisors). Also, the Nan SSRO attempted to maintain and/or 
strengthen local network by periodically gave them other tasks. This could possibly 
remind them of the existing connection with the SSRO. In contrast, in Chiang Mai 
and Lamphun neither responsive nor initiative projects were evidently operated by 
the SSROs. The GCS project which was originally hypothesised as a responsive 
project of the SSRO turned out to be a response to the Governor’s request rather than 
local needs. Therefore, although the Lamphun SSRO had participated in the GCS 
project, such activities cannot be considered as a ‘responsive project’. 
5.3.5.3 Classifying cases into diversification patterns 
Despite three patterns of SIBD – Weberian, customer-oriented, strategic – presented 
earlier, four selected provinces are compliant with only two patterns (see Figure 
5.17). Firstly, Chiang Mai and Lamphun falls on the Weberian pattern (low diversity, 
routine characteristic) as they rigorously implement the SSO’s policy. Secondly, 
Phrae and Nan falls on the strategic pattern (high diversity, initiative characteristic) 
as they initiated newly and responsively project of SIBD (CLO and P&F 
respectively).  It should be emphasised that these data from four selected provinces 
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exemplify the extent to which the diversity of service delivery not the diversity of 
entitlement or coverage exists across provinces. This diversity of SIBD occurs when 
the SSROs attempt to innovatively deliver social insurance benefits. While Nan 
portrays the most diversified pattern of SIBD, Chiang Mai is the least. Four intra-
organisational factors of the SSRO’s responsiveness – provincial strategy, leadership, 
participation, customer-oriented value – are believed to be influential on the 
diversity. These factors facilitate the SSRO’s innovations resulting in initiative 
projects which diversify SIBD pattern. 
Figure 5.16 Diversity of SIBD in Thailand 
 
Conclusion 
In a province, social insurance institution comprises three actor constellations 
including: provincial SIA (AC1), project management (AC2), and ProA (AC3). Two 
substantial constellations (AC1, AC2) are discussed in Section 5.1 to depict roles of 
provincial actors. Being obliged, selected, or coerced into SIBD, provincial actors are 
rarely active. An advisory board (the PSSS) seldom provided advices on SIBD 
decision-making. Most PSSS members similarly claimed that SIBD is not their direct 
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responsibility. Similarly, project participants play insignificant roles in SIBD. 
Evidence of their activeness in SIBD was not found in the fieldwork. Section 5.2 
discusses inter-organisational relations in two respects: resource dependence and 
degree of collaboration. In terms of resource dependence, the governor and local 
organisation – are the most prominent actor to be influential in SIBD. The external 
office could also be as influential as the two actors depending on the SSRO’s 
activity. However, their influence varies across provinces so that it could not be 
simply generalized. In terms of the degree of collaboration, Nan appears to be the 
most collaborative case compared to other cases while Phrae has a moderately high 
degree, Lamphun with a moderately low degree and Chiang Mai with a low degree 
of collaboration.  
Diversity of SIBD is seen across the four selected provinces. Chiang Mai is the case 
in which SIBD pattern resembles the uniform pattern of SIBD. Likely, high political 
tensions restrict the Chiang Mai SSRO’s performance and innovation. In Lamphun, 
with the GCS project, SIBD pattern seems slightly diversified from national norms. 
However, its responsiveness is not from local needs but hierarchical pressure from 
the governor. Politically, although national politician recommended his accomplice 
to the PSSS selection, the tension in Lamphun is not as high as in Chiang Mai. Phrae 
is originally believed to be the most diversified case. Operating the CLO project, 
local organisations are involved in SIBD and consequently diversify SIBD pattern. 
Nan is found to be the most diversified case in which the SSRO has been running 
several initiatives, e.g. P&F, mobile branch, which involve all local governments and 
the LAO. In addition to the SSROs’ innovations in both provinces, two brothers from 
Phrae occupied the position of employer representatives in Phrae and Nan. Without 
permission to interview, however, provincial politics in relation to SIBD 
interestingly remains in a black box.  
Despite access difficulties that make the politics something of a black box for 
researchers, the next chapter reviews the available evidence on political and other 




Chapter 6 : Explanations of Decentralisation, 
Collaboration and Diversity 
While Chapter 5 exhibits roles of provincial actors, their relationship patterns and the 
diversity of SIBD, this chapter further explains the diversity under the changing 
political context of Thailand. Ultimately, it aims to answer the central question of 
this research: ‘Is interprovincial diversity in SIBD caused by either or both a) the 
decentralisation policy in recent years or b) the relationship patterns between actors 
at provincial level?’ It firstly discusses particular context essential to SIBD decision-
making (see Section 6.1) and highlights the impacts of the late 1900s decentralisation 
on the three administrative spheres – SIA, ProA, LoA – and particularly SIBD (see 
Section 6.2). Then, it examines the degree to which decentralisation impacts on 
SIBD in the four provinces (see Section 6.3). Lastly, it answers the question by 
explaining how decentralisation and collaboration differently impact the diversity of 
SIBD (see Section 6.4).    
6.1 Diversification through Thailand’s political instabilities 
This research studies Thailand’s social insurance from its beginning in 1990 until 
2011. Within these two decades, Thai politics has indeed changed along with its 
social and economic contexts. To discuss the change of social insurance in such a 
long time would need another chapter. However, this research concerns the diversity 
which had occurred after the late 1990s decentralisation only. This section thus 
discusses the diversification in accordance with political changes in Thailand from 
the late 1990s onwards. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are two key political 
changes in Thailand in recent decades: the 1997 People’s Constitution and 
Thaksinisation (see particularly Phongphaichit & Baker, 2004; McCargo, 2005). 
Despite the fact that these changes are substantial to Thailand’s development, it is 
found that such political changes barely influenced provincial SIBD. 
6.1.1 Influence of national politics on SIBD 
Political elites in Thai contemporary politics at the national level include: elected 
officials, bureaucrats (appointed officials in ministries and departments), and 
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business elites. Each of them could of course have an influence on SIBD decision-
making somehow. Their power is usually perceived to reach as further as they want. 
However, SIBD seems to be out of their reach or even interest. Firstly, this research 
finds no evidence of national politicians’, or elected officials’ (MPs’), involvement in 
SIBD. There are two possible ways the MPs could have an effect on SIBD: direct 
contacts with the SSRO (or the PSSS) and their local connections with e.g. 
employers, employees. Although the SSO’s regulation does not provide an 
opportunity for them to be a PSSS member, they could perhaps discuss any matter 
related to SIBD with the SSRO and this could be discussed in the PSSS meeting. 
Also, for example of local connections, MPs may know some Chao Pho, or being 
one himself/herself. These connections may help them build up pressures on the 
SSRO or PSSS somehow. However, in minutes of meetings from the four selected 
provinces, nothing in relation to MPs is found. No mentioning of them in any of the 
interviews either. This suggests that they are rarely involved in SIBD. 
Moreover, politicians could also create pressures on the SSRO’s policy through the 
parliament. However, no evidence is found to support this assumption. Many 
politicians are rarely interested in not only SIBD but also social insurance policy in 
general. In fact, the SSF is one of the biggest government funds and politicians 
attempt to take a portion of it for other purposes. However, SIBD are less attractive 
to them maybe because social insurance system is very hard to penetrate or 
intervene. With the SSC and the SSO in operation, it is not an easy piece of cake for 
them. Although labour movements have not been strong (Hewison & Brown, 1994), 
they have not been too weak to protect their rights in social security either. Every 
time politicians intended to take money out of the SSF, the response to such intention 
would rise. Thus, with the other piece of cake appearing in front of their eyes such as 
construction project, social insurance may be a maze where they do not want to get 
lost in or have trouble with.  
Thaksin’s influence in SIBD should also be particularly discussed because this 
research selects the North as its region of study where his family and cronies persist. 
In general, Thaksin made several changes to social welfare system in Thailand 
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during his premiership (2001-2006). According to Hewison (2010, p. 126), ‘as a 
middle-income country, the social welfare innovations that the Thaksin government 
implemented stand out as a remarkable achievement’. For example, a universal 
healthcare scheme (30-baht For All Diseases: Sam Sib Baht Ruksa Tuk Rok) was then 
launched and apparently appreciated by many of those without formal employers 
(Kwon, 2009). Thaksin also intended to extend social insurance coverage to informal 
labours but it was not accomplished within his second term ended by the 2006 coup. 
All of these, however, are issues of policy-making not implementation. SIBD is part 
of social insurance policy implementation. Neither documents nor interviews lead to 
the conclusion that Thaksin has ever put direct pressures on any of the selected 
SSROs. From observations, however, some signs of Thaksin’s cronies exist in the 
Chiang Mai SIBD (discussed further in the next section). 
As the democratisation questionably goes on, Thailand has been on the rough path in 
which politics becomes a game of power not only between elites themselves but also 
with other interest groups e.g. the old and new middle class (see Section 3.2.1). 
Positively speaking, Thais become more aware and active in politics. Still, cronyism 
seems to get stronger in Thai politics, particularly in the Thaksinization period. Thus, 
some may think that Thaksin’s influence would reach as many aspects of people’s 
lives as he, or his cliques, wanted to. However, it is found that Thaksin was rarely 
involved or influential in SIBD. Nor were the MPs and business elites. Possibly, they 
have had a little interest on social insurance for several reasons e.g. low return of 
popularity or profit, or a relatively difficult process of intervention. It is worth noting 
that this is not to say that SIBD is apolitical. Nor does it say that social insurance in 
Thailand is free from pressure groups. Rather, what must be emphasised is that there 
are gaps between national politics and SIBD. The SIBD arena is indeed political but 
for some reason political elites (politicians and business alike) at the national level 
have rarely involved in it. As this research focuses on interactions within provinces, 
this interesting assumption may need to be further investigated in future research. 
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6.1.2 Money and power in provinces 
As emphasised by many scholars (e.g. McVey, 2000; Phongphaichit & Baker, 2000), 
provincial politics could have been influential to SIBD decision-making. Particularly, 
those Chao Pho who are emerging dominators of provincial politics (Phongphaichit 
& Baker, 2000; Chantornvong, 2000; Ockey, 2000) may be influential in SIBD (see 
Section 3.2.1). Based on interviews and documents, this research finds that none of 
them, despite being PSSS members, are influential in SIBD decision-making. 
Seemingly, social insurance is not attractive to those with wealth, and sometimes 
power, in the province. To provincial business elites, participation in SIBD as 
members of PSSS is only for social honour (see Section 5.1). Still, whether such 
honour is really an incentive remains questionable.  
Employer representatives in four selected provinces could be considered as Chao 
Pho in terms of their wealth in the province. In Phrae and Nan, the representatives 
are brothers from a billionaire family of East Lanna
26
 (Manager Weekly, 2007). In 
Chiang Mai and Lamphun, they both bore the same surname and mostly worked in 
the same industry of construction
27
. Particularly, the Chiang Mai representative owns 
seven businesses with initial investment of 450 million baht (£9 million). All of the 
representatives, except Lamphun, are apparently engaged with public and private 
committees (for Phrae and Nan see Isra News, 2013; for Chiang Mai see 
Rajamangala University of Technology Lanna, undated). 
In terms of political involvement, Chiang Mai is the most outstanding case of all 
four. As mentioned earlier, Thaksin’s cronies seems connected with SIBD in Chiang 
Mai, the province in which Thaksin is undeniably and unsurprisingly well-connected. 
Chiang Mai is not only the most affluent province in the North but also the 
hometown of Thaksin’s. He had been brought up in Chiang Mai until he graduated 
from his secondary school. His family is one of Chiang Mai elitist families. While 
his father is from Shinawatra, a wealthy silk-business family; his mother is a 
daughter of Princess Juntip, a descendant of the Chiang Mai Governor in 1816-1822 
                                                             
26
 Referred to an ancient kingdom located in the North of Thailand. 
27
 Sahamitr Inter Engineering belongs to the CM representative and Nakornping Yothakan 
construction company belongs to the LP representative. 
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(Wanlaya, 2013). Many of his political parties’ committees are from Chiang Mai and 
one of the interviewees, EmR2, was once one of the Phue Thai Party’s (PTP’s) 
committees in 2008. Interestingly, EmR2 is also a member of Chiang Mai PSSS and 
one of those employers who have not paid for SI contributions for a while (interview, 
EmE1, 29 December 2011).  
Ironically, while the SSRO chief strongly aimed to deal with contribution evasion 
(interview, 3 October 2011), EmR2 was still appointed into the PSSS. In the 
interview (23 December 2011), he stated that he was ‘invited (chern)’ by the SSRO 
to be a PSSS member because he had been working with many other committees e.g. 
Aeronautical Radio of Thailand’s committee, Rajamangala University of Technology 
Lanna’s committee. According to the PSSS minutes, however, he rarely appeared in 
the meetings. Moreover, during the interview, he seemingly suggests that he would 
rather find an alternative way to pay for his company’s SI contributions. For 
instance, he mentioned that his company completed road constructions for the 
government but he had not received the payment yet. Thus, this unpaid amount 
should have been credited to his company so that he could use the credit to pay for 
the contributions. However, this suggestion was not in the CMPSSS minutes nor 
mentioned by any of the CMPSSS members.  
An interesting question relates to what he has done and will do in order to keep this 
status quo (the situation in which he is not paying the contribution and still appointed 
as a PSSS member). It is difficult to find hard evidence to answer this question. 
However, the LPSSRO chief’s comment on his tenure at the CMSSRO shed some 
lights on it (interview, 22 February 2011). He mentioned the intense politics in 
Chiang Mai and stated the deterioration of his health as the reason of self-relocation 
to the LPSSRO. Also, the CM Deputy Governor depicts her task in Chiang Mai 
under the local ‘compromise (prani pranom)’ culture (interview, 23 December 
2011).  In addition to the fact that the EmR2 was once the PTP’s committee and has 
an ex-MP brother, it is likely that the negotiation on employer’s contribution 
payment will take a long time, if ever, to settle. 
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Provincial (members of Provincial Council: MPCs) and local politicians (members of 
Municipality Council: MMCs; and members of SAO Council: MSAOCs) are also in 
the provincial money and power game. For the candidates, one will likely be elected 
if they are from affluent or elitist family (Haque, 2010, p.684). However, neither of 
them has outstanding presence in SIBD decision-making. To local politicians, SIBD 
seems to be out of their interests unless they receive request from the SSRO. 
Unsurprisingly, they are more interested in social assistance benefit delivery (SABD) 
which is one of their responsibilities. Local politicians are involved in SIBD only 
when requested by the SSROs according to evidence in Phrae and Nan. To provincial 
politicians, evidence from the media only shows their cooperation with the SSRO as 
a healthcare service provider. For example, the Phuket PAO’s hospital participated as 
a service provider in social insurance scheme (Daily News, 2012). Still, no evidence 
was found in the field. 
6.1.3 Contemporary Thai bureaucracy 
Since the enactment of SSA in 1990, the Thai bureaucracy has been changed along 
with its political contexts. In recent decades, ‘groups outside the state, business 
interests in particular, began to develop means of worming their way into the insular 
state (Unger, 1998, p.60)’. Consequently, as Arghiros (2001, pp. 20-21) summarises, 
‘[I]t is evident that the rise of provincial businessmen-politicians has been at the 
expense of the power and control of the bureaucracy. It is now not unusual, for 
example, for politicians to have civil servants transferred at will - something unheard 
of until recently. …while bureaucrats are either subordinate or in alliance with the 
new rural elite, the jao pho [Chao Pho] or local powers, relations between the rural 
majority and the state are largely unaltered.’  
Thus, the Thai bureaucracy in provinces remains ‘highly personalized rather than 
institutionalized, and loyalty and obedience within the rigidly hierarchical structure 
of the public service tend to be valued more than efficiency and productivity (Lim & 
World Bank., 1980, pp. 1-2)’. Also, as Morell and Samudavanija (1981, p. 48) 
indicates ‘Thai bureaucrat ... views his position as his personal possession that can be 
used to advance his and his clique's interests. ... To fulfil the patronage needs, 
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transfers and promotions often involve breaching legal restrictions by appointing 
well-connected candidates without the required qualifications.’ 
The case of Chiang Mai reflects such characteristics of Thai provincial bureaucracy. 
Through the selection of employee representatives, nepotism appears to play its role. 
As mentioned earlier, EmR1 introduced EmE1 to a senior bureaucrat in Ministry of 
Labour (interview, EmE1, 29 December 2011). Later, he was appointed as the PSSS 
member although his formal employer was still ambiguous (according to the SSO’s 
regulation, an employee representative must be formally employed). Then, EmE1 
brought EmE2 to the circle and EmE2 became another employee representative in 
the CMPSSS. This is contradict to what the CMSSRO chief stated that the selection 
of representatives was based on their performances in labour relations. With these 
observations, thus, one should bear in mind that bureaucratic politics in SIBD 
evidently plays its role in the representative selection more than during the decision-
making process. In this selection process, they could reward those in their cliques. 
6.1.4 Local innovation 
To explore innovation inside government, Considine & Lewis (2007, p. 585) suggest 
that ‘the study needs to be able to show connections…between all the actors in the 
governmental system’. This research finds that the connections are barely influential 
in the extent of innovation. As discussed in Section 5.1, although a number of actors 
exist in provincial SIBD, only a few of them deliberately influence the decision-
making.  Rather, four intra-organisational factors of the SSRO are influential to the 
initiatives as part of the diversification of SIBD: SSRO’s strategy, the chief, intra-
organisational participation, and customer-oriented value. The first factor is a 
provincial strategy designed by the SSRO. In Phrae and Nan, the SSROs drafted their 
own annual strategy based on the SSO’s strategy. This creates the room for initiative 
projects to be operated. Dissimilarly, in Chiang Mai and Lamphun the SSROs 
restricted themselves to the SSO’s strategy. This consequently discourages initiatives 
as there is no reminder or novel direction for the organisations.  
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Secondly, it is evident that the SSRO chiefs play important roles in the 
diversification of SIBD. As Agranoff & McGuire (2003, p. 30) indicate, 
‘variations…are related to local managers' perceived internal political and 
operational barriers’. Chiang Mai and Lamphun are cases where the chiefs seemingly 
knew the barriers but dealt with these either diplomatically or indifferently. Nan is 
the most interesting case where the SSRO chief seems to be the most influential, 
compared to other cases, to SIBD diversification. The chief took part, or made a 
decision, in every step of the P&F operation while bearing bureaucratic constraints in 
mind. Phrae is the case where the chief accredited his subordinate as the project 
innovator. Among four chiefs, he appears to be the most supportive and participative 
leader.  This leads to the third influential factor, the SSRO’s intra-organisational 
participation which appears in Phrae only. The Phrae SSRO seems to be a 
participative organisation in which the initiative project was brought on by the 
officials rather than the chief. At the beginning of the project, the project was driven 
by the front-office head and supported by the former chief. The current chief, 
although arrived after the CLO had been approved, also supported the operation and 
continuation of the CLO. This openness for creativity of any officials thus led to the 
novel CLO project which diversified the pattern of SIBD in Phrae.  
Lastly, customer-oriented value plays important role in the SSRO’s responsiveness. 
In Phrae and Nan, the chiefs and the heads in both SSROs emphasised that the 
journey to the office was somewhat difficult to insured persons in remote area. 
Therefore, they created the distinctive projects which inevitably diversified SIBD 
pattern. Differently, in Lamphun and Chiang Mai, such value cannot be found. It was 
not mentioned in interviews with the Lamphun SSRO. In Chiang Mai, although the 
chief mentioned the ‘maternity benefit payment on the patient’s bed (jay-kha-klod-
kaang-tieng)’, this idea is based on the need of clients in general. It is not specifically 




6.2 Decentralisation impacts on SIBD 
Since the late 1990s, two approaches of administration – NPM and GG – have 
become important concepts of Thai administration particularly because of 
international organisations’ aid conditions after the 1997 economic crisis and the 
1997 Constitution (Bowornwatthana, 2000). Laws, regulations, plans related to 
administrative reform were inaugurated in compliance with the two approaches. For 
example, the Eighth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1997-2001) 
‘outlined the remedies [of state capacity problems]: administrative downsizing and 
reorganisation; shifting the role of government services from inspection and control 
to directing, supervising and facilitating; improving the administrative systems of 
central agencies at the ministerial and departmental levels; decentralising public 
administrative authority and delegating decision-making authority; and budgeting 
reforms to allow for freer and more flexible budget administration (summarised in 
Painter, 2006, p. 31)’. These, as a result, forced all government agencies, including 
the SSO, into administrative decentralisation.  
This section sets a framework to discuss the changes in provincial SIBD occurred 
after the late 1990s decentralisation. To achieve this, differences of SIBD between 
before and after the late 1990s decentralisation are portrayed in two dimensions: 
authority and resource. Undeniably, decentralisation can be measured in a number of 
criteria (Conyers, 1983, p. 103). This research selects two major criteria – authority 
(political), resource (fiscal) – to examine the extent to which decentralisation has 
been planned and to cross-examine decentralisation between the two criteria. As 
Conyers (1983, p. 103) states, ‘[I]t is…important to recognize that…a system which 
is 'more decentralised' according to one criterion may be 'less decentralised' 
according to another’. 
It is essential to indicate two key points preceding the following discussion. Firstly, 
in this research, each key actor’s authority and power in the post-decentralisation 
administration are to be analysed. However, the distinction between both terms is 
still ambiguous as they are closely interrelated. As Vrooman (2009, p. 62) suggests, 
‘authority is power or influence that in the mutual relationships of actors is accepted 
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as proper [underlined by the researcher to emphasise the definition]’. Differently, 
Hague and Harrop (2010, p. 11) states that ‘authority is a broader concept than 
power. Where power is the capacity to act, authority is the acknowledged right to do 
so’. This distinction could be complimented by Aghion and Tirole’s work (1997, p. 
1) which classifies authority within organisations into ‘formal (the right to decide)’ 
and ‘real (the effective control over decisions)’ authority. Apparently, the former is 
‘authority’ while the latter is ‘power’.  
This research thus accepts the ambiguity of authority/power distinction and develops 
the discussion under the term ‘authority’. As Chapter 3 discusses each actor’s 
legitimate right to act; this chapter discusses further on the capacity of decision-
making (power) either in the key actor’s perception or implementation. Specifically, 
this chapter not only discusses the power but also exhibits the gap between authority 
(acknowledgement of right) and power (capacity to act) found in the fieldwork. 
‘Authority’ is defined as ‘a right to demand obedience on the party holding the 
authority and a duty to obey on those of subordinate rank (Vrooman, 2009, p. 62)’.  
In this section, two situations, before and after the late 1990s decentralisation, are 
compared to portray a national phenomenon of pre/post decentralisation. Besides 
social insurance administration (SIA), two more administrative spheres – provincial 
administration (ProA), local administration (LoA) – are of concern as they are related 
to SIBD. Three subsections are thus presented regarding three decentralisation fields: 
the SSO and the SSRO in SIA (Section 6.2.1); the governor in ProA (Section 6.2.2); 
and, local government in LoA (Section 6.2.3).  Lastly, Section 6.2.4 discusses the 
impacts on SIBD in particular. 
6.2.1 Social insurance administration: changes in the SSO-SSRO 
relation 
Before the late 1990s decentralisation, provincial SIBD had been carried out in 
traditional bureaucratic style. The SSO designed policies hierarchically and the 
SSRO followed and implemented all policies rigidly. For example, in the first Social 
Security Plan (1992-1996), it is emphasised that the SSO needed to be settled while 
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nothing related to administrative decentralisation is mentioned. Also, the SSRO’s 
authorities were vaguely specified in Ministerial Regulation Concerning the 
Organisation of the SSO (1992) as: ‘(1) perform and coordinate under policies, 
programmes, and projects concerning duties and responsibilities of the SSO in the 
province; (2) report the result of monitoring and evaluation under policies, 
programmes, and projects to the Labour Office; (3) cooperate or support the 
performance of other organisations related to and being assigned’. 
Subsequently, this changed after the late 1990s decentralisation. To examine the 
degree to which the SSO decentralises their authority to the SSRO, the quantitative 
content analysis method was employed. Five documents related to the SSO’s long-
term plans were studied to search for the frequency of the term ‘decentralisation’ is 
mentioned in each five-year strategy (Social Security Office, 1992, 1996, 2002, 
2009c, 2010). Apparently, the greater frequency of the term being stated, the more 
important decentralisation is to SIA. Interestingly, the term does not exist at all in the 
first (1992-1996), third (2002-2006) and fourth (2005-2009) five-year strategies; 
while it exists in the second (1997-2001) and fifth (2010-2014) strategies (see Table 
6.1). Seemingly, the SSO emphasises the decentralisation only right after the late 
1990s pressure of administrative reform in the second strategy and recently in the 
fifth plan. This definitely raises the question of their actual intention about  
decentralisation in SIA. 
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However, it is evident that authorities are devolved from the SSO to the SSRO. 
According to the document given by the SSO’s Director-General during an 
interview, the authorities were devolved to the SSRO (see Table 6.2). This document 
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was produced as a summary of the discussion between the SSO and 71 participating 
SSROs (from 76 SSROs in total) on the decentralisation within social insurance 
system. Interestingly, it shows ‘already devolved’ and ‘newly devolved’ authorities 
between the SSO and the SSRO. Apparently, the SSRO is gaining more authorities 
as 24 authorities are already devolved and six authorities are newly devolved. 
Still, there are two emerging issues to be noted with this document. Firstly, 
unfortunately, the cover letter of this document was not given so that the exact date 
on which this discussion took place is unknown. However, presumably, it could be 
produced in 2010 since part of the document is labeled ‘สจบ.53’. This ‘สจบ’ label 
denotes that some data in this document belongs to the Division of Promotion of 
Provincial Administration, Provincial Administration Development and Promotion 
Bureau, Ministry of Interior. Also, regarding the two digits (53), it was possibly 
produced in 2010 (B.E.2553). Secondly, as a result of unidentifiable date, it is still 
unclear when the ‘already exist’ and ‘newly proposed’ authorities were devolved. It 
is possible; however, that the newly proposed authorities were perhaps devolved a 
year before 2010 and the already exist authorities were devolved before that. 
Nonetheless, despite such ambiguity, this document is crucial as it portrays the 
trajectory of increasingly devolved authorities in social insurance system. 
In conclusion, the SSRO, a field office of SIA, gains more autonomy after the late 
1990s decentralisation because the amendment of Constitution in 1997 emphasises 
administrative decentralisation. Subsequently, laws and regulations are enacted to 
implement such decentralisation. Also, as shown in Table 6.2, 30 authorities are 
increasingly devolved from the SSO to the SSROs until 2010. Also, these devolved 
authorities imply the expectedly decreasing control of the SSO over the SSRO. In 





Table 6.2 List of authorities devolved to the SSROs* 





1 Updating insured persons database Database √  
2 Registry of beginning and ending of entitlement registry1 √  
3 Registry of insured persons under Article 39 and 40 registry2 √  
4 Contribution refund determination and cash transfer finance1  √ 
5 Waiving employer's debt related to social insurance finance2 √  
6 Issuing documents of contribution estimation and salary 
declaration 
document1 √  
7 Updating account and financial report finance3 √  
8 Disbursement of SSF for social insurance administration finance4 √  
9 Trading outdated or out-of-use materials inventory1 √  
10 Receiving officially donated cash or gift  finance5 √  
11 Inventory and budget management inventory2 √  
12 Approval of operation and spending regarding the 
Ministry of Finance's regulations 
finance6 √  
13 Benefit payment via bank transfer payment1  √ 
14 Benefit payment to non-Thailand domiciled 
insured/entitled persons 
payment2  √ 
15 Authorization of SSF spending at the SSRO payment3 √  
16 Providing information on contribution calculation for 
employers 
info1  √ 
17 Providing information on  employee’s work injury for 
employers 
info2  √ 
18 Expansion of benefit claiming period and appeal law1 √  
19 Issuing entitlement card entitle1 √  
20 Special health service determination entitle2 √  
21 Authorizing the PSSS in disability benefit determination law2 √  
22 Seizure and trading properties and processing the 
prosecution 
law3 √  
23 Prosecuting illegal cash cheque law4 √  
24 Prosecuting crimes law5 √  
25 Commissioning an investigation committee in case of 
official's violation 
law6 √  
26 Issuing ID card of officials hr1 √  
27 Organizing seminars to disseminate social insurance 
information and knowledge 
info3 √  
28 Providing domestic travel expenses of seminar attendants finance7 √  
29 Human resource development in the SSRO hr2  √ 
30 Devolution of human resource management hr3 √  
   Total number   24 6 
 
* Self-constructed based on the data from the Official document of ‘Opinions towards devolved 
authorities’ (SSO, 2010) 
** shortened by the author 
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Figure 6.1 Percentage of resource sharing between the SSO and the SSROs 
 
Source: 1991-1998 from Hanbenjapong (1999, p. 15); 2009 from Social Security Office 
(2008b) 
Despite the pressure of administrative reform, the proportion of resource sharing in 
SIA has slightly changed (see Figure 6.1) but insufficiently to add the degree of 
change into the analysis. In 1991, the year after the enactment of SSA and the 
establishment of social insurance in Thailand, 100% of budget went to the SSO since 
its regional setting was under development. Then, from 1992 to 1998, the total 
regional budget gradually but inconsistently increased from 15 to 23%. 
Unfortunately, the data in 1999-2008 are inaccessible, so the pattern of change 
cannot be perfectly drawn
28
. However, based on 2009 data, it is possible that regional 
budget remains similar to the one before the late 1990s decentralisation. 
                                                             
28
 The data in 1999-2008 are found in other format which is incomparable to this set of data (1991-
998, 2009). Also, the researcher tried requesting the missing data from the SSO directly but the 
request has not been answered. 
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6.2.2 Provincial administration: stronger provincial governor 
Thailand’s provincial administration has been studied less than central or local 
administration. This could possibly be because ProA was ‘simply an extension of the 
central administration, especially the Interior Ministry in Bangkok (Krongkaew, 
1995, p. 356)’. Also, Charoenmuang (2010) suggests that ‘while local governments 
would be more responsive to local problems; the governor ‘always moves here and 
there [across provinces], needs to concentrate on national politics, and waits for order 
[from the upper hierarchy]. Local problems are swept under the carpet. [The 
governor] need not to get tired [in problem-solving] because s/he will not stay long’. 
Bearing these discussions and criticisms in mind, this section still considers 
provincial governor to have important roles in SIBD in the province due to her/his 
authorities and the resources increased under the Integrative Provincial 
Administration policy (IPA). 
Before the decentralisation, the governor’s authorities were only related to day-to-
day work or, in other words, ‘the basic power to oversee overall operations of ProA 
(Krongkaew, 1995, p. 346)’. Despite her/his traditional roles, the governor’s 
authorities had always been questioned whether this position should be more 
decentralised (Dhamrongrachanupap Institute, 2000), elected (CharoenMuang, 1994; 
Lertpaitoon, 1997), or remain the same (overall see Wirachnipawan, 1998). 
However, with the failure of proposals to elect governors directly in 1990s due to the 
MoI official’s resistance (see CharoenMuang, 1994; CharoenMuang, 2010), ProA 
had remained the same until the Thaksinization (2001-2006). As soon as the IPA was 
implemented in 2003, however, these issues have been less discussed. Rather, two 
forms of the IPA – the CEO governor and provincial strategy – have been more of 
focus in provincial administrative reform.  
Politically, IPA was the policy of Thaksin who would like to maintain total control 
over provincial and local government.  Therefore, he transformed provincial 
governors to be his CEOs in order to make sure that ProA would be under his 
control. This was done under the disguise of the IPA policy. As Painter (2006, p. 39) 
states, ‘[T]he CEO-governor scheme was clearly consistent with the overall design of 
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centralisation of executive power’. However, in 2008, the IPA focus shifted from 
empowering the provincial governor to integrated provincial strategic planning 
leading to the re-decentralisation of regional administration. The CEO policy, a 
provincial governor as Chief Executive Official of the province, was terminated and 
strategic planning became a major concern of all provincial offices. While her/his 
authorities remain the same as officially stated in 2003; the discretionary budget was 
transformed into provincial strategy budget. 
Consequently, under the IPA policy, the governor arguably has gained more power 
and been granted a discretionary budget for ProA. This empowerment can be 
explained in, generally, ProA and, specifically, SIBD (see Appendix 3). In general, it 
is argued that the governor usually plays no role in ProA. No matter how strong s/he 
becomes; it is inconsequential to the administration. However, it is evident that the 
governor plays an important role in the administration at provincial level 
(Dhamrongrachanupap Institute, 2009). Further, the provincial governor is 
empowered under the Decree of Good Governance which was inaugurated in 2003. 
The subsequent 2003 Office of Prime Minister’s Regulation on Integrated ProA 
specified more on her/his new roles. 
Specifically, the late 1990s decentralisation empowers provincial governor in SIBD. 
In the SSO’s official document, the governor is authorised by the SSO in 10 aspects. 
In brief, all devolved authorities are related to personnel management rather than 
budget administration. This means that the governor is able to intervene in provincial 
social insurance administration only if it is a matter of personnel administration. 
Meanwhile, the SSRO is still fully authorised on financial matters of the provincial 
SIBD. Thus, although the governor’s authorities in SIBD are increased in principle, it 
is doubtful how this is actually implemented. 
Data in Appendix 3 are only based on selected documents. In fact, tremendous 
number of laws, regulations, and orders are related to provincial governors’ 
authorities. For example, it was claimed that ‘the governor is responsible for 156 
laws, 189 regulations and 47 orders (Dhamrongrachanupap Institute, 2000, p. 90)’. 
However, it is not a purpose of this research to review these legal documents. Rather, 
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the governor’s roles are main interest. Therefore, each document cited in Appendix 3 
is selected because it provides extensive review of the pre-decentralisation 
governor’s roles (Dhamrongrachanupap Institute, 2000) and the guiding principles of 
the post-decentralisation governor’s roles (SSO’s and DPPA’s documents). 
The governor’s resource is increased over three periods: pre-decentralisation, 
Thaksinization, and post-2008. Before the late 1990s decentralisation, the governor’s 
resource was mainly allocated through the MoI. S/he had limited power over the 
resource as ‘…the governor is authorised to propose budget to related ministries only 
while [s/he] has no authority in administering centrally-allocated budget 
(Dhamrongrachanupap Institute, 2000, p. 108)’. After the IPA initiated by Thaksin, it 
was claimed that ‘the CEO governor scheme [provided] the [central] government 
with a direct channel for allocating funds to projects and districts, rather than relying 
on the more disaggregated, departmental budgetary system (Painter, 2006, p. 39)’. In 
other words, the central government directed money to the governor so that s/he 
could spend it on provincial projects regarding her/his discretion. Although the 
money to each governor, notably, was not widely publicized, it definitely increased 
the governor’s resource for ProA. 
Figure 6.2 Provincial budget in selected provinces, 2009-2012 
 
Source: Bureau of Budget (website, accessed on 12 October 2012) 
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After Thaksin was ousted in 2006, the ‘CEO Governor’ term was not of use any 
longer. Still, the governors remained empowered under the revised IPA policy which 
was implemented in 2008. Similar to the CEO policy, the governor is still able to 
relocate or reward provincial bureaucrats at certain levels. Differently, in the revised 
IPA, the governor can grant financial resources to provincial offices through annual 
provincial strategy instead of the CEO governor’s discretion. Precisely, the 
provincial budget has become less discretionary. The previous CEO budget has been 
transformed into provincial strategy budget or ‘provincial budget’ (see Figure 6.2
29
). 
Also, a province under the 2008 IPA policy has become a legal body able to receive 
budget; while, originally, it was just administrative territory.  
In conclusion, the governor’s authority and resource increased as a result of the IPA 
policy. Although this policy has been changing over time regarding political changes, 
the governor’s authorities and resources being devolved is unlikely to be decreased 
(2010 is an exceptional case
30
). Therefore, it is suffice to say that the governor has 
become stronger in both dimensions.  
6.2.3 Local administration: autonomous local government 
Historically, local governments have existed in Thailand even before the political 
reform in 1932. Early form of local governments, ‘Su-kha-pi-baan (Sanitation 
District)’, was established nationwide in 1908 with three major authorities: 
sanitation, epidemic control, and transportation (see Sanitation District Act 1908). 
Then, several forms of local governments were set up under several legislations e.g. 
Tetsaban (municipality), and Sa-pha-tumbon (Sub-district Council) in 1933 and 1956 
respectively. While various forms exist; local governments remained significant in 
Thai administration are mostly municipalities and Sub-district Administrative 
Organisations (SAOs). Provincial Administrative Organisation, an elected provincial 
government, also exists as local government (regarding decentralisation principle). 
                                                             
29
 The 2010 budget (October 2010 – September 2011) is low because of the political turmoil 
intensified from April 2010 until the general election on July 3, 2011. Such period is crucial for 
drafting government budget but as the then government was about to leave the office it is common in 
Thailand that all processes are frozen. 
30
 The provincial budget in 2010 is much lower than the other year presumably because of political 
turmoil started in 2009 which affected the government’s planning process. 
241 
 
However, under the same territory (province), their powers are limited under the 
provincial governor as ‘all of their projects and budgets must be approved by the 
provincial governor resulting in legitimate control and coercion of which the PAO 
chief must defer [greng-jai or literally translated ‘be courteous’] to the provincial 
governor (CharoenMuang, 2010)’. Thus, only municipalities and the SAOs will be 
referred to as ‘local governments’ throughout this dissertation. In this section, it is 
argued that local governments have become relatively autonomous after the late 
1990s through increased authorities and resources.  
Despite its long-term existence, local government has never been authorised or 
assigned to directly take part in SIBD. The most-related responsibility seems to be 
social assistance benefit (SAB) delivery.  Seemingly, since local governments are 
perceived by regional governments as inferior organisations due to their 
responsibility, authority, and capacity (Puang-Ngam, 2000); it is likely that either 
local politicians or bureaucrats are negligible in the SSRO’s perception. However, as 
some SSROs have decided to cooperate with local governments in delivering the 
SIBs, it is still possible that local governments become involved in SIBD.  
Authorities and resources of local governments increased after the decentralisation. 
Before the late 1990s decentralisation, local governments had been authorised nine 
responsibilities and duties (see Part 3, Sub-district Council and Sub-district 
Administrative Organisation Act, 1994). However, they still lacked powers in self-
administration as political power was concentrated on appointed government 
officials (Harding & Leyland, 2011, p. 129). This form of central control did ‘not 
allow full freedom to local administrations to experiment with self-government, to 
manage their own local affairs and to cater for the true needs of the local people 
(Krongkaew, 1995, p. 345)’. For example, ‘Tetsaban, established in 1933, 
Sukhaphibaan, established in 1952, and PAOs, established in 1955, were controlled 
by appointed government officials particularly district chiefs and provincial 
governors (CharoenMuang, 2010)’. In brief, the Thai government had encouraged 
decentralisation in principle but it was not implemented in practice as they claimed 
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that full administrative autonomy of local government would cause inefficiency in 
LoA (Krongkaew, 1995, p. 345).  
Eventually, after the Constitution was amended in 1997, pressure on the central 
government to decentralise their authorities to either sub-national governments or the 
third sector increased. Then, in 1999, the Plan and Process of Decentralisation Act 
(PPDA) was inaugurated and became a fundamental guideline of localization. 
Regarding this act, there are 31 authorities mandated as responsibilities and 
authorities of local governments (see Appendix 3). In terms of SIBD, there is no 
specific document for devolving the SSO’s or the SSRO’s to local governments. 
However, based on the selected data in Appendix 3, local governments are now 
authorised for SIBD-related functions more than before. For instance, their 
authorities appear to be expanded from support for women, children, elderly and 
disabled to the wider social assistance and public health. These expectedly enable 
them to get involved more in SIBD. 
Similar to authorities, resources of local governments are increased after the 
decentralisation. According to the Plan and Process of Decentralisation Act 1999, the 
central government is obliged to devolve not only authority but also budget to local 
governments. After 1999, local governments’ revenue has been increasing as the 
central government is expected to grant at least 35% of their revenue to local 
governments. Although it has not been achieved yet as only 26.14% is allocated to 
local governments, the tendency is apparently increasing (see Figure 6.3, Table 6.3).   
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Figure 6.3 Local and total revenue (Thai Baht), 1999-2011 
 
Source: The National Municipal League of Thailand 
Table 6.3 Local government's revenue (% of total government revenue) 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
% 13.8 13.3 20.6 21.8 22.1 22.7 23.5 24.0 25.1 25.2 25.8 25.2 26.1 
Source: The National Municipal League of Thailand 
With these available authorities and resources, local governments could arguably be 
alternative resource providers for the SSRO. It might be questioned whether the 
autonomy of local governments should be considered as potential impact on SIA. 
Ostensibly, local governments are excluded from SIBD as their roles have barely 
been mentioned in the literature of social insurance in Thailand. However, they are 
still considered as potential service providers in the provincial administration of 
social insurance. For instance, if they agree to cooperate with the SSRO, a channel of 
the SSRO’s benefit delivery will be expanded to local organisations’ offices. This, 
for example, is explicitly shown in the CLO project where the cooperation between 




6.2.4 Central-local tensions and dependence after decentralisation 
As discussed in Chapter 3, it is believed that the late 1990s decentralisation affects 
provincial SIBD in Thailand in four respects: more responsive delivery agencies, a 
stronger provincial governor, more autonomous local governments, and less-
controlling SSO. In other words, the SSRO, the governor, and local governments 
gained more powers after the late 1990s decentralisation. Meanwhile, undeniably, the 
SSO, which is obligated to pursue administrative decentralisation, had become less 
controlling over the SSRO. They were also impacted by the late 1990s 
decentralisation. Thus, such changes occurred to the four actors, listed as key actors 
in Thailand’s decentralised SIA, and are considered as impacts of the 
decentralisation. This section therefore clarifies decentralisation impacts on SIA in 
more detail.  
Originally, SIA at the provincial level was supposed to remain in uniformity. All 
field offices were expected to follow the central policy. The implementation might be 
slightly different in a small detail but the pattern of service provision in general was 
alike. However, after the late 1990s, strategic planning was applied to Thai 
bureaucracy in general and, then, social insurance administrative system was 
unavoidably changed. Specifically, delivery agencies were encouraged to change the 
pattern of SIBD from self-centric to customer-oriented. Still, although the concept 
was officially applied to the administrative system, it rather brought on a superficial 
change. The central department still believed that field offices need to pursue the 
goals and objectives they designed. Consequently, the social insurance administrative 
system generally remained centralised and non-responsive with a limited number of 
delivery agencies providing tailor-made services. 
Decentralisation is proved to have impacts on three key actors (SSRO, governor, 
local government). Evidently, the three actors had likely implemented decentralised 
authority. Such actions appeared in the forms of initiative and responsiveness. This 
may result in the SSRO’s increased autonomy from the SSO and alternative 
resources from the governor and local government. This section then argues for such 
changes after the decentralisation. It discusses on two factors including: central-local 
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tensions and alternative resource providers. The following discussions provide 
evidence to verify H1 as stated below. 
H1:  The more decentralised the governor and local government are; 
the more autonomous the SSRO becomes. 
Apparently, there are two issues – local autonomy, resource dependence – in this 
hypothesis. Firstly, discussions on decentralisation are undeniably related to local 
autonomy (e.g. Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2007; Dreher, 2006; Hutchcroft, 2001; 
Peters, 2001; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Smith, 1985). On one hand, autonomy could be 
defined as ‘freedom to participate, which requires provision of the opportunities and 
the resources to participate in economic, social and political life (Cass, 1991, p. 17)’. 
On the other hand, as Ellison (1998) suggests, it must not be understood as 
‘independence from political oversight (p.40)’ but it is instead ‘rooted in the ability 
of a government agency to perform its functions without interference from other 
governments (p.42)’. Therefore, being ‘more autonomous’ means that the SSRO 
could perform their functions more freely with less intervention from the SSO. Still, 
according to Pierre and Peters (2000), it should be noted that the transfer of power 
between different government levels is not necessarily a zero-sum game. As they 
indicate, ‘by granting more powers and autonomy to … subnational governments, the 
state loses some of its control but not as much as subnational governments increase 
their control (p.78)’.  
Secondly, this section takes Provan’s assumption (1984, p. 499) stating that resource 
dependence reflects ‘the capacity to influence’ because it is ‘a measure of potential 
power and influence over decisions refers to enacted power’. While the governor and 
local government could be an alternative resource provider, the SSRO’s dependence 
on the SSO’s resource tends to decrease. In this case, less resource dependence on 
the SSO induces greater autonomy of the SSRO. 
6.2.4.1 Central-local tensions: pressure, compliance and resistance 
An increase of local autonomy apparently creates changes, particularly tensions, in 
central-local relations. While subnational units enjoy local autonomy, central 
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authority may still attempt to maintain their control over these units (Davies, 1968; 
Gent, 2001; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Smith, 1985; Wond & Macaulay, 2010). Thus, the 
relations between national and sub-national governments always operate under 
constraints and tensions. Saunders (1995, p. 56) states that studying central-local 
relations involves an analysis of local autonomy and constraints. Since central 
government is likely to claim its responsibility and concern over local service 
delivery, this sometimes brings the ‘sense of distrust’ on the surface (Goldsmith & 
Newton, 1983). As a result, intergovernmental relations involves more than ‘zero-
sum conflict (Pierson, 1995, p. 458)’. 
Tensions between central and local can be viewed either political or bureaucratic. A 
comprehensive analysis of political tensions is proposed by Saunders (1982). He 
employs three criteria of central-local relations: economic function (economic versus 
social policy priorities), mode of interest mediation (rational discretion versus 
democratic accountability), and ideological principle (profit versus need). The former 
term in each bracket is of the central view; the latter the local. Added to this analysis, 
bureaucratic tension occurs when either resources or authority is not, or 
insufficiently, allocated from the central to the local. Andrew and Schroeder (2003) 
indicate that national-level bureaucracy attempt to maintain control over resources, 
particularly fiscal resource, which will be allocated to local. In Walker’s analysis 
(2005), tensions between central and local could possibly occur when the authority in 
policy design is not devolved despite the fact that funding is granted or not. In short, 
this section discusses bureaucratic tension rather than political tension. 
A result of tensions could be either positive or negative depending on its direction: 
horizontal or vertical. If horizontal tensions (potential conflict between the same-
level governments) occur in service delivery, the result may be positive in terms of 
encouraging competitiveness in service provision across regions (discussed in 
previous section). On the other hand, tensions arising from central-local relations 
(vertical tensions) not only obstruct policy implementation or service delivery 
(Turner, 1990) but also hinder decentralisation initiatives (Andrews & Schroeder, 
2003) and decentralisation potential (Riverson et al., 1991). This turns into negative 
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results for either service users or delivery agencies. Therefore, as the tensions of 
concern in this section are vertical, it is likely that tensions can decelerate or halt 
initiative or responsiveness. 
Decentralisation in the late 1990s enhanced the capacity of the sub-national 
governments in improving service delivery and concurrently increased their 
autonomy. They tended to tailor their services to local needs. Meanwhile, however, 
the central government still attempts to maintain the control over resources and 
authority. Standardization is one of the reasons they would claim for this control; 
another is the incapacity of the sub-national governments. Consequently, tensions 
arise from this pulling-and-hauling situation. Specifically, in the White Paper on 
‘Development of Regional Administration’ (OPDC, 2004), it is stated that all 
provincial offices must be responsive to local needs. This intensifies provincial 
offices’ autonomy of decision-making as well as tension between central and 
regional offices. In other words, the characteristic of responsiveness increases 
provincial office’s opportunity to originate particular projects regarding local needs. 
To initiate these projects, regional offices may have to negotiate with the central 
office possibly resulting in the tension. 
This section discusses evidence of the tensions between the SSO and the four 
selected SSROs (Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Phrae, Nan). To summarise, while tensions 
between the Phrae and Nan SSROs and the SSO have intensified over time; no 
evidence of tensions between the Lamphun and Chiang Mai SSROs and the SSO 
exists. Three subsections are presented below. Firstly, the evidence showing the 
SSO’s attempts in retaining the uniform pattern of SIBD is presented. Then, the 
evidence from the SSRO’s side is presented in the following two subsections: 
resistance and compliance. 
Earlier literature reasserts that central authority may attempt to limit local autonomy. 
The SSO is indeed compliant with this assertion in three respects including: few 
attempts to decentralise, lack of acceptance of administrative diversity, and 
restriction on resource allocation. Firstly, in principle, in its fourth five-year strategic 
plan (2005-2009), the SSO emphasised the development of regional administration 
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including administrative decentralisation (Social Security Office, 2009). However, in 
practice, decentralisation is not their major focus. Two evidences are found to 
support this argument.  
At the top of the hierarchy, although the Director-General intends to improve the 
regional administration of the SSO, the action has not yet been undertaken
31
. His 
policy is to restructure the regional system by grouping up a few SSROs and 
appointing a head of each group. However, this is still an ongoing process. 
Presumably, although this policy is completed, it does not signify that the SSRO 
gains more freedom. Rather, it increases the process of cooperation or, in other 
words, heightens the hierarchy.  
Also, lack of attention to administrative decentralisation to regional offices is also 
found in the Division of Research and Development. It was found that the SSO 
provided the funding of research on the topic of regional administration in social 
insurance system in the fiscal year of 2009 (Social Security Office, 2009). However, 
according to the SSO official, this funding was terminated by the then Director-
General stating that it was unnecessary to carry out this kind of research. 
Secondly, it is possible that the SSO does not accept that the SSROs could be 




‘There is no variation of implementation across provinces. Every SSRO 
needs to follow goals and strategies specified by the SSO. Also, this is 
bureaucratic system. Policies must be implemented as the central 
government designed.’ 
In fact, if this perception is of the SSO officials in other divisions, it may not be 
surprising because the SSO has been operated under bureaucratic structure since the 
beginning. However, as this is a perspective of people in the Division responsible for 
bureaucratic reform in the SSO, the question of how the reform is actually 
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 Informal conversation with the SSO official in the Division of Research and Development took 
place on the same occasion and date. 
32
 Informal conversation with a group of the officials happened during the first contact with the SSO 





. Also, the Director-General’s response to the question on the 
existence of diversification in SIBD at the provincial level is interesting. He stated 
that it was common for all SSROs to follow the SSO’s plan and also agreed with 
what one of the officials in the Division of Administrative Development said earlier. 
The scepticism towards the SSRO’s initiative project was also emerged in the 
interview with the Director of Contribution Division. In response to the Nan SSRO’s 
P&F, she stated that the project was not outstanding and did not get much 
cooperation from local governments. She seemed not paying much attention to it and 
directed any further questions to her subordinate. As she commented (interview, 10 
January 2012): 
‘I know that [P&F] project. It is not that outstanding (doad den), is it? 
I’ve heard that local governments were not that active in the cooperation 
after all. … Perhaps you should go and ask Mr.A [official in Policy and 
Planning Division] instead.’ 
Mr.A is an official in Policy and Planning Division and a columnist of the Social 
Security Bulletin, a monthly publication of the SSO. His articles mostly summarised 
SIBD in Thailand and other countries. In 2010, he mentioned the P&F in his article 
stating that ‘[to provide] social insurance service in Thailand, we also cooperate with 
local governments in service provision. For example, the Nan SSRO is now doing an 
experiment on cooperating with local governments in some aspects [of service 
delivery] (Tanit, 2010)’. However, he had never mentioned it before 2010 or again in 
his later articles. The question is, thus, whether the P&F was not successful enough 
so that he did not write about it again. Consequently, these perceptions of central 
office leads to the conclusion that the SSO tends not to admit the variation of SIBD 
unless, presumably, it is dramatically outstanding.  
Thirdly, resource allocation is restricted by the SSO. The SSO did not promise 
certain support for long-term initiative project so it was difficult for the SSROs to 
continue such project. In Phrae, for example, the SSRO was prepared to look for 
                                                             
33
 The Division of Administrative System Development bears informally nickname ‘little OPDC’. It 
implies that the Division works as a sub-unit of the Office of Public Sector Development Committee. 
The OPDC is responsible for designing bureaucratic reform plan; the Division responsible for the 
implementation of the plan in the SSO. 
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alternative resources from the governor as it was likely that the SSO would not 
allocate budget for the second year of CLO project. Differently, the Nan SSRO used 
their autonomy in negotiating with the SSO. They proposed the project in the second 
year and the SSO was convinced to approve it. According to the bureaucratic reform 
strategy, as long as the project is based on local factors, the SSO needs to allow their 
field offices to carry out a sensible project. 
Findings of the compliance can be explained at the national (from the SSO’s 
document discussed earlier in Chapter 3) and provincial (in the fieldwork) levels. At 
the national level, most of the SSROs appear to agree with what the SSO suggested 
according to the SSO’s document on the SSROs’ opinion towards the devolved 
authorities. This document presents the result of discussion exhibiting whether the 
SSROs agreed or disagreed on each devolved authority (see Table 6.4). There have 
been 16 out of 30 issues of devolved authority agreed by more than 90% of the 
attending SSROs; six with 80-89%; three with 70-79%; two each with 60-69%. 
Considering that this document is an output of the bureaucratic procedure, the 
validity of the data is still questionable i.e. whether most of the SSROs actually agree 
with the devolved authority or what are reasons behind this compliance. These 
questions could possibly answered by the selected SSROs. However, unfortunately, 
this document was given after all interviews with the SSROs had been finished. 
Therefore, the questions could be answered in future research. 
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Table 6.4 Percentage of the SSROs' opinions towards the devolved authorities, in 
descending order of Agree percentage* 
 
At the provincial level, bureaucratic characters maintain the SSRO’s compliance 
with the SSO’s policies as it is undeniable that bureaucracy is preoccupied with a 
single standard. In this research, the cases of Chiang Mai and Lamphun represent 
such compliance. The SSROs in these provinces followed the SSO’s guideline rather 
than initiated a distinctive project. One similar reason given by both SSROs was that 
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it was more convenient for the insured persons to come to the SSRO office where 
provided a one-stop service access. Also, bureaucratic character tends to play 
important role in the SSRO’s decision-making. For example, according to one of the 
Lamphun PSSS members, the SSRO was questioned whether they could do 
something new or change something in social insurance system. The answer to this 
question was that it was either impossible or difficult in the bureaucracy.  
It is also claimed that workloads in both provinces were too much to spare the room 
for creativity so; presumably, this reinforces national uniformity which is a result of 
the SSRO’s compliance with the SSO’s policies. For example, Chiang Mai as the 
second-largest city of the country is often spotted by central departments to pilot 
their projects. Not only the Chiang Mai SSRO but also the Chiang Mai PAUs are 
often ordered to implement emergent policies in addition to their routine activities. 
Therefore, they mostly run out of time in following the central policies. However, the 
question of whether the work is really overloaded is still worth noted.  
Similar to discussion on the compliance, the SSRO’s resistance can be explained at 
national and provincial levels. At the national level, using the same set of data 
presented in Table 6.4, the resistance to the SSO’s policy exists to some extent. 
Taking five examples of the most disagreed issues from the SSO’s document (see 
Figure 6.4), three issues – law5, payment1, hr2 – can be discussed with data from 
interviews while the other two – document1, finance1 – cannot. The following 
discusses three issues with data from interviews. Firstly, ‘law5’ is the most disagreed 
issue with 46 out of 71 attending SSROs (51%). This issue relates to the authority to 
prosecute criminal charges if found in SIBD. Interestingly, none of the interviewees 
working SIBD service mentioned this as an authority devolved from the SSO. 
Rather, it was mentioned as the issue they could ask for help from the governor (e.g. 
interview with the Lamphun SSRO chief).  
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Figure 6.4 Disagreement of the SSROs on devolved authorities 
 
Source: Official document of ‘Opinions towards devolved authorities’ (SSO, 2010) 
Note: Data label shows the number of SSROs which agree/disagree/no comments 
 
Secondly, the fourth most disagreed issue ‘payment1’ refers to devolved authority on 
benefit payment via bank transfer. It was mentioned by both the SSO and SSRO 
officials (interviews) that this authority could be useful for SIBD. However, 
controversially, devolving this authority was opposed in the document. Thirdly, the 
fifth one ‘hr2’ referred to authority for human resource development (HRD) in the 
SSRO. This issue, similar to ‘payment1’ was positively mentioned in the interview 
with the SSRO heads in Lamphun and Phrae as they valued skill development of 
their team and, as they claimed, supported their subordinates to take HRD 
programmemes. Still, the other two cannot be discussed further because they were 
not mentioned in the interviews at all. Therefore, it is not possible to discuss them 
with interview data. These issues comprise of: the second most disagreed issue, 
‘finance1’, referred to contribution refund and determination and cash transfer; and, 
the third one, ‘document1’, referred to the authority to issue official documents of 
contribution estimation and employee’s salary declaration.    
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Indeed, the controversial issues may raise the question of how accurate this SSO’s 
document is. Further, the question could be about the representativeness of each 
SSRO’s opinion in the meeting which this document was produced upon. However, 
on the other hand, this piece of information is crucial as it invites more questions on 
validation of the data. Therefore, cross-examined with interview data, this document 
should be noted as basic information to start the discussion on the SSO-SSRO 
relations. 
At the provincial levels, the resistance is a result of central-local tension which is 
found in two provinces, Phrae and Nan, where the initiative projects were 
undertaken. Generally, most of the SSRO’s projects compliant with the SSO’s policy 
will be approved. The SSO as a decision maker is always cautious with financial and 
personnel distribution (the SSF board is a policy maker). When a new fiscal year is 
about to start, the SSRO will submit their project propositions. If proposed projects 
or activities are compatible with the SSO’s policy, they are simply approved. 
However, if a project is novel, the SSO may ask for more detail in the first place. If 
the supplement detail is not convincing, the project will be disapproved. This, in the 
meantime, results in tensions between them. 
Speaking of the link between the resistance and the innovation, if the SSRO wants to 
initiate a distinctive project, they need to fight against the pressure from the SSO. 
Innovation which diversifies the service delivery is not expected. Indeed, NPM 
grants a chance to front-line offices to tailor the service and the central is supposed to 
support them. However, in practice, if the innovation is not ‘big’ enough, the central 
tends to ignore it stating that this is not an innovation but just a new form of service. 
Therefore, as they put more pressure on the project, the regional office who believed 
in their success tended to resist the pressure by putting more effort to prove that the 
innovation was worth doing. 
Further, the SSRO’s resistance to the SSO’s pressure exists within three levels of 
analysis: organisational, managerial, and operational. Firstly, as the SSO indirectly 
stressed uniform pattern of service delivery at the ground level, the two SSROs had 
slightly different ways in response to the SSO’s pressure. The Phrae SSRO planned 
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to ignore the pressure; whereas, the Nan SSRO decided to avoid the pressure. Both 
of them apparently tried to avoid confrontation. However, the avoidance does not 
mean none resistance. The resistance implicitly existed in the initiative projects. 
In Phrae, the SSRO was prepared for the failure of getting support from the SSO. 
They said they would try to get the project approved. But if that was not the case, 
they would be ready for Plan B, finding support from other potential sources such as 
the Governor or local governments. Differently, in Nan, the SSRO chief kept 
operating the project for the third year despite the lack of full support from the SSO. 
His solution was to submit the project which would be acceptable to the SSO in order 
to get minimum financial support and green light for the project. The Nan SSRO 
produced two projects in correspondence with each other. One is the P&F, another is 
the ‘network building with local governments’ project. Both projects were operated 
in supplement to each other. 
At the managerial level, the chief’s character is significant to the resistance. The 
most prominent evidence is found in Nan where the cooperation project had actually 
been in operation before the current chief come. According to the Nan SSRO official, 
the project had been undertaken before 2008 but it was formalised by the current 
chief. This made the project become outstanding from 2008 the year in which the 
Nan SSRO get the P&M project approved. Later on, the project started drawing 
attention from other SSROs and the SSO. Differently, the chief in Phare is also 
active. He said he was not the main drive of the project and accredited the Head of 
Front Office with the initiation of the CLO project. However, his enthusiasm on 
initiatives was noticed through the interview and his action. In the interview, he 
mentioned the chance of starting a new project several times. In his office, before the 
interview started, he was listening to radio programme organised by the SSRO. This 
programme was expected to be a new communication channel with insured persons 
in the province. 
Undeniably, at the operational level, the officials in both Phrae and Nan SSRO are 
also involved in the resistance mechanism. This is more prominent in Phrae where 
the idea of finding another source of funding was mentioned by the heads of front 
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office and back office. In Nan, although it is unclear how the officials take part in the 
resistance, the sympathy they have towards service recipients’ difficulties seems to 
play a role. According to the head of front office, most of the officials were local 
people and they understood socio-cultural conditions of the province. They would be 
willing to serve the recipients. This, as a result, indirectly supported the P&M project 
operation. However, as the Nan chief’s character seems to be self-driven and more 
formal (compared to the Phrae chief), the communication between the chief and 
officials occurred basically in regular meetings of the office. 
For example, despite the fact that administrative decentralisation is not the SSO’s 
focus and variety of SIBD is unlikely allowed, the Phrae SSRO still wanted to 
continue their CLO project. Since the result of the CLO project was satisfied to the 
SSRO (interview with the SSRO Chief and Head of Back Office, ibid), they planned 
for the second year (2011) of the project. There are three factors which could 
possibly enable them to continue the project. First, if the SSO’s approval is still 
uncertain, the SSRO may get support from the Governor instead. Second, strategic 
planning, as a part of decentralisation, seems to encourage the Chief of the SSRO to 
be performance-driven. (OPDC, 2003, p. 109) 
6.2.4.2 Alternative resource providers of the SSRO: governor and local 
government 
The diversified pattern of SIBD occurs with supports from alternative resource 
providers in the province. Although it is not prominent in Chiang Mai, the cases of 
other three provinces reasserts that the governor and local government play 
significant roles as alternative resource providers in SIBD.  
Firstly, the SSRO’s autonomy is supplemented by alternative resources from the 
governor’s extra budget. Previously, the SSRO had only two main sources of budget: 
the annual budget from the Government and the extra-annual budget from the SSO. 
The former is basically spent on salary and infrastructure; the latter is on project 
management. After the enactment of the Decree of Good Governance in 2003, the 
CEO policy empowered the governor in two respects. Financially, the Governor was 
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allocated an extra budget for any operations in the province regarding his/her 
discretion. Non-financially, the Governor had power of rewarding and punishing the 
government officials in the province by, for example, relocating them.  
There are two examples of how the governors have become alternative resource 
providers for the SSRO. The most prominent example of the governor as alternative 
resource provider exists in Lamphun. The Lamphun governor provided resources for 
the SSRO to participate in the GCS project. However, the case of Lamphun shows 
that, despite being empowered, the governor’s short-term stay in each province 
should be viewed with concern as inconsistent support. As the governor’s policy 
changed due to the usual relocation, the new governor did not provide support for the 
SSRO in the GCS (interviews with the Lamphun SSRO). Therefore, lacking  
resources, the SSRO decided to stop providing services at the counter service. 
Another example is the Phrae SSRO. Although the governor’s support for the Phrae 
SIBD did not exist during the research fieldwork, the SSRO’s perception of available 
resources implies the governor’s potential of being an alternative resource provider.  
In 2011, the SSRO had been relying on the extra-annual budget in operating their 
CLO project. However, as they anticipated that the SSO would stop their project, 
they mentioned the governor’s extra budget as an alternative (Phrae SSRO official, 
interview, 4 February 2011). 
‘In fact, our [CLO] project was designed as a three-year project. We 
have just finished the first year and are expecting to continue the 
project [in the second year]. However, I heard that the Department
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[the SSO] may disapprove the project the coming year because they 
could not let double standard happen in the system. If that really 
happens, we may need to submit the project to the Governor 
requesting for his financial support.’ 
Apparently, the Governor’s extra budget has become an alternative for the SSRO 
resulting in its greater autonomy. Previously, if projects were disapproved by the 
SSO, the SSRO had no other choices of resources. They would reluctantly give up 
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 The SSRO officials often refer to the SSO as the Department or the central not the SSO. It reflects 
that the officials, although some of them distinguished the SSO from other public organisations, 




the idea or provide another satisfactory project to the SSO. In contrast, as the 
Governor could provide financial support for them, the Phrae SSRO tends not to give 
up the project. If the SSO disagrees with their project, they will carry out a second 
plan of the project operation, being financed by the provincial Governor’s Office. 
Eventually, if the Governor agrees with this project, they could do what they really 
want – continuing their CLO project in the second year. Therefore, this alternative, 
the Governor’s extra budget, prominently provide an option for the SSRO’s project 
operation resulting in more freedom of the SSRO. 
Secondly, local governments are also capable of giving support to the SSRO as long 
as they still perceive the SSRO’s project useful. Two examples are taken from Phrae 
and Nan. In Phrae, 31 local governments participated in the CLO project providing 
service accesses of the SSROs. According to interviews with local organisations in 
Phrae, two of the interviewees stated that the advantage of participating in the CLO 
project was that the relationship with the SSRO became more established and they 
learned more about SIBD. Their relationship with the SSRO was previously similar 
to the SSRO-employer relation; they just need to pay contributions for some of their 
organisation members (i.e. permanent and temporary employees) who were entitled 
to social insurance. Differently, participating in the CLO project, they had more 
chances to communicate with the SSRO and they were also an information provider 
for their employees. Therefore, they would continue participating in the project.  
Also, the Nan SSRO utilized administrative resources of local governments to 
complete their projects. Indeed, the SSRO used the LAO’s authority to put them into 
the P&F so that they did not have a chance to make their own decision as happened 
in Phrae. However, local governments as autonomous agencies are still a result of 
decentralisation which became a supportive factor for the SSRO. They have their 
own resources which the SSRO could ask for help such as a space and a human 
resource. 
Consequently, the Phrae and Nan’s local cooperation projects were carried on with 
supports from local governments. Although reasons of local governments’ 
participation in the projects are different, their agreement to provide staffs and spaces 
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apparently enhances the SSRO’s capabilities to provide initiative services. In Nan, all 
99 local governments participated in the P&F because of the order from the LAO. 
Similarly to Phrae, they needed to provide service accesses of the SSRO. However, 
while Phrae local governments were providing staffs for SIB-related service and a 
space for document shelves, the Nan SSRO requested more from Nan local 
governments. For example, they additionally asked for their mobile office space in 
the Pua Municipality of which they were granted. These services subsequently 
became part of the diversification of SIBD in the province. 
6.2.4.3  Changing patterns of post-decentralisation SIBD 
Drawing upon the analysis in earlier sections, this section aims to portray SIBD 
pattern in the four provinces which is diversified after the decentralisation. Following 
the analytical framework employed in Chapter 3, this research discusses the changes 
of SIBD pattern as a result of the late 1990s decentralisation in two dimensions: 
authority and resources.   In terms of authority, it is found that Chiang Mai pattern 
remains the same as before the decentralisation while the other three provinces’ 
patterns are diversified. None of key actors in Chiang Mai exercised their 
decentralised authority for SIBD. However, at least one actor in the other three 
provinces executed their decentralised authority. In Lamphun, the governor appears 
to employ his power over the SSRO to serve at the GCS service point while other 
actors remain working under the pattern of pre-decentralisation.  
In Phrae and Nan, however, the governors similarly seem not to be using their 
decentralised authority while changes occur with other three actors. Hence, it is 
apparent that the decentralisation causes the diversification of provincial SIBD 
pattern. Further, authority execution of each actor should be compared across 
provinces. Firstly, for the SSRO, Chiang Mai and Lamphun are the same as before 
decentralisation while Phrae and Nan seems to employ their decentralised authority 
in negotiation with the SSO. Secondly, in reverse of the SSRO, the SSO seems 
similar to pre-decentralisation in Chiang Mai and Lamphun while their controlling 
power is decreased in Nan and Phrae. Thirdly, local governments in Chiang Mai and 
Lamphun are the same as before the decentralisation while in Phrae and Nan they are 
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more active in power execution. Lastly, the governors in Chiang Mai, Phrae and Nan 
remain the same while the Lamphun governor executed his decentralised authority. 
In terms of resource, Chapter 5 concludes that ‘decentralised resources’ are almost 
impossible to identify. This section still insists that is the case. However, findings in 
Section 5.1.3 (who gives what to whom) could provide preliminary conclusion on 
resource exchange after the late 1990s decentralisation. In brief, Chiang Mai’s 
pattern is the same as pre-decentralisation whereas the other three are diversified. In 
Lamphun, the governor allocated more of his resource for SIBD. However, other 
Lamphun key actors remain the same. In Phrae and Nan, all key actors, except the 
governor, spends more resources in SIBD. The SSRO requested for more resources 
while the SSO allowed additional resources to be allocated. Local governments spent 
more of their devolved resources on SIBD so their positions also shifted closer to the 
post-decentralisation too.  
Therefore, it could be concluded that that, as a result of decentralisation, diversity of 
SIBD exists across the four selected provinces. While SIBD in Chiang Mai is not 
diversified or remains the same as the pre-decentralisation, resource-authority 
patterns are diversified in the other three provinces including Lamphun, Phrae and 
Nan. Phrae and Nan are the cases in which decentralisation affected all key actors in 
both authority and resource dimensions. Lamphun is the case which decentralisation 
obviously enabled the governor to cooperate more with the SSRO. Lastly, the Chiang 
Mai case is where all four actors seem indifferent to decentralisation. Also, none of 
the four actors actually implemented the decentralised authorities and resources. In 
all cases, the SSO still performed its role as same as in the pre-decentralisation 
period. Most governors performed the traditional roles; exceptionally, the Lamphun 
governor executed his devolved authority and provided resources for the SSRO’s 
service in attempt to have them involved in the GCS. While the SSROs in Phrae and 
Nan employed their decentralised power, the Lamphun and Chiang Mai SSROs did 
not. Similarly, while local governments in Nan and Phrae provided resources for the 
SSRO; they appeared not to be involved in SIBD in Lamphun and Chiang Mai. 
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6.3 Decentralised authority, responsiveness, and diversity  
According to Hutchcroft (2001, p. 24), ‘[B]efore one can adequately shape 
decentralisation initiatives or assess their impact on development and democracy, it 
is first necessary to define more clearly what is meant by the terms “centralisation” 
and “decentralisation”’. This research has already completed this task in Chapter 2. 
However, it needs to be further emphasised that ‘decentralisation’ in this chapter 
does not only mean the transfer of power from central authority to its subordinate 
(World Bank, 2005) but also restricted to decentralisation of decision-making. This 
concept – decision-making decentralisation – focuses on ‘how the authority to make 
political decisions is distributed among different tiers (Treisman, 2002, p. 6)’. Thus, 
discussion on decentralisation in this chapter is related to the process and power of 
decision-making being decentralised to sub-national authorities. Accordingly, 
‘decentralised authority’ is restricted to the power of decision-making to participate 
in or initiate a distinctive project. If the actor voluntarily participates in other actor’s 
project (responsiveness) or initiates a distinctive project (initiative), it is considered 
that they applied decentralised authority. 
To measure decentralisation impact has never been an easy task (Dreher, 2006). As 
Smith suggests (1985, p. 85), ‘one obvious test of change in levels of decentralisation 
relates to the functions and powers of subordinate governments’ which may be 
measured by using data on spending and personnel. This research has attempted to 
do so in Chapter 3. However, these indicators could not exhibit the impact of 
decision-making decentralisation at the implementation level. Rather, it shows 
changes at the policy level. Therefore, this chapter uses responsiveness and initiative 
of each provincial actor as indicators of the decentralisation impact. As 
responsiveness reflects the extent to which local unit could make a decision, a 





6.3.1 Perception of decentralised authority 
This section discusses perception of the SSRO chiefs and provincial governors on 
decentralised authority only. None of local governments were asked if they perceived 
that authority was decentralised in practice. It is apparent that all local governments 
in Thailand are given authority and resource (see Chapter 3). In Phrae and Nan, 
although local governments were interviewed, this question was exempted and the 
question of their implementation of authority in SIB-related activity was rather of 
main interest. Also, Chiang Mai and Lamphun were cases where local governments 
did not participate in any of the SSRO’s project so they were not interviewed.  
In overall, most of the SSROs and provincial governors perceived that authority had 
been decentralised, while three interviewees (Phrae governor, Nan SSRO, Nan 
governor) did not agree that the decentralisation had empowered them in reality. 
Three SSROs – Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Phrae – ostensibly acknowledged the 
decentralised authority. In Chiang Mai, the SSRO chief simply agreed that the 
decentralisation empowered the SSRO. In Lamphun, the SSRO Chief agreed and 
concluded that the SSRO’s operation had become more flexible after the 
decentralisation as he replied (interview, 22 February 2011): 
‘If I have to compare [between before and after the decentralisation], it 
must be in regards of operation [of SIBD]. … The integration [of 
provincial administration under the IPA policy] means empowering the 
Governor. He/she gaining more power in social insurance is authorised to, 
simply speaking, work on behalf of the SSO Director General. Then, as 
the Governor being authorised, the work at the provincial level has 
become more flexible. We [the SSRO and the Governor] need not to wait 
for the central department’s permission. We can work it out at the 
provincial level. Sometimes the Governor even authorises us [the SSRO] 
to lead the activity.’ 
In Phrae, the Chief of Phrae SSRO implicitly stated that SIA had rarely been 
decentralised before the late 1990s. As he said (interview, 4 February 2011); 
‘…if you ask what were the missions of the SSRO before the 
integrative provincial administration [IPA] being enacted, I would say 




Further, comparing the situation between before and after the decentralisation, he 
agreed that the SSRO became more autonomous.  
‘Was it [the SSRO] autonomous [before the late 1990s 
decentralisation]? It seemed not because the SSRO needed to follow 
the guidelines and orders. However, after the integrative provincial 
policies, it seemed [to be more autonomous]… One indicator is 
rewarding system’ 
He referred to the rewarding system as an indicator of freedom in the sense that it 
was a result of decentralisation which affected the SSRO’s autonomy. The 
‘rewarding system’ he mentioned was the relocation of the SSRO chiefs. Although 
the previous system of relocation was still unclear, two presumptions could be 
addressed in accordance with the previous general relocation system. First, 
theoretically, it must be based on merit system. Second, it could be operated through 
negotiations between the SSO and the chiefs themselves.  
However, after the decentralisation, the relocation – either promotion or demotion – 
was based on the Chief’s performance. Her/his performance would be evaluated 
based on the target proposed before October, the starting point of a new fiscal year. 
For instance, if the SSRO could not collect the contributions from employers as 
projected, it indicated that the Chief was incompetent and would be relocated to a 
province unwanted by other chiefs or remote from Bangkok. Conversely, if s/he 
could achieve the target, s/he would be relocated to a ‘better
35
’ province or his/her 
requested province.  
As a result of the pressure of the new performance evaluation, the SSRO was given 
more power in decision making and project planning. They could do whatever they 
want in order to achieve the proposed target. In other words, what they must do was 
to achieve the target, or the ends, regardless the means they used. As the Phrae Chief 
suggested, 
                                                             
35
 To determine which province is ‘better’ is fluid and subjective. According to the Phrae Chief, the 
bigger province is not always better-off; rather, it is considered as more complex and difficult. Some 
chiefs prefer a smaller province because it is easier to achieve the target and maintain their 
performance at a certain level. 
264 
 
‘…working in this [current social insurance] system, honestly 
speaking, [in order to achieve the target] it depends on the strategy of 
each SSRO. Some SSROs prefer general way of public relation. 
Some prefer door knocking. Some prefer periodical monitoring.’ 
 
However, the Nan SSRO chief seemingly did not acknowledge the decentralised 
authority as he had different opinions towards it. Being asked if the SSRO had 
become more autonomous after the late 1990s decentralisation, the Chief replied 
firmly that the SSRO had always been autonomous (interview, 11 October 2011) as 
following:  
‘Provincial offices are autonomous. We [the SSRO] can make decisions 
based on information we have in the province. The IPA policy has no 
effect on us. Integration (buranakaan) [of provincial administration] is 
just a word which has never come into practice. ’ 
 
The Integrated Provincial Administration, as he claimed, increased the power of 
neither the Governor nor any PAU in practice. As SIA is a special public service 
delivery involved in fund management, the Governor cannot intervene in the 
decision-making of the SSRO either before or after the decentralisation. Besides, the 
IPA policy is not only about empowering the governor but also making strategic 
plan. Being asked if strategic planning affected the SSRO’s operation, the SSRO’s 
chief admitted that it did provide a chance for provincial offices to respond to local 
needs more than before. Therefore, despite the chief instant response, the Nan SSRO 
has gained more autonomy after the late 1990s decentralisation. 
It is concluded that the Chiang Mai and Lamphun governor agreed that the late 1990s 
decentralisation had given them more power while the Phrae and Nan governor 
unlikely agreed with such statement. In fact, at the beginning of interviews, all 
provincial governors agreed that the late 1990s authorised them more authority to 
them. However, their opinions in conclusion varied. On the one hand, Chiang Mai 
and Lamphun governors similarly insisted that their power had been increased after 
the decentralisation. However, interestingly, the Chiang Mai governor suggested that 
Chiang Mai is a province of compromise culture and perhaps the increase of power 
may be unnecessary. On the other hand, the Phrae and Nan governors similarly 
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commented that the integration had been operated in provincial administration and 
the IPA did empower them in terms of money and personnel. They can encourage 
initiatives in the province by providing provincial offices extra budget. However, 
their authority in practice (power) remained the same.  
6.3.2 Implementation of decentralised authority 
Regarding the implementation of decentralised authority, ten actors can be classified 
into three groups: unlikely to be implementing, implementing, unclear. Firstly, no 
evidence indicates that four actors (Chiang Mai SSRO, Chiang Mai governor, Phrae 
governor, Nan governor) implement the authority which leads to the conclusion that 
they are unlikely to implement the decentralised authority. Secondly, it is evident 
that four actors (Lamphun governor, Phrae SSRO, Phrae local government, Nan 
SSRO) implement their decentralised authority. Lastly, it is unclear whether the two 
actors (Lamphun SSRO, Nan local government) are implementing the authority. To 
conclude, evidence suggests that the SSROs are likely to implement the authorities 
while the governors are unlikely. It is unclear however to make a conclusion for local 
governments. The following discusses the implementation by actor. 
In case of the SSROs, evidently, the Phrae and Nan SSROs implement the authority 
while the Chiang Mai does not. In Phrae and Nan, the SSROs implemented 
decentralised decision-making authority in starting initiative projects (CLO in Phrae, 
P&F in Nan). The Phrae SSRO started the project in response to local needs. In Nan, 
not only local needs but also the Chief’s attitudes appear to be key factors in four 
respects. Firstly, the Nan SSRO Chief seemingly perceived the SSO as both a budget 
provider and a creativity block. He stated that the SSRO had been working freely 
regardless of decentralisation. What limited their capability however was ‘the 
bureaucracy’. He stated that all provincial offices could be creative but the creativity 
could possibly be hindered by the higher tier of bureaucracy. Therefore, he 
overlooked the power of central control and ran the Nan SSRO as autonomously and 
creatively as possible. 
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Secondly, the chief had a different concept of efficiency from the SSO’s. While the 
SSO was concerned about benefit-cost efficiency, the chief believed in equality as 
much as efficiency. 
‘Efficiency is not only about benefit (kumrai) and loss (kaad-tun). We 
[the SSRO] must also consider equality (kwaam sa-mur-phak) too. In 
Nan, some insured persons live far from the SSRO’s office. If we are too 
concerned about benefit and loss [of public service delivery], what about 
them [the insured persons in remote area]?’ 
 
Thirdly, he believed in the establishment of a ‘social insurance empire’. In the 
interview, he mentioned that the SSRO should consider the chance of creating its 
own ‘empire (ah-na-juk)’.  
‘We must know who could cooperate with us and how they could help 
(chuay leua) us. We must build our own empire. Within this empire, the 
SSRO must be able to make the most of everything.’ 
 
On the one hand, this empire denoted an entity supposedly promoting co-operation 
but actually dominated and used by the SSRO. On the other hand, this empire meant 
cooperation in which a strong bond was built to pull all actors together. As he also 
suggested, ‘the empire must be strengthened for the sustainability purpose’. 
Fourthly, the chief had persistently been interested in the issue of setting up a branch 
of the SSRO regardless of the number of insured persons. It was found that the Nan 
SSRO Chief completed his Master’s with the dissertation topic of ‘Implementation of 
the SSRO Branch Setting-up policy in Narathiwas
36
’. In principle, for the SSRO to 
have a branch, at least 100,000 of insured persons must be registered in the province. 
Nan is excessively small, with 10,715 insured persons, in this sense so that the 
branch could not be set up. However, he managed to exercise his idea under the 
project of Mobile Branches. As a result, the P&F was started in 2008 with a major 
cooperation between the SSRO and the LAO. Two projects – M-service, mobile 
branches - were delivered subsequently. The SSRO chief drove these set of his 
beliefs into practice. He successfully convinced the SSO to allocate a budget for the 
                                                             
36 Narathiwas is the province in which he had worked before he moved to Nan. 
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Nan SSRO and the Nan LAO to commit in the P&F. In contrast, the Chiang Mai 
SSRO is labelled as ‘unlikely implementing’ without doubts since no initiatives are 
found in Chiang Mai.  
It is hard to conclude whether the Lamphun SSRO implements the authority. While 
no initiatives of the SSRO are found in Lamphun as same as Chiang Mai, the 
participation of the Lamphun SSRO in the governor’s GCS project suggests that 
perhaps the Lamphun SSRO does implement the authority. The SSRO implemented 
the decentralised authority by voluntarily participating in the GCS project which was 
not in the SSO’s policy guidelines. However, participating in the GCS project is 
rarely related to responsiveness to local needs. Rather, it was found that the SSRO 
decided to take part in the project because the Governor requested their cooperation 
and provided them with financial support for overtime staffs. Therefore, the case of 
implementation for the Lamphun is SSROrather unclear. 
In case of governors, although two provincial governors – Chiang Mai, Lamphun – 
agreed that the decentralisation brought on more authority to them, only the 
Lamphun governor implemented the decentralised authority. In Chiang Mai, 
evidence of the implementation is not found. For example, there is no evidence of 
initiative cooperation between the governor and the Chiang Mai SSRO. Contrarily, 
Lamphun is the only case in this research which the governor implemented his 
decentralised authority. He could convince the Lamphun SSRO to participate in the 
GCS project which was hierarchically assigned to the Governor’s Office by the 
Ministry of Interior. 
Contrarily, Phrae and Nan are cases where the governor indicated that their power 
remained the same as before decentralisation and evidence of decentralised authority 
implementation are not found in both case. In Nan, the governor exemplified the case 
of a claimant whom he had helped to get the benefits as the implementation of 
decentralised authority (interview, 13 October 2011). This claimant should have been 
entitled but his employer had not paid the contribution. It was likely that his claim 
would be denied. Therefore, the governor decided to negotiate with the SSRO and 
consequently he received the benefits. However, this examplifies negotiation 
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between actors rather than the implementation of decentralised authority. Therefore, 
it cannot be claimed that the governor implemented the decentralised authority. 
Moreover, looking at the Nan SSRO’s activities cooperating with the Nan 
Governor’s Office, none of them complied with local initiatives criteria. Therefore, it 
is concluded that the Nan governor was not applying the decentralised authority. 
In case of local governments, it is concluded that local governments differently 
implemented the decentralised authority as their decisions to join the SSRO’s project 
were made in a different way. Among five local governments in Phrae, for example, 
an official from Mae Jua Municipality stated that the organisation was selected 
because they, according to what the SSRO informed them, had been awarded as one 
of the best practice local governments in Phrae. While in Baan Lao subdistrict, the 
Baan Lao SAO official stated that the organisation participated in the SSRO’s project 
based on the SAO Chief Executive. However, with two local governments, it should 
be noted that the case of Nan is difficult to clearly define whether they actually 
implemented their decentralised authority. Their participation was requested by the 
Nan Local Administration Office (LAO) whose authority includes the right to 
demand local governments. Therefore, the implementation of local governments in 
Nan is left unclear (0/R). 
6.3.3 Degree of decentralisation 
This section discusses the SSRO’s decentralisation degree regarding two respects – 
decentralised activities, decentralised contexts. This degree refers to the 
decentralisation degree of the SSRO not the case (or the province). If the 
determination is for the case as a whole, it would involve too many actors with 
various degree of decentralisation requiring attribution to each of them. This would 
lead to a question of how these various degrees of decentralisation could be 
generalized into a single degree.  
The SSRO’s level of decentralised activities is derived from their perception and 
implementation of decentralised authority. Evidence (summarised in Table 6.6) 
suggests that the SSRO’s degree of decentralised activities in Lamphun and Nan is at 
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moderate level while Chiang Mai is at low level and Phrae is high. Firstly, at a low 
level, Chiang Mai is the case where the SSRO perceived that decentralisation had 
impact on SIBD but no evidence of the implementation has been found. Secondly, at 
a moderate level, the Lamphun SSRO perceived the decentralisation impact and 
implemented the decentralised authority by participating in the governor’s GCS 
project. Thirdly, at a high level, the Phrae SSRO perceived the impact and 
implemented the authority in running the initiative CLO project. Lastly, at a 
moderate level, Nan is where the SSRO disagreed that the decentralisation had an 
impact on their operation but, in contrary, they implemented the initiative P&F. 
Secondly, the SSRO’s level of decentralised contexts is derived from two actors’ 
(governor, local government) perception and implementation of decentralised 
authorities. Lamphun is the only case where degree of decentralised contexts is at 
moderate level; the other three cases are at low level. Firstly, in Chiang Mai, the 
governor likely perceived the decentralisation impact but did not implement the 
decentralised authority. Local government is not involved in the Chiang Mai SIBD. 
Therefore, this case is specified as a low degree of decentralised contexts. Secondly, 
Lamphun is similar to Chiang Mai in terms of no local government involvement. 
However, its degree of decentralised contexts is at moderate level as the governor 
likely perceived the decentralisation and using his decentralised authority to urge the 
SSRO to cooperate in the GCS project. Lastly, Phrae and Nan are at the low level of 
decentralised contexts. Indeed, local government implemented their decentralised 
authority in participating in the SSRO’s initiative project and this should place the 
two cases at the moderate degree. However, the governors in two provinces unlikely 
perceived the decentralisation impact and their implementation of decentralised 
authority is not evident. This, therefore, make the two cases remain at the low degree 
of decentralised contexts. 
Taking the two components (decentralised activities and contexts) into consideration, 
the four SSROs have different degree of decentralisation. Firstly, Phrae is the case 
where the SSRO has moderately high degree of decentralisation as they have a high 
degree of decentralised activities and low degree of decentralised contexts. Secondly, 
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Lamphun is the case in which the SSRO has a moderate degree of both decentralised 
activities and contexts. Thirdly, the Nan SSRO has moderately low degree of 
decentralisation as they have moderate degree of decentralised activities and low 
degree of decentralised contexts. Lastly, Chiang Mai is the case where the SSRO has 
a low degree of decentralisation as they have low degree of both decentralised 
activities and contexts. 
Table 6.5 The SSRO's degree of decentralisation 
 
 
In conclusion, two criteria – perception, implementation – of decentralised authority 
are employed to analyse decentralisation impacts on SIA. In terms of perception, 
three actors (Phrae governor, Nan governor, Nan SSRO) tentatively (or mostly?) 
disagree that the authority is decentralised in practice. Evidently, also, the SSRO and 
local government in Phrae and Nan have implemented decentralised authority; while 
the governor has also carried it out in Lamphun only. Contrarily, Chiang Mai is 
proved to be the case where decentralisation does not have an impact. Interestingly, 
Chiang Mai is the province in which Thaksin and his cliques intently dominate 
provincial politics. No connections between Thaksin and the SIBD were found. 
However, the fact that one of his ex-party members is in the PSSS and could avoid 




6.4 Associations between decentralisation, collaboration and 
diversity 
In this section, two associations are clarified to answer the central question of this 
research (see Section 1.2): decentralisation-diversity association and collaboration-
diversity association. Firstly, as shown in Table 6.7, the degree of decentralisation is 
not always congruent with the degree of diversity. It was believed that there was a 
positive association between decentralisation and SIBD diversity. However, this 
research finds supporting evidence in only two cases: Chiang Mai and Phrae. Neither 
the SSRO nor the key actor (governor) employs their decentralised authority in 
Chiang Mai while Phrae is the opposite. It is possible that political tensions in 
Chiang Mai potentially hinder the implementation of decentralisation policy in the 
province (see Section 6.3). In contrast, Lamphun (low diversity, moderate 
decentralisation) and Nan (high diversity, moderately low decentralisation) are cases 
in which the two degrees are not congruent. In Lamphun, the governor applied his 
decentralised authority to pressure the SSRO. Although the SSRO was rarely 
employed their decentralised authority, the governor’s action makes the 
decentralisation into moderate degree. In Nan, SIBD is highly diversified but the 
SSRO did not perceive and implement their decentralised authority. Although the 
governor and local governments seemingly employ their decentralised authority, 
evidence shows that they did not (see Section 5.3). 
Table 6.6 Associations between decentralisation, collaboration and diversity 
 
Interestingly, the association between collaboration and diversity seems more 
positive than decentralisation-diversity association. In two cases of low diversity 
(Chiang Mai, Lamphun), the degree of collaboration appears to be low too. In 
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Chiang Mai, none initiatives were started and collaboration was not found in 
provincial SIBD. In Lamphun, responsive project (GCS) was operated in cooperation 
with the governor. Despite being slightly diversified, this cooperation is not an 
initiative and the case remains at the moderately low degree of collaboration. By the 
same token, Phrae and Nan are highly diversified cases with a high degree of 
collaboration. Both of them provided initiative services in collaboration with local 
organisations. Therefore, this leads to the conclusion that collaboration does have 
potential in SIBD diversification. Particularly in the four selected cases, SIBD 
diversity is evidently more associated with collaboration than decentralisation. 
In other words, this research finds that collaboration is more likely a positive factor 
in diversity. When collaboration occurs, the diversity will likely occur too. On the 
contrary, if collaboration rarely appears, the diversity may be trivial. From the four 
provinces, evidence suggests that collaboration brings on more actors and 
innovations and these thus increase the diversity of SIBD. It should be noted that 
only those requested by the SSRO (e.g. local governments) got involved in SIBD 
collaboration. These actors were purposively selected to collaborate in particular 
projects. Several other actors in provincial politics i.e. politicians or business elites 
could join in SIBD collaboration too but this is quite unlikely. As discussed in 
Section 6.1, non-bureaucratic actors (politicians and business elites alike) tend to 
take SIBD for granted. While evidence of these actors’ interest in SIBD is hard to 
find in the media, it is even harder to find such evidence in the field. A few evidences 
suggested the contrary that Chao Pho are involved in SIBD not because of their 
interest but other reasons such as privilege of being the PSSS or recommended by 
their cliques (see Chapter 5). 
On the other hand, decentralisation is not always positively associated with the 
diversity of SIBD. For instance, the diversity is not necessarily increased even when 
decentralisation is acknowledged or implemented by provincial actors (see Section 
6.3). Evidence suggests that decentralisation policy indeed enhances authorities of 
SIBD actors but, unsurprisingly, it results in nothing if the actors are not 
implementing their decentralised authorities. For example, in the case of Chiang Mai, 
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both the SSRO and the governor acknowledged that the decentralisation but no 
evidence shows that they utilised their decentralised authorities. Meanwhile, no 
innovation in SIBD is found in Chiang Mai. On the contrary Nan is the case with low 
degree of decentralisation and high degree of diversity. Being slightly decentralised, 
the SSRO chief disagreed that he gained more authorities from decentralisation 
policy and neither the governor nor local governments perceived and implemented 
the decentralised authorities. However, being a highly diversified case, the SSRO 
managed to start SIBD initiatives and consequently diversify its SIBD pattern. 
Further, it could be concluded that inconsistent association between decentralisation 
and the diversity of SIBD involves not only implementation gaps (outcomes are 
different from proposed goals) but also political pressures. While the first is usually 
an obvious problem of any policy implementation, the second reflects how Thai 
provincial politics obstructs decentralisation resulting in rigid form of SIBD. For 
instance, some SSROs may want to execute their decentralised authorities and start 
an initiative. However, they may need to deal with Chao Pho in the province or 
senior bureaucrats from the ministry or department. For example, Chiang Mai is the 
case with low decentralisation and thus low diversity, possibly for three reasons. 
Firstly, Chiang Mai SIBD involves Chao Pho who is well-connected with the 
national-level government and Thaksin. As presented in Section 6.1, EmR2 was not 
forced to pay the contribution his company owed the SSRO. With all possible 
evidence, this could be because of his power regarding the connections with political 
and business elites both at the national and provincial level.  
Secondly, there seems to be intervention from a senior bureaucrat who came from 
some department (implicitly suggest as those who are from the MoL) in Chiang Mai 
SIBD (see Section 6.1). This does not directly interfere in SIBD but it does show 
how politicised Chiang Mai SIBD is. Lastly, Chiang Mai’s political culture of 
compromise (see Section 6.1) may preclude the SSRO, or any organisations in the 
province, from initiatives. Such compromise connotes negotiations between 
stakeholders which usually lead to agreements in which political damages to selected 
stakeholders are minimised. These selected stakeholders are unsurprisingly political 
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and business elites in the province. Thus, to start an initiative among these 
circumstances, it often involves negotiations with those with money and power in the 
province. 
Conclusion 
This chapter finds that collaboration is more positively associated with the 
diversification than decentralisation. While only two cases (Chiang Mai, Phrae) 
exemplify the positive association between decentralisation and diversity, there are 
positive associations between collaboration and diversity in all four provinces. Thus, 
this supports the view that not only decentralisation has impacts on SIBD. 
Collaboration is also, or to some extent more, influential to the diversification. Also, 
it could be concluded that the inconsistent association between decentralisation and 
the diversity of SIBD is a result of implementation gaps (outcomes are different from 
proposed goals) and political pressures at the provincial level. The former is usually 
an obvious problem of policy implementation. The latter reflects how Thai provincial 
politics obstructs decentralisation resulting in rigid form of SIBD. The prominent 
example is the case of Chiang Mai in which Chao Pho and senior bureaucrats 
intervened in SIBD and compromising culture is of utmost concern to several actors 
e.g. the governor, the SSRO.  
Last but not least, the findings in this chapter suggest that diversity of SIBD requires 
collaboration rather than decentralisation (localising power). Decentralisation does 
change the power and resource structure of SIBD. The SSRO becomes more 
autonomous with greater autonomy, alternative resource providers, and less central 
control. However, the SSRO’s autonomy is increased only by the definition that it is 
‘fundamentally institutional, and is rooted in the ability of a government agency to 
perform its functions without interference from other governments. (Ellison, 1998, p. 
42).’ In practice, there remains central control which generates tensions among 
actors. In contrast, collaboration brings on new actors and relations which creates 
innovations and diversifies the pattern of SIBD. It is a mutual agreement in which 
actors willingly work together under a certain set of objectives.  
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Chapter 7 : Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses five issues: research findings, theoretical issues, research 
methodology, policy implications and research implications. Firstly, research 
findings are discussed regarding research questions and the proposed model (Section 
7.1). Secondly, the theoretical model (developed in Chapter 2) is revisited to discuss 
its application to the four cases considered (Section 7.2). Thirdly, reflections on 
research methodology are discussed regarding research design and data accessibility 
(Section 7.3). Fourthly, policy implications are presented to discuss the 
diversification and territorial justice (Section 7.4). Lastly, research implications are 
discussed with regards to directions for future research (Section 7.5). 
7.1 Research findings 
This section is organised in five subsections. Firstly, Section 7.1.1 answers each of 
the research questions listed in Chapter 1. Section 7.1.2 summarises the findings case 
by case. Section 7.1.3 analyses how each case could fit into the model of 
diversification proposed in Chapter 2. Section 7.1.4 discusses the findings in Thai 
contexts. Lastly, Section 7.1.5 argues for the theoretical contributions of this 
research. 
7.1.1 Answering Research Questions 
First of all, in response to the first basic question (what are the roles and relations of 
each policy actor in the delivery system at the provincial level?), roles and relations 
could be clarified separately. Firstly, provincial actors were analysed regarding two 
administrative spheres (PSSS administration and project management) (see Section 
5.1). In the PSSS administration (AC1), provincial actors can be categorised into six 
groups: the SSRO, governor, internal offices, HCPs, external offices, and 
representatives of employers and employees. It was expected that AC1 would play a 
role as an advisory board for provincial SIBD. However, most of them rarely, or 
sometimes only with great difficulty, managed to play their part for various reasons 
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(see Table 5.4). For government organisations, bureaucratic inertia and the claim on 
the SSRO’s specialisation appear to be a reason. For employer and employee 
representatives, reasons are variably claimed e.g. the PSSS post is just for social 
prestige, the attempts to participate in SIBD decision-making are ignored. In the 
project management sphere (AC2), the SSRO is, no doubt, the one who starts a 
distinctive project which involves local organisations. These local organisations 
voluntarily joined (in Phrae) or are indirectly obliged to join (in Nan). At best, trust is 
built between them and the SSRO but, at worst, they just follow the contract with the 
SSRO and passively serve the recipients. 
Secondly, inter-organisational relations in each province are unsurprisingly complex. 
These were analysed in two regards: relationship patterns and collaborative activities. 
Considering how they get involved in SIBD (voluntary or obligatory), relationship 
patterns were categorised into four types: contracting, cooperating, coordinating, and 
collaborating (see Section 5.3). Mostly, these relations were cooperative except the 
SSRO-local relation in Phrae and the SSRO-local and SSRO-external in Nan which 
were more collaborative in nature. These relations are part of the diversification of 
SIBD. To understand collaborative activities, this research used Agranoff and 
McGuire’s five labels of activities: information seeking (IS), adjustment seeking 
(AS), policy and strategy making (PM), project based (PB), and resource exchange 
(RE). Most of activities are IS, PB, RE, and AS respectively (no PM activity was 
found). These activities suggest the degree of collaboration which can be sorted from 
highest to lowest as Nan, Phrae, Lamphun and Chiang Mai. 
Regarding the second basic question (to what extent does diversity of SIBD exist in 
Thailand’s social insurance administration?), it is evident that diversity of provincial 
SIBD exists across the four provinces – Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Phrae, Nan – in the 
North of Thailand (see Chapters 5 and 6). In short, the degree of diversification 
varies between provinces: Chiang Mai, low; Lamphun, Moderately low; Phrae, 
Moderately high; and, Nan, High. This reflects the SSRO’s responsiveness in each 
province. In Phrae and Nan, the SSROs are relatively responsive and operate 
initiatives – Phrae’s CLO, Nan’s P&F – in SIBD. In contrast, evidence suggests that 
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Lamphun, with its participation in GCS, is slightly responsive to the governor who 
implemented his decentralised authorities. It should be noted that Chiang Mai, an 
important province to Thaksin’s political power, appears to have a low degree of 
diversity. Evidence suggests that this is a result of not only the SSRO’s 
unresponsiveness but also political pressures from Chao Pho in Chiang Mai whom 
are likely well-connected with Thaksin. 
In response to the central question (Is interprovincial diversity in SIBD caused by 
either or both a) the decentralisation policy in recent years or b) the relationship 
patterns between actors at provincial level?), evidence firstly suggests that 
decentralisation is sometimes, if not always, positively associated with SIBD 
diversity. In Chiang Mai and Phrae, decentralisation is congruent with the degree of 
diversity. While Chiang Mai has low degrees of decentralisation and diversity; Phrae 
has high degrees in both aspects. However, the association between decentralisation 
and diversity in Lamphun and Nan is not positive. Lamphun has moderate degree of 
decentralisation and low degree of diversity. Participating in the governor’s GCS 
project is a reason of the degree difference. In Nan, the decentralisation-diversity 
association is negative. With low degree of decentralisation, SIBD diversity is 
contrarily at high degree. While it is evident that none of key actors employed 
decentralised authorities, the P&F is highly diversified from national pattern of 
SIBD.  
Further, this research finds that decentralisation is not the only factor responsible for 
the diversity in delivery of Social Insurance. The diversity is also impacted by inter-
organisational collaborations within each province. In all four provinces, 
collaboration and diversity are positively associated. For instance, in Chiang Mai and 
Lamphun, the degrees of collaboration and diversity are similarly low. In Phrae and 
Nan, both degrees are differently at high level. Reinforcing the central argument of 
this research (see Chapter 2), although differently, both collaboration and 
decentralisation enables the SSRO to be responsive which results in the diversity of 
SIBD across the North of Thailand.  
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7.1.2 Descriptive summary of cases 
To discuss the research findings, the four cases are categorised into either more or 
less diversified cases. Evidence suggests that, in Chiang Mai and Lamphun (less-
diversified cases), SIBD remain standardized while in Phrae and Nan SIBD was 
more diversified from the national norms. Firstly, the less-diversified cases appear to 
generally provide standardized services. Particularly, Chiang Mai was found to 
rigidly follow the central guidelines as no initiative projects were found in the 
fieldwork. Lamphun was originally assumed to be operating an initiative project, 
Government Counter Service (GCS), but the project turned out to be the Lamphun 
governor’s request rather than the SSRO’s initiative. Therefore, Lamphun is 
eventually classified as another example of the standardized pattern.  
In contrast, secondly, the case where delivery pattern were most diversified from the 
uniform norm were Phrae and Nan. In Phrae and Nan, the SSROs respond to local 
needs and originate initiative projects. The SSROs in both provinces operated the 
Cooperation with Local Organisations project (CLO; Phrae) and the Thinking 
Partners and Friends of Insured Persons project (P&F; Nan). Although these projects 
were designed in compliance with the SSO’s policy of network building, the way the 
SSROs implemented the policy was distinctive in comparison to the national norms 
of SIBD and other SSROs’ projects. Local organisations participating in the CLO 
and the P&F become additional service accesses for insured persons, whilst other 
SSROs mostly cooperated with local organisations as information-distributing centre.  
In more detail, findings from each province can be discussed in four regards: 
provincial actors’ roles and involvement in SIBD (Chapter 5), inter-organisational 
relations (Chapter 5), decentralisation in the province (Chapter 7) and SIBD pattern 
(Chapter 6). Firstly, compared to the other cases, Chiang Mai is the most 
standardized case of a provincial SIBD pattern. Although an attempt at initiative was 
found, it was terminated during the approval process. Decentralisation seems not to 
be implemented in SIBD. While actors appear to be rarely active, inter-organisational 
relations in the province are either contracting or cooperative. Considering data from 
fieldwork with Chiang Mai’s political nature, it is unsurprising that initiative is not 
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prioritised and decentralisation is rarely implemented. With political pressures from 
provincial elites, bureaucrats would prefer the status quo to initiatives. Despite being 
relatively devolved, to implement decentralised authorities may mean taking a risk to 
challenge some Chao Pho or influential people. 
Lamphun is an ambiguous case where responsiveness and initiative were seemingly 
conjoined. Although the GCS exists in Lamphun and is somewhat related to 
provincial SIBD, it is only a response to the governor’s request not a self-initiating 
project. Nonetheless, the SSRO’s participation in GCS slightly diversifies their 
pattern of SIBD from national standards. Decentralisation is not obviously 
implemented by the SSRO. However, the governor financially supported the SSRO 
to participate in the GCS using his decentralised budget. This leads to inter-
organisational relations in Lamphun including contracting, cooperation, and 
coordination. Hugely different from Chiang Mai, political pressures are rarely found 
in Lamphun SIBD. For example, despite his connection with one of the then 
Ministers, an employee representative found it difficult to get his voice heard in 
SIBD decision-making. 
Thirdly, Phrae is a case of highly-diversified pattern, notably the CLO project. To 
start this initiative, the SSRO appear to have used their decentralised authority and 
cooperated with autonomous local governments. However, the governor does not 
play a part in SIBD in this province. Similar to Chiang Mai and Lamphun, most 
actors were rarely active in SIBD. With regards to SSRO-local collaborative activity, 
this results in the coexistence of inter-organisational relations in the province: 
contracting, cooperation, and collaboration. Lastly, Nan is the most diversified case 
among selected provinces regarding their initiative project, the P&F. This is an 
outcome of the SSRO’s decentralised decision-making and the SSRO-LAO 
collaboration. Like other provinces, most of actors are barely active in SIBD except 
the LAO (an external office appointed for their legal capacity to direct local 
governments in the province). Similar to Phrae, three inter-organisational relations – 








Interestingly, although political pressures on SIBD are not evident, the employer 
representatives in Phrae and Nan are brothers from a wealthy family rooted in Phrae. 
They are not involved in any political parties but their family business won the 
governments’ construction projects several times. This suggests they may have some 
connections with the governments. It is thus worth noting that Chao Pho (particularly 
in terms of their wealth) are involved in in SIBD as one of the PSSS members in both 
provinces. Considering their capabilities (see McVey, 2000), they could execute their 
power in SIBD decision-making if they wish.  
Revisiting discussions on political variables in the province (see particularly Section 
2.2.5 and Chapter 3), it is evident that political elites do get involved in SIBD 
somehow. They either participated in the PSSS (e.g. Chao Pho) or indirectly chose 
the PSSS members (senior bureaucrats, national politicians). Regardless of this, 
however, it is arguable that none of them directly influenced or intervened in SIBD 
which subsequently generated the diversity. Also, as Bowie (2008) suggests, the 
politically oppressed in the North are likely to resist their patrons. However, in this 
research, no evidence was found to reassert this argument. In the four cases, even the 
involvement of the oppressed (employees) is hardly found. Let alone their resistance. 
Thus, to conclude, political variables in the province do have impacts on SIBD but 
hardly in the way suggested in many theories. 
Based on the earlier summary, the pattern of SIBD in Thailand can be summarised 
into a single diagram (see Figure 7.1). This can be explained in three regards. Firstly, 
similar to diagrams in earlier chapters, three administrative spheres are illustrated 
with different colours: PSSS is purple, project management is yellow and provincial 
administration is orange. The yellow zone is encircled with dashed line because it 
appears it is project management which diversifies SIBD and does not exist in all 
provinces. Secondly, arrows between each actor are drawn to illustrate the number of 
relationship patterns which exist between the two actors (e.g. two arrows equal two 
patterns). Its colour and style signify different meanings: black arrows for 
contracting pattern; black dashed for cooperation; black dotted for coordination; and, 
red arrow for collaboration. Lastly, each small white circle with a letter inside 
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represents a type of resource being exchanged between two actors. For example, the 
white circle with ‘I, M, S1, S2’ situated between local organisation and the SSRO 
means that, in the local-SSRO relationship, four types of resource (information, 
material, staff and service) are exchanged. 
7.1.3 Putting cases into models 
Table 7.1 illustrates how the proposed model of diversification (see Figure 2.1) can 
be applied to SIBD diversification in the four selected cases. The central argument 
proposed in Chapter 2 is proved to be true; decentralisation degree and 
diversification degree are positively associated. For instance, high diversity appears 
in the highly decentralised case (Phrae) and low diversity in the lowest decentralised 
case (Chiang Mai). However, there are cases where the diversification degree is not 
congruent with the decentralisation degree. For instance, despite exhibiting moderate 
and moderately low degrees of decentralisation respectively, Lamphun has low 
diversity and Nan has high diversity. Instead, what is congruent with the 
diversification degree in these cases is the degree of collaboration. Lamphun has 
moderately low degree of collaboration with low degree of diversification; Nan has 
high collaboration and high diversity. 






























The four cases do not fit perfectly into a single model. Each case is not exclusive to a 
particular model; rather, considering all of them together illustrates a continuum of 
diversification patterns. Firstly, starting from the case of Chiang Mai, the SSRO’s 
diplomatic character enables this case to be flexible and opportunistic and, therefore, 
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somewhat Weberian. Secondly, Lamphun case comprises both Weberian and 
customer-oriented patterns since the SSRO seems to be conventional but sometimes 
respond to local request. Thirdly, Nan could fall into the strategic model as they have 
an initiative project (P&F) which is strategically managed. However, as the Nan 
SSRO is still ambiguously autocratic-participative in coordinating with other 
provincial actors and has a moderately low degree of decentralisation, it is arguably 
somewhat strategic. Lastly, at the end of the continuum, Phrae is the closest case to 
the strategic pattern of diversification. Their initiative project (CLO) is highly 
diversified from the uniform pattern. It is also a concrete evidence of moderately 
high degree of both collaboration and decentralisation. 
7.1.4 Social insurance performance in provincial Thailand 
In Thailand, it appears that social insurance institution at the provincial level has 
rarely been working as it is regulated (see Chapter 5 and Appendix 5). With an ideal 
role as a participative mechanism of SIBD, a tripartite board or the PSSS (AC1) 
barely performs its legally-bounded role. The PSSS is well-structured with three key 
stakeholders - government, employer, employee – appointed in the committee. 
However, its practice has been in a fused form (in Riggs’ term). This undeniably 
reflects Riggs’ model of prismatic society in which the structure is well-organised 
while the practice barely follow the structure. Evidence suggests that the PSSS 
members from government organisations are inert. Most of them claim the SSRO’s 
specialisation as the reason not to be active, or intervene (kao luang), in SIBD. With 
political interventions from politicians and/or bureaucrats, employer and employee 
representatives are questionably involved in SIBD. Ideally, selected employers in the 
PSSS would act as employer representatives. However, this research finds that their 
participation in SIBD is trivial. Interestingly, all of them are those in wealth and 
power and likely Chao Pho in the province. Despite being appointed as the PSSS, it 
is unclear how they participate in SIBD.  
Likewise, an employee representative is supposed to stand up for employees but that 
is not the case for Thai SIBD. Some employee representatives are nominated by a 
senior bureaucrat and some are selected because, as the SSRO claims, they could 
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‘work with’ the SSRO. Implicitly, these circumstances reflect patronage system in 
Thailand in which reciprocal relationship between superior and inferior are essential. 
An employee gets a relatively prestige social status (a member of government 
committee) and become compliant with the SSRO, or his/her patron, in return. 
Evidently, these representatives are mostly quiet in the PSSS meetings. They seem to 
be there just to agree with whatever comes up in the meeting. In an interesting case, 
one of the employee representatives is not officially employed in any organisations 
and thus cannot be a PSSS member. However, he is still recommended by a senior 
bureaucrat and appointed in the PSSS. No evidence shows how he is actively 
involved in SIBD. 
The SSRO, under these tense circumstances, is mostly driving SIBD on their own. 
The PSSS appears to be a rubber stamp for their decision-making. Adding up the 
politics of selection and appointment of representatives, the PSSS is questionably a 
supporting method of SIBD. Further, with Chao Pho involved, even a routine 
operation of SIBD could be difficult. For instance, SIBD requires a contribution 
payment from both employers and employees. In Chiang Mai, however, the SSRO 
finds difficulty in or reluctantly imposes contribution collection on the employer with 
strong political power. He was once a committee member of Thaksin’s political 
party. Additionally, even the deputy governor implicitly suggested that to work in 
Chiang Mai compromise was preferred over confrontation. In this sense, compromise 
implies negotiations between provincial elites, not the government and its citizens. 
To avoid such political tensions, the SSRO initiates another actor constellation – 
project management (AC2) which involves local organisations e.g. local 
governments, community hospitals, sub-district heads. This AC2 is more manageable 
for the SSRO as it is basically service improvement at the local level. It involves 
only the SSRO, the SSO, and other selected-by-SSRO organisations. The SSO 
provides financial support and legitimisation of the project. Selected organisations 
are contracted under the MoU. This seemingly simplified pattern has, however, its 
own problems. On one hand, local governments involved in SIBD as hierarchically 
subordinate to the SSRO instead of working as cooperating partners. They evidently 
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work under the SSRO’s order, or request for cooperation. On the other hand, the SSO 
unsurprisingly attempts to retain central control over local discretion. It is difficult, 
for the SSROs, to get the SSO’s financial support for the continuation of their 
initiatives. Thus, what crucial to SIBD diversification is in fact the personality, and 
perhaps the policy, of the SSRO chief. In Phrae and Nan, for example, the SSRO 
chiefs actively design their initiatives which diversifies SIBD pattern in the 
provinces. 
Last but not least, it is fair to say that social insurance institutions have rarely been 
affected by Thai political uncertainties. This research finds that Thailand’s political 
instabilities do have impact on the institutions in terms of freezing, not reshaping, 
policy development. As argued earlier, SIBD seems to be out of concern for those in 
power and wealth. Considering approximately nine millions insured persons with a 
total 67-million population, they are somewhat of a minority in the nation. Those 
who long for popularity to win over general elections may simply overlook at their 
votes. Also, historically, the working class has long been ignored in Thailand since 
1970s (see Baker and Phongpaichit, 2009; Schramm, 2001). Emphasising economic 
development, the government usually designs policies in favour of investors or 
employers. Work welfare policy is provided only to meet international standards. 
SIBs in Thailand cover all aspects suggested by the ILO. Currently, the most 
progressive move in Thai social insurance is coverage extension to informal labours. 
These are driven not by politicians but by technocrats in the Thai bureaucracy. Even 
Thaksin and his governments paid little attention to social insurance policy during 
his tenure. Consequently, SIBD remains out of interest to those at the top of political 
pyramid. It is less-developed than benefit entitlements.  
7.1.5 Theoretical contributions 
It is expected that this research could provide at least four theoretical contributions 
including one for each theoretical perspective in Chapter 2 (i.e. social insurance, 
decentralisation, collaborative public management, inter-organisational relations). 
Firstly, as SIA is believed to be standardized and centralised, this research finds that 
Thailand could exemplify the case where the administration is diversified and 
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decentralised (see Chapter 5). Secondly, as several studies on decentralisation within 
the welfare state suggest that diversity tends to be increasing as a result of 
decentralisation, this research in contrast emphasises that not only decentralisation 
but also collaboration are factors which explain diversity (see Chapter 6). Thirdly, as 
degree of collaboration is rarely discussed in collaborative public management 
studies, this research proposes that it could be determined in the combination of two 
components; relationship patterns and collaborative activities (see Chapter 5).  
7.2 Revisiting the proposed model of diversification 
Theoretical models and reality rarely match perfectly.  While Section 7.1 shows the 
relationship between the original theoretical model and the data collected during this 
study, it is clear that the two do not map together well in some cases.  Therefore, this 
section discusses limitations which might explain the disjuncture between the model 
and the data. 
7.2.1 Reflections on Agranoff and McGuire’s model 
Agranoff and McGuire’s model is a good start when undertaking research on 
collaborative public management. Indeed, plenty of analytical frameworks based on 
Agranoff and McGuire’s work (2003) are already present in the literature, reflecting 
how it is seen as a strong descriptive study of relevant networks (Provan & Kenis, 
2008). However, this research develops its analytical framework from this model not 
only because it is an ‘extensive discussion of the dilemma of managing public 
networks (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 246)’ and a study which ‘proclaimed the 
importance of networks for the formulation and implementation of public policy 
(O'Toole & Meier, 2004, p. 682)’ but also because of the breadth and depth of 
analysis provided by this model. Firstly, Agranoff and McGuire propose two 
dimensions (collaborative activity and collaborative strategy) which sufficiently 
cover two levels of collaboration analysis, suggested by (Sullivan, Williams, & 
Jeffares, 2012), including macro (collaboration pattern) and micro (collaborative 
management). Secondly, their model also provides a tool for analysing collaboration 
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in details (e.g. classifying 20 activity types) which is employed as a starting point for 
building up an understanding of inter-organisational collaboration in this research. 
Nonetheless, this research is different from Agranoff and McGuire’s work in at least 
two regards. Firstly, although this research employed their collaborative activity 
labels, it sees the collaborative activities differently. For instance, five types of 
collaborative activities can be divided into either a vertical or a horizontal direction. 
However, each activity type is not restricted to a particular direction as, for example, 
information seeking (IS) can happen horizontally and project-based activity (PB) can 
happens vertically too. In other words, it looks at collaborative activities from non-
linear rather than linear perspective. A second major difference concerns how 
applying their model to a delivery agency which is not local government requires a 
revision of the analytical framework. As the SSRO is not a local government, they do 
not have authority to design other provincial policies beyond SIBD. They are under 
the matrix organisational structure where two superordinates (the SSO, the governor) 
have legitimacy to control them. In other words, they have autonomy for provincial 
SIBD policy-making but not for provincial policy-making in general. With such 
differences, this research developed several analytical frameworks to understand the 
selected case studies. For instance, Chapter 6 discusses collaboration in mutual-
agreement rather than from a hierarchical viewpoint. It also proposes 81 possible 
resource-exchange patterns as an analytical framework in order to understand the 
actor’s influence on the SSRO. 
7.2.2 Reflections on Riggs’ prismatic model 
Having Thailand as a case study, Riggs’ model is essential to understanding its 
society and politics. The question being posted since the beginning of this 
dissertation is whether this model is still applicable to Thailand. Some said it had 
been dead; others said it is still alive. This research agrees with the latter and argues 
that despite the ever changing contexts Thailand is still a bureaucratic polity and 
prismatic society. Firstly, Riggs’ concept of bureaucratic polity can still explain Thai 
contemporary politics to a certain extent. Indeed, Thailand has been progressing on 
democratisation. Bureaucrats would have become less involved, or powerful, in 
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politics. However, they remain influential in Thai contemporary politics. The recent 
coups and Thaksin’s intervention in Thai bureaucracy are prominent examples. 
Secondly, within the context of prismatic society, Thai bureaucracy still reflects the 
fused service pattern with seemingly well-organised structure. For example, 
Thailand’s SIBD exemplifies how modern structure of tri-partite committee is 
designed and works in prismatic contexts. Despite being well-structured following 
international guidelines and experiences, SIBD practices are many times different 
from what could be expected. 
It should be noted, however, that Riggs’ model helps explain Thai socio-political 
contexts mostly at the national level. At the provincial level, this research finds it 
difficult to apply Riggs’ theory in explaining bureaucratic practices and provincial 
politics. Literature on Thai bureaucracy (see Section 6.1.3) and emerging political 
elites (see Section 6.1.2) are thus reviewed to explain Thailand’s SIBD further. In 
other words, Riggs’ model of bureaucratic polity is limited to a political game 
between bureaucrats and political elites at the national level while this research seeks 
for an explanation at the provincial level. Thus, it is fair to say that this research goes 
deeper into the sub-national level of bureaucratic polity. It clarifies how things work 
at the provincial level rather than national level. 
7.3 Reflections on research methodology 
7.3.1 Revisiting research design 
As discussed in Section 4.2.4, the design of this research has both strengths and 
weaknesses. This section revisits them in two regards: being case-study research and 
being qualitative research. The employing of a case study based approach can give 
rise to concerns around generalizability and bias. As Yin (1994) suggests, ‘the 
greatest concern [of case study research] has been over the lack of rigor of case study 
research [p.9]’. However, Yin himself argues that ‘[W]hat is often forgotten is that 
bias also can enter into the conduct of experiments ... and the use of other research 
strategies (p.10)’. Being aware of bias, this research is designed and carried out to 
minimise bias using data triangulation. For the question of generalizability, Yin also 
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suggests that ‘case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical 
propositions and not to populations or universes. ... [it] does not represent a 
"sample," and the investigator's goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytic 
generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization) (p.10)’. 
Employing case study strategy, this research aims to propose a theoretical model of 
SIA. As discussed through this dissertation, Thailand is selected as an example of 
how the model could be applied to the real world. It should be remembered that this 
research does not represent Thailand as a sample of a wider context. 
Being qualitative research, this research may contain classic weaknesses of 
qualitative research, compiled by Bryman (2008), including: subjectivity, difficultly 
replicated, generalisation problem, and a lack of transparency. For example, the 
indication of the degrees of diversity, decentralisation and collaboration may seem 
subjected to the researcher’s interpretation. However, coding analysis is employed to 
generate evidence from a tremendous amount of data. It attempts to minimise 
subjectivity in this research. Also, it should be emphasised that this research aims to 
understand the diversity from the actor’s perspective and qualitative methodology is 
useful for this purpose. According to Bryman (2008, pp. 385-390), five strengths of a 
qualitative research strategy includes: seeing through the eyes of the people being 
studied, description and the emphasis on context, emphasis on process, flexibility 
and limited structure, and concepts and theory grounded in data. Chapter 5, for 
example, discussed provincial actors’ opinions on the PSSS role in SIBD. It provides 
an insight from most of actors who participated in the PSSS in reality. 
7.3.2 Revisiting limitations of data accessibility 
Besides the weaknesses discussed above, limitations of data accessibility are of 
concern in two regards. Firstly, before the fieldwork, it was of concern that it might 
prove difficult to access all the relevant actors and documents needed for this study. 
Indeed, this was the case, and alternative interviewees and data resources had to be 
identified as the research progressed. However, as seen in the analysis presented, 
insufficient data remains in several parts. Therefore, it should be reiterated here that 
this research is not trying to make a conclusion out of such insufficiency. Instead, the 
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research findings are the researcher’s attempt to conclude only when the data appear 
sufficiently strong.  
Secondly, two concerns over getting the right person to be interviewed should be 
noted. First, government officials, or bureaucrats, are frequently relocated from one 
place to the other. Particularly, those working as chiefs of the office are often 
relocated by central order. This may limit the strength of the data as some 
interviewees had just arrived in post not long before taking part in the study. One 
example is the Chiang Mai SSRO chief who had arrived just a few months before the 
interview and so appeared less able to give in-depth responses on detailed aspects of 
the policy. However, as the Lamphun SSRO chief was the Chiang Mai SSRO chief 
before moving to Lamphun, he was able to not only comment on his earlier work but 
also draw comparisons between the two regions. Second, some office chiefs 
appointed other staffs to give an interview or called some staffs in to join in the 
interviews. This sometimes makes the interview difficult as the interview questions 
needed to be re-adjusted to try to solicit information from those present. 
7.4 Policy Implications 
As discussed earlier, there are geographical differences of service provision across 
the four selected provinces. Thus, the question related to territorial justice arises. Put 
simply, the Thai government has long designed service delivery on the basis of 
centralisation. The SSO is responsible for national policy and the SSRO is 
responsible for provincial services. In principle, territorial justice – accessibility of 
public services should be equalised across nation (Kay, 2005) – is of concern. 
Benefits are equally entitled to insured persons across the nation. Also, as the 
government would assume, service access (the SSRO office) is equally accessible 
across Thailand on the basis of one office for each territory (province). 
Exceptionally, more than one office could be established in a highly populous 
province like the metropolitan Bangkok with its 12 SSRO offices. This in general 
complies with the concept of territorial justice concerning ‘allocation of resources 
between areal administrative units (R. Walker & Lawton, 1988)’ and 'to each area 
according to the needs of the population of that area (Davies, 1968)'. In short, it 
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concerns the positive correlation between need and provision (Davies, 1968; Kay, 
2005; Powell, 1992). 
However, as Boyne and Powell (1991, pp. 264-265) state, ‘[T]he achievement of 
perfect territorial justice is not a panacea for problems of resource distribution’. They 
suggest four remaining problems: ecological fallacy, trade-off between justice and 
local autonomy, trade-off between efficiency and equity, and non-guaranteed 
equality of well-being. The first two problems are reflected in this research. Firstly, 
in Thailand, although there is at least one SSRO office in every single province, its 
location is mostly in the city centre (Muang). This overlooks the fact that insured 
persons are scattered in all districts of the province. Complying with ecological 
fallacy, this ‘inter-area equity’ is hiding ‘intra-area inequity’ (Boyne & Powell, 1991, 
p. 264). While SIBD is easy to access for those residing in Muang district, those in 
other districts need to travel in various distances to the SSRO office. In other words, 
‘[W]hat looks like equality on one dimension may appear to be inequality on 
another’ (Boyne et al., 2001, p. 21).  
Secondly, national norms are emphasised in Thailand’s SIBD but, in Phrae and Nan, 
service users are receiving an extra service provided in cooperation between the 
SSRO and local organisations. This reflects Boyne and Powell’s note that ‘local 
discretion to respond to need conflicts with the objective of clients with similar needs 
receiving similar services regardless of where they live’ (p.244). However,  as Kay 
(2005, p. 547) suggests, ‘equalising the capacity for territorial justice are much more 
questionable when policy competencies are asymmetric among sub-central units, 
where their sizes are not uniform and where particular social and economic needs are 
territorially concentrated’. This research finds that, considering the distribution of 
insured persons across districts, the Phrae and Nan SSROs’ initiatives are enhancing 
geographical equality of SIBD access. Also, considering Thammasat University’s 
study, service users in the two provinces are satisfied the most. It highlights local 
needs involving more accessible service access in remote areas of the province, 
engages local organisations in SIBD and gives greater autonomy to SIBD local 
agency (the SSRO). It thus deserves a wider implementation across the nation.  
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Indeed, this localisation of SIBD may involve the trade-off between local autonomy 
and territorial justice (Judge, 1975). However, although local autonomy may come 
with territorial inequality, the question to be answered is whether Thailand focuses 
on actual or potential outcomes. As Heald (1983, p. 240) distinguishes, ‘[I]f the focus 
is upon actual outcomes, territorial equity requires that there are actually equal 
standards of provision in all areas. If, however, the focus is on potential outcomes, 
territorial equity requires that there might be equal standards of provision . . . local 
choices determine whether standards are, in fact, equal’. To answer this question, this 
research agrees with Boyne et al. (2001, pp. 32-33) as they stress, ‘centralization is 
necessary but not sufficient condition for equity. Centralization is necessary because 
in the absence of national controls, local agencies are likely to react in different ways 
to similar circumstances; but centralization is insufficient because a national 
government may ignore issues of equity when allocating resources’. Thus, although 
localisation of SIBD is suggested on the narrow basis of need (closer access to 
insured persons in remote areas), SIBD still requires concern not only territorial 
equity but also equality of service access which could be achieved by the 
localisation.  
7.5 Directions for future research 
Future research could take an alternative approach to understand multi-level 
governance from that of this study. This research is based on a set of particular 
theoretical and epistemological approaches (see Chapter 2).  For example, this 
research agrees with Huxham (1996) that collaboration is ‘magnified complications’ 
of organisations working together. Undertaking this research can only look at some 
aspects of this. It takes the approach that collaboration is good as it could help tailor 
public service delivery pattern. However, future research may re-examine positive 
impact of collaboration on public service delivery. Is it overestimated or 
underestimated? Does it have negative, as well as positive, impacts on delivery?  
Also, employing qualitative methodology, this research has not been able to attach 
actual quantitative values to the exchanges between actors and had to rely on their 
perceptions. Future research might find it is possible to quantify these aspects. 
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Alternatively, it could follow similar substantive interest but consider a wider range 
of theoretical and methodological approaches to multi-level governance. For 
example, the analysis of inter-organisational relations could be developed using 
statistic methods to re-examine the degree of collaboration in Chapter 6. Also, the 
case selection could be expanded to all 75 provinces in Thailand. Perhaps, 
consequently, robustness of data analysis would be increased. Ultimately, it would be 
interesting to see if research based on different theoretical or methodological 
underpinnings reaches the same conclusion.  
Concluding remarks 
To understand SIBD in Thai contexts, this research re-examines the applicability of 
Riggs’ theory in developing countries. His concept of bureaucratic polity can still 
explain Thai contemporary politics to a certain extent. In the 1990s, optimists once 
noticed that Thailand was progressing on democratisation. Bureaucrats would 
become less involved, or powerful, in Thai politics. Twenty years later, they remain 
key actors in the country’s contemporary politics. The 2006 coup and Thaksin’s 
attempts to diffuse bureaucratic powers are prominent examples. Also, explaining 
public service delivery in Thailand could lean on the prismatic model. In this 
research, Thailand’s SIBD exemplifies how modern structure of tri-partite committee 
works in developing contexts. Despite being well-structured following international 
guidelines, its practices are many times not as expected. 
Political variables are evidently related to SIBD in several ways. National politicians 
and senior bureaucrats intervene in the selection of PSSS members. They put their 
cliques (Phak Phuak) in these positions for various reasons. In three cases (Chiang 
Mai, Phrae, Nan), Chao Pho (emerging political and business elites in the province) 
are appointed as an employer representative yet their performance in this role are 
questionable. Particularly, in Chiang Mai, the Chao Pho has not paid for SI 
contributions for a while in spite of his being the PSSS member. Still, these are not 
direct impacts on SIBD diversity. Further, some may be sceptic on Thaksin’s role in 
SIBD. It is apparent that, during his terms, Thaksin succeeded in adopting and 
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implementing many policies. However, except money matter in the SSF, he rarely 
paid attention to social insurance and SIBD. The only connection between SIBD and 
Thaksin found in this research is that the Chao Pho PSSS member in Chiang Mai 
was Thaksin’s party member. Not only his money and power in the province but also 
connection with Thaksin should thus be taken into consideration. Possibly, these are 
the reasons why he managed to avoid contribution payments. Also, this example 
suggests that SIBD in Chiang Mai possibly remains in rigid form to keep status quo 
and avoid conflicts with provincial elites. However, to strengthen such conclusion, 
future research with a particular focus on politics of social insurance in Thailand 
should be conducted. 
With respect to future research on social security administration, this research finds 
that despite national uniform pattern of delivery initiatives at the sub-national level 
are possible. In other words, there might be tensions between a uniform 
administration of social insurance rooted in traditional conceptions and a diverse 
pattern based on modern conceptions of good governance and new public 
management. However, initiatives could occur with regards to decentralisation and 
collaboration. This research exemplifies Thailand as the case in which traditional 
uniform administration runs up against innovative forms of governance based on 
initiative at the local level. Personalities of leading actors at the provincial level and 
the ability to introduce new patterns of delivery on a non-uniform basis are found to 
be the variables of diversification. Seemingly, the Thai system allows this is in a way 
that most European systems would not. As a result of the late 1990s decentralisation, 
innovation of services at the provincial level has become relatively possible due to 
the strategic decision-making of leading actors and the flexibility in resource 
exchange. The SSRO could provide initiative services in cooperation with other 
provincial actors who could be alternative resource providers. For example, the Nan 
SSRO cooperated with the LAO and local government in the P&F project to provide 
additional services in remote areas. 
Diversity of SIBD is arguably essential to policy outcomes and this research explains 
why that is the case. It has been undertaken to understand the mechanisms of social 
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insurance delivery in Thailand; how they vary; and, what impact this has on policy 
making and implementation. It has exemplified Thailand as a good example to reflect 
on these issues and study them in a way that is of a comparative value. This research 
thus suggests that people should not see diversity as a monolithic item.  
Diversity has been seen as common issue in several disciplines. Sometimes it is 
overlooked and perceived as a context rather than an issue of study. This research 
argues that diversity should be taken as a central concern. Particularly, diversity of 
implementation matters to the outcome. Most of the possibilities of diversity in 
public service delivery come from modern idea of what government ought to be e.g. 
decentralised governance. In this example, diversity of implementation has affected 
perceptions within the system as well as outcomes. Therefore, it is necessary not to 
treat the system as a single object and rather look for differences in implementation 
between regions. This research has exemplified Thailand as a good example to 























Appendix 1: SIBs and administrative bodies in selected countries 
 
Major data sources: International Social Security Association (ISSA), US’s Social Security Administration (SSA) 
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Appendix 2: Budget allocation process of Thailand’s social insurance administration 
 
Source: Adapted from Division of Finance and Accounting (1997, pp. 2-3)
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Appendix 3: Governor’s authorities, before and after 
decentralisation 
 Before* After** 
General 
authorities 
1. Administration under laws and 
regulations 
2. Administration under assignments 
of the Cabinet, ministries, 
departments, or the Prime Minister. 
3. Administration under suggestions 
of ministerial auditors. 
4. Monitoring or, in case of legal 
violation, prohibiting actions of 
government officials in the 
province. 
5. Cooperating with government 
officials in development or disaster 
mitigation in the province. 
6. Proposing budget to related 
ministries and then reporting to the 
MoI. 
7. Monitoring local administration in 
the province. 
8. Monitoring operation of public 
organisations or enterprises. 
9. Recruit, employ, reward, and 
punish officials in the province. 
1. Introduction of strategy and putting it 
into practice with good leadership. 
Focusing on problems at grass roots 
level and tackling by means of available 
tools while setting up guidelines to solve 
problems. 
2. Being Teak Leader for coordination for 
working in every part of the province, 
adhering to the strategy for 
development. Governor shall encourage 
team work while boosting morale with 
largesse to attain targets and support the 
efforts to tackle problems. At the same 
time, support shall be directed to bolster 
resources to be used in the development 
process. 
3. Create system to support local 
administration to become strong in the 
course of working for the people. 
4. Making the system of administration to 
be strong, efficient and reliable. 
5. Developing knowledge, capacity, 






1. Enforcement and prosecution under 
the Cheque Fraud Act 1991 
2. Consideration and permission on 
insured person’s application under 
Article 39, Social Security Act 
1990 
1. Relocating SSRO officials 
2. Promoting SSRO officials 
3. Disciplinary proceedings 
4. Recruiting and selecting SSRO officials 
5. Acting on behalf of the SSRO chief 
6. Dismissal and expulsion determination 
7. Granting permission on applying for an 
official’s examination 
8. Granting leave permission 
9. Approving leave with pay 
10. Approving business trip 
*extracted from Dhamrongrachanupap Institute (2000), p.87-88 for general authorities, p.118 for 
SIBD-related authorities 
**  extracted from: (1) for general authorities, Regulations of Prime Minister’s Office Concerning 
Provincial Management, 2003, Clause 8, (2) for SIBD-related authorities, the SSO’s and the Division 





Appendix 4: Local government’s authorities, before and after 
decentralisation 
 Before After 
General* 1. transportation 
2. cleanliness 
3. epidemic prevention 
4. disaster mitigation 
5. education, art, and culture 
6. women, children, elderly, and 
disabled support 
7. environmental monitor 
8. local tradition, wisdom and 
culture preservation 
9. other duties assigned by the 
government 
1. annual plan 
2. transportation 
3. land development 
4. infrastructure 
5. public assistance 
6. job training 
7. commercial and investment 
8. tourism 
9. education 
10. social assistance 
11. local art and culture 
12. residential management 
13. recreational management 
14. sport promotion 
15. democracy development 
16. citizen's participation promotion 
17. cleanliness 
18. recycle management 
19. public health 
20. crematory provision 
21. livestock 
22. slaughter control 
23. security 
24. forest and environmental 
management 
25. urban planning 
26. public transport 
27. public space monitor 
28. building regulation 
29. disaster mitigation 
30. domestic safety 
31. other missions in benefit of 
residents 
SIBD-related** Women, children, elderly and disabled 
support 
Social assistance and public health 
* for pre-decentralisation extracted from Sub-district Council and Sub-district Administrative 
Organisation Act, 1994, Part 3; for post-decentralisation summarised from the PPDA 
** author’s analysis 
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Appendix 5: SSRO’s legislated authorities 
Extracts Source 
Article 20: Social Security Regional Office is authorised 
to and responsible for:  
(1)  operate services under social security law, 
workmen’s compensation law, and other 
relevant laws  
(2)  monitor, advise, and support operation of the 
SSRO’s branch  
(3)  report the monitoring and evaluation under 
policies, programmemes, and projects to the 
Labour Office  
(4)  cooperate or support the performance of other 
organisations related to and being assigned. 
Ministerial Regulation of the 
Ministry of Labour Concerning the 
Organisation of the Social Security 
Office, 2011 
 
Article 18: Social Security Regional Office is authorised 
to and responsible for:  
(1)  perform and coordinate under policies, 
programmemes, and projects concerning duties 
and responsibilities of the SSO in the province  
(2)  report the monitoring and evaluation under 
policies, programmemes, and projects to the 
Labour Office  
(3)  cooperate or support the performance of other 
organisations related to and being assigned. 
Ministerial Regulation of the 
Ministry of Labour Concerning the 
Organisation of the Social Security 
Office, 2009 
Social Security Regional Office is authorised to and 
responsible for:  
(1)  perform and coordinate regarding duties and 
responsibilities of the office within the province  
(2)  report the performance under policies, 
programmemes, and projects to the Labour 
Office 
(3)  cooperate or support the performance of other 
organisations related to and being assigned. 
Ministerial Regulation of the 
Ministry of Labour Concerning the 




Appendix 6: Primary data analysis of provincial resource-
dependence relations 
Org. = Organisation 
OT (Organisation Type):  Pu = Public, Pr = Private; 
RP (Relationship pattern):  O = Obligatory, V = Voluntary, IO = Indirect Obligatory 
(x) = the number of resource types being mandated/expected/exchanged 
 



















Appendix 7: Interviewee list and schedule 
No. Actor Interviewee interview date 
Phrae (PH)    
1 PH SSRO SSRO chief 4 February 2011 
2 PH SSRO SSRO front-office head 4 February 2011 
3 PH SSRO SSRO back-office head 4 February 2011 
4 PH LO LO chief 3 March 2011 
5 PH EO EO chief 1 March 2011 
6 PH LWPO LWPO chief 2 March 2011 
7 PH LSDC LSDC director 3 March 2011 
8 PH Governor Governor 8 March 2011 
9 PH HCP PHO chief 10 March 2011 
10 PH External AO deputy chief 10 March 2011 
11 PH EmE Employee 21 December 2011 
12 PH Local Baan Lao SAO officer 3 March 2011 
13 PH Local Mae Jua Municipality officer 3 March 2011 
Lamphun 
(LP) 
   
14 LP SSRO SSRO chief 22 February 2011 
15 LP SSRO SSRO back-office head 9 November 2011 
16 LP EO EO chief 9 March 2011 
17 LP LWPO LWPO chief 11 March 2011 
18 LP LSDC LSDC director 12 March 2011 
19 LP Governor Deputy governor 11 March 2011 
20 LP HCP PHO deputy chief 19 December 2011 
21 LP HCP Rep of PH director 6 October 2011 
22 LP External Hariphunchai Memorial Director 18 March 2011 
23 LP Employee Employee 24 February 2011 
Chiang Mai 
(CM) 
   
24 CM SSRO SSRO chief 3 October 2011 
25 CM LO LO chief 4 October 2011 
26 CM EO EO chief 4 October 2011 
27 CM LWPO LWPO chief 4 October 2011 
28 CM LSDC LSDC director 5 October 2011 
29 CM Governor Deputy governor 23 December 2011 
30 CM HCP PH deputy director 6 December 2011 
31 CM Employee Employee 2 26 December 2011 
32 CM Employee Employee 1 29 December 2011 
33 CM Employer Employer 2 23 December 2011 
34 CM External University Hospital deputy 
director 
7 December 2011 
35 CM External McCormick Hospital director 6 December 2011 
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No. Actor Interviewee interview date 
Nan (NN)    
36 NN SSRO SSRO chief 11 October 2011 
37 NN SSRO SSRO front-office head 1 December 2011 
38 NN LO LO chief 12 October 2011 
39 NN EO EO chief 11 October 2011 
40 NN LWPO LWPO chief 12 October 2011 
41 NN LSDC LSDC director 11 October 2011 
42 NN Governor Governor 13 October 2011 
43 NN HCP PHO chief 13 October 2011 
44 NN HCP Rep of PH director 12 October 2011 
45 NN External LAO chief 1 December 2011 
46 NN Local Pua Municipality officer 30 November 2011 
Bangkok    
47 SSO SSO Director-General 10 January 2012 
48 SSO SSO director of contribution 
division 





Appendix 8: List of key documents and sources 
No. Title* Source 
   Chiang Mai   
1 Chiang Mai PSSS Meeting Agenda on 24 December 2009 CM LSDC;  
CM EmE2 
2 Chiang Mai PSSS Meeting Agenda on 3 May 2011 CM LSDC;  
CM EmE2 
3 Chiang Mai PSSS Meeting Agenda on 3 October 2011 CM EmE2 
4 Circulated Letter on Approving Minutes of Meeting (3 May 2011) 
Approval 
CM EmE2 
5 Ministry of Labour's Regulation on the SSF spending on Meeting 
Allowance  
CM EmR2 
6 Minutes of Chiang Mai PSSS Meeting on 3 October 2011 CM LSDC;  
CM EmE2 
7 Roles of Employer Representative in the Chiang Mai PSSS CM EmR2 
8 Social Security Committee's Order No.71/2009 on Appointment 
of Chiang Mai PSSS 
CM LSDC 
  Lamphun   
9 Authorities and Responsibilities of Provincial Subcommittee of 
Social Security 
 LP SSRO 
10 Minutes of Lamphun PSSS Meeting on 22 November 2010 LP SSRO 
11 Main Missions of the SSO and Social Insurance Benefits LP LO 
12 Social Security Board's Order No.82/2009 on Appointment of 
Lamphun PSSS 
LP External;  
LP SSRO  
13 Statistics of benefit utilization LP SSRO 
  Phrae   
14 Action plan of Fiscal Year 2008 of the Phrae SSRO PH SSRO 
15 Budget Allocation Strategy of 2011 of the Phrae SSRO PH SSRO 
16 Northern News: Phrae SSRO awarded Best Practice on Learning 
and proactive organisation 
online 
17 Minutes of Phrae PSSS Meeting on 19 October 2010 PH SSRO 
18 Phrae PSSS Meeting Agenda on 23 December 2010 PH SSRO 
19 Phrae SSRO's Order No.5/2010 on Duty Assignment PH SSRO 
20 Phrae SSRO PR News No.12/2010 "SSRO: Learning and 
proactive organisation" 
online 
21 Programmeme and projects of Fiscal Year 2005, of the Phrae 
SSRO 
PH SSRO 
22 Social Security Board's Order No.75/2009 on Appointment of 
Phrae PSSS 
PH SSRO 
23 2010 Provincial Strategy of the Phrae SSRO PH SSRO 
24 2010 Annual performance of the Phrae SSRO PH SSRO 
  Nan   
25 List of Programmemes and Projects from year of establishment 
until 2010 
NN SSRO 
26 Memorandum of Understanding on Reciprocal Organisations NN SSRO 
27 Minutes of Nan PSSS Meeting on 27 December 2006 NN SSRO 
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No. Title* Source 
28 Minutes of Nan PSSS Meeting on 6 December 2007 NN SSRO 
29 Minutes of Nan PSSS Meeting on 23 August 2007 NN SSRO 
30 Minutes of Nan PSSS Meeting on 30 October 2007 NN SSRO 
31 Minutes of Nan PSSS Meeting on 26 November 2008 NN SSRO 
32 Minutes of Nan PSSS Meeting on 26 March 2009 NN SSRO 
33 Minutes of Nan PSSS Meeting on 18 September 2009 NN SSRO 
34 Minutes of Nan PSSS Meeting on 17 November 2009 NN SSRO 
35 Minutes of Nan PSSS Meeting on 26 June 2010 NN SSRO 
36 Minutes of Nan PSSS Meeting on 28 June 2010 NN SSRO 
37 Minutes of Nan PSSS Meeting on 4 April 2011 NN SSRO 
38 Minutes of Nan PSSS Meeting on 12 May 2011 NN SSRO 
39 Namelist of Nan PSSS (the 9th Commissioned) [endorsed on 5 
May 2006] 
NN SSRO 
40 Nan Governor's Office's Order No.1970/2010 on Assignment of 
Coordinator with Local Governments 
NN SSRO 
41 Nan Governor's Office's Announcement on Social Insurance 
Coordinators 
NN SSRO 
42 Nan SSRO's Annual Performance Plan of Fiscal Year 2011 NN SSRO 
43 Number of Insured Persons by district, Nan province NN SSRO 
44 Project of Friends and Partners of Insured Persons NN SSRO 
45 Social Security Board's Order No.02/2006 on Appointment of 
Nan PSSS [with practical guideline] 
NN SSRO 
46 Table of Satisfactory of service recipients of the MoL, Nan 
province 
NN LO 
  Bangkok   
47 Ministerial Regulation on Organisation of Social Security Office 
2002 
online 
48 Ministerial Regulation on Organisation of Social Security Office 
2009 
online 






50 Number of Insured Persons by District, 2011 SSO 
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